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Abstract 
This thesis comprises three papers that analyses important issues relating to the banking 
sector in an emerging market. In particular, we examine depositor discipline, large bank 
dominance and bank valuation issues focusing on the Jordanian banking system. 
Paper 1 examines how depositors behave towards bank risk in emerging markets. It seeks to 
investigate whether depositors are able to recognise bank risks and penalise risky banks 
through the changes in deposits and interest paid to depositors. Taking into account the fact 
that effective depositors' discipline does not only involve depositors' reactions to bank risk, 
but also the subsequent response from the banks, the paper tests for bank's responses to 
depositors' signals in the market allowing for banks' asymmetric response to the loss of 
deposits. We find that depositors are able to discipline banks behaviour through both quantity 
and price. However, the results show that depositors' recognition of banks' behaviour is 
strongly influenced by financial crises. On the other hand, in contrast to other studies, the 
analysis suggests that the introduction of an explicit deposit insurance system has no strong 
significant influence on depositors' discipline. Moreover, we find that banks react to 
depositors' actions by improving bank earnings more than enhancing other fundamentals. 
Paper 2 explores intra-industry information transfer in the banking sector and empirically 
assesses the large bank dominance issue within the framework of returns and volatility 
spillovers. Using two financial methodologies, Vector Error Correction (VEC) and 
Generalized Autoregressive Heteroscedastic (GARCH) models, we find evidence of 
significant intra-industry information channelled through not only the level of intra-industry 
returns but also through the common volatility returns without a clear dominance effect from 
large to small banks. This suggests that investors appear to be indifferent to the signal quality 
of information between large and small banks. These findings concerning return and 
volatility relations between large and small banks have important implication for regulators 
in emerging markets. Regulators should look for stabilizing potentially adverse effects of a 
negative event(s) at all banks in the system irrespective of their size. 
Paper 3 aims to analyse the main reasons for the difference between market and book values 
in the banking industry. More specifically, it seeks to examine whether earnings and its 
components are relevant and sufficient to bridge the gap between these two values and if 
bank efficiency has incremental information content in this relation. This study applies the 
non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach to estimate the relative cost 
efficiency of banks, and employs the Truman's et al., (2000) valuation methodology. We find 
that the component items of net income are important in explaining bank market value. 
Furthermore; banks' operational efficiency adds incremental information in explaining the 
gap between market and book values. The results are robust to the inclusion of other 
explanatory) variables such as credit and solvency risks. 
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General Introduction 
1 
1. Introduction 
There now seems to be a general consensus that financial intermediaries play a vital role in 
the process of economic growth by intermediating scarce financial resources in the economy 
(Levine, 1997). A key stylized fact of emerging countries is that most financial intermediation 
is carried out by commercial banks. Therefore, it is important for authorities in each emerging 
economy to create a stable environment that enhances the efficiency of banks, which in turn 
could lead to a higher volume of intermediation and improved financial services and products. 
During the last few years many financial institutions in emerging countries have been 
undergoing drastic transformation. In particular, the influence of rapid and radical 
environmental changes is restructuring the banking industry, reallocating boundaries, and 
changing the basis of their operations. These changes in the banking system have attracted 
both practitioners and academics to examine different issues in emerging markets in order to 
strengthen the financial sector as well as improve the supervision and regulation of banking in 
order to embrace market forces and sustain economic stability and growth. 
This thesis is concerned with the analyses of three issues in an emerging market banking 
sector, namely, Jordan. Particularly, it focuses on market discipline, large bank dominance, 
and bank valuation and efficiency. Before dealing with these issues one might address the 
following three questions: 1) Why emerging markets? 2) Why banks? And 3) Why the three 
issues outlined above have been chosen for study in this thesis? 
In order to answer the first question, we can simply say that emerging markets are too 
important to ignore. Emerging markets are countries or markets that are not well 
established economically and financially, but are making progress in that direction 
(Beim and Calomiris, 2001). Emerging markets have attracted a considerable attention 
and are likely to become increasingly economically and politically important because 
they often exhibit high rates of GDP growth and also reflect a continuum of market 
conditions'. They represent an enormous opportunity for entrepreneurs, multinationals, 
and investors and pose a threat to established product market and demand for global 
1 Some emerging economies, for example China and India, achieved average growth rates of 
4 to 7 
percent during the 1980s and 1990s, and up to 10 percent in the early 2000s, compared with 
1 to 3 percent 
for developed countries (Olsson, 2002). 
2 
resources. Although, such market have the potential to redefine the way business is 
done in many industries the functioning of emerging markets remain shrouded by myths 
(Levich, 2001). However, some markets are maturing and on course towards 
convergence and integration into the world of mature and developed financial markets. ' 
In finance, it is often argued that the gains from trade are enhanced when there is a 
greater difference in trading nations (Bekaert and Urias, 1996; Kohers, et al., 1998). 
Thus, economists have used this concept to assess the impact of bringing emerging 
financial markets into the picture of international investments. The greater the 
difference between the preconditions or the less the correlation in business cycles 
between countries, the higher the potential gains for investment. However, the 
investment thesis for this space is straightforward; investment in emerging markets not 
only has the potential to generate higher returns and diversification benefits, but also 
brings potential for a higher level of risk. 
It is now generally recognized that emerging markets have paid a price for being too 
different. The broad meaning of being different than the developed markets is the 
idiosyncratic risks of these markets. Although one emerging market may be different 
from an anther, there are, however, a number of characteristics which in varying degrees 
are likely to be found in these countries. Less stability, weaker institutions, and poorer 
corporate governance are some of the common factors (Olsson, 2002). 
Instability in emerging markets and the appearance of various financial crises; at the end 
of the 1990s encouraged many international investors to weight their portfolios 
domestically4. As a consequence emerging markets started to realize that their future lag 
in becoming more globally integrated. With more attention from the international 
institutions, such as World Bank, International Monitory Fund, and the Bank of 
International Settlements, many countries have attempted to reform their economies, 
institutions, and markets to encourage this integration process. 
2 For more discussion regarding growth in emerging markets see for example, Stiglitz, (2003) and Olsson 
(2002). 
3 For example the economics crises and market crashes in Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America. 
4 Tesar and Werner (1995. pp. 298-9) noted that home bias vary between developed countries, 
from very 
severe in Japan, only 5% foreign equity holdings, to less severe in the United Kingdom and 
Germany 
where foreign investment reached 20%. 
3 
From the crises that have occurred in emerging and developed markets, a debate has 
emerged as to the importance of strong national and international policies and financial 
institutions to enable countries to integrate successfully into the global financial 
community. The efforts of policy makers have been focused on the need to reduce 
financial fragility and systemic risk in both domestic and global financial markets. 
Enhancing financial markets transparencies, improving the financial systems, reforming 
financial supervision, and institutional incentives reorientation which require the 
involvement of the society in addition to the government, are some examples of 
financial reforms in emerging countries (Stiglitz, 2003). 
Literature on comparative financial systems has traditionally focused on the relative size 
and power of the banking sector and investigates in particular two cases of financial 
structure, the bank-based and the market-based systems. Although, a comprehensive 
and widely accepted theory of financial structure is lacking, emerging markets are 
generally considered as bank-based economies (Beim and Calomiris, 2001). Therefore, 
banks are the most important part of the financial system in emerging markets, and this 
addresses the answer to the second question regarding why banks have been considered 
in our analysis. For many emerging markets, the economic function of the financial 
system is essentially performed by banks alone which make them the crucial part of a 
healthy financial system. In other words, banks are dominant in virtually all emerging 
financial markets. This is the direct consequence of legal frameworks and information 
institutions that are insufficient to support strong public capital markets. Also, banks are 
better able (compared to public markets) to survive in environments where legal 
foundations are insufficient as they are well adapted to private screening and monitoring 
in environments of imperfect information (Beim and Calomiris, 2001). 
The third question as to why we chose the three areas of research that focuses on market 
discipline, large bank dominance, and bank valuation and efficiency is discussed below. 
Given the advantages of banks and the uniqueness of banking institutions, the 
regulatory environment has become as an important factor in the theory of financial 
intermediation. A number of aspects of banking enhance the potential instability of the 
banking system and boost the need for financial regulation. Advocates of bank 
regulation have argued that regulation might be vindicated because of the 
4 
transformation function of banks. Banks may be subject to banking panics which force 
them to stop their operations. In a worse case scenario, a bank's failure may propagate 
and generate other failures (systemic panic). Therefore, broad consensus between 
bankers, economists, and regulators is that banks are special and bank runs and failures 
are costly to the economy (see Bossone, 1999; Benston, 2004). 
Since markets and supervisors both fail individually to protect the economy from 
banking crises; the new regulatory framework (Basel 2) relies on market discipline to 
complement bank regulation and supervision. Market discipline in banking is 
commonly interpreted as a situation in which banks' stakeholders face costs that are 
positively related to bank risk and they react on the bases of these costs (Berger, 1991). 
Various economic agents can exercise market discipline. Depositors, subordinated debt- 
holders, stockholders and credit rating agencies are the usual candidates (Llewellyn, 
2005). However, in emerging markets, depositors are the most popular market 
participants who can effectively discipline bank behaviour. In paper 1 of this thesis, we 
attempt to contribute to the existing literature by providing additional evidence that 
depositors, even in emerging markets, are able to participate in minimizing banks risk- 
taking behaviour, and this helps complement rule-based regulations. 
Several aspects of banking make this industry unique and require special attentions 
from regulators. In particular, the prevalence of asymmetric information and the extent 
to which a specific event, occurring at a particular bank, generates an influence on the 
banking system including contagion effects and potential systemic risk are some 
examples. However, recent trend towards competition, technological change, and 
deregulation have led to consolidate and an increased dominance of large banks in the 
financial services industry. The emergence of the large banks can have market power 
implications that are of concern to regulators (Solvin et al., 1999). Whether large banks 
need to be treated differently by regulators is a controversial issue. Thus, this issue is 
the focus of attention in the second paper namely; do large banks dominate the banking 
sector in emerging markets? 
Effective bank regulation and policy making, should aim to ensure stability; however, 
another dimension that should be taken into consideration is the relationship between 
bank valuation and efficiency, particularly in emerging markets. According to Beck 
5 
(2000), policy makers should not assess banking policies only along the metric of 
stability. They also should examine which policies encourage banks to operate 
efficiently and to make sound capital allocation decisions. It is commonly believed that 
an economy with a more efficient financial system performs better. In addition, 
operational efficiency is an essential element for the soundness of the banking system 
that facilitates economic growth and monitors the soundness of the overall financial 
system (Molyneoux and Iqbal, 2005). For banks to succeed and survive it is always 
thought that they have to efficiently produce their outputs from inputs. In the banking 
literature, producing more outputs than competitors, for the same amount of inputs or 
consuming fewer inputs for the same amount of outputs, is a sign of efficiency. Hence, 
bank efficiency may used as a proxy for banks' ability to survive through competitive 
advantage that affects the firms current profitability and its future potential. Since 
capital markets might be the place where the signals of bank efficiency can be found, 
investors (current and potential) need to gather information about the bank for the 
purpose of investment decisions. Therefore, the third paper in this thesis concentrates on 
examining whether bank efficiency contains incremental relevant information that can 
be used in pricing a bank stock in order to help investors to take accurate decisions in 
the capital market. 
The above three issues which define our research area and identify a specific interest in 
this thesis are recognised as the topical issues currently facing policy makers and 
investors in emerging markets. Erb, et al., (1997), and Garten (1997), indicate that 
emerging markets are complex and many factors in these markets need to be explained. 
They also emphasize that the evolution of an emerging market may be determined by 
characteristics that are unique to that particular country and its stage of economic 
development. That is why we believe it is important to analyse an emerging market, 
such as Jordan. The Jordanian financial system has embarked on various structural 
developments and has advanced a flexible pragmatic approach to investments and 
openness. In this respect, we think that the empirical findings reported in this study for 
Jordan are relevant because they might also be valid for other emerging markets of 
similar characteristics and stages of development. 
Moreover, as is the case in most emerging markets, banks in Jordan are the dominant 
financial institutions; they control most of the financial flows and possess the bulk of 
6 
the financial assets in the economy. Therefore, ensuring a safe and sound financial 
system along with an efficient functioning of the banking system is one of the cardinal 
and challenging missions of bank regulators in this market. Therefore, we believe that 
Jordan acts as a representative case study for analyzing market discipline, large bank 
dominance and bank valuation issues in emerging markets. 
2. Research Questions, Methodology, and Thesis Structure 
This thesis comprises three papers, each looking at one particular issue. While, the first 
paper provides a comprehensive analysis of depositors' behaviour towards bank risks, 
the second paper analyses the issue related to the stock returns and volatility dynamics 
within the banking sector. It examines the intra-industry information transmission and 
analyses if there is a dominant role played by one very large bank in the capital market. 
The third paper attempts to bring particular attention to the importance of economic 
information for accurate market valuation which is needed for bank monitoring and 
performance evaluation. In particular, we examine whether bank efficiency can be used 
as an additional variable in banks valuation models, and therefore may in a way or 
another create more incentives for bank managers to mange their bank in an efficient 
way and ensure overall bank stability. 
In paper 1, market discipline has been examined. Regulators in most emerging markets 
have been required to implement appropriate regulation and supervisory practices for 
their financial sectors in order to minimize the likelihood of financial crises. Neither 
rule-based regulation nor market-based regulations have been, as far as we are aware, 
successful individually to prevent banks from taking high risks. Therefore, greater 
disclosure within the banking system and better informed public and homogeneous 
standards (all objectives of Basel 2) must be part of any recommendation set for policy 
makers (Lanzi, 2006). 
However, market discipline not only involves depositors' reaction but also the 
subsequent response of banks. As argued by Hamalainen (2006), and Hamalainen et al., 
(2005), market discipline can only be considered effective if it makes banks act 
conservatively and limit their risk. The quiet life theory suggests that the lower the 
intensity of environmental pressures, the lower is the effort explained by managers to 
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derive the maximum output from a given amount of inputs (Berger and Hannan, 1998). 
Therefore, depositor discipline may be treated as a pressure exercised on bank managers 
in order to drive those managers to work in a sound and safe manner. 
In market discipline, information asymmetry between banks and market participants are 
taking one step further than other contracts. Information asymmetries are due to the 
bank's private information about its operations (adverse selection) and about hidden 
actions that borrowers can take to increase their personal well being at the bank's 
expense (moral hazard). Nevertheless, depositors can influence bank behaviour. They 
may have more information than regulators, and they may respond quicker than 
regulators to the changes of banks' conditions. Although depositors discipline is an easy 
and simple mechanism, the nature of the deposits contract (no extra benefits are 
expected from banks' high risk taking) makes depositors try to inform themselves about 
the conditions of the bank. Therefore, this feature of the deposit contract keeps banks on 
their toes (Calomirie and Kahn, 2000) and creates risk of contagious bank runs 
(Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Park and Peristiani (2007) also note that the load of 
market discipline falls on the shoulders of debt holders (depositors). In contrast, 
shareholders incentives to increase their profitability may outweigh their desire to 
decrease bank risk (Tsuru, 2003). 
After a discussion about the foundations and mechanisms of depositor discipline, the 
first paper in this thesis surveys the theoretical and empirical literature on market 
discipline and addresses the following questions: First, are depositors in emerging 
markets reliable enough to recognize bank risk-taking? In other words, can depositors in 
emerging markets penalize risky banks for bad behaviour? Second, is depositors' 
behaviour towards bank risk affected by the introduction of deposit insurance? Third, is 
depositors' behaviour towards bank risk different before and after the financial crises? 
And finally, are signals sent by depositors considered by banks to adjust their risk 
levels? 
In the first paper, both the price (depositors punish banks through higher deposits cost) 
and quantity (where depositors punish banks by withdrawing their claims in the bank) 
approaches have been used to test for the existence of depositor discipline. Reduced 
form equations have been used to capture deposit demand and supply features. In 
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addition, more than one estimation technique (Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Two 
Stages Least Squares (2SLS), and Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
methodologies) have been employed. 
When depositor discipline issues are examined using a unique data from Jordanian 
banks over the period 1982 to 2005, the following main findings emerge. Evidence of 
depositor discipline through both quantity and price is found. In addition, the results 
show that depositor recognition of bank behaviour seems to witness a wake-up call after 
the financial crises. In contrast, depositors seem to be insensitive to the introduction of 
deposit insurance which may indicate that depositors treat the introduction of such a 
scheme as non-credible. Therefore, we find that depositors' incentives to monitor banks 
behaviour were not influenced by the introduction of a deposit insurance scheme. 
Furthermore, we argue that banks may respond asymmetrically to their loss of deposits 
and only improve their fundamentals when their deposits level is affected negatively. In 
contrast, banks will not have any incentives to change or improve their fundamentals if 
deposits are growing rapidly. The results support the view that banks respond to market 
signals by improving their profitability as a response to the loss of deposits in order to 
re-build depositor confidence. 
Development in the banking industry including financial innovation, advances in 
information technology, deregulation, conglomeration and so on affect the structure of 
the banking industry in both emerging and mature markets. These changes have led to 
higher levels of interrelations between banking firms which have led regulators to be 
more concerned over expected market power, increased systemic risk and stronger 
moral hazard incentives. The overall effect of the new trends in the banking industry 
depends on whether or not the riskiness and returns of individual banks have become so 
closely correlated that adverse conditions with a subset of banks can quickly and 
strongly spillover to other banks within the industry, bringing about a system-wide 
problem (Elyasiani et al., 2007). 
In paper 2, we analyse the intra-industry interdependence information transmission 
associated with returns and volatility within the banking sector. In particular, three main 
questions are examined: Is there returns causality from the large bank to smaller banks 
in the Jordanian banking sector? Is there volatility transmission from large to small 
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banks? Does the 11th of September event affect returns causality and volatility 
transmissions running from large bank to small banks? 
The intra-industry information transmission literature in banking concentrate on 
examining the contagion effects using event study methodology (e. g Bessler and Nohel, 
2000; Lang and Stultz, 1992; and Brewer and Jackson, 2002 among others). The second 
paper addresses the issue of returns and volatility transmission using two popular 
methods in finance, the Vector Error Correction (VEC) model and the Generalized 
Autoregresive Heteroscedastic (GARCH) Methodology. The VEC model has been 
chosen to incorporate any long-run relationship between banks in the sample while 
studying the short term relations between the bank returns. On the other hand, the 
GARCH modelling framework is widely used to incorporate second moment volatility 
effects. The results show that information transmission and predictability of returns and 
volatility exist between banks in the sample. However, a dominance role of the large 
bank is not clearly evident. Furthermore, the results indicate that the 11th of September 
event had an important effect on returns interdependence and volatility spillover pattern 
within the Jordanian banking sector. 
The research objective of the third paper is to investigate how investors and policy 
makers can go beyond accounting information to accurately value banks. In particular, 
we use estimates of bank efficiency for a sample of Jordanian banks in order to explain 
differences between book and market values. 
Consistent with shareholder wealth maximization (creation), managerial performance 
and their efficiency needs to be assessed by shareholders from a valuation perspective 
(market performance). However, the market value of equity is a function of a range of 
information variables, including a firm's earnings, the book value appearing in the 
balance sheet and, perhaps, other contextual and economic variables as well (Tippett, 
2000; and Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). 
In this context of bank performance (and therefore valuation) the concept of efficiency 
appears to be important. There has been a growing interest in estimating efficiency in 
the banking sector (Breger 1993; Berger and Hannan, 1998; and Ferrier, and Lovell 
1990; and Tripe, 2004). In addition, a large number of studies concentrates on 
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estimating cost efficiency (e. g. Berger e al., 1993; Resti, 1997; and Sathye, 2003), 
although a smaller number of studies examines the profit side of banks' operations (e. g. 
Berger and Master 1997; and Maudos and Pastor, 2003). The literature also relates 
efficiency to various aspects of banking market features and regulation (Altunbas et al., 
2000; and Chang and Chiu, 2006). Various studies have also thought to relate X- 
efficiency measures to bank profitability (Elyasiani et al., 1994, Berger et al., 2000; and 
Kwan, 2006). 
While the pervious literature mainly addresses the important relation between market 
performance and bank efficiency using `direct valuation' theory ( e. g. Becalli et al., 
2006), the third paper in this thesis uses an `inputs-to-equity-valuation' theory. In direct 
valuation theory, bank efficiency is intended to be associated with equity market value 
changes or levels. The book value of equity, under this theory, is assumed to be 
included in the equity market value. The results of such studies, based on direct 
valuation, only give insight about the relative stock price associations of bank efficiency 
(Holthausen, and Watts, 2001). However, in paper 3, we attempt to use inputs-to-equity- 
valuation theory in order to provide information that bank efficiency may be used as an 
input variable in the valuation model which can be used by investors when they value 
bank equity. This method enables us to examine whether bank efficiency can bridge the 
gap that may occur between market and book values, and help market participants to 
achieve better bank valuations. Therefore, we empirically examine the following two 
questions: is accounting information value relevant in evaluating banks in emerging 
markets? Can efficiency (as an economic performance measure) add more information 
in interpreting the gap between the bank book and market values in emerging markets? 
The methodology applied in the third paper is similar to the value relevant studies in the 
capital market-based accounting research. Based on Ohlson (1995) we used the 
approach of Trueman et al., (2000) to study the impact of financial and non financial 
information. The estimated efficiency scores for each bank in our sample over the 
period from 1993 to 2005 were carried out using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). 
The result supports the ability of efficiency to give additional information content in 
order to achieve improved bank valuation. 
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3. Contributions to the Literature 
Overall, the main contributions of this study to existing work in banking are summarised 
according to each paper as follows: 
In paper 1 we contribute to the growing literature which investigates the issue of 
depositors' discipline by providing additional evidence that the existence of depositors' 
discipline is not exclusive to developed markets and even in small economies depositors 
may exact a pressure on banks risk-taking behaviour. The importance of this evidence 
for policy makers is that it suggests that market discipline tools should be used to 
complement regulation in order to maintain stability in the financial system. 
In paper 2, we contribute to the literature by examining if a large bank can extend its 
power by affecting smaller banks' returns and volatility in the capital market. The effect 
of size on systemic risk and the strength of spillover effects are also important because 
various authors suggest that a `financial meltdown' generally starts with problems 
plaguing the largest institutions. However, our finding that large bank influence does 
not extend to the capital markets provides an insight that regulators should not treat 
large banks differently to smaller banks. Investors appear to recognise the relevant 
information that affect banks stocks irrespective of their size. We believe that the result 
of this paper is important not only for regulators, but also to further our understanding 
of banking behaviour in the capital market. The intra-market interdependence structure 
has implications for market efficiency, profitable investment opportunities, and risk 
diversification. 
In paper 3 we further delimits the area of research by focussing on bank valuation. During the 
1990's, the banking industry was deregulated almost everywhere and, consequently, banking 
institutions have become both more complex and market oriented making bank valuation a 
more difficult issue. In paper 3, we contribute to the banking literature by trying to join two 
separately developed areas of research (banking and accounting literature). We find empirical 
support for the view that bank efficiency can be considered as a relevant measure that can 
help to bridge the gap that may occur between banks' market and book values. Since the 
primary goal of investors in both emerging and developed markets is creating value, bank 
efficiency should attract the interest of managers, academics and regulators when analysing 
bank value. 
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Paper 1 
Market Discipline and Depositor Behaviour in Emerging 
Markets 
Abstract 
A broad consensus between bankers, economists, and regulators is that banks are 
special and bank runs and failures are costly to the economy; therefore banking stability 
is afforded the utmost importance. Since markets and supervisors both fail individually 
to protect the economy from banking crises; the new regulation framework (Basel 2) 
relies on market discipline to complement bank regulation and supervision. This paper 
examines how depositors behave towards bank risk in emerging markets. In particular, 
it seeks to investigate whether depositors are able to recognise bank risks and penalise 
risky banks through the changes in deposits and interest paid to depositors. Taking into 
account the fact that effective depositors' discipline does not only involve depositors' 
reactions to bank risk, but also the subsequent response from the banks, the paper 
follows Barajas and Steiner (2000) and tests for bank's responses to depositors' signals 
in the market allowing for banks' asymmetric response to the loss of deposits. When 
depositors' discipline in the Jordanian banking market has been examined using panel 
data for the period from 1982 to 2005, the following main findings emerge. Evidence of 
depositors' discipline through both quantity and price effects are found. Our analysis 
offers a fundamental building block for explaining how reactions towards bank 
fundamentals are sensitive to financial crises and deposit insurance. The results show 
that depositors' recognition of banks' behaviour is strongly influenced by financial 
crises. On the other hand, in contrast to other studies, the analysis suggests that the 
introduction of an explicit deposit insurance system has no strong significant influence 
on depositors' discipline. Moreover, we find that banks react to depositors' actions by 
improving banks' earnings more than enhancing the other fundamentals. 
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1. Introduction 
Academic researchers increasingly question the role of market discipline in systemic 
stability (Crockett, 2002). In the absence of market discipline, depositors implicitly 
subsidise the risks taken by their bank. This raises the probability of bank failures, 
which are typically very costly, ranging anywhere from a few percentage points of GDP 
to as high as 50 percent of GDP (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007). On the other hand, 
risk-rating is a difficult task. Assessing bank risk requires access to reliable information 
(concerning banks). Therefore, practitioners think that as markets in emerging countries 
may not function well, then it must be the case that market discipline also does not work 
efficiently (Caprio and Honohan, 2004), and that these countries need to rely more 
heavily on capital and bank supervision. 
Therefore, banks have been subject to more regulation than most other institutions in 
the economy, the main aim being to protect the depositors, or to deal with the negative 
externalities that arise from banking sector collapse. However, the banking sector has 
dramatically changed in recent years. Development in information technology, the 
proliferation of financial markets, the blurring of distinctions between banking and non- 
banking financial institutions and the continuous introduction and development of new 
products has fundamentally changed the financial services landscape. This more 
dynamic and competitive environment might not be compatible with traditional 
regulatory structures. Moreover, inappropriate regulation and supervision not only 
significantly affects financial sector development but also increases the probability of 
financial crises that might in the worst case scenarios, spread beyond national 
boundaries. Barth et al., (2001) who examined banking systems around the globe, find 
that, in countries where banks face a greater degree of regulation and restrictions there 
is a higher probability of a banking crisis. 
Policy makers in emerging markets are faced with increasing globalisation pressure and 
this can have implications for the regulation of the banking system. Increased volume 
and volatility of capital flows, for instance, may endanger the financial stability needed 
for economic growth. The question which arises, therefore, (here) is how to adapt the 
regulatory framework to the increasingly competitive globalised environment. 
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Regulators in most emerging markets have been required to implement appropriate 
regulation and supervisory practices in the financial sectors. Traditionally, policy 
makers introduced various prudential and systemic regulations aimed at providing 
depositors with protection which could be explicit or implicit'. However, the evidence 
of a growing number of failed banks around the world, such as in the US, Latin 
America, Turkey, Asia and the Middle East among others, has illustrated that the safe 
and efficient operation of the banking system cannot be guaranteed by government 
regulation alone, regardless of how conscientious the regulators, or well intended the 
regulations. Government regulations need to be supplemented by market discipline 
(Kaufman, 2003). Nevertheless, evidence show that there is no systemic tendency for 
emerging markets to lack the pre-requisites for market discipline (see Caprio and 
Honohan, 2004). 
Market discipline, the third Pillar of Basel 2, should play a role in regulatory regimes 
aimed at promoting systemic stability and a safe and sound banking system. As stated 
by the BIS (2001, p l) "market discipline has the potential to reinforce minimum capital 
standards (Pillar 1) and supervisory review process (Pillar 2), and so promote safety and 
soundness in banks and financial systems". Bank regulators in many developed and 
developing countries have discussed the possibility of adopting the new regulation 
aimed at enhancing transparency and to make information reliable and accessible for 
market participants (Ward, 2002). The primary focus of the new international capital 
adequacy regulations (Basel 2) is that the three pillars (capital standards, supervision, 
and market discipline) need to be satisfied and sufficiently well designed to regulate 
banks effectively. Otherwise, it is unlikely that Basel 2 will achieve its objective of 
maintaining a safe and sound banking system. 
Market discipline in banking is commonly interpreted as a situation in which banks' 
stakeholders face costs that are positively related to bank risk and they react on the 
bases of these costs (Berger, 1991). Various economic agents can exercise market 
discipline. Depositors, subordinated debt holders, stock holders and credit rating 
1 Explicit deposit insurance is contractual obligation, implicit insurance is only conjectural. 
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agencies are the usual candidates. However, in emerging markets, depositors are the 
most popular market participants who can effectively discipline bank behaviour2. 
Depositors penalise banks for poor performance. This may materialise via customers 
withdrawing deposits (quantity effect) or by them demanding higher yields (price 
effect) therefore making risk-taking more costly for banks. Depositors' discipline 
should reduce banks' incentives to take excessive risk and hence should contribute to 
the stability of the financial system. Although, it has not been suggested that effective 
market monitoring is sufficient to prevent banking crises, market discipline can limit 
their cost and likelihood (Caprio and Honohan, 2004). 
The theoretical literature on bank runs is divided into two main views. Firstly, there are 
those who stress that depositors may cause a run on perfectly good banks when a bad 
bank in the same system is affected (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). This strand of the 
literature explains how a run situation is reached because of information asymmetries 
between banks and depositors. Since depositors cannot comprehensively monitor banks 
performance they use imperfect signals to influence their behaviour. Consequently, any 
signal in the market, even if it is imperfect, may be used by depositors to review their 
perceptions about the solvency of banks. Hence, in extreme situations, solvent banks 
can close. 
The second strand of the literature argues that depositors can discriminate between good 
and bad banks. This view is based on models of solvency theory that relate the crises in 
the financial sector to the consequences of real shocks in the market and the pro-cyclical 
behaviour of credit (Kindleberger, 1978). In the upturn of a business cycle, banks seem 
to extend credit extensively to the real sector and become highly leveraged. Then, when 
2 As argued by Levy-Yeyati et al., (2004), banks in developing countries are not required to issue 
subordinated debt as a vehicle for market discipline due to the high cost of issuance and presence of 
illiquid markets. On the other hand, rating agencies may not be appropriate parties for exercising market 
discipline on banks because they do not have a direct economic stake in the financial firms and the only 
cost they might suffer is the loss in reputation in the case of market discipline. Furthermore, discipline by 
shareholders is hardly effective in reducing banks risk because shareholders and bank management prefer 
to seek upside risks (Tsuru, 2003). Therefore, depositors discipline has been chosen in this study for two 
reasons; first depositors are present in all banking systems, and they are not entitled to any special 
benefits even if bank's high risk precedes high returns. On the contrary, they might suffer substantial 
losses in the case of bank failure. 
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real shocks send the economy into a downturn, debtors' capability to honour their loans 
becomes dramatically reduced. If banks do not have adequate reserves to face their 
situation, insolvency problems can occur, and bank panics may ensue. 
Empirically, there is a substantial literature that examines how depositors choose among 
different banks and whether they would effectively monitor bank management by 
punishing poorly managed banks for bad behaviour. However, market discipline not 
only involves depositors' reactions but also the subsequent response of banks. As 
argued by Hamalanian (2006) and Hamalanian et al., (2005), market discipline can only 
be considered effective if it makes banks act conservatively and limits their risk. The 
quiet life theory suggests that the lower the intensity of environmental pressures, the 
lower the effort undertaken by managers to derive the maximum output from a given 
amount of inputs (Berger and Hannan, 1998). Therefore, depositor discipline may be 
treated as a pressure exercised on bank managers in order to push those managers to 
work in a sound and safe manner. 
While most of the studies on depositor discipline focused on developed banking sector 
experiences (e. g., Hannan and Hanweck, 1988; Ellis and Flannery, 1992; Murata and 
Hori, 2006; Tsuru, 2003; and Birchler and Maechler, 2001; among others), recent 
banking crises in developing markets have attracted researchers to address this specific 
issue. The question of the ability of these markets to exercise efficient and effective 
discipline on banks with regard to risk-taking has been increasingly assessed 
particularly in Latin American and Asian banking markets (e. g. Martinez Peria and 
Schmukler, 2001; and Barajas and Steiner, 2000). The results from these studies support 
the view that depositors are able to discipline banks' behaviour. 
This study contributes to the small but growing amount of literature which investigates 
the issue of depositors' discipline in emerging markets, by providing more evidence on 
the existence of market discipline in less developed markets. It uses Jordan as a case 
study to explore the depositors' discipline issue. Drawing on a unique Jordanian 
commercial bank panel data set for the period 1982 to 2005 we investigate the 
mechanisms of depositor discipline and demonstrate that depositors are able to 
recognise risk and punish bank risk-taking through withdrawing their 
deposits or 
demanding higher interest rates. To investigate if there are any changes in depositors' 
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behaviour before and after twin crises (that occurred in 1989)3, two sample periods have 
been analysed. In addition, the influence of explicit deposit insurance on depositors 
discipline is also examined. 
Overall, the empirical estimates enable us to conclude that depositors in Jordan punish 
banks for risky behaviour through both deposit withdrawals and higher prices (interest 
paid to depositors). Depositors also seem to change their behaviour as this factor altered 
substantially after the financial crises of 1989. This result is consistent with Martinez 
Peria and Schmukler 's (2001) evidence that shocks in the sector breed greater depositor 
vigilance. Regarding the results of the effect of introducing explicit deposit insurance on 
depositors' discipline, no clear evidence was found to support the idea that market 
discipline in Jordan has been harmed by the introduction of depositor insurance 
coverage. This result may be interpreted as a lack of credibility in insurance coverage 
introduced by the new scheme (namely, Jordan deposit insurance) that perhaps was 
perceived as being unable to cover all deposit liabilities. Alternatively, the recent 
introduction of the scheme and the lack of crises may mean depositors are not confident 
in the scheme and therefore are not pricing risks accurately. 
Additionally, as argued by Calomiris and Powell (2000), a true test for market discipline 
should also involve a second test in which it is determined whether banks effectively 
respond to the signals provided by depositors. We build on this idea, and following 
Barajas and Steiner's (2000) methodology, this study finds that banks only respond to 
the changes in deposits levels by improving their earnings even when we allow banks to 
respond asymmetrically to banks' deposit loss. Our results are robust with regard to 
different estimation techniques, and the inclusion of a set of control variables that may 
affect the criteria used by depositors in choosing their bank. 
The main motivation for investigating the market discipline issue in banking is related 
to a series of theoretical and empirical papers that have debated the possible effects of 
depositors' behaviour on bank risk-taking in emerging markets. This is an area that, as 
far as we are aware, has been studied and examined before but not for the case of Jordan. 
3 Twin crises is the case where the country whiteness both of banking problem and currency devaluation. 
For the distinction between twin crises and pure banking or currency crisis (see Bauer, 2007). 
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Also, the issue of efficient bank regulation in emerging markets may have broader 
implications because of the scarcity of resources especially for saving. Furthermore, we 
believe that depositors are more able to share the burden of bank regulation than 
shareholders, because shareholders' incentives to increase bank profitability may 
outweigh their desire to decrease bank risk (Tsuru, 2003; and Park and Perstiani, 2007). 
Depositor discipline is a relatively straightforward mechanism. The nature of deposit 
contracts (no extra benefits are expected from banks' high risk-taking) create strong 
incentives for depositors to try to inform themselves about the condition of banks. 
Therefore, this feature of the deposit contract keeps banks on their toes (Calomiris and 
Kahn, 1991) and also creates the risk of contagious bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 
1983). The analysis presented in this paper demonstrates that complementarities 
between legal regulation (rules) and depositor forces may help to reduce banking risk. 
Finding evidence of depositors' discipline can provide important motivations for 
regulators and policy makers to think about market discipline issues and consider 
appropriate incentives, costs and rewards that result in safer banking systems. For 
complementarity between regulatory rules and market monitoring, banks' corporate 
governance and appropriate market conditions may play an important role in 
strengthening bank regulation and supervision. A combination of rules, corporate 
governance, and appropriate market conditions to enable adequate market discipline, 
should help to reduce undesirable consequences of bank failure and maintain financial 
stability. 
It is important to note that the details related to the existence of market discipline in 
banking systems are very much a country specific issue. It will, to a large extent, be 
influenced by factors unique to the country concerned. Some factors, such as 
depositors' culture, may cause depositors to react differently in each country. 
Furthermore, the ability of depositors to analyse financial information differs between 
countries. Even if depositors are informed, they might be not sophisticated enough to 
utilise information. A study of the Jordanian banking system should help us identify 
whether depositor discipline has an impact on bank behaviour in the country. 
In addition, the unique sample used in this study includes the period of the so-called 
Jordanian twin crises `the Petra Bank and currency crises' of 1989. This period was 
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followed by the introduction of various reforms that required banks to disclose more 
information in order to enhance market discipline. It seems appropriate to conduct a 
study of market discipline for Jordan since regulators here have made significant efforts 
to rely more on market discipline. In addition, it is of interest for researchers to examine 
whether depositors are ready to penalise banks for bad behaviour. During the study 
period, an explicit deposit insurance corporation was also established in Jordan. This 
`safety net' scheme may affect the incentives of depositors to monitor their bank. The 
long time period of the study enables us to test the changes in depositors' reaction 
towards risk. Therefore, Jordan's experience may offer a good case study to examine 
the issue of market discipline and the deposit insurance effect. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The conceptual framework of 
market discipline is analysed in section 2. Section 3 reviews the empirical literature and 
provides a critical evaluation of the existing evidence. Section 4 describes the Jordanian 
banking system, regulation, and deposit insurance scheme. Section 5 illustrates the 
methodology and data employed in the empirical analysis. Section 6 describes and 
evaluates the paper's main results, and section 7 is the conclusion. 
2. Conceptual Framework for Market Discipline 
Over the last few decades researchers have addressed the general question of banks' 
role as financial intermediaries, focusing on the development of theories explaining the 
need for banks to exist (eg., Akerlof, 1970; Diamond 1984; and Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981, among many others). Banks provide transaction and payment systems, credit, 
insurance services, risk-sharing services, and transform liquid liabilities into illiquid 
assets. They can have specific skills to monitor projects in order to be able to finance 
them. It is always thought that the existence of a banking system helps to overcome the 
problems associated with asymmetric information in an economy4. This in turn has 
shaped research into the need for an effective way of regulating banks. 
a Asymmetric information is divided in the banking literature into moral hazard and adverse selection. In 
economic analysis moral hazard refers to hidden actions in a contractual relationship, where adverse 
selection arises when the customer knows more than the bank about the probability of the 
loss happening 
because of hidden information. 
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In recent years, both developing and developed countries have suffered significantly 
from banking crises. Banks' depositors as well as borrowers face potential losses in the 
face of bank failure. Generally, the economic impact of the insolvency of banks poses 
different problems for society compared to the insolvency of non-financial companies 
or other financial institutions5. Banks are different because the monitoring mechanism 
enables them to attract deposits for long-term investments. Mayes (2004) gives two 
causes for these differences. First, the holdings of deposits, and second the transmission 
of a problem between banks generating more widespread bank failures and systemic 
risk. Due to the widespread use of banks, not only for making payments but also as a 
store for savings, a bank's failure has a far greater effect throughout the economy 6 
Therefore, in the case of bank failure, many parties in the economy will share the loss. 
The question of bank failure prevention and control has long played a central role in 
banking and economic theory. Historically, Adam Smith, in his seminal text The Wealth 
of Nations, effectively supports the unregulated market. He wrote: " ... 
free competition 
too obliges all bankers to be more liberal in their dealings with their customers, lest 
their rivals should carry them away. In general, if any branch of trade, or any division of 
labour, be advantageous to the public, the freer and more general the competition, it will 
always be the more so" (Smith 1776, p. 353). Adam Smith used the term `invisible 
hand' to describe the natural force that guides unregulated markets (free-markets) 
through competition for scarce resources as a part of a self-regulating system. 
According to Adam Smith, in a free market each participant will try to maximise self- 
interest, and the interaction of market participants, leading to the exchange of funds, 
enables each participant to be better off than when simply producing alone. Furthermore, 
he states that in a free market, no regulation of any type would be needed to ensure the 
mutually beneficial exchange of funds, since this "invisible hand" would guide market 
participants to trade in the most mutually beneficial manner. In other words, Smith 
accepted competition between banks in the market place as the best discipline due to its 
5 Furthermore, the failure of a bank has an adverse effect on non-financial firms precisely because 
individual bank- firm relationships are valuable (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). 
6 As argued by De Ceuster and Masschelein (2003), the transmission of the failure information can 
happen through, institutional inter-linkages, informational effects or the macro economic environment. 
7 Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) report 117 episodes of systemic banking crises in 93 countries since the 
late 1970s. Between 1980 and 1996,133 out of 181 IMF countries had experienced serious problems in 
their banking sector. The fiscal cost of banking crises in developing countries alone exceeded $1 trillion 
in the 1980s and the 1990s. 
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ability in creating incentives for efficiency. Thus, he saw no need for central or 
governmental bodies to regulate or monitor banks' behaviour. 
Later, Adam Smith's view was supported by schools of thought called the `free 
banking' school (laissez-faire) . The main ambition of the school was to prohibit 
government intervention in the financial system supporting the free functioning of the 
financial system. The Scottish banking system between 1716 and 1844 is considered a 
model of 19th century free banking. The banks operated with virtually no restrictions 
imposed by government authorities. Advocates of free banking, such as Dowd (1992, 
1996), Cameron (1972), White (1990), and Economopoulos (1988,1990), support the 
stability of the free banking; they argued that free banking helps to promote economic 
growth because of the intense competition between the banks, which forced them to 
innovate. In addition, Kareken and Wallace (1978) find that under certain assumptions 
there are no bank failures under laissez-faire banking. In their model, failures are 
induced by the non-optimal pricing of government deposit insurance. Fama (1980) 
argues that, under competitive banking, "... portfolio management activities... fall under 
the Modigliani-Miller theorem on the irrelevance of pure financing decisions. It follows 
that there is no need to control the deposit creation or security purchasing activities of 
banks to obtain a stable general equilibrium with respect to prices and real activity" (p. 
39). Moreover, McCulloch (1981) argues that the maturity transformation activity of 
banks borrowing short and lending long is not a natural function of financial 
intermediaries. It is a malfunction that is a by-product of several forms of government 
intervention that encourages what he calls "misintermediation" (p. 103). 
In summary, the "free banking" school theorists (such as White 1984, Selgin 1988, 
Glasner 1989, and others) have provided a theoretical basis and offered historical 
evidence for the soundness of a free banking system. One of the major arguments is that 
competition in the supply of money forces banks to maintain either their brand names or 
convertibility of their liabilities (banknotes or deposits) into specie or real commodities, 
which in turn prevents banks from over-issuing money. In contrast, a self-correcting 
mechanism does not exist under a system where the supply of money is monopolized by 
the government. Therefore, free banking is more stable than central banking. 
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The latter argument goes further to suggest that close monitoring of bank operations is 
best performed by depositors because depositors would lose funds in the case of bank 
failure. Depositors would adapt to the competitive nature of the banking sector. Given 
that bank management is always eager to have more deposits and they need to maintain 
a good reputation in order to attract deposits, incentive based strategies to correct 
management behaviour through depositors' pressure is, the argument goes, all that is 
needed to discipline banks. 
During 1772 to 1823, David Ricardo expanded on the benefits of free trade (unregulated 
market view) and introduced the theory of comparative advantages. Ricardo referred to 
the ability of individual bankers to adjust their own note-issue to the demands of the 
market. He advocated competition in banking. However, the only restriction in addition 
to convertibility which Ricardo saw fit to impose was that banks deposit securities 
against their note issues. Insuring the quality of notes and protecting poor participants 
(borrowers) against bankruptcy was his main argument; however, Ricardo set the 
foundations for discussing the role of competition as a tool of regulation. 
Theoretically, with perfect information, market forces will induce good banking 
practices because, as argued by Karken and Wallace (1978), profit maximising banks 
would choose strategies with zero probability of bankruptcy. Hence, competition 
exhibits a beneficial effect, for instance, competition may minimise long-run production 
costs for goods and services, reduce resource waste, improve productivity and banks' 
efficiency, and also maximise social welfare. In addition, a competitive regulatory 
system is seen as advantageous for the promotion of innovations in the banking system. 
It is accepted that in a world of no transaction costs where governments maximise social 
welfare, and where there is well defined enforceable property rights, markets will 
achieve efficient outcomes (Coase, 1960). Furthermore, if the prerequisites for this 
laissez-faire `invisible hands' theory holds, government regulation of banks would be at 
best irrelevant, however, the prerequisites for `invisible hands' to work sufficiently do 
not exist (Barth et al., 2006). 
s See Ricardo's book "The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation". According to Ricardo's theory, 
even if a bank could produce everything more efficiently than another bank, it would reap gains from 
specialising in what it was best at producing and trading with other banks. 
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The traditional view of free unregulated banking has been criticised. Free or unregulated 
banking is inherently unstable because of market failures arising from such factors as 
externalities, natural monopolies, and information asymmetry. Free banking causes 
counterfeiting, wildcat banking, fraudulent banking, over-issue of banknotes and 
overexpansion by banks. Free banks are therefore prone to failures and lead to systemic 
banking instability. Economic and non-economic reasons have been given to justify 
banking regulations, such as to protect small depositors, to maintain monetary stability. 
to protect the payments system, to assure safety and soundness of financial institutions, 
to avoid or to limit the effects of failed institutions, and to encourage efficiency and 
competition in the financial system (Chu, 1996). 
Pigou's (1938) classical treatment of regulation argues that where the market is 
imperfect, Adam Smith's "invisible hands" will not work. In reality, market perfection 
and market competition in the sense of pure competition do not exist. Asymmetric 
information and the costs of information are among the main reasons for market 
imperfections. Banks often have strong incentives to avoid providing information. 
Therefore, early economists9 acknowledged the need for an alternative plan, hinting that 
this might be in the direction of central banking; they emphasised that banking markets 
could not function efficiently without a central bank. 
One argument against self regulatory banking is that banks will collapse because of 
externalities due to market imperfection and asymmetric information. The imperfections 
that can impede the functioning of the market and that creates a potentially constructive 
role for government to enhance social welfare include monopoly which could harm 
competition, externalities 10 , and/or 
information asymmetries in property rights and 
contract enforcement. The latter will impede the creation, verification, and enforcement 
of contracts to correct these market failures. Under this view Goodhart (1990) asserts 
that it is very difficult to know the reason behind a relatively high interest rate offered 
by a bank whether it will be offered because of greater efficiency or riskier strategies. In 
9 See for example, Tooke, T. (1848), A History of Prices, Vol. IV Tooke T. and Newmarch, W. (1857), A 
History of Prices, Vols. V, VI. 
10 Externalities induce markets to produce too many goods with negative social consequences such as 
banks extending excessive credit, and too few goods with positive social consequences such as 
information about borrowers. 
27 
other words, depositors are uninformed and unable to monitor banks because of 
information asymmetry. 
Asymmetric information leads to `free rider' and externality problems as well as 
contagious bank runs because depositors, particularly small ones, cannot discriminate 
between healthy and unhealthy (or problematic) banks. Consequently, there is no 
guarantee that competitive pressure would enforce good banking practices and a central 
bank is required to correct for market failure due to information asymmetry, which is 
the essence of a central bank (Sayers 1957, p. 1). In general, theoreticians in the 19th 
century disagreed as to whether banks were best disciplined by competition or by a 
central bank. For instance, Goodhart (1989) argued that central control performed by the 
central bank can provide beneficial functions such as preventing financial crises in the 
banking sector that might arise from information problems associated with a bank's 
risk-taking. The emphasis of Goodhart's argument was on three possible reasons for the 
need for an inter-bank loan organisation (such as a central bank). The transaction and 
monitoring costs of inter-bank loans would be less if arranged centrally, the central 
authority would require banks to hold enough (socially optimum) amounts of reserves, 
and these reserves would protect the banking system from external influences that might 
be subject to contagion effects. 
Hence, the argument went that as a result of countries lurching from one financial crisis 
to another and public concern over the soundness of the financial system, as well as to 
the rejection of competition as a means of controlling bank's behaviour, tight 
supervision and prudential regulation are necessary in order to check excessive risk 
taking. Coase (1988) argued that unregulated private actions create outcomes whereby 
social marginal costs are greater than private marginal cost. Social marginal costs occur 
due to the fact that bank failures have a great effect on the whole economy, whereas 
private marginal cost is directly related to the negative effect on shareholders' and 
employees' wealth. In this context, Chari and Jagannathan (1988) show that a little 
uncertainty about the nature of a bank run may trigger a system-wide collapse or a panic. 
Their view is that a number of the depositors, who are uninformed about the true value 
of their bank's assets, can only learn about the state of the bank by observing the line of 
depositors making withdrawals. However, they cannot distinguish whether there is a 
long line because of consumption needs or because informed depositors are getting out 
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early. They may then infer (correctly or not) that the bank is about to fail and withdraw. 
This' panic' view is based on asymmetric information and a signal extraction problem, 
as the information is imperfectly revealed to depositors by the withdrawal decision of 
other depositors. 
Theoretical literature on bank runs stresses that depositors are able to run from a solvent 
bank when insolvent ones are "attached". Diamond and Dybvig (1983), following 
Bryant (1980), develop a model in which bank runs are conceived as a random event 
originating as shifts in agents' beliefs. Now, Diamond and Dybvig's theorem has 
become a benchmark framework to study the issue of bank runs. In their view, a bank 
panic is not necessarily related to events in the real economy. Bank runs may be created 
by any event associated with any modification of customers' (depositors) expectations 
of the bank. In this situation, information asymmetries between the bank and its 
depositors may aggravate the problem. Since depositors cannot perfectly monitor bank 
performance, they may use imperfect signals from other investors to revise their 
expectations about the solvency of the bank. In other words any bad news, such as 
withdrawal signals or limited deposit insurance, may signal that a bank is in trouble and 
consequently depositors act in the same way resulting in massive deposit withdrawals 
and a solvent bank run' . Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) view bank runs as a result of 
rational revisions in beliefs about the riskiness of the bank's portfolio performance. 
Jacklin and Bhattacharya, argue that information about bank's investment in risky long- 
lived assets causes depositors to prefer early withdrawal, a demand that the bank cannot 
support with its assets, leading to `information based' bank runs. 
Therefore, one could argue that restrictions on competition would improve bank 
profitability, reduce failure rates and hence safeguard stability (Keeley, 1990). Under 
these circumstances, Dewatripont and Tirole (1993) stress the importance of protecting 
" The "first come first served" rule in banking and the illiquidity of bank assets are two critical reasons 
for depositors' panics. Depositors will always choose to step to the head of the queue to avoid receiving 
less than they are promised and lose some or all of their deposits. On the other hand, it is important to 
distinguish between bank panics and runs. Where bank runs mean sudden waves of withdrawals, bank 
panic occurs when bank debt holders in all or many banks in the banking system suddenly claim their 
cash to such an extent that the banks suspend convertibility of their debt into cash (Calomiris and Gorton, 
1991). In some cases, banks would suspend convertibility. Suspension, however, only occurs when 
depositors panic because of expectations formed conditional on observing the noisy indicator, but would 
not panic if they had full information (Gorton, 1985). 
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small depositors who do not have the sophistication or the incentives to analyse bank 
accounts or monitor their behaviour. 
They place an emphasis on the role of well informed parties and regulators to control 
and monitor bank behaviour in order to protect depositors. Furthermore, Faina (1980) 
and Baltensperger and Dermine (1991) argued that regulation to prevent bank failure is 
warranted due to the unique services provided by banks. Thus, monitoring banks cannot 
be solved in a socially acceptable way by shifting this task to each depositor separately. 
Regulators attempt to prevent bank runs in different ways including for example: 
funding banks with equity rather than demand deposits; using central banks as lenders 
of last resort (LLR); and offering government deposit insurance (DI). 
Nevertheless, the role of the LLR and DI are the two main examples of banking sector 
regulation used in the literature 12. The main purpose of providing the central bank the 
role of LLR is to prevent the collapse of banks which are experiencing financial 
difficulties, protect depositors, and avoid any expected panic within the financial system. 
Central banks provide liquidity support directly to financial institutions if they cannot 
obtain finance from other sources. The classical conditions for an effective LLR are that 
the central bank should freely lend to solvent banks against good collateral and at a 
penalty interest rate (Freixas and Rochet, 1997). However, the LLR has been under 
attack from two different fronts (Freixas, 2003). First, the distinction between solvency 
and illiquidity may not be clear in a crisis, and second, as Goodhart (1995) points out, 
banks that require the assistance of the LLR are already under suspicion of being 
insolvent. 
In recent years, the introduction of explicit DI systems has also become a widespread 
event. The potential vulnerability of deposit-funded banks to runs and the banking 
system's vulnerability to panics are often used as motivation for deposit insurance 
schemes (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). DI is a solution to avoid bank runs. It is an 
implicit or explicit guarantee given to depositors in which all or part of their deposits 
12Some suggest reforms to establish "narrow banks" which goes back to Simons (1948), which is a 
proposal banking system that would eliminate bank runs, as well as the need 
for deposit insurance 
provided by central bank. It would restrict banking institutions to 
hold liquid and safe government bonds. 
risky loans would be made by other financial institutions 
(see Litan 1987). 
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amount in a bank will be paid in the event of bank failure 13 . While complete 
government deposit insurance will protect banks from runs because there will be no 
need for depositors to react to banks' problems quickly, because there will be no fear of 
loss, this type of insurance is socially costly. The government will have to tax other 
sectors of the economy in addition to the banking sector, in order to be able to cover any 
expected depositors' payments (Barth et al., 2006). 
In fact, while systemic regulation 14can protect both depositors' wealth and the banking 
system from crises, the actual application of regulation has proved to be limited to 
correct for identified market imperfections and failures. A study by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF, 1998) shows that banking crises are expensive and the cost, 
however, of resolving such crises can amount to 55% of an economy's GDP 15. The 
main serious drawback of banking systemic regulation is that, for example, deposit 
insurance safety nets create moral hazard problems 16. This is because their existence 
provides increased incentives for bank risk-taking that might result in insurance pay offs, 
and as such insured depositors have no incentive to adhere to market discipline when 
they suspect banks from taking on excessive risks (Mishkin, 1997). 
In addition, deposit insurance increases the problem of adverse selection as depositors 
are not affected if loans are unpaid. Furthermore, moral hazard problems associated 
with regulation safety nets, that induce too-big-to-fail, too-important-to-fail, and 
regulatory forbearance behaviour are considered as further evidence of the limited 
13DeCuster and Masschelein (2003) define explicit deposit insurance as an insurance prescribed by law, in 
contrast to implicit deposit insurance which is not laid down by rules but it is generally believed to exist. 
Before the actual existence of deposit insurance schemes, many governments had implicit deposit 
insurance through government intervention in the case of bank runs. 
14In the banking literature, usually there is a distinction between three different types of regulation, 
prudential, systemic and conduct of business regulation. Where prudential regulation is mainly concerned 
with monitoring and supervision of financial institutions with more emphasis on asset quality and capital 
adequacy, Goodhart et al., (1998) define systemic regulation as regulation concerned mainly with the 
safety and soundness of the financial system. On the other side, conduct regulation focuses on the ways 
that financial institutions conduct their business. (See Casu et al., 2006 for more discussion on different 
bank regulation). 
15 In this study a distinction between currency crises and banking crises has been made. Currency and 
banking crises were identified for a group of over 50 countries for the period 1975-97. 
16 The safety net, defined as the protection of banks' creditors against losses resulting from bank failures, 
is motivated in the first place by the short maturity structure of bank liabilities and the private information 
characteristic of their longer-maturity assets, reflecting banks' unique liquidity creation and 
intermediation functions (Diamond and Dybvig , 1983). 
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benefits of bank regulation 17. In this context, Bhattacharya et al., (1998) argue that 
because of the appearance of deposit insurance, banks are tempted to take on excessive 
risk and hold fewer reserves. Demirguc- Kunt and Detragiache (2002) find that explicit 
deposit insurance schemes tend to increase the probability of systemic banking 
problems and significantly increase the probability of a banking crisis". Similarly, 
Milhaupt (1999) has argued that the existence of implicit deposit insurance results in 
even worse outcomes than explicit insurance. Implicit deposit insurance is more costly 
than explicit deposit insurance. As argued by Demirguc-Kunt et al., (2006) explicit 
deposit insurance can formally curtail the size of guarantees previously conveyed to 
banks that were government-owned or granted emergency blanket coverage. 
It is recognized that deposit insurance and the existence of a central bank acting as a 
LLR to an insolvent banking system can encourage too much bank risk-taking and also 
can create the need for bank regulations to reduce moral hazard incentives. [Regulators 
have also instituted regulations historically with the same justifications that protect 
banks from competition by introducing restrictions on banking operations such as 
capital adequacy requirements (De Custer and Masschelein, 2003)] 19 
Capital adequacy requirements were based on the risk weighted assets held by banks. 
The main belief here was that bank capital helps prevent bank failure and the amount of 
capital affects returns for the owners (equity holders) of the bank. In addition, capital 
adequacy ratio requirements serve to protect depositors and promote the stability and 
efficiency of the financial system (see Berger et al., 1995 for more discussion on the 
importance of capital in financial institutions). 
In 1981, the first formal capital requirements were based on bank size but not on bank 
risk (introduced in Japan US and Europe). In 1988, regulators (the Basle Committee) 
adopted risk-based measures for the determination of capital adequacy namely Basel 120. 
17 Government forbearance is an example of time inconsistency. It refers to a problem that it may not be 
optimal ex post (after the event occurs) to implement regulations that when optimal ex ant (before the 
event occurs. For further discussion on these practices see Mishkin (1997), and Casu et al., (2006). 
18 Demirguc- Kunt and Detragiache (2002) used a large sample of 61 developed and developing countries 
over a period from 1980 to 1997. 
19 Restrictions on entry and branches are other types of regulation. For further information on these types 
of regulation see Heffernan (2000). 
20 The Basel Committee was established by central bank governors of the Group of Ten countries (G 10) 
in 1974 to foster cooperation on bank supervisory matters among the member countries. 
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Banks were forced to have sufficient capital believing that if a bank is forced to hold a 
large amount of equity capital, the bank will have less incentive to hold risky assets, 
because owners will have more to lose in the case of failure especially as capital is a 
costly source of funds. In other words, capital requirements reduce incentives to 
`gambling' and moral hazard by putting bank equity at risk. Accordingly, the first 
international capital agreement, Basel 1, had two primary objectives: first, to increase 
bank capital and reduce credit risk, and to provide a level playing field for competition 
between banks of different countries through implementing uniform rules within 
countries (Palia and Porter, 2004). 
However, even with the implementation of Basel 1, the regulatory authorities could not 
guarantee that banks would not take-on excessive risks since banks have a great 
incentive to hide their risk-taking activities in order to lower their required capital 
requirements. Banks' capital ratios calculated using the original Basel 1 may not 
provide a good indicator of a bank's financial condition because the systems created a 
structure that could lead to capital arbitrage21. Also, capital requirements have been 
perceived to reduce banks' franchise value and were not longer enough to yield efficient 
outcomes (Hellman et al. 2000). Basel 1 has also failed to maintain soundness in the 
banking system or to protect banks from failure. During the 1990s, many countries, 
such as, Mexico 1994, Asian countries 1997, Japan 1990, Turkey 1999, and Sweden 
1991, among many others, faced banking crises which had a substantial impact on their 
economies (IMF, 1998). 
Kaufman (1998), and Dowd (1996; 1998; and 2003) have contested the arguments in 
defence of bank regulation. They claim that capital adequacy regulation is both 
unnecessary and incapable of improving banks' capital position more than the banks 
could do on their own. Where Dowd argues that shareholders can enforce proper risk- 
21 Capital arbitrage arises when a bank chooses to sell, or simply chooses not to acquire, safer assets 
whose economic or market capital charge is less than the regulatory charge, while remaining or acquiring 
assets whose regulatory capital charge is less than the economic or market capital requirement. That is, 
banks can keep their regulatory capital ratios looking better than their portfolio risks might suggest. 
Capital arbitrage is mainly conducted by global banks. The internationalisation situation (when foreign 
firms play a critical role in a domestic financial sector encouraged by world financial liberalisation), and 
increasing international activities and trade of multinational corporations persuade banks to go global and 
operate cross borders. All this increases the development of ways of delivering financial services and 
produces innovative financial products, such as securitisation and derivatives, challenging the traditional 
approach to capital adequacy regulation. 
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taking behaviour, both authors think that capital adequacy can only help to counter the 
negative effects of other government interventions, such as moral hazard created by 
deposit insurance and bailouts of large banks (under the policy of too-big-to-fail). 
Jones (2000) criticised Basel 1 by showing that banks can use financial innovation to 
increase their reported capital ratio without truly enhancing their soundness. Peek and 
Rosengreen (1997) also argued that well capitalised banks are just as likely to require 
regulatory action as under-capitalized banks. As argued by Matthews and Thompson 
(2005), Basel 1 has been criticised on a number of accounts: it is difficult to implement 
because of the differences in taxes and accounting rules between countries. Second, 
Basel 1 concentrated only on credit risk ignoring other types of risks in banking. Third, 
the Accord ignores the risk diversification issue in the calculation of required capital. 
Finally, it neglected the market value of assets, except for foreign exchange and interest 
rate contracts. 
In response to the above concerns, considerable attention has been paid to reforming 
bank regulation in order to create a healthy and competitive financial services sector 
that is minimally affected by regulation, and simultaneously is a source of stability and 
strength to the economy at large. Accordingly, regulators have started to rethink the 
regulations by creating the right foundation for external (informal) forces which act on 
banking operations, namely market discipline. The main objective here is that although 
market participant (e. g. depositors) runs are very costly, if banks know that depositors 
may run, they should take appropriate action to abort depositors' reactions. 
Hence, Basel 1 was adjusted to move from a rigid to a more flexible view of capital 
requirements. As stated by Molyneux (2002) "A convenient and accurate label for these 
supervisory changes is the `marketisation' of capital adequacy supervision. Basel 2 
recognises that external market discipline and rapid managerial responses in risk 
management to market innovations cannot be handled adequately via capital adequacy 
supervision based on the mandatory imposition of largely unchanging (or slowly 
changing at best) ratios and similar rules" Molyneux (2002, p2). 
In April 2003, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision released to the public the 
New Basel Capital Accord (Basel 2) which is expected to be implemented by the end of 
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2007. It takes into account other kinds of risk, considers heterogeneity between 
countries and concentrates more on market forces. Banks are now allowed to rely on 
their own internal models to assess and control risk. More emphasis is placed on 
reinforcing regulators to add disclosure requirements to bank institutions, in order to 
increase transparency and foster market discipline aiming to provide more risk 
sensitivity to capital requirements. Basel 2 advances three regulatory pillars: minimum 
capital requirements, supervision and market discipline. It allows banks to choose 
between different approaches to measure three types of risks: credit, market and 
operational risk. 22 23 The main perspective of Basle 2 is that regulation should proceed 
using rules in addition to creating incentives for appropriate behaviour. This view is 
consistent with solvency theory which states that crises in the financial sector are a 
consequence of real shocks and depositors can distinguish between bad and good banks 
and a bank run depends on bank fundamentals (Kindleberger, 1978). Market discipline 
is a market-based approach which regulates banks by the `invisible hand' as opposed to 
the very visible hand of direct government regulation and enforcement. The invisible- 
hand approach to regulation aims to align the incentives of market participants with the 
objectives of the regulator, thereby harnessing the same powerful forces that allow 
markets to work so efficiently. Hamalainen (2006) has noted that using cost benefit 
analysis for introducing incentive based solutions for bank regulations, rules and 
incentives may be the only solution to effective bank regulation. He argues that 
regulatory policies with incentives that induce behavioural responses can be created for 
all bank stakeholders and this enhances corporate governance mechanisms. 
Consequently, market discipline mechanisms are seen as one of the main ingredients of 
maintaining a sound banking system (Vives, 2001). Bernanke (2007, p 8) has stated 
that: "as opposed to the very visible hand of direct government regulation and 
enforcement. The `invisible-hand' approach to regulation aims to align the incentives of 
market participants with the objectives of the regulator, thereby harnessing the same 
powerful forces that allow markets to work so efficiently". While Levine (2005) 
suggests that strengthening official supervisory powers hurts bank development and 
22 For more about the New Accord see http: //www. bis. org/plupl/bcbsca. htm. 
23 The broad classification of required disclosures are: scope of application, capital structure, capital 
adequacy, credit risk exposure and assessment, credit risk mitigation, market risk exposure and 
assessment, operational risk exposure and assessment, equity exposure and assessment, securitisation 
exposure and assessment, and exposures to interest rate risk in the banking book. 
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leads to greater corruption in bank lending without any compensating positive effects, 
he argues that market based regulations that require informational transparency and 
strengthen the ability and incentives of the private sector to monitor banks tends to 
promote sound banking. Because, if the risk position of the bank can be assessed (for 
instance by depositors or shareholders) a bank cannot increase its market share and 
profits by taking on more risk because investors will discount this risk. Furthermore. 
disclosure requirements may help to make the risk position of banks better assessed and 
this should increase the tendency towards credit rationing of wealth and also increases 
the cost of borrowing for high risk-taking banks. In other words, markets may contain 
disciplinary mechanisms that reward banks that manage risk effectively and penalise 
those whose risk management is inept or imprudent. Thus, some economists and 
regulators assume that market forces will reinforce bank capital regulation and 
supervision to ensure safety (Distinguin et al., 2006). 
2.1. The Concept of Market Discipline 
The idea of market discipline is not new in banking. Leathers and Raines (2000) trace it 
back to the free banking era in Scotland. The recent increase in academic attention to 
market discipline has been bolstered by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
when in 2003 it emphasised the role of market discipline in Pillar 3 of proposed revised 
capital framework (Basel 2). Market discipline in the banking sector can be defined as 
a situation in which private sector agents24 face cost increases as banks undertake risks, 
and take action on the basis of these costs (Berger, 1991). It refers to what is called a 
market-based incentive scheme in which banks depositors (or debt holders) punish 
banks for greater risk-taking by demanding higher yields on those liabilities. Although 
banks are required to hold capital buffers against adverse outcomes in their investment 
of creditors wealth (mainly depositors) in risky assets (loans default), their solvency 
target may not take into account the interests of lenders or even society as a whole. 
Hence, market discipline can be expressed as a tool for safeguarding the integrity of the 
financial system by making risk-taking more costly which curbs the incentive to take 
excessive risks (Nier and Baumann, 2006). 
24 Greenspan (2001) defined market discipline as private counterpart supervision. 
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Market discipline tends to be beneficial for the banking system in different ways. First, 
by penalising high risk-taking banks, increased market discipline may reduce moral 
hazard incentives (Martinez-Pena and Schmukler, 2001). Second, market discipline 
may improve the efficiency of banks (through a change in management or bank 
mergers) by putting pressure on relatively inefficient banks to become more efficient or 
exit the industry (Berger, 1991). In other words, market discipline appears to increase 
competition and decreases monopoly power (Vives, 2001). Third, as argued by Ghosh 
and Das (2003) and Hamaliainen (2006), markets give signals about the credit standing 
of financial firms which can be combined with inside information gained by supervisory 
procedures and then increase the efficiency of the overall supervision process. Flannery 
(1998) suggests that market information may improve two features of the overall 
process for regulators by enabling them to identify incipient problems more promptly. 
In addition, it provides them with an incentive and justification to take action more 
quickly as soon as a problem has been identified. In this sense, market discipline may 
be able to supplement the traditional supervisory assessments to distinguish good banks 
from bad banks therefore; it is more likely to lower the overall social costs of bank 
supervision (Flannery, 2001). Particularly, the market is difficult to lobby for 
forbearance and reacts more quickly than regulators to increased bank risk-taking and 
thereby reduces systemic risk. Market price information more accurately detects the 
actual risk in banking firms by providing incentives for rational market investors who 
are at risk from bank failure. 
Fourth, as illustrated in Hamaliainen (2006), informed market participants who can 
conduct market discipline tend to be able to reduce regulatory pressures imposed on the 
financial institutions. For example, a recent proposal by the UK's Financial Services 
Authority (2001), to create only wholesale deposit-taking banks, allows them to reduce 
regulatory controls over these banks and enables them to concentrate on those banks 
that are in more need of protection. Because, wholesale depositors are able to make 
informed assessments of the firms they deal with, they will be in less need of regulatory 
protection, or they may even help regulators adopt stricter regulatory control when 
it is 
needed. Wall (1989) and Evanoff (1991) suggest market discipline mechanisms which 
act as triggers for bank closure, lead to prompter action by the authorities and, as a 
consequence, fewer claims on the deposit insurance fund. 
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Using market discipline within a regulatory framework for the financial system is not 
without its cost. Goodhart et al., (1998) argue that greater emphasis on market discipline 
may increase the probability of bank runs and may have knock-on effects within the 
financial system (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), because of the existence of asymmetric 
information in the banking industry and the lack of a secondary market in bank loans. 
To the extent that sophisticated savers have an advantage in recognising and reacting to 
market information, it is possible that small uninformed savers might be at greater risk 
of incurring proportionately greater costs if failures occur (VanHoose, 2007). In 
addition, the resources needed to provide enough information in the market in order to 
help with appropriate market discipline functioning may enable large banks to have cost 
advantages over smaller banks. With inaccurate information and unqualified market 
participants, regulators may receive misleading signals which can lead to inappropriate 
reactions. 
Therefore, Lane's (1993) conditions for effective market discipline require some degree 
of regulatory agency monitoring in order to be effective25. This suggests that market 
based regulatory policies needs some rules in order to create efficient and effective 
supervision. Hamaliainen (2006) suggests that market discipline is unlikely to be a 
substitute for supervisory monitoring. While the existence of insured funds by 
supervisors is necessary to ensure that banks do not take-on excessive ex ante risk, 
market discipline is important in assessing whether the regulatory authority has met its 
goals. 
2.2. The Relevant Monitors 
Market discipline appears justified by the aforementioned arguments and it therefore 
seems legitimate to encourage the monitoring of banks by professional investors and 
financial analysts as a complement to banking supervision (Decamps et al., 2004). But, 
incorporating market discipline in the regulation process poses an important question. 
Which participants have enough disciplinary power to influence bank behaviour, and 
then are able to influence future bank decision-taking? Generally speaking, all parties 
that provide funding to banks have good incentives to monitor banks. 
25 See section 2.3 for the conditions and process of effective market discipline. 
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However, it should be recognized that monitoring is a costly activity hence; if the 
expected monitoring costs outweigh the expected benefits no effective monitoring will 
take place (De Ceuster and Masschelein, 2003). In other words, monitors need to face 
costs that increase as firms undertake risks and to take action as a result of these costs 
(Berger, 1991). Llewellyn (2002) develops the concept of a "stakeholder monitor". 
Stakeholders, as the name implies, have something at stake in the relative success or 
failure of the firm. Stakeholder monitors are all those private agents who have an 
interest in the outcome of the monitoring process, such as investors or equity holders, 
and debt holders such as depositors. 26 
According to Hamalainen et al., (2005), market discipline occurs when a deposit-taking 
institution can receive signalling from the stakeholders to assess the risk of their 
activities. Depositors can withdraw their deposits and move them to a safer bank, debt 
holders are able to demand a higher yield thereby increasing the cost of funds for riskier 
institutions, and equity holders can sell their shares and may put downward pressure on 
share prices which may place management under increased checks (Berger, 1991). 
Debt holders are usually insured or secure the bank's debt over the assets of the bank, 
thus they do not have the same risk as depositors or other unsecured liability holders. 
Furthermore, equity holders are potential monitors since they have a large or small stake 
in the bank, they can exercise various corporate governance mechanisms to influence 
bank managers. Then managers have incentives to act in a way consistent with the 
equity holder's interests (Cannella et al., 1995), because equity holders can influence 
managerial turnover. Sufficiently unsatisfied equity holders can create an environment 
that facilitates a hostile takeover (Jensen and Ruback, 1983), but they cannot directly 
cause a run on a bank (Horvitz, 1983)27. 
In fact, shareholder monitoring has been criticised, since shareholders and bank 
management prefer to seek upside risk where on the downside, equity holders' loss is 
limited to the extent of their investment. Evanoff (1993) argued that equity holders have 
an incentive to select high risk-taking banks (moral hazard problems) and this is 
26 Some monitors do not have a direct economic stake in the financial firm such as rating agencies: the 
cost they suffer if they fail to rate banks according to their risk is primarily 
in reputation. 
27 They may react by selling stock in secondary markets. 
39 
inconsistent with the regulatory authorities' incentives for monitoring, as such they are 
unsuitable market discipline instruments. On the other hand, as argued by Tsuru (2003). 
depositors are not entitled to any special benefits if the high risk-taking bank succeeds, 
depositors will suffer from losses in the case of bank failure therefore depositors should 
have greater incentives to suppress banks' excessive risk-taking activities28. Although 
regulatory authorities monitor banks to represent the interests of small depositors, who 
are not themselves experts in bank monitoring, Murata and Hori (2006) argue that the 
options of depositors to shift their deposits from risky banks to safer ones (rationing 
their investment) may be able to perform a disciplinary role by means of `exit' not 
`voice', as defined by Herschman (1970). 
Depositor discipline is not only an important pillar of a sound banking system, but also 
of overall economic efficiency, since market discipline is an element for financial 
efficiency and in the absence of discipline, depositors implicitly subsidise the risk taken 
by their banks and this raises the probability of failure. Bank failure, through contagion 
effects, imposes potential costs on a banking system or on the economy as a whole and 
so using depositor discipline to reduce the likelihood of such outcomes will benefit the 
economy overall (Birchler and Maechler, 2001). In this context, D' Amato et al., 
(1997), for example, show that contagion in depositor behaviour may have played an 
important role in the 1994-95 banking crisis in Argentina. Depositors usually discipline 
the behaviour of banks through two channels, cost (price) and quantity. 
Economists believe that small and insured depositors cannot play an important role in 
monitoring since they have no incentives to react in the market. Therefore, they should 
be insensitive to bank risk. In contrast, uninsured depositors would be the primary 
monitors of banks because they are exposed to bank risk-taking behaviour and may lose 
their deposits above the deposit insurance ceiling if their bank fails (Park and 
28 Besides equity holders and depositors, subordinated debt holders can also serve as potential monitors. 
Subordinated debt holders lose their stake when the bank defaults but they do not have any benefits of 
any upside gain when the bank takes-on excessive risk, so subordinated debt holders have even stronger 
incentives than equity holders to monitor the bank to limit risk-taking ( see e. g. Gorton and Santomero, 
1990; Karacadag and Shrivastava, 2000; Sironi, 2001; and Caldwell, 2005). In addition, Flannery and 
Sorescu, 1996) stated that the premium on subordinated notes and debentures is related to balance sheet 
measures of risk of bank holding companies In addition, specialised information 
firms such as auditors 
and rating agencies assess the condition of banks. Their incentives are not 
directly linked to the future 
value of the banks' securities, but instead depend on their own reputation and accreditation. 
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Persistiani, 1998)29. However, some studies also suggest that insured depositors (e. g. 
Davenport and McDell, 2006) are sensitive to a bank's condition. Similarly, Martinez- 
Peria and Schmukler (2001) also find that even insured depositors have acted to 
discipline banks in developing countries such as Argentina, Chile and Mexico during 
the 1980s and 1990s. Depositors are concerned not only about the solvency of 
individual banks, but also about the solvency of their deposit insurance fund and the 
actual willingness of governments to support failed banks. 30 
Since deposits are the most important source of banks financing in emerging markets, 
and depositors are sensitive to any increase in bank risk due to the nature of deposit 
contracts (no upside gain on an existing deposit), depositors seems to be the critical 
market player to practice discipline on bank risk-taking in emerging markets. 
2.3. The Process of Market Discipline 
Market discipline is thought to be a multi-dimensional concept (Hamalainen et al., 
2005). In order for market discipline to be a complementary regulatory tool, and 
therefore operate effectively in safeguarding the financial system and the economy from 
crisis, market participants need to act according to two distinct procedures. First, they 
have to monitor the risk, and then they have to influence the banks risk-taking 
behaviour (Flannery, 2001). A recent study by Hamalainen et al., (2005) suggests a two 
stage process, the recognition and the control stages. The control stage proposed by 
Hamalainen et al., (2005), and the influence stage proposed by Flannery (2001) have the 
same meaning, namely, the ability to have an effect on bank behaviour. However, 
Hamalainen et al., (2005) distinguishes the recognition stage from the monitoring stage, 
the former describes the process of checking bank behaviour, the latter means 
successful checking or a successful way of monitoring. The sequential process of 
market discipline is summarised in Figure (1.1). The analysis discussed in the following 
29 Certificates of Deposit (CDs) holders seem to be a good source of market discipline because usually 
CDs have a high denomination (in most cases more than 100,000$ and, unlike other deposits, they can be 
traded on the secondary market (see e. g. Hannan and Hanweck 1988, James 1988,1990; Cargill, 1989. 
Jagtiani and Lemieux, 2001; and Keeley 1990, among many others). 
30 In the following sections, we will concentrate on depositors since they have the most monitoring 
incentive power, particularly in emerging markets where most banks depend on depositors as a financial 
source rather than financial markets' source of funds. 
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sections draws on the discussion suggested in Hamalainen et al., (2005), and 
Hamalainen (2006). 
A- Recognition Stage 
Figure 1.1: The Process of Market Discipline 
Special Market and Informational 
Characteristics: 
- Capital markets are open and efficient. 
- Adequate bank information transparency and disclosure of 
capital market structure and risk exposure. 
Relevant, reliable, comparable, and adequate information are 
available at the right time. 
u 2- Depositors can effectively 
observe bank risk. 
1 
Depositors are capable to respond to the bank 
condition changes and able to provide signals in the 
market 
B- Control Stage 
Primary or Secondary 
market signalling and action 
Ar-ý 
Regulatory authority or other 
interested parties react to the 
market signals. 
Secondary Market: Semi 
direct market discipline 
signalling and action 
through bank 
management 
Indirect 
Regulators indirect market discipline Discipline 
action, e. g. by imposing strict capital 
controls. 
1- Depositors consider 
themselves at risk. 
Price Effect 
(incentive margin) 
Primary Market: 
Direct discipline signalling 
and action 
Bank response to market signals 
Semi Direct 
Discipline 
1 
Direct 
Discipline 
1 
The bank and the management behave in a prudential manner 
consistent with their solvency. 
Source: Adopted from Hamalanian 2006, and Hamalanian et al (2005), adapted by the author. 
Indirect Market 
discipline action 
participants, e. g. 
equity holders voting 
out management 
Limited Moral Hazard Problem: 
-No bailout or any government intervention must be anticipated 
in the case of bank failure. 
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2.3.1. The Recognition Stage 
In this stage, two pre-conditions should be satisfied in order to enable investors (or 
depositors) to recognize or monitor bank risk31. The first precondition is that investors 
must first consider themselves to be at risk, (see Morgan and Stiroh, 1999). In this case, 
depositors should not expect any explicit or implicit support if the bank cannot manage 
to sustain a particular safe risk position and they should have high incentives to 
undertake effective monitoring. Conversely, the incentives for the depositors (market 
participants) to monitor are weakened when the losses likely to be incurred from a bank 
failure are low. A supervisory regime which provides guarantees cannot expect a 
substantial amount from market discipline, for instance: where too-big-to-fail issues are 
apparent, where there is full cover deposit insurance, where has been a history of 
bailouts and so on (Llewellyn, 2005). The greater the probability of rescue or protection 
of depositors from the consequences of excessive risk-taking by banks the weaker will 
be the incentives for depositors to monitor bank behaviour. In the case of high 
regulatory protection, deposits may be attracted to high risk banks, to cover liquidity 
problems in some cases, without affecting prices. Thus, bank moral hazard behaviour 
will not be affected by depositor behaviour or risk-taking may actually be increased. 
Banks will take on riskier investments or reduce capital and liquid reserves knowing 
that depositors' funds are protected if excessive risk-taking fails. On the whole, with 
government protection, risky banks are enabled to continue excessive risk-taking where 
they should be penalised directly by market participants or the latter should signal 
excessive risk-taking to the regulators for subsequent intervention 32. 
The second precondition is that depositors should process the information of the bank 
profile correctly (Crockett, 2002). Unrestricted open capital markets are required for 
effective market discipline and to enable depositors to access the needed information. 
Therefore, proposals that enhance bank disclosure may improve depositors' ability to 
recognise changes in bank condition, thereby market discipline works earlier and in an 
efficient way, increasing the incentives for banks to raise their internal controls and 
31 Since this paper focuses on depositors' discipline, we will concentrate on depositors as the main market 
discipline player. 
32 It is important to note here that there are some depositors/ individuals that need to be protected for 
social, political, or ethical reasons. Hence, for a successful policy proposal a trade-off between protection 
costs and benefits needs to be evaluated (see Lane, 1993 and Calomiris, 1999). Recently new designs of 
deposit insurance have been aimed at achieving such aims including: co- insurance, risk related deposits 
insurance premiums and restricting protection to "Widows and Orphans" (Hamalainen et al., 2005) 
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monitor bank management practices. In this context, information that is relevant, 
reliable, sufficient, and of the appropriate quality, is needed at the right time (Berger 
1991, Lane 1993 and Hamalainen et al., 2005). At this stage, if market discipline is 
effective, depositors monitor the risk profile of the financial institution and without 
delay impound any changes in the firm's condition in deposit rates demanded. This is 
termed the "price effect" by Park and Peristiani (1998, p 349). This may also correspond 
to adjusting the results of the amount of deposits held at banks causing what is termed 
the "quantity effect". 
On the other hand, if depositors cannot effectively assess bank risk, inaccurate signals 
will be transmitted to banks. Cordella and Levy-Yeyati (1998) illustrate the effects of 
limited or no disclosure and deposit insurance on banks' risk-taking behaviour. They 
find that if depositors cannot observe bank risk, they will be unable to practise market 
discipline. They cannot reward low risk banks with lower interest rates and therefore 
banks will have less incentive to spend resources on monitoring or selecting their 
customers in order to obtain high quality loan portfolios. In addition, they show that 
deposit insurance affects price competition and reduces risk-monitoring by banks. On 
the other hand, depositors who can recognise more risky banks will ask for higher 
interest rates or compensation. Good disclosure will help in pricing bank risk-taking and 
this will force banks to move towards quality competition that lowers their risk profits. 
VanHoose (2007) argues that the response or reaction of depositors may take one of two 
forms. First, depositors can respond to changes in banks' conditions by reducing the 
quantity of fund supplied to the bank or be willing to continue supplying the same 
quantity of fund at a higher rate of return, which is what VanHoose term as an 
incentives margin. Second, they may react by cutting off their supply of funds to the 
insolvent bank, known as the extensive margin. 
However, it is important to note here that for effective market discipline, the market 
should process information efficiently. Markets need to be efficient in the sense that 
prices reflect the risk characteristics of individual banks. As noted by Llewellyn (2005), 
bad bank regulation, such as the imposition of inappropriate capital requirements, may 
create distortions in the banking industry, such as mis-pricing of risks or mis-allocation 
of capital, which can affect efficiency and consumer welfare. 
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2.3.2. The Control Stage 
If market participants effectively recognise that they are at increased risk due to bank 
risk taking behaviour, and then they react to adjust the cost and availability of funds in a 
manner that reduces underlying bank risks, the market will achieve what is called the 
control stage. In this stage, market participants will affect the financial institution 
directly or indirectly. Consequently, the true risk control, as argued by Lane (1993), 
depends on whether the bank responds to the market signals and responds in a way 
consistent with their solvency. Flannery (2001) defines this stage as a market influence 
which is the ability of market participants to affect a firm's financial decisions. 
Hamalainen (2006) argues that the influence of market participants on bank risk-taking 
should be analysed with regard to the relationship between market participants and the 
bank. He proposes three market discipline signals (and actions) that can be used to 
explore the effectiveness of market discipline. 
First, direct market discipline is the direct pressure that occurs in the primary market 
caused by market participants. The action involves a direct response from market 
participants through the cost and the quantity of funding. In this market discipline the 
signalling and the action occur concurrently and are carried out by the same market 
participants. Hence, investors (debt or equity holders) would be successful in exercising 
market discipline if the bank's cost or ability of funding is affected. 
Second, semi-direct market discipline exists through internal parties (bank 
management). In this type of market discipline action, current investors aim to control 
bank management risk-taking through signalling changes in price or selling 
(withdrawal) of their investments. Unlike direct action, the existing debt holders will 
have more ability to influence management behaviour than primary market participants 
(potential investors). For instance equity holders have voting rights, and bond holders 
may have covenants attached to their holdings. 
Third, indirect market discipline occurs when the recognition of risk results in signals 
that are used by other parties (e. g. regulatory authorities) to initiate disciplinary action 
against banks. Hamalainen (2006) describes this stage further as the ability of the third 
party to extract signals that initiate action from either the primary market (changes in 
yield spreads), or secondary market discipline (the availability of new funds). 
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Additionally, signalling and actions are performed by different market participants in 
this type of discipline. On the other hand, market discipline signals and the supervisors' 
reactions may complement each other. Although supervisors and regulators may have 
more confidential information reported to them about the bank, they may lack the fine 
transactional information that comes from repeated market interaction. Thus, 
depositors' reactions towards insolvent banks can push supervisors to act appropriately 
and stop bank runs quickly. 
Actual risk control and the successful control stage depends heavily on whether the 
bank and its management react to the signals and behave in a manner consistent with the 
banks overall solvency. So there is a need for managers to respond to market prices and 
quantity signals. Lane (1993) suggests that borrowers may not respond to market signals 
Nevertheless; if managers do not respond to signals received from the market and then 
do not change behaviour, market discipline will not be effective. Such management 
incentives and responses may be induced by the incentive structures faced by bank 
managers (Llewellyn, 2005). 
For example, incentive structures may be affected when managers adopt short-term 
behaviour or when management rewards depend on generating business volume. 
Incentive structures aim to ensure that the responsibility for the prudent management of 
banks lies firmly with management, and will ensure that bank stakeholders will have the 
ability to impose conditions that restrict or control these activities. Furthermore, a 
strong corporate governance environment should also ensure that bank management has 
the right incentive contracts to manage the bank in a responsible fashion (BIS, 1997). 
On the whole, for market discipline to work effectively, depositors (market participants) 
and managers should have adequate incentives to respond to the changes in bank 
condition and market signals, respectively. The incentives of both parties may be 
induced by timely publication of relevant, reliable and high quality information about 
the condition of the bank. In addition, any factors that reduce the incentives of 
depositors to conduct monitoring, such as regulatory rescue in the case of bank failure, 
should be removed, and strong corporate governance would be recommended to boost 
management response. An active market with sufficiently well informed players will 
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result in accurate signals being absorbed directly or indirectly by the bank management 
to correct the bank risk profile. 
2.4. Market Discipline in Emerging Markets 
The occurrence of various emerging market banking crises has motivated regulators to 
investigate the use of policies based on market discipline in order to encourage banks to 
behave in a prudent way. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), in their cross country 
study for instance, have found that the risk of hosting a banking crisis is influenced by 
factors such as macroeconomic imbalances (slow growth, high inflation), inadequate 
market discipline (which they attribute to the presence of deposit insurance and weak 
institutions), and liberalisation (as an indication of the removal of interest rate controls). 
In addition, financial instability may also have arisen as a consequence of financial 
globalisation. Many emerging markets have realised the positive effects of financial 
globalisation on economic growth by reducing capital transactions costs and increasing 
the amount of capital availability. International organizations such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) in addition to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), promote 
globalisation in emerging markets. (See Mishkin (2007) for a recent analysis of 
globalization in emerging markets). 
However, among the negative consequences of globalisation have been the emergence 
of contagion effects, expected outflows of investment capital, and the increased risk of 
foreign exchange crises (Kim, 2003). Maintaining sound financial regulation through 
market discipline may therefore be one of the important steps to reduce possible 
negative effects of globalisation. 
Although, evidence suggests that market discipline may exist in emerging markets (see, 
for example, Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001), whether it works well as a tool for 
controlling banks risk-taking behaviour is open to debate. This is because policies and 
recommendations relating to the implementation of market oriented regulation may 
appear straight forward in emerging markets, but a successful implementation of such 
policies may prove more difficult ( Levy-Yeyati et al., 2003). 
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Vives (2006) suggests that in emerging market economies the asymmetric information 
problems are more real. He argues that the production of information is more 
problematic due to special institutional factors". Lack of sufficient information, weak 
disclosure rules and accounting standards, small bank size and relatively high fixed 
costs of information production all aggravate asymmetric information problems. Such 
asymmetries affect the development of the financial system. 
The traditional deposit and lending functions of banks is typically more important in 
emerging economies (Allen and Santomero, 2001) than the developed economies and 
banks remains central to the financial system overall. In fact, in emerging markets, the 
main source of external financing is bank loans. This issue has a direct effect on the 
relationship between banking system development and economic development. Bank 
fragility, therefore, can have a bigger effect on emerging economies 34 
In emerging economies, debt and equity issuance is likely to be less than in the 
developed economies and the secondary markets tend to be thin (Levy-Yeyati et al., 
2004). Also, the responsibility for the generation of information and the role of contract 
enforcement lie relatively more on financial institutions than markets (Vives, 2006). 
Thus, price and quantity signals from market participants may become noisy signals of 
the underlying bank condition, reducing their potential as a market discipline tool. 
Accordingly, many practitioners think that as markets plainly do not function well in 
low income countries, then it must be the case that where market discipline also does 
not work these countries need to rely more heavily on capital and regulatory supervision. 
In this context, Caprio and Honohan (2004) have argued that offsetting factors to the 
weaker market and formal information infrastructures in emerging markets are due to 
the less complex character of banking business in low-income countries, the growing 
internationalisation of these markets through the presence of foreign banks involved in 
33 Llewellyn (2005) divides market impediment factors into structural and policy induced factors. 
Structural factors are institutional factors, policy induced factors refer to monitors' protection that may 
affect the market discipline functioning. 
34 In fact, since banks are the main creators of liquidity, they will be more in danger of deposit runs. At 
the base of a bank run is the coordination problem of depositors who may be able to turn a sound 
bank 
into a failed one when they decide to call back their short term deposits. The banking 
literature 
summarises two views of crises: the multiple equilibrium panic view (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) which 
relates bank run to events unrelated to bank fundamentals, and the information based view 
(Gorton 1985, 
and 1988, and Jaklin and Bhattacharya (1988) which relates bank runs to 
bad news about the assets of the 
bank. Recently, these views have been developed by linking the probability of a run to the strength of 
fundamentals (Morris and Shin 2000, and Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005). 
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international trading of the debt and equity of locally-controlled non-government banks: 
and, the smaller size of the business and financial community. For these reasons, most 
existing studies of market discipline in emerging economies focus on the behaviour of 
depositors. 
Moreover, given the disappointing record of governments around the world as monitors 
of their self-owned banks, the continuing dominance of the public sector in some 
emerging economies limits the likely development of market monitoring. (Caprio and 
Honohan, 2004)35. Furthermore, Levy-Yeyati et al., (2004) suggest that government 
ownership of banks is an institutional factor which affects market discipline for a 
number of reasons, firstly government owned banks restrict stockholder monitoring and 
they are not publicly held. Secondly, due to the size of state banks and their role as 
vehicles for political lending, state banks are usually assumed to be protected by 
implicit government guarantees or even explicit protection. 
Regulatory policies may play a critical role in reducing market discipline. In general, 
the aim of regulation is to provide the banking and financial system with stability and 
avoid the negative effects associated with failing institutions and systemic crises, and to 
protect small investors from losses. On the other hand, if the losses that are likely to be 
incurred with the failed bank are low due to regulatory protection policies, incentives 
for depositors and banks to incur costly monitoring are also weakened. As previously 
noted, too-big-to-fail protection, generous deposit insurance schemes, forbearance and a 
policy history of bailouts seem to be more prevalent in emerging economies because of 
their high systemic risk and expected contagion effects. However, because this 
protection tends to be under-funded, their creditability is likely to be questioned 
especially at a time of systemic crisis. In this context, Martinez Peria and Schmukler 
(2001) find evidence of comparable market responses among insured and uninsured 
depositors in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico which they attribute to the lack of 
confidence in the existing insurance schemes or implicit guarantees due to lack of 
funding or long delays in repayments. 
3s As stated in Levy-Yeyati et al., (2003) using data collected by Barth, et al., (2001), the percentage of 
banking system assets that are 50% or more government -owned average 23% among emerging 
economies, while the corresponding statistics are 11 % for high income OECD countries and 8.5° p for 
high income OECD countries. 
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Generally, the ex-ante involvement of bank regulators (mainly central banks) in 
emerging and developed markets in dealing with banking sector problems usually takes 
the following forms: the central bank may want to commit to closure if bank returns are 
low, signalling a solvency problem, and help the bank if returns are only moderately 
low, signalling a liquidity problem. Such a commitment provides incentives to bank 
managers to behave prudently in managing bank risk. However, costly liquidations 
may not be optimal so regulators may neglect the choice of carrying out bank closures, 
therefore damaging their credibility. Vives (2006) argues that it is difficult for central 
banks in emerging markets to build a reputation for disciplining banks because the 
central banker's effective horizon is short as a result of political instability and the lack 
of protection for banks supervisors who attempt to impose discipline. 36 
Another distinctive factor affecting market discipline in emerging markets is the high 
uncertainty relating to economic volatility. Emerging countries experience greater 
macroeconomic volatility with greater swings in external flows and higher vulnerability 
to external shocks. Also, these countries are typically exposed to larger exchange rate 
risks, more systemic (non-diversifiable) risks in their bank loan portfolios which require 
more skilful management and monitoring by banking system supervisors37. Moreover, 
weak domestic currencies can often lead to the dollarisation of domestic savings or to 
the shortening of deposits ready for foreign currency transformation. This link between 
exchange rate and currency rollover risks tends to cause systemic financial fragility 
(Vives, 2006). 
Additionally, emerging markets economies tend to have a weak supervisory structure. 
According to Vives (2006, p. 10), `Supervisors are either more easily corrupted, because 
of the lack of resources and low salaries, or more vulnerable to retribution if they do not 
acquiesce to the demands of lobbies, because of the lack of effective legal protection. ' 
On the other hand, conventional government regulation of banks may backfire because 
regulators maybe incompetent or corrupt. Instead of protecting the public interest, 
regulators often end up saving the banking industry and its political supporters. This is 
36 Cukierman (1992, Chapter 19) gives an example of Argentina in the 1980s where the average term in 
office for a central bank governor was less than a year while the legal term was 4 years. 
37 For more information of regulation in emerging market (see Vives, 2006; and Levy-Yeyati et al., 
2003). 
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illustrated by the fact that about two thirds of low and medium income countries have 
experienced major banking crises over the last 30 years costing their governments as 
much as 50% of their GDP (for example, a study by IMF (1998) indicates that the 
Argentina crises which occurred in 1980 and 1985 cost up to 55% of the country's 
GDP)38. 
In this context, Barth et al., (2006) support the view that increasing the powers of 
official bank supervisors in developing countries does not reduce the likelihood of 
banking crises nor does it compensate for reduced private sector monitoring caused by 
deposit insurance. So the question arises here is: Is there any chance for market 
discipline to work and support capital requirements and supervision in emerging 
markets in order to derive a safer and sounder banking system? 
It has been noted that while there are clear limitations to the usefulness of market 
discipline (for example due to, institutional factors, inadequate regulatory policies, lack 
of accurate information), still there is a chance for the market to participate in 
improving the condition of banks as a complement to capital requirements and other 
types of supervision. (See the next section for some empirical evidence on market 
discipline). 
The global trend is towards placing increased emphasis on market discipline in the 
supervisory process (Ward, 2002). Given that capital markets are underdeveloped 
probably the best channel to discipline banks is via the role of depositors who are 
present in all countries and should be more aware of the riskness of banks that operate 
in volatile economic environments. A key factor in assessing the likely effectiveness of 
depositor monitoring is the nature of the informational environment. Timely and 
accurate information to guide market participants is an essential prerequisite for 
effective market discipline39. Flannery (2001) specifies that market information may 
help to produce a more efficacious application of supervisory influence either by 
supplementing supervisors' assessments of bank condition, or by replacing supervisory 
38 Bank crises, of course, also occur in high income countries, such as the US Savings and Loan crises in 
the United States in which around 3000 banks failed costing about $180 billion. 
39 The third pillar of the new Basel Accord (Market discipline) emphases disclosure should be made on a 
semi-annual basis and includes (among others): structure of the capital, and risk exposures and 
assessment. 
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discretion with a legislated rule. Additionally, disclosure requirements are almost 
certainly beneficial. Barth et al., (2001) find that regimes with higher levels of bank 
information disclosure have significantly lower levels of government corruption. On the 
other hand, disclosure may not have the desired disciplinary effect. A supply of accurate 
and timely information is necessary, but is not in itself sufficient to discipline bankers 
(Karacadag and Taylor, 2000). Therefore, one should realize that the importance of 
making market discipline more effective within the context of market safety nets is 
strongly influenced by the role played by public safety nets that obviously temper 
market discipline solutions. 
Bankers' incentives are the most important. Thus, public intervention should be 
designed so that bankers fear failure. `Risk-sensitive' capital requirements are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for incentive-compatibility. The stake of the government and 
market participants in the financial system are not perfectly aligned. Neither supervisors 
nor market participants are unambiguously more timely and accurate in their assessment 
of risk than others. All groups produce valuable complementary information that 
contributes towards improving the performance of banks (Berger et al., 2000). The idea 
is not that market monitoring can effectively replace official supervision, but that it has 
a potentially powerful role within the overall regulatory regime. In particular, it has the 
advantage of increasing the efficacy of the overall supervisory process. 
3. Literature Review 
Considerable efforts have been paid by researchers and supervisors to examine the 
existence of market discipline. In the market discipline framework, debt holders, 
depositors, and shareholders can put pressure on banks, decreasing the quantity of funds 
or raising the funding premium on debt, deposits, and equity. Since depositors are 
common to all banks in developed and developing countries, there is an argument in the 
literature that depositors may have the ability to share the burden with regulatory 
supervisors to increase the safe operation of the financial system. In contrast, 
shareholders incentives to increase their own profitability may outweigh their desire to 
decrease bank risk (Tsuru, 2003). The main reason for this is that the more risks banks 
take, the higher the expected return for shareholders. Park and Peristiani (2007) argue 
that shareholders can either be considered as `enemies' of regulators, 
by condoning 
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increased risk-taking on the part of banks with option values that exceeds their charter 
values, or `allies' for regulators by punishing risky strategies of low option value 
institutions. As a bank's risk of failure increases, equity holders may switch from ally to 
enemy status. Park and Peristiani use Tobin's Q to infer bank charter values, and argue 
that the burden of market discipline generally falls on the shoulders of debt holders. 
Therefore, the market discipline literature typically focuses on the reactions of private 
debt holders to bank actions40. In the following sections, previous evidence of market 
discipline will be analyzed 
3.1. Review of Empirical Evidence Concerning Market Discipline 
As long as there is heterogeneity across banks in terms of asset quality, earnings, 
liquidity, and capital structure, depositors can attempt to distinguish ex ante between 
healthy and weak banks. In general, early studies of market discipline extensively 
analysed the U. S. financial system (see Table 1 in Appendix 1.1 for a brief summary of 
previous studies). These studies can be divided into three main groups. The first group 
of studies (e. g. Crane, 1976; Hanan and Haweck, 1988; Goldberg and Loyd- Davies, 
1985; Baer and Brewer, 1986; Gilbert et al., 2001; Cargill 1989; Jajtiani and Lemieux 
2000; Morgan and Stiroh, 1999; and James, 1988) examine whether banks are penalised 
for increasing the default risk in their debt, in particular, they analyse how the yield on 
deposits responds to the changes in bank conditions (price based approach). This strand 
of the literature has largely concentrated on developed countries banking systems. The 
literature provides evidence that the interest rate paid on unsecured deposits is sensitive 
to various bank risks related to bank fundamentals, measured by items such as the level 
of non-performing loans, various liquidity indicators or bank profitability. Furthermore, 
evidence of market discipline has been indicated indirectly. For example, Berger et al. 
(1995) found a positive relationship between capital and earnings of US banks in the 
1980s. 
The second group of studies (such as, Goldberg and Hudgins, 1996; Crabbe and Post 
1994; Billet et al., 1998, and Calomiris and Wilson, 1998) examined whether changes in 
bank fundamentals caused withdrawal's of debt (quantity approach). This approach is 
based on the assumption that if asymmetric information exists, prices may fail to reflect 
ao Since our study focus is on depositors' discipline we will pay more attention to this type of market 
discipline literature. 
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the degree of riskiness and banks may tend to be disciplined by quantity rather than 
price effects. When bank fundamentals suggest greater risk-taking, depositors tend to 
withdraw their funds from riskier banks, which make it difficult for them to raise 
additional funds (deposits). Again the aforementioned studies support the existence of 
this type of discipline. 
The third group of studies combines the two approaches. Studies which use this 
approach demonstrate that riskier banks offer higher deposit rates but they are able to 
accumulate smaller amounts of deposits. Park and Peristiani (1998) show evidence of 
market discipline in the U. S. thrift industry throughout the 1980s, as depositors were 
shown to demand higher interest rates and deposit growth was shown to be lower as 
banks' activity became riskier. 
More recent studies (Morgan and Stiroh, 1999; Evanoff and Wall, 2000; Jagtiani et al., 
2002; Krishnan et al., 2003) follow the above approaches and test the correlation 
between market risk premiums on deposits, subordinated notes and debentures, and 
accounting measures of risk such as non performing-loans to total loans, loan loss- 
provisions, capital asset ratios, exposure to junk bonds, variability of return on assets, 
ratio of real estate loans to total loans, return on assets and variance to stock returns 
(Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 1998). Most of these studies find some evidence 
supporting the existence of market discipline by depositors. 
On the other hand, various studies used different statistical approaches to identify the 
existence of depositors' discipline. For example, Maechler and McDill (2006) used the 
Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) methodology to examine the dynamic 
relation between deposit quantity and the price of uninsured deposits using U. S. banks 
quarterly data from 1987-2000. They find that `good' banks can raise their level of 
uninsured deposits by increasing prices while weak banks cannot. They suggest that 
depositors discipline not only raises the cost of choosing a high level of risk but also 
may effectively restrict bank managers' behaviour. In fact, all previous studies examine 
the issue of market discipline by analysing the effects of bank risk and solvency 
(independent variables) on deposit growth or interest paid to depositors' (dependent 
variables) individually or together using one or two equation structural models. In most 
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cases, bank fundamentals are used for the purpose of estimating the probability of 
default. 41 
Additionally, the market discipline literature has been expanded from contemporaneous 
affirmation to forecasting, in order to explore whether information in current-prices 
corresponds to future outcomes. Some researchers have argued that the prices of 
subordinated debentures reflect not only the current condition of financial firms, but 
also their future condition. Evanoff and Wall (2001), for example, argue that analysis 
of the forecasting ability of subordinated debenture credit spreads demonstrates that 
these can explain next quarter regulatory ratings better than capital ratios. Furthermore, 
Kramer and Lopez (2004), added that subordinated debentures can improve the 
forecasting accuracy of supervisory rating models four quarters prior to inspection, and 
they are more closely correlated with bank risk measures in the 12 months prior to bank 
failure. 
Jagtiani and Lemieux's (2001) study focused on pricing behaviour when bank 
organisations face financial difficulties. Their sample consisted of banks that failed 
during the period 1980 to 1995, whose parent bank holding company had publicly 
traded bonds outstanding during the recent quarters prior to failure. This study found 
that bond prices were related to the financial condition of the issuing bank holding 
companies, and that bond spreads started to rise as early as six quarters prior to failure 
as the issuing firm's financial condition and credit ratings deteriorated. On the other 
hand, Jagtiani and Lemieux found no evidence of market discipline in the uninsured CD 
market for a sample of bank holding companies (BHCs) with failing subsidiaries. 
Besides the literature that has examined market discipline in the US financial system, 
the literature on evidence of market discipline in other countries has become more 
widespread recently. Birchler and Maechler (2001), for example, study the presence of 
market discipline in Swiss banking. They empirically test if depositors exert market 
discipline by monitoring their banks and by withdrawing uninsured deposits whenever 
their bank risks increase. Using data from 250 Swiss banks for the period from 1987- 
1998, their results support the existence of depositors' discipline. Additionally, they 
41 Bank fundamentals which indicate bank risk and solvency are related to CAMEL variables: non 
performing loans as a ratio of total loans, loan loss provisions, the capital to assets ratio, management 
efficiency ratio and liquidity ratios. 
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find that depositors respond to changes in deposit protection and they are sensitive to 
institutional differences across banking groups. 
Moreover, the existence of depositor discipline in Japan has recently been studied 
following the Big Bang reforms in 1996. Using data from 1991 to 2001, Hosono (2003) 
finds that there is a relationship between interest rates, the growth of deposits and 
factors affecting bank-specific risks. He found that among regional banks, both interest 
rates and growth of deposits are significantly correlated with bank risk measures. 
However, for major Japanese banks, interest rates are not significantly correlated and 
growth rates of deposits are weakly correlated with risk measures. More recently, 
Murata and Hori (2006) focus on small Japanese banks. Their findings show that riskier 
institutions attract smaller amounts of deposits and are required to pay higher interest 
rates; they also find that changes in deposit maturity structures also occur in response to 
increases in risks. Additionally, Spiegel and Yamori (2007) have studied the impact of 
Japanese regional bank market pricing decisions on the intensity of depositors discipline 
using the quantity approach. They find that market discipline was greater for banks that 
adopted market price accounting. 
Overall, the bulk of the empirical evidence appears to suggest that market discipline is 
apparent in developed banking systems; however, it is not entirely clear that it is present 
in developing countries. In particular, banks in the developed countries might be subject 
to greater market discipline than in developing countries since they are subject to more 
stringent reporting requirements and their debt holders might be more sophisticated. 
Given the substantial number of financial crises, that have occurred in developing 
countries over the last two decades, there has been growing policy and academic interest 
in the role of market participants ( particularly depositors) acting as monitors of bank 
risk-taking behaviour42. The history of relatively weak regulatory and supervisory 
systems, and the recurrence of banking crises in the developing world, it has been 
argued, may in fact increase debt holders' incentives to monitor their banks. 
Consequently, researchers have begun to investigate evidence of depositor discipline in 
these markets. While some studies use country level data (e. g. Levy-Yeyati et al., 2004; 
42 For instance, the Mexican Crisis in 1995, Asian crisis in 1997, Japan in late 1990s, and Turkey during 
early 2000s. 
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Calomiris and Powell 2001; D'Amato et al., 1997, Barajas and Steiner 2000) others 
undertake cross-country studies (e. g. Martinez Peria and Schmukler 2001; Arena 2003, 
and Galindo et al 2005). 
The conclusion of the ability of depositors to discipline bank behaviour has been 
supported by a series of studies on various developing countries. For example, 
depositors' behaviour towards bank's risks has been found in Bolivia (Ioannidou and de 
Dreu, 2006), Colombia (Barajas and Steiner, 2000), India (Ghosh and Das, 2003), 
Turkey (Ungan and Caner, 2006), Russia (Karas et al., 2006), and Uruguay (Goday and 
Gruss, 2005), [see Appendix 1.1 Table 1 for a brief summary of these studies]. 
In contrast, Arena (2003) estimates depositor behaviour and market discipline for a 
range of Latin American and Asian emerging economies. He estimated bank risk as a 
measure of various bank fundamentals and considered market discipline as the reaction 
of depositors to bank risk-taking in the form of either demanding higher interest rates or 
deposit withdrawals. The study finds mixed evidence for the existence of market 
discipline. Additionally, Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) analysed depositors' 
behaviour in Argentina, Chile and Mexico. They examined two issues. First, they 
examined depositors' discipline and its relation to deposit insurance schemes in these 
countries. They found evidence of depositor discipline for both small and large insured 
deposits as well as for uninsured deposits. Second, they link market discipline and 
banking crises, showing that large systemic effects take place during crises, affecting 
deposits and interest rates across banks regardless of their fundamentals. They find that 
banking crises are a "wake-up call" for depositors exerting a greater impact on their 
behaviour. Moreover, Gruben et al., (2003) study six countries (Argentina, Canada, 
Mexico, Norway, Texas and Singapore) and find evidence that market discipline and 
bank risk were persistently inversely related and measures of bank risk increased 
significantly in the aftermath of liberalization (but only where depositors fail to 
discipline banks). Galindo et al., (2005) used a more comprehensive bank data set from 
13 Latin American and Caribbean countries during the period 1992 to 2002 finding 
evidence consistent with the existence of market discipline in those countries. 
Cross-country studies such as those by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004), and 
Hosono et al., (2004) find that many countries around the world retain some degree of 
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depositor discipline; however the level of that discipline depends on bank regulation, 
deposit insurance and the level of financial development. They show that the quantity 
based approach is more appropriate for developing economies because of the lack of 
transparency and information asymmetry problems in markets, which makes interest 
rates less likely to reflect information about bank risk. In contrast, they recommend that 
both price and quantity effects are more likely to be important in developed countries. 
Consistent with this argument, Karas et al., (2005,2006) uses data from Russian banks 
during 1999 to 2002 and demonstrates the existence of strong market discipline by 
quantity but only weaker price effects. When Wilson et al., (2004) limited their analysis 
to depositors' price effects they failed to find evidence of depositors' discipline. In 
contrast, Hess and Feng (2006) find that risky non-bank financial institutions in New 
Zealand have to offer higher interest premiums with higher insolvency probability, on 
the other hand they find that depositors tend not to reward these institutions for better 
quality of information disclosure. 
While most of the previous literature concentrates on examining depositor discipline by 
uninsured depositors few studies recognize that even small insured depositors have the 
ability to encourage banks to reduce risk-taking behaviour. According to Flannery 
(1998), depositors are concerned not only with the solvency of individual banks but also 
with the solvency of the deposit insurer. In many emerging markets, depositors do not 
perceive that insured deposits are perfectly safe. Hence, even insured depositors may 
penalise riskier banks by requiring higher interest rates or withdrawing their deposits 
43 due to exposure to greater bank-risk taking (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991) 
3.2. Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance and Crises 
Theoretically, there are two opposing debates regarding the need to insure depositors. 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) have argued that the main objective of deposits insurance 
is to protect the system from bank runs. An alternative view from Kareken and Wallace 
(1978) claims that, under certain assumptions, there is no need for deposit insurance if 
creditors are fully informed and can know what portfolios banks are holding, and then 
43 Zarruk (1989) indicates that bank's spread increase with the amount of equity capital and decrease with 
deposits variability. Using a theoretical model he shows that bank's spread is an increasing function of the 
deposit insurance premium for the case of non decreasing absolute risk aversion. 
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bank runs will not exist. However, if creditors do not have full information, a bank can 
increase risk without necessary increases in costs. Due to fact that obtaining information 
is costly, creditors cannot reduce this asymmetric information. 
Consequently, some studies examine the role of deposit insurance systems and their 
influence on the bank deposit market. While financial systems are liberalised and rely 
more on market forces, deposit insurance (following the Diamond and Dybvig view) 
can lower the probability of systemic bank runs. Deposit insurance systems might be an 
efficient tool in preventing bank runs, as they can reduce the incentives to withdraw 
deposits. On the other hand, it has been argued that deposit insurance systems reduce 
incentives for depositors to monitor banks and this reduces the degree of deposit 
discipline. Thus, the main problem created by deposit insurance is a problem of moral 
hazard. Even those depositors who are able to exercise pressure on banks would not do 
so because of the expected repayments in the case of bank failure. In this context, 
Demirgus-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) have investigated the importance of bank 
fragility when the extent and coverage of deposit insurance increases. Based on a 
sample of 61 countries, exhibiting varying degrees of coverage in their deposit 
insurance systems for 1980-1997, they find that bank fragility increases as deposit 
insurance schemes becomes more explicit and extensive. This suggests that moral 
hazard effects may dominate the stabilising effects deposit insurance has on the risk of 
banks runs. In addition, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga (2004), suggest that explicit 
deposit insurance reduces required deposit interest rates, while at the same time it 
lowers market discipline with regard to bank risk-taking. 
In fact, deposit insurance schemes vary widely in their coverage, funding, and 
management. Therefore, the effect of deposit insurance may vary across countries. For 
example, Gropp and Vesala (2000), in contrast to the aforementioned studies, find that 
moral hazard was reduced after deposit insurance was introduced in the EU, since 
depositors had previously held expectations of a much more extensive implicit safety 
net. Calomiris and Mason (2003) noted that the functioning of depositor discipline was 
improved in the U. S. during the era of the Great Depression (1929 to 1933), compared 
to the 1997 Asian crises or the crisis in Japan during the 1990s, because of the absence 
of deposit insurance. They argued that US banks had to improve their asset portfolios 
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rapidly by shifting toward low-risk assets while substantially cutting dividends 
(Calomiris and Wilson 1998)44 
Nevertheless, the reduction of market discipline by the introduction of deposit insurance 
systems is the main empirical finding from the aforementioned literature. However, the 
main argument under this view is that with deposit insurance, depositors do not 
distinguish a safe bank from a risky one and hence do not pressure bank managers to 
avoid excessive risks. Thus, deposit insurance is blamed for increasing the incentives of 
banks to handle high risk because it reduces the link between a banks' risk of default 
and its funding costs since the deposit insurer will be available to pay for depositors in 
the case of bank failure (Kane, 1989). 
However, this assumption is questionable. If the restitution procedure takes a 
considerable amount of time and effort, or if there is a risk that deposits are not 
reimbursed, then depositors who are protected by deposit insurance may behave 
sensitively to bank risk (Cook and Spellman, 1994). For example, in a case study of the 
Comptroller of the Currency's corrective actions against the U. S. Hamilton Bank 
between 2000 and its failure in 2002, Davenport and McDill (2006) argue that holders 
of uninsured deposits were particularly sensitive to news of the bank's conditions. 
Imai (2006) found that deposit insurance reform in Japan in 2002 (from full to limited 
insurance) worked well in increasing market discipline. However, he argued that failure 
to eliminate the too-big-to-fail policy partially reduced the positive effect of the deposit 
insurance reform. Nier and Baumann (2006) estimate the amount of deposit discipline 
across 32 countries between 1993 and 2000, they found that when banks enjoy high 
degrees of government support the effect of uninsured funding is reduced and only 
limited market discipline appears to exist. 
Although some argued that even fully insured depositors will respond to bank risk if 
deposit insurers face financial difficulties (e. g. Kane, 1987; Cook and Spellman, 1991; 
Park and Peristiani, 1998), others, such as Ioannidou and Dreu (2006), noted that 
"overly generous" deposit insurance systems (or open ended implicit guarantees) have 
44 Calomiris and Mason (2003) noted that the direct cost of bailing out insolvent banks during the U. S 
Great Depression was 3% of GDP, compared to 20% during Asian currency crisis in 1997 and 30% for 
Japan loan write off problems during the late 1990s. 
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the potential to eliminate depositor discipline completely (especially if this occurs in a 
weak environment of bank regulation and supervision systems). This weakness in the 
financial system may lead to substantial social costs as a result of serious financial 
crises. Ioannidou and Dreu examined the direct effect of deposit insurance design on 
market discipline and show that the effect of deposit insurance depends on the coverage 
rate. When the coverage exceeds 60% of depositors discipline significantly reduces. 
One can wonder here if the findings of a negative effect of deposits insurance on market 
discipline are common to all banks or whether it is affected by institutional factors 
specific to individual countries. In this context, Budnevich and Franken (2003) find 
evidence supporting the argument that deposit insurance does not appear to reduce 
market discipline because of the institutional arrangement of deposit insurance (e. g. 
length of payment, credibility and coverage). 
Regarding the relation between depositor discipline and crises, research results have 
conflicting conclusions. Martinez Peria and Schmuckler (2001) and Hosono et al., 
(2005) have argued that market discipline increased after the Asian crises. In contrast, 
Urgan and Caner (2006), found evidence of market discipline before the crisis in Turkey 
(which occurred in 2001) but not after the crisis. They argued that the reliance on 
government support after the crisis limited the depositors' incentives to monitor banks' 
behaviour. Nier and Baumann (2006) find that in countries which experience crises, the 
presence of market discipline provides strong incentives for banks to manage their risks 
and market discipline is more effective in curbing risk-taking incentives in countries 
where competition among banks is strong. Particularly, they find that disclosure 
requirements boost banks' capital positions. 
Recent studies have concentrated on the importance of reliable information in 
encouraging effective market discipline. Podpiera (2006), for instance, finds evidence 
using panel data from 65 nations' banking systems during the 1998 to 2002 period that 
improved systems for disclosure of financial information do appear to promote safer 
banking systems. A clear understanding of how banks adjust their condition in response 
to changes in their environment is an important issue for regulators and policy makers. 
Hence, depositors may have the power to constrain default risk on deposits. The 
literature on bank modelling identifies that depositors not only emphasize pricing 
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default risk, but also act to limit it (Calomiris and Powell, 2001). In other words they are 
`risk-tolerant' in addition to being "risk-averse" (Calomiris and Wilson, 1998). Bank 
depositors delegate the monitoring of bank borrowers to their banks. However, as the 
level of default risk on deposits increases, depositors become less liquid, which may 
increase the agency problems inherent in delegated monitoring. Naturally, these 
problems will cause a type of quantity rationing. Depositors will penalize risky banks 
by withdrawing their deposits. Banks which suffer these shocks face a strong incentive 
to reduce asset risk or increase the quality of their assets and capital in order to avoid 
disciplinary withdrawals of funds by depositors (Calomiris and Wilson, 1998). 
3.3. Bank Response to Depositor Discipline 
In fact, as has been argued by Berger (1991), Bliss and Flannery (2002), Hamalainen et 
al., (2005), and Hamalainen (2006), the previous literature focuses primarily on whether 
bank liability prices or quantities are affected by changes in bank risk. However, the 
extent to which the existence of effective market discipline actually influences bank 
behaviour (the so called control stage) has taken a back stage; (see Figure 2.1 for 
illustration of the control stage). While Bliss and Flannery (2001) and Billet et al., 
(1998) fail to find any evidence of management response to changes in bank holding 
companies' security prices, and bond ratings (respectively), Calomiris and Powell 
(2001), Crabbe and Post ( 1994), and Nier and Baumann (2006), find evidence that bank 
management respond to market discipline by decreasing their risk. Calomiris and 
Powell (2001) argue that even if there is evidence that depositors choose banks 
according to their financial fundamentals, it does not necessarily mean that market 
discipline exists. It must also be true that banks are effectively disciplined in that they 
react appropriately by adjusting their fundamentals in response to the signals provided 
by depositors. Barajas and Steiner (2000) tested the direct response of various bank 
fundamental variables for a study of Colombian banks and they suggest that the 
existence of market discipline where depositors' behaviour responded to 
bank 
fundamentals and this sends signals to banks who then adjust their positions 
accordingly. 
While most of the empirical literature finds evidence of market discipline, the 
degree to 
which depositors can exert an influence on bank 
behaviour and impact of deposit 
insurance arrangements is likely to be country specific. The issue of whether market 
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discipline exists or not is an empirical question and we cannot assume that it exists 
within a specified- banking system without such evidence. Some factors, such as 
depositors' culture, may affect depositors' reactions differently in each country. 
Furthermore, the ability of depositors to analyse financial information may vary 
between countries. Even if depositors are informed, they might not be sophisticated 
enough to utilise such information. One may expect market discipline to be more 
prevalent in developed countries because of the greater sophistication of depositors and 
easier access to financial information. Given these factors, we would argue that country 
specific studies are likely to be more accurate (and preferred) compared with cross 
country analysis. 
The reminder of this paper aims to contribute to the above literature by providing a 
comprehensive view of the role of market discipline in the Jordanian banking system. 
First, we will provide a brief overview of the key characteristics of the Jordanian 
banking system. Second, we will examine whether depositors discipline banks in 
Jordan. Third, following Calomiris and Powell (2001), we will examine whether banks 
efficiently respond to the signals provided by depositors. Therefore, this study will 
analyse whether depositor discipline is sufficient to ensure the appropriate risk decisions 
of bankers. Finally, we aim to test for the effects on market discipline from the 
introduction of a deposit insurance scheme, and the effects of the twin financial crises 
(currency devaluation and the Petra Bank failure in 1989) on depositors' behaviour will 
be examined. 
4. Jordanian Banking System, Regulation, and Deposit Insurance 
4.1. Jordanian Banking System and Regulation 
Three different groups of domestic banks operate in Jordan, commercial banks, 
investment banks, and Islamic banks. All banks are subject to similar regulatory and 
market conditions, and operate under the universal banking principle45. As of 2005, the 
45 The introduction of the banking system in Jordan dates back to the early 1920s when the British entity, 
the Ottoman Bank, opened in Jordan and acted as a fiscal agent to the government before establishing the 
Central Bank of Jordan. Then the Arab Bank was established in 1936. The next foreign bank was the 
British Bank of the Middle East in 1949. After the number of bank offices operating in Jordan reached 
five steps were taken to establish a currency board to create a local currency that would replace the 
Palestinian Pound (Mohammed 1994). Between 1955 and 1960 three additional banks were established, 
the National Bank, the Cairo Amman Bank, and the Bank of Jordan. By 1970, the number of 
banks 
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banking system comprised 21 banks (including five branches of foreign banks), five 
investment banks, two Islamic banks and one Industrial Development Bank (IDB). All 
banks are permitted to accept deposits and extend loans and credit facilities in domestic 
and foreign currencies. Commercial banks practise all banking business; investment 
banks practise financial investment and commercial activities in addition to brokerage 
services on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) (Isik et al., 2004). 
However, investment banks are not permitted to extend overdraft facilities. Islamic 
banks accept deposits and extend loans, but do not pay interest on deposits and collect 
no interest on loans. Instead they make equity investments in companies and share 
profits and losses with depositors. In this framework, Islamic banks are essentially an 
equity based system, where equity capital is provided by the depositors who receive no 
fixed interest on their funds but a dividend out of the bank's profit (Hassan, 1999). 
Moreover, the IDB specialises in the provision of medium-term financing (including 
project finance) to industry. Banks in Jordan have a total of around 470 branches in 
2005 serving a population of 5.3 million, approximately one branch for every 10,000 
inhabitants. The Arab Bank, the Housing Bank, and the Jordan National Bank are the 
three largest banks in the country, accounting for 73% of banking sector assets at the 
end of 2004. The Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ), established in 1964, is the banking 
system's regulatory authority. Banks' total assets in 2003 amounted to 222.5% of GDP 
(CBJ 2004, p 25). However, Jordanian banks hold a large proportion of their assets in 
currency deposits in foreign banks. This indicates that Jordanian banks are conservative 
in managing their resources. 
The main source of banks' funds is deposits. As is apparent in Table 1.1 deposits 
represented 75.52% of total banks balance sheet in 2005. Deposits during the past 
decade have risen dramatically. The increase was mainly in the deposits of the private 
sector (residents) which accounted for about 74% of total deposits. However, during the 
twin crisis in 1989 depositors lost confidence in the banking system and this reflected in 
46 a decrease of deposits between 1989 and 1990. Moreover, demand deposits increased 
operating in Jordan amounted to eight commercial banks with about 41 total branches. Twenty years later, 
the number of banks has increased threefold, the total number of branches exceeded 500 in year 2006. 
46 In July 1989, the Jordanian government signed the first agreement with the IMF and the World Bank. 
Policy makers in Jordan have been encouraged to liberalise the financial sector, capital accounts, and the 
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in proportion relative to saving and time deposits. This may indicate that depositors 
preferred to hold shorter-term deposits when they felt their funds were at risk. 
Considering the recent maturity structure of deposits for 2004 and 2005, one can notice 
the increase in time deposits (10%) to 73.3% of total deposits in 2005. This was 
attributed to the increase in rates on time deposits which surpassed those on other types 
of deposits. It is important to note that in the early 1990s the CBJ issued orders 
canceling any limitations or restrictions in relation to deposit rates. All licensed banks in 
Jordan are now free to specify interest rates that apply to deposits (CBJ, 2006). 
When analysing the structure of deposits in terms of depositors, one can note that the 
rate of residents' deposits increased at a faster rate than for non-residents depositors. 
This indicates that Jordanian banks still depend primarily on residents' liquidity despite 
the substantial number of non- residents living in the country. Concerning interest rates 
on deposits, generally the interest rate on all types of deposits decreased between 2000 
and 2005 which may be due to a more stable economic environment. This fall in rates 
increased the incentive for households to look to alternative sources of investments to 
boost yields. 
exchange rate regime. In response, interest rates have been liberalised resulting in an increase in interest 
rates that put more pressure on banks' profits and increased competition among institutions. In the same 
year, two types of crises occurred. First, the Jordanian currency lost 50% of its value. Secondly, the 
banking sector witnessed a large increase in nonperforming loans, followed by a failure in the banking 
system and bank insolvency problems. The second largest bank at that time period (Petra Bank) 
collapsed. The worse aspect of this story is that Jordanian Government committed itself into paying 
nearly 300 million JD to bank depositors and the government was forced to cover the large amounts of 
funds, equivalent to 10% GDP, to settle the foreign obligations and to meet the run on insolvent banks 
(Akel, 1994; Chalk et al., 1996). 
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The banking system has two main features. First, despite a reasonable number of banks 
the banking sector is highly concentrated with the three largest firms accounting for 
over 60% of total deposits. Secondly, while the savings rate is high, bank lending 
policies and practices are exceedingly risk averse and typically avoid long-term 
investments (Euro Med Partnership, 2006, p. 11). 
Regarding banking sector regulation, the CBJ is the only supervisory body in Jordan. 
Maintaining and monitoring stability, and ensuring the safety and soundness of the 
banking system (despite the surrounding political instability in the region) are the main 
objectives of the central bank. However, the main aim of the CBJ in the early 1990s was 
to curb the growth of liquidity using loans to deposits ceilings. To attract foreign 
exchange, especially in the form of workers' remittances, foreign banks are allowed to 
offer foreign currency investment portfolios for non-residents, interest rates have been 
liberalized and foreign currency transfers have been freed from any restrictions. In 
addition, there are no restrictions on the flow of foreign currency for commercial and 
capital transactions. Entry of foreign banks is subject to licensing (approval from central 
bank) and the usual array of prudential regulations. 
In 1991 Treasury bill auctions were introduced in order to bring about a wider role for 
market forces and to facilitate the use of indirect techniques for monetary control (CBJ, 
1997). Weekly auctions of certificates of deposits (CDs) were introduced in 1993. In 
1996, swap operations in foreign exchange were permitted to enhance efficiency in the 
foreign exchange market, the central bank liberalised all transactions in foreign 
exchange, and all banks have been required to publish their prime lending rates. 
The failure of Petra Bank in 198947 prompted the central bank to follow a more strict 
approach regarding the capital adequacy of Jordanian banks. The deficiency a more 
prudential regulation and supervisory capacities were among the reasons for the banking 
system crisis (Al Jarrah, 2002). 
47 Three other bank failure cases have disturbed the financial sector in Jordan In the late 1980s: (1) the 
Jordan Gulf Bank suffered a serious liquidity problem, (2) malpractice of the Mashreq Bank forced its 
closure, and (3) the Islamic Investment House was liquidated because of quality problems of its portfolio 
and divergence from the terms of its license. The three cases were met with firm decisions from the CBJ 
which restored confidence in the banking system (Dihel and Kardoosh, 2006). 
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Although it took a while, various steps have been taken to maintain adequate capital in 
the banking system. In 1993 The CBJ adopted the main features of Basel Accord (Basel 
1) requiring banks to hold capital adequacy ratios of 10%, and this is higher than the 
international minimum standard of 8%. In 1997, the CBJ raised the risk-weighted capital 
adequacy ratio from 10 percent to 12 percent. The central bank believed that the higher 
ratio was more consistent with the operating environment at that time. 
In addition to the Basel capital adequacy requirements, the CBJ imposed a minimum 
capital requirement of JD 40 million (to be reached by 2007) for all banks48. Only cash 
and government securities can be used to increase capital. Commercial banks are also 
required to place 14% of their deposits in an interest free account at the CBJ, whereas 
investment banks also have to hold only 9%. Furthermore, the capital to deposits ratio 
was set at a minimum of 7.5%, and banks are not permitted to make loans to companies 
in which they hold more than 10% of capital. A new Banking Law (no 28) came into 
force in 2000 to protect depositors' interests and later the same year the CBJ established 
a separate and independent Deposits Insurance Corporation (DIC). Deposits up to JD 
10000 ($14000) were insured. 
In addition, the DIC act as the liquidator of banks as directed by the CBJ. Besides 
deposit insurance, bank liquidity is also regulated to ensure adequate ability of banks in 
meeting depositors demand. The minimum liquidity requirement for Jordanian banks 
stood at 30% in 2005. The assets that satisfy liquidity or reserve requirements include: 
domestic currency and coin, balances held with the Central Bank, net credit balances 
with other licensed banks in Jordan, net credit balances in foreign exchange with banks 
abroad, government securities with one year maturity or under, foreign securities 
negotiable in international financial markets denominated in a convertible currency and 
maturing within a maximum of one year; and any other assets considered as liquid 
assets by the Central Bank, such as commercial bills and others. 
In order to enhance the strength of the banking system, the CBJ adopted a number of 
additional procedures and measures to organise banks' operations and increase their 
capability to face the developments engendered by the new Basel 2 requirements. In 
48 It has been rumoured that the CBJ is going to raise this limit to JD 100 million, possibly by as early as 
2010. 
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order to boost the confidence in the banking system, the CBJ set down standards for 
good corporate governance and required banks to follow those standards. In addition, 
from 2004 the Jordan Securities Commission adopted strict rules of disclosure and 
required all listed companies to file quarterly reports (since all the local banks are listed 
they are covered by this requirement). 
Additionally, the CBJ is paying more attention towards public communication relating 
to bank regulation. One way in doing this is by announcing relevant information about 
banks' operations through the publication of monthly reports, in addition to the Monthly 
Statistics Bulletin. The CBJ and the government are committed to enhancing efficiency 
in data dissemination by promoting the adoption of international accounting standards 
by commercial banks in order to increase the competitiveness of the banking system. In 
addition, banking institutions are required to publish their financial statements and audit 
reports in two national daily newspapers at the end of the fiscal year. The Exchange 
Commission Law (established in 1997) has now strengthened the capacity of the Jordan 
Securities Commission to enforce reporting requirements. The standards of reporting by 
banks are improving as well. An Electronic Data Distribution system has been initiated 
in year 2000 to improve the comprehensiveness and timeliness of information on 
commercial banks, and this should also develop the data reporting by banks to the 
central bank and general supervision of the banking system (Oxford Analytica, 2006, 
p. 9). In addition, bank directors are legally responsible for misleading information about 
bank performance. All banks are also subject to physical examination by the central 
bank of Jordan at least once a year. If examiners find any deficiencies in the bank's 
activities and accounts from a regulatory perspective, moral suasion is typical. 
The target date for implementing Basel 2 was January 2008 although various problems 
may face the implementation of the new Accord, particularly the ability of Jordanian 
banks to supply accurate information to the market ( the information that may provided 
by a bank might not reflect the actual bank position). Therefore, the CBJ is preparing 
banks for the implementation of the new Accord by undertaking the following steps. 
First, supervisors are starting to cooperate with banks and other regional supervisors in 
preparing for a flexible adoption of the new Accord by offering training in banks or the 
CBJ or both. Second, a new information system is being developed to build banking 
data bases in order to manage bank risk. Third, the CBJ is establishing new procedures 
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to determine the most appropriate level of capital adequacy, consistent with Pillar 2 of 
the new Accord because national supervisors are free to modify the capital regulation 
for their jurisdictions if such a modification is reasonable and conservative given the 
specific local risk experience. One challenging issue relates to the treatment of Islamic 
banking, which is not specifically covered in the new Accord. It is obvious that in the 
interests of the CBJ banks need to actively adopt new capital framework so that the 
country's supervisors' process will be recognized by other bank regulators and will not 
put Jordanian banks at a competitive disadvantage. 
An important question may arise here as to whether all the above preparations are 
enough to achieve market discipline or whether the deposit insurance schemes that 
commenced in 2000 is going to affect the incentives of depositors to monitor bank risk. 
4.2. The Deposit Insurance System in Jordan 
If any emerging market faces a collapse in its banking system, regulators will be 
advised to create a protection scheme for depositors to stop bank runs. Therefore, the 
introduction of an explicit deposit insurance system has become common not only to 
eliminate financial instability but also to help in limiting the open-ended implicit 
guarantees that are widespread in developing countries (Ioannidou and Dreul, 2006). 
According to Demirguc-Kunt and Sobaci (2001), the number of countries with explicit 
insurance increased from 12 to 71 between 1974 and 1999 49 . Jordan was not an 
exceptional case; it has introduced explicit deposit insurance. A deposit insurance 
corporation (DIC) was established in the country with the passage of law No 33 in 2000. 
Only Jordanian banks and branches of foreign banks are required to contribute to the 
deposit insurance fund. Branches of Jordanian banks operating outside the country are 
excluded from the insurance scheme. On the tither hand, Islamic banks operating in 
Jordan have the option but not the obligation to join. The deposit insurance coverage is 
limited. The corporation covers up to a maximum deposit of 10,000 JD (approximately 
USD 14,000). All types of deposits are covered except government deposits, intra-bank 
deposits, and cash collaterals within the limits of the value of the extended facilities 
49 While DI is widespread in Europe and Latin America, it is less common in the Middle East, 29 percent, 
and Sub-Saharan Africa, 11 percent ( Demirgüc-Kunt et al., 2006). 
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guaranteed by the said collaterals and credit facilities balances in overdraft facilities 
(JODIC report 2005 note 11: 10). Depositors are expected to be paid instantaneously; 
however, the insurance sum should be paid to the insured depositors within 30 days 
from submitting a deposit claim (JODIC law 2000, Article 62). 
Although, the corporation is publicly sponsored and administrated, it is privately 
financed and enjoys a corporate entity status with financial and administrative 
independence. The fees charged to banks include: first, a 100,000 JD (approximately 
USD 140,000) fee paid upon the establishment of the bank (paid in two instalments by 
banks established prior to passage of the law) and second, an annual fee equal to 0.25 
percent of the bank's aggregate deposits. This is subject to an increase of up to double 
the amount in the case that the CBJ finds that the degree of bank risk exceeds a certain 
level (See Table 1.2 for comparisons between the deposit insurance in Jordan and other 
countries). The deposit insurance corporation in Jordan is managed and supervised by a 
board of directors chaired by the governor of the central bank and only the CBJ can 
decide to liquidate a member bank. One of its duties is to examine banks' operation and 
financial results included in the financial reports which are available at the CBJ. 
Table 1.2 compares the deposit insurance scheme in Jordan with those of Germany, the 
EU, U. S., Colombia and the world average. The European Union Deposit Insurance 
Directive was established in 1994 in order to harmonize minimum depositor protection 
throughout member countries, although it can be seen that deposit insurance was in a place 
in Germany before that date. Other schemes such as US and Colombia were also 
established earlier. Apparently, from the table the deposit insurance scheme in Jordan is 
comparable to those of developed countries as well as to the other countries in the world. 
Given the above features of the Jordanian deposit insurance scheme, the following 
analysis will examine market discipline in the Jordanian banking system and will 
examine where deposit insurance eliminates incentives (if they exist) for depositors to 
monitor banks behaviour (see Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2006) for a good discussion about 
deposit insurance schemes around the world). 
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Table 1.2 
Cross Country Comparison of Deposit Insurance Schemes 
Germany 
Coverage Limits 30% of equity* 
Coinsurance No 
Foreign currency Yes Can be Yes n. a*** Yes, in 48 Yes 
Deposits cover excluded 
Intra bank 
deposits 
Covered 
US Colombia World 
average 
Jordan 
US$ COL$10 3 times per JD 10000 
Yes No Yes, in 18 No 
Funding Funded but Not Funded Funded Funded, in Funded 
additional fund regulated 58 cases 
callable 
Source of Banks only Not Joint Private Private 15 Banks, the 
Funding regulated Joint 51 corporation 
Public I returns, and 
loans and 
grants. 
Management Private Not Public Public Private Il private 
regulated Joint 24 
Public 33 
No No 
EU 
ECU 
$20000 100000 million** capita GDP (US$14000) 
10% No 25% Yes, in 17 No 
Membership Voluntary Compulsory Compulsory Compulsory Compulsory Compulsory 
in 55 cases 
Risk adjusted Yes Not Yes Yes Yes, in 21 Yes 
Premiums Regulated cases 
Notes: 
* All non-bank deposits are covered up to a limit of 30% of the liable capital of the troubled institution. 
** As of July 2000, this is around US$4600, or 2 to 3 times per capita GDP. 
*** Colombia's financial system does not allow for foreign currency deposits. 
Source: Adapted from Beck (2000), and Barajas and Steiner (2000) and adjusted by the author. 
5. Empirical Methodology and Data 
In order to assess if depositors react to bank level fundamentals in such a way that 
deposit withdrawals could be considered an action of market discipline in the country, 
we test if riskier banks attract fewer deposits. The null hypothesis is that deposit 
withdrawals and deposit interest rates do not respond to observable weaknesses in 
individual banks, traceable to ex-ante bank characteristics. If bank level fundamentals 
(described in the data section) explain significantly the growth rate of real deposits and/ 
or interest paid to depositors, this will be evidence for the existence of depositors' 
discipline. 
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5.1 Testing for Depositor Discipline 
As illustrated by Park and Peristiani (1998), there are two ways in which discipline may 
be tested in the market for bank deposits, through price (the interest paid to depositors) 
or quantities ( level or growth of deposits) or using both methods. The aforementioned 
author estimated the following models: 
ADeposit;, = a'; +#' xd; 1+1 +, 
i. 'Controls;, 
Interest 
jr = a; 
2 
+lu, t (1) 
xd;, t+ý + 
A2 Controls i,, + E; t (2) 
Where, ADeposit; 
, 
is the growth rate of deposits in bank i at time t, Interest; , 
is the 
interest rate on deposits in bank i at time t. d;,, +, , 
is the expected probability of default 
or failure of bank i in the following period, representing the risk or expected loss 
assumed by depositors. Controlsi , 
is a vector of control variables, , u;, and £!, are 
disturbance terms. 
The above equations 1 and 2 test for the existence of market discipline by testing for the 
significance of 8' and/ or ß2. If depositors tend to demand fewer deposits from riskier 
banks, then , ß' should be negative and significant, and signalling the existence of 
depositor discipline. Similarly, if depositors demand a higher interest rate from banks 
with a higher probability of default (higher risk), then ß2 will be positive and 
significant, and one may conclude that depositors are practising discipline over banks. 
However, two important issues arise in the specification of equations 1 and 2, first, the 
issue of how to measure the probability of default d1 +, . 
Secondly, what are the 
appropriate variables which should be included in the model as control variables. 
Regarding the first issue of how to estimate the probability of default, Park and 
Peristiani (1998) used a two step method. In the first step, they estimate the probability 
using a logit model as a function of bank performance indicators or fundamentals 
(defined in the next section), and use the estimated probability directly as an 
explanatory variable in equation 1 and 2. However, this two step estimation of bank 
default methodology has been criticised by Martinez Pena, and Schmukler (1999,2001). 
They point out that this approach may fail to detect whether changes in the dependent 
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variables (deposit growth or interest paid to depositors) were caused by some particular 
bank feature or because of the possibility that the probability of failure is not estimated 
accurately. Furthermore, by including the probability of default directly, it is not 
possible to determine which of the bank indicators may be providing the strongest 
signal to depositors that banks are in fact taking on high risks. In addition, Barajas and 
Steiner (2000, p. 14) state that "it may not always be possible to estimate the probability 
accurately, especially in a period when there are not many actual observations of bank 
failures". Hence, a one step model has been suggested to explicitly and directly examine 
the relationship between bank fundamentals and deposits growth and/ or interest paid to 
depositors. Building on this argument, we use one step method using the bank 
fundamentals directly. First we estimate the changes in deposit levels as a reaction to 
the changes in bank fundamentals. Secondly, we establish the relation between deposit 
interest rates and the selected bank specific variables. We estimate the reduced form 
equations model for the equilibrium deposits and interest paid by trying to confirm that 
depositors shifted their deposits from risky banks to safer ones, and also that they 
demand a higher interest rate when they realise that their bank has a higher probability 
of default. 
In other words we assume that market discipline exists if an increase in bank risk leads 
to a decrease in the supply of deposits and therefore, holding other factors constant, 
market discipline will lead to a lower level of deposits and higher interest paid. As such 
we estimate the following equations: 
ADeposit, t=a, +, 
ß' x Bank; t_, + 
2'Controls; 
t+ Pit 
(3) 
Interest ,, t = a, 
2 +, 82 x Bank ,, t_, + 
22 Controls i, + E, t 
(4) 
Where, ODeposit; t 
is the growth rate of deposits in bank i at time t, Interest; t 
is the 
interest rate on deposits in bank i at time t. Bank;,, represents a vector of 
bank 
fundamental variables that takes a higher value when bank i 
is in good shape in the last 
year, this vector is included with a lag to account 
for the fact that balance sheet 
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information is available to the public with a certain delay. Controls;, is a vector of 
so control variables, and E; t and , u,, are disturbance terms 
Concerning the second specification issue, previous studies use a wide range of control 
variables to explain other factors that exert an influence on depositors' behaviour. 
Murata and Hori (2006), for instance, include only bank size as a control variable 
whereas Park and Peristiani (1998) include macroeconomic variables to control for the 
overall size of the market, bank-specific controls relating to bank market share and size, 
and a number of regulatory dummy variables. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) 
include two controls in their individual country estimation: bank overhead and size. On 
the other hand, Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001), include two sets of control 
variables; systemic and macroeconomic variables, both of which vary over time but not 
across individual banks, and they test for the effect of bank size on depositors' 
behaviour, (but they do not include the size variable within the set of bank fundamental 
variables since it is not considered to be directly linked to riskiness). Calomiris and 
Powell (2001) include period effects as time varying controls. Moreover, Barajas and 
Steiner (2000) argued that market discipline tests may be considered weak in the case of 
not adding appropriate and sufficient control variables. They point out that the main 
short-coming of the specifications used in market discipline studies is that, while they 
may control the effects of economy-wide factors, they do not incorporate additional 
individual bank variables that should play a key role. Therefore, they suggest non- 
fundamental variables that may affect perceived risk to depositors, adding the number 
of branches to indicate the benefits in terms of easing transaction costs, to the extent 
that bank deposits are used for payments purposes. 
Building on the above studies, we include two sets of control variables, first, non- 
fundamental variables (these are explained in more detail in Section 5.3), and secondly 
macroeconomic and systemic variables. In addition, the period of our study sample 
allows us to explore the impact of financial crises on market discipline by estimating 
equations 3 and 4 for the periods before and after the 1989 twin crises (of the Jordanian 
50 This method of testing for market discipline has been used by Ioannidou (2005), Murato and 
Hori 
(2006), Semenova (2006), Barajas and Steiner (2000), and Ghosh and Das (2003), among others. 
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Dinar devaluation and the Petra Bank failure). The period from 1982 to 1988 represent 
the pre-crises period, whereas as the post-crises period is from 1991 to 2005. 
Furthermore, to analyze whether the introduction of explicit deposit insurance 
introduced in Jordan in 2000 affected the way in which depositors discipline their banks, 
we estimate equations 5 and 6 as follows: 
ADeposit, 
t = a; ' +, 
ß' xBank, t_, +Z 
Controlý, 
t +O'Baný, t_k *DI, _k 
+ts; t (5) 
Interest;, a2 +, ß2 x Bank; t_, + 
A2Controls; 
t+ 
O2Banki, 
t_k * DIl_k + v; t (6) 
Where, DI is deposit insurance dummy variable equals to one before the year 2000 and 
zero otherwise51. If the added interaction variable coefficient occurs with a significant 
opposite sign (compared with the fundamental risk variable), this will indicate the 
negative effect of introducing the deposit insurance system on depositor discipline. 
Therefore, a negative and significant estimate for 0' and a significant and positive 
estimate for 02 would signify the reduction of depositor discipline as a result of 
introducing explicit deposit insurance. The joint significance test of the interaction 
variables will be examined in order to detect any important effect of deposit insurance 
on deposits growth or interest paid to depositors. 
To estimate the above models, this study uses OLS estimation for each equation 
separately. In addition, we allow for fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) 
estimation, and identify the preferred model according to the Lagrange Multiplier and 
Hausman tests. Moreover, the correction techniques of White (1980) for unknown 
heteroskedasticity have been used since our sample includes multi-year observations. 
Furthermore, Wald restriction tests have been applied to examine the importance of all 
fundamental variables coefficients in affecting the growth rate of deposits or interest 
paid to depositors. In the sensitivity analysis, we experiment with alternative estimation 
techniques. First, we use the Two Stages Least Squares (2SLS) estimation technique to 
address the possible endogeneity issue between bank capital and other fundamentals. 
Bank capital is included as an instrument for bank size (bank size affects access to 
51 A deposit insurance dummy has not been added separately to avoid multicolinearity problems, for more 
discussion see Gujarati (1995). 
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capital) estimated by the natural log of total assets; the current profit (estimated as the 
return on assets ratio which may be viewed as an exogenous variable affecting the 
policy of the bank to increase its capital base through retained earnings), and the ratio of 
total loan to total assets (more risky banks may be required to hold more capital). We 
then enter the predicted value for the capital as a regressor in the deposit growth, and 
interest paid equations, in addition to the other fundamentals. Secondly, the Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) methodology has been used. This estimation technique 
will consider the contemporaneous correlation between the two structural equations for 
deposit growth and interest paid equations. 
5.2 Testing for Bank Response 
Consistent with Barajas and Steiner's (2000) approach, whether depositors are sensitive 
to bank fundamentals is only the first step in determining if there is market discipline. 
For effective market discipline to exist, a second step should involve understanding 
whether banks respond positively to the signals provided by depositors. Therefore, we 
develop our test to understand whether banks respond positively to the signals provided 
by depositors. If deposits decreased as a result of weaker bank fundamentals, then banks 
must take a corrective action to ensure that deposit growth increases again by improving 
their fundamentals. 
We use the response model suggested by Barajas and Steiner (2000) to examine the 
direct reaction of bank fundamentals and changes in deposits. In this study we define 
what is called `fundamental' growth in deposits (Depofun) as the key explanatory 
variable for bank response, and we zero in those changes that are attributable to an 
individual bank's performance fundamentals in relation to other non-fundamental, 
macro economic, and systemic variables. 
Bank response to the signals received from depositors have been assumed to firstly 
represent a symmetric response, when banks respond to the changes of deposits growth 
irrespective to the sign of change (positive or negative), and secondly, as an asymmetric 
response, where distinction between negative and positive changes in deposit growth 
have been considered. 
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The first test (symmetric response) consists of regressing each fundamental variable on 
lagged values of the calculated `fundamental' deposits growth (Depofun), to determine 
whether this period's fundamentals are sensitive to depositors' preference for strong 
fundamentals in the previous period. A. significant coefficient of Depofun indicates that 
effective depositor discipline exists. 
In the second test (asymmetric response), we allow for a possible asymmetry in bank 
response to the depositors' signals by assuming that the banks adjust their fundamental 
variables in the case of deposit losses. In contrast, banks will not have any incentive to 
change or improve their fundamentals if deposits are growing rapidly. Two definitions 
of deposits loss are used, deposit losses I (Dloss 1) and deposit losses 2 (Dloss 2). 
Dlossl occurs when the fundamentals deposit growth rate of a given bank is negative, 
so it defines an absolute loss of deposits owing to weak fundamentals. On the other 
hand, the second loss (Dloss 2) defines deposit loss as any situation when a bank 
exhibits a fundamental growth rate below banking sector average deposits growth, thus 
indicating that this bank could increase deposits by moving its fundamentals closer to 
the sector average. 
Formally we define two dummy variables for each bank i and period t as shown below: 
1. Denofun_. -< 0 Doss 1; t ý D1oss2; t, 
1, Depofun; 
t --< 
SysGrowth 
0, otherwise l 0, otherwise 
Where, SysGrwth is the banking sector average deposits' growth. 
In each case, individual fundamental variables were regressed against the interaction 
variable (the interaction between the lagged value of the calculated deposit fundamental 
and one of the estimated dummies each time) in order to examine banks' asymmetric 
response to depositors' signals. 
5.3 Data and Variables 
To conduct our analysis on depositor discipline, we have constructed a panel 
data set 
which contains yearly data for 13 out of 16 domestic commercial 
banks from 1982 to 
2005. The rest of the commercial banks were excluded because of an 
insufficient 
78 
amount of available financial information. This study focuses on the commercial banks 
to ensure the comparability between banks in the sample. This does not involve any 
significant loss in the data because commercial banks capture a dominant part of the 
domestic market (about 80% of the total number of banks)52. The data are limited to 
yearly observations instead of monthly or quarterly data due to the absence of such 
information for Jordanian banks. The panel data used in this study has been obtained 
from individual banks' annual reports audited and submitted to the central bank and 
announced to the public. We believe that this data is sufficient for this study since we 
are concentrating on the reaction of depositors who are informed about the banks' 
condition through this information. The panel data used in this study is unbalanced in 
the sense that the number of observations per bank varies across years. The choice of 
the period of study can be justified on the grounds that it is the period for which data on 
the relevant variables are available on a consistent basis. During the sample period, 
there were no government owned banks, and there are no de novo banks. 
The sample covers the period when the twin collapse of the currency and the banking 
system occurred. Hence, to examine the effect of the Petra Bank failure and the 
currency devaluation in late 1989 and the introduction of the deposit insurance scheme 
in 2000, on depositors' behaviour towards banks risk, the period of analysis has been 
split into two separate periods. First, for the crises effect two periods are examined: 
from 1982 to 1988, and from 1991 to 1999. Second, to examine the effect of the 
introduction of the deposit insurance scheme on market discipline we use a dummy 
variable which takes the value of zero from 1982 to 1999 (before the introduction of 
deposit insurance) and one for the sample period from 2000 to 2005. 
The variables which are included in the analysis can be divided into two categories. The 
dependent variables namely: the changes in total deposits, calculated as year on year 
percentage changes, and the implicit interest rate, measured by the ratio of total interest 
payments to total deposits53. The second category is the explanatory variables classified 
as bank fundamentals and control variables. 
52 Foreign branch data were eliminated from this study because of the lack of information. All foreign 
branches are not listed in the stock market and are not required to be disclosed in the annual reports. 
53 We have no opportunity to obtain the rate offered by the banks due to the availability of such 
information, so this ratio seems to be an appropriate for estimation. 
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5.3.1. Indicators of Bank Fundamentals and Control Variables 
Following Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001), Ghosh and Das (2003), Ioannidou and 
Dreu (2006), and Birchler and Maechler (2001), CAMEL rating indicators are used to 
capture bank risk characteristics. The CAMEL abbreviation can be defined as: Capital 
adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity. These indicators have 
some connection with the risk of bank failure (see Table 1.3 for the description of 
variables and the expected sign). This particular fundamental variables choice has been 
selected because they follow the choice of bank-specific variables that have been used 
in earlier studies on bank risk. 
Following Barajas and Steiner (2000), we also include a number of bank characteristics 
that may capture bank risk or why deposits may grow more rapidly in one type of bank 
compared to another. The two groups of control variables are included in this study. 
First, the non-fundamental variables which include, bank size and the number of 
branches. Bank size measured as the natural log of total assets, might be able to capture 
market power or reputation. On the other hand, bank size may also capture the lower 
probability of failure due to too-big-to-fail arguments, better access to funds, and 
diversification benefits. Bank size is expected to enter with a negative sign in the 
interest rate equation and with a positive sign in the deposit growth equation (see for 
example Hess and Feng, 2007; Murata and Hori, 2006; and Barajas and Steiner, 2000). 
Moreover, we proxy the level of bank transaction services by the number of branch 
offices, we expect the number of branches to reflect the quality of payments services 
offered by banks, all else being constant, as deposits should grow faster and interest 
payments decrease in those banks that lower transaction costs or offer more payments 
services by providing more branches. 
Secondly, we include additional controls for macroeconomic and systemic effects. One 
of the important factors influencing market discipline in emerging economies is the 
relative importance of systemic risk. Levy-Yeyati et al., (2004) suggest that relatively 
large real shocks combined with a strong dependence on highly pro-cyclical 
international capital flows, coupled with narrow domestic markets, yield large output 
volatility and this creates a propensity for such economy's to fall into deep recession. 
This may deteriorate the repayment capacity of bank depositors and in turn, bank 
solvency. Thus, systemic sources may overshadow the informational content of 
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observed bank fundamentals. To the extent that banks are subject to large systemic risks 
that might threaten the value of their assets, depositors and investors will respond to 
fluctuations in those risks no matter how healthy bank fundamentals are. 
Table 1.3 
Bank Fundamentals and Control Variables: 
Variable 
A- Fundamental Variables 
Capital Adequacy: 
-Capital to total assets ratio 
Asset Quality: 
-Loan loss provisions to total 
loans 
-Total loans to total Assets 
Management efficiency: 
- Non interest expenditures to - or + 
total assets + or - 
Earnings: 
-Return on assets ratio 
Liquidity 
-Cash plus balances with + (-) 
other banks to total assets 
ratio 
Expected 
Influence' 
Interpretation 
Represents the bank's asset risks and indicates the banks health, the 
higher the ratio the more reliable the bank is considered to be (see for 
example, Galindo and Powell, 2005; Cook and Spillman, 1994; Hanna 
and Hanwech, 1988; Park and Peristiani, 1998; Martinez Peria and 
Schmuckler, 2001; Hosono et al. 2005; and Karas, 2006; Calomiris and 
Powell, 2001). 
+ (-) 
Represents the amount of funds set aside to absorb expected losses of 
non-performing loans, so the higher this ratio the higher the credit risk 
(see for example, Barajas and Steiner, 2000; Nier and Baumann, 2006). 
ý+ý - 
Measures the level of credit risk. The higher the level of credit risk, the 
less the expected growth of deposits and the more the expected interest 
payments (see for example Calomiris and powell, 2001; Tsuru 2003). 
- (+) 
The relation is ambiguous. The rise of this ratio may be caused by a 
decline in efficiency of management (in this case the relation will be 
negative, and positive with deposits growth, and interest paid, 
respectively). However this relation may be inversed if the increase of 
this ratio was as a result of new services developments, improvements in 
service quality or advertising new products (see for example, Karas, 
2006; Ghosh and Das, 2003) 
The higher the ratio the more profitable the bank is considered to be. 
Hence, the more the expected deposit growth and the less the interest 
paid to depositors (see for example, Levy-Yeyati et al., 2004; Galindo et 
al., 2005; Karakas, 2005). 
+ (-) 
The higher the ratio the more the ability of the bank to meet unexpected 
withdrawals, and the safer the bank is considered to be (see for example, 
Tsuru, 2003; Hosono et al., 2005; Murata Hori, 2006). 
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B-Non-Fundamental Variables 
-Bank size (natural logarithm 
of bank's asset) 
+ (_) 
The bigger the bank, the more bank reliability and the lower the failure 
probability. Therefore, larger banks are expected to attract more 
deposits, and access cheaper sources of funds from other sources (e. g. 
inter-bank credits market), and hence offer low interest rates to 
depositors. Depositors, in turn, are likely to see the large bank as more 
reliable and accept lower deposit interest rates (see for example, Arena, 
2005; Murata and Hori, 2006; Spiegel and Yamori, 2007). 
-Number of branches 
C- Macroeconomic and Systemic Variables: 
-GDP Growth 
+ (_) 
-Inflation rate (Changes in 
Consumer price index) 
-Cash outside banks to 
system deposits 
Bank deposits 
Concentration ratio. 
Other Control Variables 
-Three months U. S. Treasury 
bills 
Notes: 
- (+) 
- (+) 
+ (-) 
- (+) 
(+) - 
Banks with a larger number of branches network are able to spread 
geographically and able to attract more deposits with lower interest (see 
for example, Spiegel and Yamori, 2007; Barajas and Steiner, 2000; 
Calomiris and Mason, 2003). 
The higher this ratio the stronger the economy the more the expected 
growth in deposits and the less the interest paid (see for example Ghosh 
and Das, 2003; Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Hosono et al., 
2005; Ioannidou and Dreu, 2006). 
The higher the inflation the higher the consumption and the lower the 
saving. Therefore, if there is an increase in the inflation rate, the lower 
the expected growth in the deposits and the higher the compensation of 
interest rates (see for example Ghosh and Das, 2003; Martinez Peria and 
Schmukler, 2001). 
This ratio gives an indication of the individual preferences for holding 
currency relative to bank deposits. A negative (positive) effect may 
prove the probability of contagion effect in the deposit growth (interest 
paid) equation (see for example Ghosh and Das, 2003; Karas, 2005) 
This ratio may reflect the banking system risk. The effect is ambiguous, 
see discussion for the interpretation (see for example, Goldberg and 
Hudgins, 1996). 
A significant relationship proves the integration between the local 
market and the global market. 
I The expected influence represents the expected relation between the variable and the deposits growth (interest paid to depositors). 
+ denotes a positive effect, and - indicates a negative effect. 
2 All variables are collected from banks annual reports and ratios are calculated by the author. 
In order to control for the behaviour of the overall banking sector, our estimations 
include the ratio of cash outside banks to system deposits (CASH). This variable 
provides a preliminary way of testing for contagion effects. Contagion refers to the 
situation in which individual depositors at a given bank act according to what the rest 
of the banking system appears to be doing, after controlling for bank-specific and 
macroeconomic factors. Cash outside banks over system deposits reflects individuals' 
preference for holding currency relative to bank deposits. If depositors perceive an 
increase in systemic risks, they might decide to withdraw their deposit from banks 
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regardless of their fundamentals. The value of cash outside banks over system deposits 
will increase and individual bank deposits will fall. Therefore, a negative correlation 
between individual bank deposits and cash can be interpreted as evidence of contagion 
effects. A reverse argument holds between the interest payment variable and cash 
variable. This variable for testing the contagion effect has been used by Ghosh and Das 
(2003). 
To capture the behaviour of depositors, we control for banking sector concentration 
(CON). The effect of banking sector concentration on depositor behavior is ambiguous, 
however, some theoretical arguments and country comparisons suggest that a less 
concentrated banking sector with many small banks is more prone to financial crises 
compared with concentrated banking sectors with a few large banks, 54 
An opposing view, however, is that a more concentrated banking structure enhances 
bank fragility so that large banks may receive larger net subsidies more frequently than 
small banks through implicit "too-big-to-fail" policies. This greater subsidy for large 
banks may in turn intensify risk-taking incentives, increasing the fragility of 
concentrated banking systems (Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Mishkin, 1999). Additionally, a 
few large banks may not be easier to monitor than many small banks. If size is 
positively correlated with complexity, then large banks may be more opaque than small 
banks, which would tend to produce a positive relationship between concentration and 
fragility. 
Finally, Boyd and De Nicolo (2003) stress that banks with greater market power tend to 
charge higher interest rates to borrowing firms, which induces them to assume greater 
risk. To the extent that the concentration is positively associated with banks enjoying 
greater market power, the Boyd and De Nicolo (2003) model predicts a positive 
54 Allen and Gale, (2000) give reasons supporting this argument, first, large banks can diversify better so 
that banking systems characterized by a few large banks will be less fragile than banking systems with 
many small banks. Second, concentrated banking systems may enhance profits and therefore lower bank 
fragility. High profits provide a "buffer" against adverse shocks and increase the franchise value of the 
bank, reducing incentives for bank owners to take excessive risk (Hellmann, Murdoch, and Stiglitz, 
2000). Third, some hold that a few large banks are easier to monitor than many small banks, so that 
corporate control of banks will be more effective and the risks of contagion less pronounced in a 
concentrated banking system. 
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relationship between concentration and bank fragility. From the above argument, we 
could conclude that it is important to test for the effect of concentration on depositors' 
behaviour. Furthermore, following the traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance 
(SCP) paradigm more concentrated market are believed to be less competitive (see, for 
example, Berger and Hannan 1989; Molyneux and Forbes, 1995). We expect a positive 
relationship between deposit concentration levels and the growth rate of deposits and a 
negative relation with interest paid on deposits. 
To account for environmental effects, macroeconomic variables are included in our 
model. Unexpected macroeconomic shocks undermine the viability of financial 
institutions. The variables included in the empirical implementation in this study not 
only capture the effects of economic activities, but also the external effects on the local 
market. With respect to economic activities, the inflation rate (consumer price index 
changes) and real GDP growth have been included because they have a common effect 
on all banks in the sector (see Ioannidou and Dreu, 2006; Hosono et al., 2005; Martinez 
Peria and Schmukler, 2001). 
Regarding external effects, the US risk-free-rate (3 month US Treasury bill rate) has 
been added to test for the integration level with the global economy and the openness of 
the local deposit market, a significant sign on this variable indicates that the local 
market is integrated with foreign markets and vulnerable in the context of foreign 
capital inflows and outflows. A negative effect on deposit growth and a positive effect 
on interest rates are expected to indicate the integrated level with the global market. 
6. Estimation Results 
After describing the sample set, the estimation results are organised as follows. First, we 
attempt to answer the following question; do depositors discipline their banks in 
Jordan? Then, we analyse the second question of whether depositors' reactions towards 
bank risk differs before and after the crises that occurred in 1989. In addition, we also 
analyse how the introduction of a deposit insurance system in 2000 affected market 
discipline. Finally, we aim to investigate whether banks respond to depositor discipline 
(if it exists). 
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6.1 Data Description 
An overview of the data used in this study is provided in Table 1.4. The names of the 
variables are provided in column I. The remaining columns present the summary 
statistics for the variables over the entire 1982-2005 sample period. Deposit growth has 
been positive across banks during the sample period (14.13% annually but varied during 
the sample period and across banks), the standard deviation is about 22.17% with a 
substantial difference between minimum and maximum values (-79.86% and 105.83% 
respectively). On the other hand, the interest paid to depositors does not change much 
over time (standard deviation 1.62%) and average equals 5.09%. There is one bank in 
our sample (the Jordan Gulf Bank) that reported negative capital at least once during the 
period under consideration before it was restructured and converted into the commercial 
bank in 2004. 
As is apparent from Table 1.4 macroeconomic variables record relatively high volatility 
during the period of study, this may provide a good justification for including 
macroeconomic variables in our study. The inflation rate varies between -0.20% to 
25.7% over the study period, the same ups and downs was recorded for GDP growth 
which varied between an upper rate of 12.99% and lower rate of -16.46 %. The banks in 
the sample had high average levels of liquidity 39.24% of their total assets on average) 
which perhaps reflects a conservative strategy to investment. This liquidity ratio reached 
as high as 81.17% of total assets for some banks in the sample. Given their liquidity, it 
is surprising to notice a high level profitability for Jordanian banks, the average return 
on assets amount to 1.04% with variation of 23.52%55 
Profit growth for the Jordanian banks appears to have been stimulated by high interest rate 
spreads, as well as stock market development, the latter by generating brokerage fees as 
well as special interest charges from margin trading (Dihel and Kardoosh, 2006). 
55 Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) report average return on asset (during 1990-1997) for Australia, 
Canada, Chile, and Germany, as 0.8%, 0%, 0.4%, and 0.2% respectively. On the other hand liquidity of 
the same countries was 9.7%, 19.6%, 31 %, and 27.2% respectively. These figures indicate that during our 
sample period Jordanian banks profitability and liquidity were relatively high. In addition 1.04% return 
on assets for the Jordanian banks is comparable with UK banks average return on assets between 1999 
and 2004 (which was equal to 1.035%) (See Figueira et al., 2007). 
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Although, some Jordanian banks during the sample period had a relatively large 
proportion of loan investments (reaching above 90% of total assets) the average value at 
36% appears low. The banks also seem to hold modest levels of loan-loss-provisions 
(which reached a minimum level of 0.01%, for some banks in the early years of this 
sample period). 
Table 1.4 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean 
Dep 
Int 
14.13 
5.09 
Median 
11.13 
5.28 
St Dev 
22.17 
1.62 
Cap 6.26 4.03 6.63 
Liq 39.24 40.53 15.26 
Pro 1.92 0.66 4.86 
Minimum Maximum 
-79.86 
0.87 
-5.97 
3.65 
0.01 
105.83 
9.85 
39.08 
81.17 
36.43 
96.65 
3.64 
0.16 
25.70 
12.99 
40.19 
2.2923 
9.8335 
10.60 
87.80 
Ti 36.00 39.08 17.98 9.73 
Manag 0.97 0.76 0.68 0.07 
ROA 1.04 0.90 2.02 -7.40 
Inf 4.27 3.30 5.09 -0.20 
GDP 1.34 3.00 5.50 -16.46 
CASH 22.53 19.96 8.18 13.37 
Log No. B 1.19 1.279 0.49 0.00 
Size 8.41 8.38 0.51 6.95 
US RFR 4.98 5.01 2.35 1.01 
CON 65.10 65.79 938 50.53 
ADF 
lever 
-14.0109 
0.0000 
-16.6497 
0.0000 
ADF (DI) 
-2.0959 -5.0326 
0.2467 0.0000 
-2.1014 -5.9326 
0.2445 0.0000 
-4.5795 - 
0.0002 
-4.3225 - 
0.0005 
-0.1949 - 
0.9358 
-6.4258 - 
0.0000 
-2.8460 - 
0.0533 
-8.7772 - 
0.0000 
-17.9903 
0.0000 
-3.0135 
0.0350 
-4.4184 
0.0003 
-6.5671 
0.0000 
-6.0531 
0.0000 
Notes: 
-All numbers in the table are in percentages except Log No. B and Size. 
- Total number of observations is 273. Data are obtained from banks' annual reports. Macroeconomic variables are obtained from 
the central bank of Jordan data base. The US RFR% is obtained from the US Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
from: http: //research. stlouisfed. org/fred2/data/TB3MS. txt. 
-Dep is the yearly percentage change in deposits; Int is the total interest paid on deposits to total deposits; Cap is the capital 
adequacy ratio estimated as the capital to total assets ratio; Liq is the liquidity ratio calculated by dividing liquid assets(cash and 
bank deposits) to total assets; Pro is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, Manag management efficiency ratio estimated as 
non interest expenses to total assets; ROA is the return on assets ratio; Inf is inflation rate; GDP is the growth rate in the real GDP; 
Tl is the ratio of total loans to total assets; CASH is the cash outside the banking system to system deposits; CON is three bank 
deposits concentration ratio. US RFR is three month US treasury bills risk free rate. log No. B is the natural logarithm of total 
number of branches. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
ADF is the Augmented Dickey Fuller test for stationary (Dickey and Fuller, 1979). The basic objective of the test is to examine the 
null hypothesis that the series contains a unit root versus the alternative hypothesis that the series is stationary. In order to include 
the variable in our models the stationarity condition must be achieved. Our results indicate that all variables are stationary in their 
levels, except liquidity and capital, thus, we include these two in their first difference. 
D1 defines the first difference. 
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6.2 Depositor Reaction Towards Bank Risk 
To study the effect of bank fundamentals (characteristics) on depositors' behaviour and 
to examine the existence of market discipline, we estimated the reduced form 
regressions (3) and (4) including each of the fundamental variables and also all the 
variables together. The three estimation approaches of OLS, fixed effects and random 
effects were used; however we used the LM and Hausman tests results to identify the 
preferred (best fit) models and these are reported. The estimates for the deposits growth 
equation (3) are reported in Table 1.5. The dependent variable (deposits growth) is 
regressed against a variety of bank fundamentals, and non fundamentals, as well as 
macroeconomic and systemic variables and other control variables. We report seven 
equations, these are numbered 1 to 6, include all the variables but only one fundamental 
is included each time. In equation 7 the results include all the fundamental variables. 
The aim of estimating equations that include only one fundamental variable is to see if 
these assert individual influence in deposit growth compared to when they are combined 
with all other fundamental values as reported in column 7. 
The results provide evidence that market discipline is at work in Jordan. Most of the 
bank fundamental variables enter the deposit growth equations in a manner consistent 
with the hypothesis that market discipline exists. A bank with relatively more liquid 
assets experiences a rise in its deposits base (positive coefficient value of 0.2381 and 
significant at the 1% level). Regarding assets quality, loan-loss provisions coefficient 
(1.0074) significantly affects banks deposits growth at the 10% significance level. The 
higher the level of loan-loss provisions the more the expected growth in bank deposits. 
This result indicates that depositors in Jordan penalise risky banks by withdrawing risky 
assets. Likely, the coefficient of management efficiency is negative (-5.6318) and 
significant at the 1% level, and this suggests that inefficient management practices 
affect deposit growth negatively. Meanwhile, the return on assets variable 
has a 
negative sign and significant in the individual equation (coefficient value equals to 
(- 
1.9924) which suggest a negative relation between deposits and growth, 
indicating that 
profitable banks fail to attract more deposits. 
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Table 1.5 
Factors Affecting Deposits Growth Results- Full Period (1982 -2005) 
Variable De endent variable: Deposits Growth 
Banks' fundamental and non-fundamental variables 
(1) 
Size 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (d) 
-. 6105 -. 0472 -. 2316* -. 0911+ -. 2986* -. 0916+ -. 1033+ 
. 
3709 
. 
0354 
. 
0757 
. 
0391 
. 
0801 
. 
0376 
. 
0480 
Log No. B -. 0002 -. 2842 -. 0003 . 
0104 
. 
0005 
. 
0007 -0.0001 
. 
0006 
. 5922 . 0016 . 
0169 
. 0016 . 00064 0.001 
A Cap t-t 
A Ligt_1 
Prot_1 
. 1708 
. 1999 
TL t_, -. 0709 
. 0510 
ROA t_, 
Managt_t 
. 0174 . 
06797 
. 
2296 -. 0911 
. 
2202 
. 
2081 
. 2506 . 
0391 
Macro economics and systemic factors 
Cash -. 1433 -. 1431 -. 40374 -. 1494 -. 5972 t -. 01128 0.0250 
. 2780 . 
2647 
. 
3460 
. 2899 . 3397 . 2839 
0.2766 
CON 
INF 
GDP 
-. 0025 -. 0029 -. 00013 -. 0003 
. 
0036 
. 
0034 
. 
0038 
. 
0037 
-. 0089+ -. 0089* -. 0052 -. 0043 
. 
0035 . 0033 . 
0035 . 0036 
. 2381 * 
. 
0475 
1.0074-'i 
.. 5387 
. 
0016 -. 0021 . 
0031 -. 0024 . 
0061 
. 
0103 . 0110 . 
01085 . 
0110 . 0106 
Other control: -. 0008 
US Rf 
. 
0108 
Estimation 
Method 
F- Statistic 
FE OLS OLS OLS 
2.16 5.12 
. 
03823 0.000 
1.42 1.46 
.1 
123 . 
0962 
(7) 
-. 2112 
. 
2759 
0.2733* 
0.0703 
0.2633 
0.2952 
-0.0018+ 
0.0635 
-1.9924+ 0.5594 
. 
8491 0.8667 
- 5.6318* -6.7914* 
1.4160 1.9187 
. 
3272 . 16186 
0.1727 
. 
25719 
. 
2308 0.2165 
. 
00035 . 00016 -0.0026 
. 
0038 . 
0036 0.0034 
-. 00550 -. 00427 -0.0083+ 
. 
0035 . 
0035 0.0033 
0.004 
0.0103 
OLS OLS OLS 
1.53,3.38 3.60 
. 
0711 . 
0011 0.000 
. 
1484 . 
1076 R-Sq 
. 
0603 
LM 
(p-value) 
Hausman Test 
Chi-Sq. Statistic 
(p-value) 
DW 
Wald Test 
2.40 4.22 
(. 5247) (. 6406) 
12.58 11.99 
(. 0828) (. 1517) 
. 
1102 . 
11505 . 
0983 0.169 
1 1.63 0.24 1.41 . 32 
1.24 
(. 0427) (0.6242) (. 5196) (. 5726) (. 2652) 
20.27 14.67 
(. 0024) (0.066) 
12.36 13.05 14.34 
(. 1360) (. 1101) (. 3501) 
2.08 
16.15 
(0.00o) 
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Notes for Table 1.5: 
- Dep is the yearly percentage change in deposits; Int is the total interest paid on deposits to total deposits; cap is the capital adequacy ratio estimated as the capital to total assets ratio; Liq is the liquidity ratio calculated by dividing liquid assets(cash and bank deposits) to total assets; Pro is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, Manag management efficiency ratio estimated as non interest expenses to total assets; ROA is the return on assets ratio; Inf is inflation rate; GDP is the real growth rate in GDP; Ti is the ratio of total loans to total assets; CASH is the cash outside the banking system to system deposits; CON is three bank deposits 
concentration ratio. US RFR% is three month US treasury bills risk free rate. Log No. B is the natural logarithm of total number of branches. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
- In each model the first value is the estimated coefficient, the second is the standard error for each variable included. 
- Dependent variable in all models is deposits growth rate calculated as the percentage changes in deposits level from year t- I until 
year t. 
t, +, * indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and I%, respectively. 
- FE, RE, OLS, stand for Fixed Effect, Random Effect, and Ordinary Least Square estimations, respectively. 
-LM is the Lagrange Multiplier test. This test was originally developed by Breusch and Pagan (1980). It compares between pooled 
regression and random effect models based on Maximum Likelihood estimation under the null hypothesis the efficient estimators 
are pooled least Squares. 
nT 
2(T-1) 
e« 
nT 
e2 ir 
2 -i 
1 nT 
2(T -1) 
1-i n 
=1 
(Te, )2 
ý_ý , e2; ý r= 
-1 
7 
T _X2( I) if HO is true 
- Hausman Test is a test to choose between fixed or random effects specification. The null hypothesis is that both the fixed and 
random specifications are consistent and the alternative hypothesis is that fixed effect is better estimator than Random effect. Values between brackets are p- values. 
(N f-ýe )z 
w=xZ Var V fP -Var [ý 1e] 
T--x, 2 (I ) if HO is true 
-DW is Durbin and Watson's (1951) test of Ho: no serial correlation in the residuals (e) versus H 1: residuals are serially con-elated. 
The test statistic is calculated using the residuals from the estimated full model based on the following equation: 
n 1! 
1: (et - et-1 
)2M 
et z 
t=2 t=1 
- Wald Test is the Wald Test for Coefficient Restrictions. This test computes a test statistic based on the unrestricted regression. The 
Wald statistic measures how close the unrestricted estimates come to satisfying the restrictions under the null hypothesis. If the 
restrictions are in fact true, then the unrestricted estimates should come close to satisfying the restrictions. This test has been used to 
examine the null hypothesis that the sum of the fundamental variables (Capital, Liquidity, loan loss provision, total loans, and 
management efficiency) coefficients, included in the deposit growth model, equal zero. 
The only variable that is not statistically significant and does not show any effect on 
deposits growth is the capital ratio variable and this suggests that depositors do not 
consider bank capital levels in their choice of banks (may be because they believe that 
this item is already regulated). However, it is worth noting that in the full model the 
only significant fundamental variables are liquidity, total loans, and management (See 
Table 1.5 column 7). 
Most control variables were not important in affecting banks' deposit growth. Except 
for bank size, the negative coefficient of -0.1033 in the last column in Table 1.5 
indicates that, all other things being equal, bigger banks demand fewer deposits, either 
because they have access to other sources of finance or because they are expanding less 
than smaller banks (Ioannidou et al, 2005). 
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Although the inflation level does not appear to affect deposits growth, the growth rate of 
real GDP alters deposit growth significantly. GDP growth in Jordan is included to 
control for the business cycle. The results indicate that, ceteris paribus, the higher the 
growth rates in GDP, the lower the demand for deposits. To some extent, this result is 
surprising because one would expect that the better the state of economy, the higher the 
lending opportunities for banks, and hence the higher the demand for deposits. This 
relation may be reversed in the case of an availability of substitutions towards other 
sources of investment choices. 
Regarding the interest rate equation, Table 1.6 summarises the results from estimating 
equation 4. In Table 1.6 the dependent variable (interest paid to depositors) is regressed 
against a variety of variables: bank fundamentals, non-fundamentals, macroeconomic 
and systemic variables, in addition to other control variables. Again, the first 6 columns 
in the table represent the results when each fundamental variable has been included one 
at a time. 
Banks with higher liquidity can successfully reduce their interest expenses. on the other 
hand, banks with risky assets (higher loans to total assets) and higher earnings (higher 
ROA) pay higher interest to depositors, this increase in interest paid to depositors is 
maybe due to the fact that more risky banks that can generate higher earnings may offer 
more competitive interest rates to depositors in order to maintain deposit levels. In 
addition, banks with higher non-interest expenses relative to total assets are found to 
pay more interest for depositors. This is may be related to the signaling of inefficient 
management practices. 
While bank capital has no effect on deposits levels, it is related positively and 
significantly to interest paid to depositors. This relation seems to be inconsistent with 
the depositors' discipline hypothesis; however, it might be interpreted as depositors 
assuming that banks only increase their capital when they face higher risk. 
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Tablel. 6 
Factors Affecting Interest Paid Results- Full Period (1982 - 2005) 
VariableDependent Variable: Interest Paid to De ositors) Banks' fundamental and non-fundamental variables 
Size 
Log No. B 
A Cap 
_j 
A Ligt_1 
Pro t_1 
TLt_I 
ROAt_ I 
Manag_t_I 
-3.416* 
. 
4138 
Macro economics and systemic factors 
Cash 
(1) (2) (3) 
-. 0624 -. 1027 . 0635 
. 
04437 
. 3044 . 
3296 
(4) (5) (6) 
. 
3961 
. 
2399 
. 3694 
. 
30212 
. 
3406 
. 
2865 
-. 00016 . 
0982t 
. 
8282 -. 0012 . 
0071 
. 
0049 
. 
00066 
. 0051 . 
0056 
. 
0054 
. 
0061 
. 
0050 
. 1081 
. 
2694 
-. 1679 
-1.1185 
2.7004 
32.5411 * 
5.9401 
. 
4802 
. 
0097 
. 
2626 -1.1677 -0.8200 
2.4611 2.214 2.285 2.1195 1.993 
. 
9184 
. 
2921 2.232 
CON 
INF 
GDP 
Other control: 
US Rf 
Estimation 
Method 
F- Statistic 
R-Sq 
LM 
(p-value) 
Hausman Test 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic 
(p-value) 
DW 
-. 0516 . 0014 . 
0061 
. 
0040 
. 
0031 
. 
0141 0.0026 
. 
2400 
. 
0370 
. 0403 . 0371 . 
0360 
. 
0353 0.0318 
-. 0004 . 
0314 
. 
0258 . 
0183 
. 
0038 
. 
0293 
. 
0321 
. 
0295 
-. 0046 . 
0565+ 
. 
052011- . 
0375 
. 
0036 . 0289 . 
0303 . 0280 
. 
0028 -. 0360 -. 0253 
. 
0109 
. 
0808 . 0839 
OLS OLS 
1.34 
. 
2236 
9.79 
0.0000 
. 
0415 . 
2410 
8.68 . 40 
(. 3696) (. 994) 
. 
76 . 97 
(. 3837) (. 3235) 
. 
0279 . 
0086 0.0181 
. 0301 . 
02824 0.0253 
. 
0532 . 
0418 0.0419- 
. 0284 . 
02663 0.0249 
92.5712* 50.49* 
10.7430 15.5700 
(7) 
0.1234 
0.2733 
0.0047 
0.0046 
4.3890* 
1.502 
-3.287* 
0.3976 
-0.656 
2.207 
0.7969 i 
0.4718 
15.449+ 
6.440 
. 0052 -. 
0082 -. 0160 -0.0192 
. 0775 . 
0792 . 0737 
0.0695 
OLS OLS 
1.12 
. 
3522 
6.87 
. 000 
. 
0345 . 
1803 
OLS OLS OLS 
4.76 
. 
000 
10.70 
. 
000 
14.10 
0.000 
. 
1323 . 
2551 . 
4601 
1.12 11.43 13.19 13.06 11.16 
(. 9973) (. 1786) (. 1054) (. 1098) (0.5152) 
1.65 . 
05 . 
34 
(. 1992) (. 8266) (. 5585) 
08 . 78 
(. 7812) (. 3760) 
2.06 
Wald Test 
(p-value) 
See Table 1.5 for notations. 
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2.5144* 
. 3762 
19.15 
0.0000 
The capital ratio is a proxy for capital sufficiency. Traditionally, depositors may 
consider highly capitalised banks as more credible and therefore agree to earn lower 
deposit interest rates. However, the opposite tendency appears to occur in our results 
and may be explained, as argued by Peresetsky et al., (2007), as a consequence of banks 
with excessive capitalisation operating less efficiently. Less efficient banks may seek to 
attract depositors by offering higher deposit interest rates therefore a positive sign on 
the capital ratio coefficient in the regression may exist. This result is in line with 
Akerlof s (1970) model of rational behavior by market participants in case of 
information asymmetries. If buyers (depositors) cannot adequately observe the quality 
of products, they will demand a discount to bear the risk of such uncertainties. 
Consistent with the market discipline hypothesis banks with higher liquidity are 
considered to be safer and pay a lower interest rate, and banks with poor management 
are required to pay more interest. 
The results pertaining to the interest paid to depositors' variable tells a different story 
about banks' size. The size of banks does not seem to have a significant effect on the 
interest paid to depositors, and banks with larger numbers of branches are not able to 
decrease the interest paid to depositors even though the number of branches may be 
considered a good proxy for services rendered by banks to their clients. On the other 
side, the only added control variable which affects interest paid to depositors is the 
growth in GDP. 
The Wald coefficient test supports the importance of the joint bank fundamentals 
coefficient. In both cases, in equations 3 and 4 the null hypothesis that bank 
fundamentals are not important in explaining banks' deposits growth and interest rate, 
respectively, were rejected (see Tables 1.5 and 1.6). 
To summarise, we find that depositor discipline is at work not only through deposit 
growth but also through interest paid to depositors. Our results are inline with Martinez 
Peria and Schmukler (2001), who find that market discipline exists in emerging markets 
through deposits growth and interest paid. In contrast, our results are not consistent with 
Karas's et al., (2005) argument that depositors discipline their banks mostly by reducing 
the amounts of their deposits. Our results also support the notion that deposit growth 
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falls as bank risk taking increases. Moreover, the evidence suggests that depositors 
require higher interest rates when banks undertake risk. 
In addition, we tested for the robustness of our estimates comparing OLS and 2SLS (see 
Table 1.7). We address the possibility of endogeneity between deposit growth, interest 
rates and bank fundamentals by employing the 2SLS procedure. Although, the Hausman 
test supports the 2SLS procedure in the interest rate equation, OLS was preferred in the 
deposits growth equation (these results are presented in panel A of Table 1.7). 
Additionally, we re-examine the relationship between bank fundamental, deposit growth 
and interest rates using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) estimation which 
considers the contemporaneous correlation between the deposits and interest paid 
equations. These results are presented in Table 1.7 Panel B. 
Generally, despite using different estimation approaches the previous results hold. The 
respective fundamentals continue to be jointly significant in explaining deposit growth 
and interest paid to depositors irrespective of the estimation method used. 
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Table 1.7 
The Effect of Bank Fundamentals on Deposit Growth and Interest Paid to 
Depositors using more than One Estimation Method 
Panel (A): OLS and 2SLS Estimations 
Dependent Variables 
Variable 
A Cap t_i 
A Ligt_l 
Pro t_i 
TL t_, 
ROA t_t 
Mang t_1 
R-Sq 
Hausman Test 
Chi-Sq. Statistic 
(p-value) 
(Deposits Growth) 
(1) (2) 
OLS 2SLS 
Estimation Estimation 
. 
0902 1.5991 * 3.4310+ -10.0140+ 
. 2360 . 5709 1.7720 4.3640 
. 
2282* 
. 
0673 
. 
3973 -. 3427 -2.0760 4.5080 
. 3190 . 4257 2.3981 3.2721 
. 02871 
. 0581 
-. 0103 
. 
0640 
1.166* 
. 4371 
1.524* 
. 4955 
-1.0244 
. 9201 
-4.756* 
1.7664 
0.0975 0.0770 0.2970 0.1368 
. 15368+ -2.2100* -1.573O* 
. 
0769 
. 5030 . 5873 
-1.4379 18.9380* 22.5690* 
1.0023 6.878 7.6960 
-4.0524+ 53.265* 47.071 * 
1.9202 13.2920 14.8420 
(Interest Paid) 
(3) (4) 
OLS 2SLS 
Estimation Estimation 
8.43 
(0.2085) 
8.70 
(0.0035) 
4.79 
(0.0295) 
31.84 
(0.0000) 
1 1.37 
(0.0777) 
19.66 
(0.0000) 
2SLS estimation technique addresses the possible endogeneity between bank capital and other fundamentals. Bank capital is shown 
to respond significantly to prior changes in fundamentals when we include it as an instrument for the bank size, current profit 
estimated as the return on assts ratio and the ratio of total loan to total assets. We then enter the predicted value of capital as a 
regressor in the deposit growth and the interest rate equations, using the specification in which liquidity, loan-loss provision, total 
loans, return on assets and management are included as fundamental variables. The Hausman test compares the two estimations 
(2SLS and OLS), H,,: differences in coefficients are not systematic. The Wald test tests the hypothesis that the corresponding group 
of fundamental variables is equal to zero. +, * indicate significance at the 5% and 1%, respectively 
See Table 1.5 for variables definition. 
Wald Test 
Chi-Sq. Statistic 
-value) 
Notes: 
Panel (B): SUR Estimations 
Dependent Variables 
Variable (Deposits Growth) (Interest Paid) 
SUR Estimation SUR Estimation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Coefficients Standard Errors Coefficients Standard Errors 
A Cap t_1 0.090 0.233 3.526+ 1.757 
A Ligt_1 
0.228* 0.066 -2.264* 0.501 
Pro t_1 0.397 0.315 -2.191 2.375 
TL t_1 0.029 0.057 1.167* 0.433 
ROA t_1 
-1.024 
0.908 19.293 * 6.851 
Mang f_, -, « * 1.742 53.149* 3.152 -4. /30 
R-Sq 0.098 
Wald Test 
Chi-sq Statistic 
(00.06 a..., . ý.... . 
001) 
ý 
-vaýur 
0.299 
109.85 
(0.000) 
Notes: 
The Table reports the regression results of growth rate of deposits (column 1,2) and Interest paid to depositors (column 3,4) on 
bank fundamentals (Risk Characteristics) using SUR estimation. 
SUR is Seemingly Unrelated Regression. This estimation technique corrects for any contemporaneous relation in errors across 
equations. The regression coefficients, standard errors, R2is, etc. are different in SUR estimation from those in the standard 
regressions. This is due to the consideration of any correlated errors in the two equations. 
Wald Test tests the null hypothesis that the corresponding group of fundamental variables is equal to zero. indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and I%, respectively. 
See Table 1.5 for variable definitions 
6.3. Depositor Discipline Before and After the Twin Crises in 1989 
The changes in depositors' behaviour towards risk before and after crises are examined 
in this section. Tables 1.8 to 1.11 report the results of equations 3 and 4 for two separate 
non-overlapping periods, the pre-crises period from 1982 to 1988 and the post-crises 
period from 1991 to 2005. First, for the results of the pre-crises period, we refer to 
Tables 1.8 and 1.9 for deposit growth and interest paid, respectively. It is apparent that 
depositors' discipline during this period is limited in both the deposit growth and 
interest paid equations. While, size was a significant factor affecting deposits growth in 
the pre-crises period, coefficient equals to 0.5925 which significant at the 5% level, 
return on assets (bank profitability) was the only bank fundamental determining interest 
paid to depositors during the same period, significant coefficient value at the 5% 
significance level (see Table 1.9 column 7). This may provide evidence that 
banks are 
weakly affected when they attain fewer earnings by being required to pay more 
interest 
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to depositors. In addition, bank size seems to have an effect on the amount of interest 
paid to depositors, larger banks during the pre crises periods seem to take advantage by 
paying less interest (in Table 1.9 the size variable was negative and significant in 4 out 
of the 7 estimated equations) . 
In contrast, bank liquidity, assets quality or capital adequacy plays no role in depositors' 
choice of their banks. Moreover, depositors during this period were more sensitive to 
the level of inflation (see column 7 in Table 1.8). The inflation rate negatively affected 
deposit growth but banks did not respond to the increase in inflation by increasing 
deposit rates (see the last column of Table 1.9)56. The variable that captures the potential 
spillover effect (contagion effect), the measure of cash outside the banking system 
divided by systemic deposits, has the expected sign and is significant in the deposit 
growth equation (see Table 1.8) and negative (but not significant) in the interest rate 
equation (see Table 1.9), alluding to the fact that deposits with the entire banking 
system grew at a slower rate than cash outside banks. The rapid growth of cash outside 
banks might be a consequence of increases in system wide liquidity in the face of 
declining interest rates on banks deposits and limited alternative avenues for parking 
funds by depositors. In both equations, the Wald test reveals that bank fundamental 
factors are jointly not significant in both specifications. 
56 Accounting data are not adjusted for inflation. 
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Table 1.8 
Factors Affecting Deposit Growth Results- Pre Crises (1982 - 1988) 
Variable Parameter Estimate (Dependent Variable : De osits Growth 
Banks' tundamental and non-fundamental variables 
Sire 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
. 4558-1' -. 0656 -. 0814i -. 0793t . 4651 
ý 
. 5123 't 
. 2394 . 
04576 
. 
0459 
. 
04597 
. 
2746 
. 
2846 
Log No. B -. 0041 . 
0009 -. 00019 . 
00057 
. 
00364 
. 
00092 -. 00375 
. 
06406 
. 
1087 
. 00093 . 
00108 
. 2926 . 
0029 
. 
00458 
A Cap t-, -1.1193 
1.0465 
A Ligt_, 
Pro t_t 
TL t_1 
ROA r-1 
Manag t_i 
Macro economics and systemic factors 
Cash 5.8018{ 
3.1380 
CON 
INF 
GDP 
Other control: 
US Risk Free 
Rate 
Estimation 
Method 
F- Statistic 
-. 5119 
1.1489 
. 
2210 
. 
1411 
-1.8069 
1.5333 
-. 0898 
. 
0857 
1.1138 1.2631 1.3328 1.2480 1.1587 6.8739+ 
2.0723 2.0891 2.0962 2.0406 2.0367 3.2242 
6.214t 3.1082 3.5540 3.5097 1.2056 . 9866 
7.476 
4.487 3.6833 3.7058 3.7148 3.7250 3.731 5.096 
-. 0175+ -. 00543 -. 00543 -. 0060 -. 00653 -. 0059 -. 
0199+ 
. 0086 . 
0067 . 
0067 . 
0067 . 
0065 . 0065 . 
0088 
. 
0082 . 
001586 . 
0020 . 
0019 . 
0006 . 00081 . 
0114 
. 01013 . 
0078 . 
0079 . 
0079 . 0076 . 
0076 . 0104 
-. 0260 . 
0053 . 
0014 . 
0038 . 0189 . 
0196 -. 0288 
. 
02317 . 
0206 . 
0209 . 
02087 . 
02169 . 
0215 . 
0248- 
OLS OLS 
1.99 1.41 
. 
0382 . 
2194 
OLS OLS OLS 
(7) 
. 5925+ 
. 2671 
-. 4749 
. 
4464 
-3.5910 
2.208 
. 3523 
. 4084 
-. 76027 
1.1719 
-3.3890 . 1715 4.0964 4.501 
OLS OLS 
1.36 1.60 1.08 1.65 1.74 
0.2348 . 1023 
0.3946 . 
0880 0.0937 
. 5227 . 
1553 R-Sq . 
4308 
Hausman Test 29.28 
Chi-Sq. Statistic 0.000 
(p-value) 
DW 
LM 
Wald Test 
8.75 4.50 
. 3638 
0.7768 
. 3345 
0.0456 
2.58 7.51 
0.9767 . 
26576 
. 3417 
0.3613 
4.21 11.28 
. 7875.0.0543 
1.9648 
. 
09 
. 
765 3 
See Table 1.5 for notations. 
. 
15 
. 6985 
. 
25 
. 
6169 
. 
05 
. 
8249 
0.00 
0.9940 
-. 7863 
1.3456 
0.00 
0.9724 
. 
88 
. 
3487 
1.75 
0.1937 
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Table 1.9 
Factors Affecting Interest Paid Results- Pre Crises (1982-1988) 
Variable Parameter Estimate (Dependent Variable : Interest Paid to Depositors) 
isanKS' size and Fundamentals 
Size 
(1) (2) 
-. 0087 -. 01558* 
. 
00916 
. 00551 
(3) 
-. 0171 
. 0075 
(4) 
-. 0168* 
. 
0063 
RE RE RE 
log No. B -. 00003 . 
00014 
. 00001 . 
00058 -. 00003 . 
000043 
. 
00103 
. 
00013 
. 
00011 
. 00013 . 
0001 
. 
00013 
. 00012 . 
00074 
A Cap t-i 
A Ligt_l 
Pro t_1 
Lag TL t_1 
ROA t-1 
Manag t_1 
. 
0966 
. 
0669 
. 
0375+ 
. 0152 
0.0648 
0.0628 
. 0159 
. 0117 
. 0443 
. 1239 
(5) 
-. 1659+ 
. 
00722 
. 
0951 
. 
1057'1 
. 
0773 . 
0583 
-. 2602 -. 0094 
. 1979 . 1193 
Macro economics and systemic factors 
Cash -. 0750 -. 0886'i 
. 
0508 
. 
0499 
CON -. 00029 -. 00013 
. 
00019 
. 
00199 
INF . 
00013 
. 
00014 
. 
00016 
. 
00016 
-. 0867-. 0807 -. 09081 . 0889* -. 0310 
. 
0507 . 
0504 
. 
0503 . 0503 . 3885 
-. 4297* -. 00418+ -. 00038+ -. 00043* -. 00002 
. 
00163 
. 
00163 . 00017 . 
000161 . 
00014 
. 1516 . 
00015 . 
0002 . 
00019 . 
00015 
. 1662 . 
0002 . 
0002 . 
00016 . 
00012 
GDP -. 0002 -. 00015 -. 00022 -. 0002 -. 00018 -. 00021 . 
7922 
. 
00018 
. 
00018 . 
00018 . 
00018 . 
00019 . 18428 . 
00014 
Other . 
00049 . 
00061 
control: US . 
00094 . 
0009 
Risk Free 
Rate 
Estimation RE RE 
Method 
F- Statistic 16.87 11.29 
. 
0000 . 0000 
R-Sq . 
4458 . 
5908 
Hausman 
Test: Chi- 
Sq. Statistic 
(p-value) 
LM 
7.14 10.92 
. 
5213 . 
2062 
69.79 
. 
0000 
Wald test 
See Table 1.5 for notations. 
16.01 
. 
0000 
. 0006 . 
00059 . 
00035 
. 0010 . 
0010 . 
00096 
RE RE 
11.28 11.26 
. 0000 . 
0000 
. 7763 . 
7761 
7.65 9.81 
. 4684 . 
2788 
82.15 36.92 
. 0000 . 
0000 
-. 0173 
. 
0106 
1 1.53 1 1.46 16.67 
. 
0000 . 0000 . 
0000 
. 7801 . 
7791 . 
8121 
(6) 
-. 0164+ -. 0191 
. 
0071 
. 0045 
. 0456 
. 0953 
. 0006 . 
0010 
. 
9495 . 
0007 
(7) 
-. 0054 
0065 
7.00 6.84 2.54 
. 
5369 . 5535 . 
9965 
72.37 
. 
0000 
71.20 
. 0000 
3.10 
. 
0738 
0.44 
0.5090 
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Secondly, Tables 1.10 and 1.11 summarise the after crises results for the deposit growth 
and interest paid equations, respectively. It is clear that depositor discipline improved in 
the second period (fundamental variable are more significant compared with the pre- 
crises period in both of quantity and price equations results presented in Tables 1.11 and 
1.12). Hence, the crises seem to have had a positive effect on market discipline. The 
twin crises of the Petra Bank failure and the currency devaluation possibly worked as a 
`wake-up call' for depositors, as noted by Martinez Peria and Schmukler's (2001) study 
on the effects of the Latin American crises. They argue that traumatic episodes during 
severe crises may act as a "wake-up call" for depositors, increasing their awareness of 
the risk of their deposits. Our results seem to be consistent with this argument. Where 
assets quality and earnings affect deposit growth (see Table 1.11), bank capital 
adequacy, liquidity, assets quality, management efficiency and earnings determine 
interest paid to depositors (see Table 1.11). Moreover, bank fundamental variables 
were jointly significant in both cases. In addition, banking system deposit concentration 
has an important effect on deposits growth. The coefficient of banks deposits 
concentration ratio was positive and significant in the deposit growth and interest rate 
equations indicating that a more concentrated banking system stimulates more deposit 
growth and increased deposit rates. Additionally, a more healthy economy has promoted 
a higher deposit growth in the post banking crises sample period. This may be 
interpreted as a build-up of confidence in the banking system especially as the Jordanian 
government undertook substantial reforms aimed at building a sound and safe financial 
system. Interest rate and trade liberalisation effects during the 1990s may have induced 
one of the findings of the regressions reported in Tables 1.9 to 1.12. The impact of 
greater market openness to outside depositors who found the Jordanian banking system 
a relatively safer haven for their savings due to the instability in the region, as well as 
being influenced by the globalisation trend. Perhaps these factors are reflected in the 
negative significant coefficients on the U. S risk free rate variable in the post crises 
period (Table 1.11), whereas the impact of US rate had no influence on the Jordanian 
deposit rate or growth prior to the crises. This may indicate that with more open markets 
investors or depositors may choose to place their funds overseas if offered attractive 
returns. On the other hand, this result may provide some explanation for the existence of 
market discipline which may be induced by foreign investment in local market `external 
discipline' (Vives, 2002). 
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Table 1.10 
Factors Affecting Deposit Growth Results- Post Crises (1991 - 2005) 
Variable 
Banks' Size and Fundamentals 
Size 
log No. B 
A Cap t_, 
A Ligt_j 
Pro_, 
Lag TL_, 
ROA_, 
Manag, 
Parameter Estimate (Dependent Variable : De 
(2) 
. 51149* 
. 1340 
(3) 
. 1026- 
. 
0598 . 
4550* 
. 1634+ 
. 1269 . 
0721 
. 
00437 -. 00212 -. 0003 . 
00460 
. 
00454 -. 00069 
. 0029 . 
0096 
. 
0010 
. 
0029 
. 
0029 
. 0012 
. 07714 
. 1103 
Macro economics and systemic factors 
Cash 
. 
9364 1.0497 
. 
6444 
. 6420 
CON 2.5771 * 2.5968* 
. 
3963 
. 
3873 
INF-. 2815 -. 02995 
. 
0195 
. 0187 
GDP . 0166+ . 
01549+ 
. 
0067 
. 0065 
Other -. 0631 * -. 0619* 
control: US . 
0199 
. 
0199 
Risk Free 
Rate 
Estimation OLS FE 
Method 
F- Statistic 13.54 14.06 
0.0000 0.0000 
R-Sq . 
6229 . 
6260 
Hausman 8.68 16.55 
Test: Chi- (. 3696) (. 0352) 
Sq. Statistic 
(p-value) 
DW 
LM 
Wald test 
(1) 
. 4588* 
. 1238 
. 0045 
. 0029 
. 0561 
. 2979 
. 081 1 
. 
3193 
. 
0468 
. 0965 
1.1408+ 1.6893* 
. 4390 . 5084 
-. 0512 . 
09798 
. 0731 . 1273 
-2.01 14+ 
1.1058 
-4.463* 
1.7256 
-1.1086 2.3572 
2.461 4.686 
1.40 
0.2373 
See Table 1.5 for notations. 
4.69 
. 
0302 
. 2240 . 0908 . 90748 . 98753 . 1120 
. 5934 . 6012 . 
6347 
. 6329 . 
6276 
3.1582* 3.2208* 2.6926 * 2.6616* 3.0737* 
. 3637 . 
3836 . 4017 . 
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43710* 
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FE FE OLS 
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Table 1.11 
Factors Affecting Interest Paid Results- Post Crises 
(1991- 2005) 
Variable 
Banks' Size and Fundamentals 
Size 
log No. B 
(1) 
. 5856 
. 
8772 
Parameter Estimate (Dependent Variable : Interest Paid to Depositors 
(2) 
-. 1814 
. 
3762 
(3) 
. 
0359 
. 
4240 
(7) 
1.233 
. 
7727 
(4) 
. 
7546 
. 
4649 
(5) 
-. 0452 
.3 
945 
(6) 
. 
5261 
. 
3655 
-. 0193 . 
1112't 
. 
9254 -. 0047 . 
0100 
. 
0042 -. 0301 
. 2034 . 
6119 
. 
0069 
. 
0082 
. 
0065 
. 
6016 
. 
0161 
A Cap 5.8262 + 
2.8906 
A Ligt_l 
Pro_, 
TL_j 
ROA_1 
Manag_i 103.97* 88.608* 
13.6334 21.1351 
Macro economics and systemic factors 
Cash 1.5993 2.1954 2.5915 2.3754 2.5410 -1.0845 . 03575 
4.4641 3.7977 4.2107 3.6922 3.9856 3.6799 . 10452 
CON 
INF 
8.8751 * 8.1221 * 9.2056 5.3398+ 7.5265 5.3158+ 2.4390 
2.7974 2.3118 2.5814 2.3689 2.4827 2.3019 2.3491 
-. 0272 . 
0254 -. 0414 -. 0426 -. 0539 -. 2592 -2.085 
1327 . 
1207 . 
13198 . 
11473 . 
12479 . 
11414 3.6166 
GDP . 
051 1 . 6190 . 5566 . 
0509 . 0646 . 
0435 . 0463 
. 
0046 . 0417 . 
4595 . 
0401 . 0437 . 
0400 . 3636 
Other control: US . 1925 . 
1582 . 1993 . 
2051 t . 2087 . 
1036 . 
0597 
Risk Free Rate . 1401 . 
1230 . 1385 . 
1211 . 1316 . 
1211 . 1128 
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
F- Statistic 2.93 10.02 2.64 6.88, 
. 
0042 . 
0000 . 
0092 . 
0092 
32.0724 29.6079+ 
7.2850 11.6404 
5.34 10.76 6.66 
. 
0000 . 
0000 . 
0000 
R-Sq . 1153 . 
3129 . 1051 . 
2341 . 1918 . 
3234 . 5054 
Hausman test Chi- 
Sq. Statistic 
(p-value) 
LM 
2.80 3.19 2.28 4.20 
. 
9460 . 
9218 . 
9713 . 
8385 
. 
70 . 59 
1.43 . 
87 
. 
4018 . 
4417 . 
2323 . 
3500 
DW 
Wald test 
See Table 1.5 for notations. 
6.561 1* 
2.4575 
-3.3800* 
. 46262 
-4. O76* 
. 75936 
-. 7791 11.3076+ 
3.1148 4.5746 
2.8109* . 
9872 
. 4784 . 7832 
2.80 12.25 3.19 
. 
9460 . 1404 . 
9218 
. 
73 . 
22 . 52 
. 
3935 . 
6389 . 
4695 
1.93 
30.00 
0.0000 
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6.4. Deposit Insurance and Market Discipline 
Having found a relationship between bank fundamentals and deposit growth as well as 
interest paid to depositors signifies that market discipline is at work in Jordan. However, 
we need to find out at this stage how the mechanisms of market discipline were 
influenced by the introduction of a deposit insurance system. Specifically, to examine 
whether the introduction of explicit deposit insurance, introduced in Jordan in 2000, 
affected the way in which depositors discipline their banks. We estimate equations 5 
and 6. The results of both estimations are presented in Panels A and B (1 and 2) of 
Table 1.12. 
Panel A in Table 1.12 summarises the results of estimating the deposit growth equation 
(equation 5), when the interaction of bank fundamentals and the deposit insurance 
dummy variable have been added to the model. The results show that depositors' 
sensitivity to bank size existed with the introduction of the deposit insurance system. 
However, this size effect may indicate that the too-big -to-fail policy does not help 
banks attract more deposits or pay lower interest rates. In fact, it could be that large 
banks, in general, are treated as the most risky therefore they have to offer greater 
returns for existing depositors. Overall, the results indicate that the introduction of 
deposit insurance was not responsible for eliminating market discipline. In the deposit 
growth estimation (Panel A Table 1.12), the only significant interaction variable is the 
liquidity variable, however, the sign of the coefficient (0.5247) signifies that market 
discipline through liquidity increased after the introduction of deposits insurance. The 
total effect of liquidity and the interaction between liquidity and the deposit insurance 
dummy variable tend to be positive signifying the large influence of bank liquidity has 
on depositors' behaviour after introducing deposit insurance. However, not all the 
indicators of bank risk which were previously found to reflect market discipline are 
significant. One exception appears from these estimations results. Bank capital appears 
to affect deposit growth with the expected positive sign (coefficient value of signalling 
that the stronger capitalised banks attract more depositors). When deposit insurance was 
introduced, depositors' discipline through quantity has not been affected by the explicit 
insurance. It is likely that with, the effect of asset quality, earnings were not significant 
in the deposit growth equation. 
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Table 1.12 
The Effect of Deposit Insurance on Depositor Discipline 
, Deposit,, a; ' +, ß' x Bank,, 
-, 
+ 2' Control,,, + O' Bank, t_k 
* DIt_k + t%t 
Interest; ', a2 + #2 x Bank; t_, +22 
Controls; 
t+ 
02 Bank; 
t_k 
* DI1_k + v; t 
Variable Panel (A) 
(Deposits Growth) 
Parameter Estimate 
Coefficient(1) Standard Error(2) 
Fundamental Variables 
A Cap, 
- 1 . 
6379-1 
A Ligt_1 
. 
2174+ 
Pro_ 1 1.1262+ 
TL_, 0.0786 
ROA_, 1.7263 
Manag, 0.2429 
A Cap, 
-, 
* DI 0.3616 
A Ligt_, * DI 0.5247* 
Pro-, * DI -1.0608 
TL, * DI -0.0691 
ROA_, * DI -1.4890 
Manag_, *DI -2.7869 
Non Fundamental Variables: 
(5) 
(6) 
Panel (B) 
( Interest Paid) 
Parameter Estimate 
Coefficient(3) 
0.3565 7.990 i 4.1009 
0.1057 -0.3279 0.8091 
0.4767 -1.6069 3.9961 
0.0837 -0.2983 0.6640 
1.2054 -5.1610 9.5876 
2.5342 10.8181 19.20379 
0.2838 -2.5784 4.1523 
0.1273 -2.8247* 0.9720 
0.5506 -0.7139 4.8149 
0.1318 0.0537 1.0129 
1.9623 21.8294 14.5219 
4.9826 77.3906+ 37.7531 
Size -. 08013 - 0.0456 0.5907-] 0.3455 
log No. B 0.0003 0.0006 
Systemic and Macroeconomic 
0.0057 
Standard Error(4) 
0.0047 
Cash 0.0279 0.0279 1.1891 2.0311 
CON 
. 4323t 0.2258 -6.3007 3.1620 INF0.0018 0.0032 0.0073 0.0243 
GDP 
. 00549-1 0.0032 0.0175 0.0245 US Risk Free Rate 0.0120 (0.011) 0.0938 0.0728 
Estimation Method 
Wald Chi Sq (0 +ß) 
(P value) 
R-Sq 
LM 
Hausman Chi- 
Sq. Statistic 
(p-value) 
Interaction variables 
coefficient test 
(p-value) 
OLS 
83.68 
(0.000) 
0.2729 
0.50 
0.4791 
15.50 
(0.6904) 
0.84 
(0.359) 
25.27 
(0.000) 
Notes 
A Deposits is the year by year percentage changes in deposits level, interest is the interest paid to depositors, Bank fundamentals are 
estimated using CAMEL (Capital, Assets Quality, Management Efficiency, Earnings, and Leverage), Control is a vector of control 
variables to capture the effect of macroeconomic and systemic factors, DI is a deposit insurance dummy variable that takes the value 
of one after the introduction of deposit protection and zero otherwise. The standard errors have been corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
Panel A reports the results of equation 5 which regress the deposits growth on bank fundamentals, Interactions between each 
fundamental and the estimated dummy variable (which takes the value of I after introducing the deposit insurance and zero 
otherwise) in addition to the other control variables ( columns I and 2). Panel B represents the results of equation 6 which includes 
the same former independent variables but interest paid to depositors as a dependent variable. 
*, +, t, indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
D 
OLS 
268.81 
(0.000) 
0.4618 
0.01 
0.9079 
9.76 
(0.9394) 
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Regarding the interest paid to depositors (Table 1.12 Panel B), the results indicate that 
two interaction variables (liquidity and management efficiency) were significantly 
affected by the introduction of deposit insurance. In the case of the liquidity interaction 
variable, it shows that depositors' sensitivity to liquidity has been improved after the 
introduction of deposit insurance (-2.8247, negative coefficient sign). In addition, 
market discipline through management efficiency has also been promoted. While the 
management fundamental variable is not significant in the interest estimation results, 
and enters the equation with a positive sign, the interaction variable is found to be 
positive indicating an improvement in depositors' penalising bad management after the 
introduction of deposit insurance. The reasons for this increased attention to 
management efficiency may be because depositors believed that deposit insurance was 
not enough to stop mis-management within banks. All in all, the results do not support 
the hypothesis of a negative effect of insurance on depositors' incentives to monitor 
banks risks. 
Furthermore, to examine whether there is market discipline after the introduction of 
deposit insurance, we test whether the combined coefficients (0+0) are statistically 
significant in both equations 5 and 6. We find that in both cases 0 +ß #0 indicating the 
existence of market discipline after the introduction of deposit insurance. Moreover, the 
joint significance of the interaction variables supports the limited contribution of the 
interaction variables in determining deposit growth. On the other hand, the significance 
joint coefficient test on the overall interaction variables in the interest rates equation 
may be due to the improvement in recognition of management efficiency. On the whole, 
this insensitivity towards the depositors' coverage of loss may be interpreted as the 
deposit insurance scheme offered in Jordan was not generous enough to stop depositors' 
incentives to recognise banks risk (Ioannidou and Dreu, 2006)57. Another explanation 
for the existence of market discipline along with depositors' coverage is the creditability 
of the deposits insurance system which is not visible yet to depositors because the 
Jordanian banking system has not faced any failures since its creation. Our results find 
that the introduction of deposit insurance does not have an adverse impact on depositor 
market discipline is consistent with the findings of other studies, such as Cook and 
57 We mean by generous that depositors are not fully covered, where some countries such as Mexico, 
Turkey promise 100% coverage, Jordan deposit insurance limit individual depositor reimbursements to 
amounts less than their full claims. 
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Spellman (1994), Kane (1987), and Park and Peristiani (1998) and with Demirgüc- 
Kunt's et al., (2006)58. However, they contrast with Ioannidou and Dreu (2006), and 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004). 
6.5. Bank Response to Depositors' Reactions 
As discussed in the theoretical discussion, market discipline can only be effective if 
both depositors both recognise bank risk (recognition stage) and banks respond to 
signals sent by depositors' actions towards this risk (control stage). Banks are assumed 
to respond to depositors' actions through reducing their risk. The previous results only 
support the first part of market discipline. These results suggest that depositors are 
sensitive to bank risk, and reactions to banks risk are stronger in the post-crises period 
(between 1991 and 2005). Depositors' behaviour has not been very sensitive to the 
introduction of explicit deposit insurance. Therefore, in this section we analyse whether 
effective market discipline is at work in Jordan and describe the responses of banks to 
depositors' reactions. 
Following Barajas and Steiner (2000), we measure to what extent bank fundamentals 
change in response to past changes in deposits. The component of deposit growth that is 
directly attributable to bank fundamentals we term "fundamental deposit growth" 
(Depofund). The fundamental deposit growth is calculated as the real growth of deposits 
explained by fundamental variables from the full regression (equation number 7 in 
Table 1.5). This is shown as follows: 
Depofun 
,= -0.2112 
Cap, 
-, 
+ 0.2733 LIQ, _, 
+ 0.2633 LLP, _, - 
0.0018 TL, 
_, 
+ 0.5594 ROA, _, - 
6.7914 Mang, 
-, 
(7) 
Thereafter, two tests are employed to detect the reactions of banks. First, we assume 
that banks respond to the aggregate decrease in deposits levels by having a `symmetric 
response' by examining whether the current period's fundamentals are sensitive to 
depositors' preference for strong bank fundamentals in the previous period. Hence, each 
fundamental variable (response variables) is regressed on the lagged value of 
fundamental deposit growth (independent variable). Table 1.13 shows the results of 
regressing the lagged value of fundamental deposit growth against the current 
58 Demirgüc-Kunt et al., (2006, p. 10) stated that: "even if a country's safety net covered all 
bank balances, depositors 
would remain at risk for the opportunity costs of claiming and reinvesting 
the amounts they are due and also for costs 
occasioned by delays in receiving 
deposit-insurance disbursements. This means that government guarantees ne% er 
completely extinguish market discipline. 
Still, stability can be undermined if deposit-insurance managers displace 
more discipline than they are able to exert" 
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fundamental variables one at a time (univariate regressions). For market discipline to 
hold, a positive sign is expected for management efficiency and a negative sign for each 
of the bank capital, assets quality, liquidity and earnings. The reason behind these 
expected signs is that if depositors punished a bank in the last period for weak 
fundamentals (fundamental deposits growth falls), then banks are supposed to react in 
the following period by improving its fundamentals, increasing their capital base, 
liquidity, profitability, and assets quality and decreasing management inefficiency. The 
results of these tests are reported in Table 1.13 Panel A. Only earnings (ROA) and 
capital behave in a way consistent with market discipline. This indicates that, holding 
other factors constant, if banks face a deposits fall, they react in the next period by 
trying to increase their earnings and improve their capital. On the other hand, banks 
seem to ignore management efficiency in their response. Instead of decreasing their 
non-interest expenses to total assets (management efficiency measure), these tends to 
increase even more. Similarly, banks' loan-loss provisions ratio responds statistically 
but in the opposite direction. We expected in that if banks realize less deposit growth, 
they may react by improving their provision and reducing expected loan-losses, but 
instead banks react by decreasing their loan-loss provisions ratio even more. 
Second, we allow for asymmetric bank responses to signals received by depositors. By 
asymmetric bank responses, we mean that banks may respond differently to different 
types of deposit loss. As argued by Barajas and Steiner (2000), bank managers only 
react to the downside of a business cycle when they feel that the banks will be harmed. 
Thus, the two types of deposits loss that have been proposed (Dlossl it and Dloss2; t) are 
supposed to account for such asymmetry in banks' responses (see the methodology 
section for the description of creating these variables). 
These variables constitute two extremes in deposit losses. In the total sample of 273 
observations, Moss] defines only 81 observations as having experienced fundamental 
deposit losses, therefore it captures only the most extreme cases of individual banks 
being out of line with their fundamentals. On the other hand, Dloss2 encompasses a 
greater number of observations (166) in which individual banks were simply exhibiting 
sub-par fundamentals in relation to the rest of the banking sector. For the interaction 
between Moss] and Depofunt_l, bank behaviour appears to be more consistent with 
market discipline. Banks now tend to improve their profitability (see 
Table 1.13 Panel 
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B 1) when depositors have discriminated against them in the previous period. 
Nevertheless, banks tend to improve their capital (significant at 10% level) when they 
continue to decrease management efficiency, but do not appear to adjust their loan-loss 
provision or their liquidity levels. Where the results of banks asymmetric response to 
Dlossl are very similar to the previous results, but one defence occur bank response 
through earnings improvements increased strongly to reach a1% significance level with 
an increase in the explanatory power (R` increased from 0.4% to nearly 14%). In 
addition, banks liquidity has an estimated negative sign but it fails to approach 
statistical significance. Based on these results, we can say that banks are more biased to 
respond to deposits losses (negative growth of deposits) by improving their profitability. 
Section (B2) in Table 1.13 summarises the results of the effect of interaction between 
Dloss2 (relative losses) and Depofunt_1 on the next period fundamentals, we can draw 
nearly the same conclusion from the results regarding strong evidence of bank response 
through earnings improvements. Other fundamentals do not behave in a manner 
consistent with market discipline. Banks do not appear to adjust or improve their 
capital, efficiency, or even asset quality when they face losses in their deposits relative 
to overall system deposits. Overall, from the above results, we can infer that while 
depositors are recognise bank risk and discipline bank behaviour, this effect does not 
appear to be strong. Under these circumstances, more needs to be done in order to reap 
the benefits of depositors' discipline. Such findings should provide Jordanian's bank 
supervisory authorities cause for concern, especially regarding changing banks' attitude 
towards risk-taking. 
Table 1.13: Response of Banks to Fundamental Growth of Deposits 
Estimation Provision 
Panel A- Symmetric Response 
Independent (1) 
Variable 
Depofun, 
_, . 
0611* 
. 
0203 
LM 269.31 
. 
0000 
Hausman Test 
P-value 
. 
29 
. 
5897 
Estimation 
Approach 
R2 
RE 
M48 
Response in Fundamental Variables 
(Dependent Variables) 
Liquidity 
(2) 
ROA 
(3) 
Capital 
(4) 
Management 
(5) 
-. 0177+ 
. 
0073 . 
2584 -. 02631 10491- 
. 
1767 
. 
0151 . 
0572 
39.52 14.86 
. 
0000 . 
0001 
3.29 
0.0697 
2.29 
. 
1303 
FE 
0.0361 
RE 
. 
00424 
115.84 14.86 
0.0000 . 
00012 
. 
03 
. 
8681 
2.29 
. 
1303 
RE 
0.007 
RE 
. 
0042 
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Panel B- Asymmetric Response 
(1) 
1- Banks only respond when their fundamental 
deposit growth's negative 
(2) 
Liquidity 
(3) (4) (5) 
Estimation Provision 
Lag 
Depofun*Lag 
Dlossl 
LM 
. 
0451 -. 1016 
. 
0319 
. 
2742 
2 52.90 66.03 
0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman Test 4.529 
P-value 0.018 
3.59 
0.0582 
ROA Capital Management 
1557* -. 07516t -. 0689 * 
. 
0220 
. 
0399 . 
01093 
26.90 14.13 3 9.10 
0.0000 0.0002 0.00 
0.00 0.01 5.30 
0.9796 0.9299 0.0214 
Estimation FE FE 
Approach 
R2 0.0028 0.0013 
Lag Depofun* 
. 
07802* 
LagDtoss2 
. 
0265 
LM 
Hausman Test 
P-value 
Estimation 
Approach 
RZ 
Notes: 
RE RE 
0.1372 0.0083 
2- Banks only respond when their fundamental 
deposit growth is below the banking sector average 
FE 
0.1555 
. 
40880-'r -. 0863* -. 0883 -. 05379* 
. 
2240 . 
019762 07410 
. 
0094 
263.97 51.19 21.27 116.35 35.87 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
7.655 
0.023 
FE 
0.0412 
0.54 
0.4618 
RE 
0.0257 
14.55 
0.0001 
FE 
0.0233 
0.00 
0.934 
RE 
0.0007 
1.54 
0.2148 
RE 
0.1603 
The table reports the results of testing banks' response to the changes in deposit growth. First, Panel A represents symmetric 
response where we assume that banks react to the previous period changes in deposit growth, without distinguishing between 
positive or negative changes, by adjusting their fundamentals. In order to examine whether banks respond to changes in deposits, we 
regress each of the fundamental variables on the lag value of Deposfun which explains the real growth of deposits, this value is 
estimated using fundamental variables and calculated as follows: 
Depofun = -0.2112 Cap, _, 
+ 0.2733 LIQ, 
_, 
+ 0.2633 LLP, 
_, - 
0.0018 TL, 
_, 
+ 0.5594 ROA, _, - 
6.7914 Ming, 
-, 
In columns I to 5 (Panel A), the values in the highlighted rows represents the coefficients and the standard errors proceed from 
regressing the lag value of deposit fundamentals (Depfun t-1) against the current period loan loss provision ratio, liquidity. ROA, 
capital, and management efficiency, respectively. The only significant values which are consistent with the hypothesis that banks 
adjust their fundamentals following the changes in their deposits are the ROA (column 3) and capital (column 4) variables. However, 
the rest of the variables are either not significant (liquidity) or indicate incorrect bank response (management, and provisions). For 
example, the coefficient value of the management regression in column 5 (-0.0177) is significant at the 5% level, but the negative 
sign means that banks respond by decreasing (instead of improving) their efficiency. 
Panel B (I and 2), show the regression results of regressing each fundamental variable on the interaction between the calculated 
deposits fundamental (Depfun) and the estimated dummy variables Dlossl and Dloss2 to account for asymmetric response 
assuming that banks only respond to the losses arising from negative deposit growth or deposit growth less than the systemic growth 
of deposits, respectively. The two types of deposit loss dummy variables are defined as follows: 
Dossl;, 1, Depofirn 0 Dloss2;, 1, Depofun ;, - SysGrowth 
0, otherwise 0, otherwise 
Where, SysGrwth is the average banking sector deposit growth. 
* +, t, indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
In each regression the estimation technique was selected using the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) and the 
Hausman tests. 
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7. Conclusions 
This paper examines the hypothesis of effective depositors' discipline. It presents 
evidence that depositors can practise disciplinary effects with regard to banks operating 
in an emerging market. The results confirm that depositors, as the main market 
participants in emerging financial systems, can share the burden with regulators in 
maintaining a sound and safe banking system which may reduce moral hazard problems 
in those markets. The results are in line with those found by Martinez Peria and 
Schmukler (2001) on Argentina, Chile and Mexico; Ioannidou and de Dreu (2006) on 
Bolivian banking; Barajas and Steiner (2000) on Colombia; Ghosh and Abhiman (2003) 
on India; Ungan and Caner (2006) on Turkey; and Goday and Gruss (2005) on Uruguay. 
These results are encouraging to bank regulators who are currently tackling the adoption 
of the Basel 2 Accord which requires more market intervention in addition to capital 
regulation and bank supervision. 
This study contributes to the existing literature by applying the existing methodologies 
and extends the current evidence on depositor discipline, using a unique data set from 
an emerging market. The use of a single country data set reflects our view that market 
discipline is best examined on a country-by- country basis as it is very much a country- 
specific issue. In addition, while most of the previous literature focuses on testing for 
the recognition of market discipline (typically focusing on the quantity approach), 
substantially less research has tackled the issue of market influence and control on 
banks 59 
. This paper extends the previous 
literature by empirically testing for the 
existence of effective market discipline, analysing both the recognition and control 
stages using both price and quantity approaches. 
Two initial questions have been investigated in this paper, first, do depositors react to 
bank risk-taking behaviour, and is this reaction affected by financial crises or the 
introduction of explicit deposit insurance? Second, is depositor discipline effective 
enough to force banks to respond to the signals sent by depositors to the market? In 
order to analyse these questions, a comprehensive panel data was collected from the 
Jordanian banking sector for the period from 1982 to 2005. Answers to the first question 
59 Market control means whether market pressures change bank risk taking or not, 
beyond the analysis on 
"market monitoring" (Bliss and Flannery, 2001). 
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come from the estimations of reduced form equations, in which dependent variable 
(deposits, as proxied by yearly percentage growth rates in total deposits; and price 
proxied by implicit interest rates which are interest expenses divided by total deposits) 
are modelled as a function of bank fundamentals, systemic and macroeconomic 
variables, as well as other control variables. 
Furthermore, in order to analyse depositors' sensitivity to financial crises, two non- 
overlapping periods (namely pre- and post-crises) have been examined, as well as the 
effect of the introduction of deposit insurance. Overall, the estimation results enable us 
to conclude that depositors in Jordan punish banks for their risky behaviour through 
both withdrawals of deposits and higher deposit prices. Depositors seemed to witness a 
"wake-up call" effect after the financial crises (where market discipline effects 
strengthened). Regarding the results of the effect of introducing the explicit deposit 
insurance on depositors' discipline, no clear evidence was found to support that market 
discipline is harmed by new depositors' insurance coverage. This result may be 
interpreted as a perceived lack of deposits protection coverage by the new insurance 
scheme - that is, the system may be viewed as being not credible. Depositors may have 
no or little confidence in the new deposit insurance arrangements. This view is 
supported Marinez Peria and Schmukler's (2001) argument that deposit insurance has 
no effect on depositors' behaviour towards risk. Another interesting finding of our study, 
in contrast to Levy-Yeyati et al., (2004), is that we find that macroeconomic variables 
tend to have a limited effect on market responses. Furthermore, deposits sensitivity to 
the global market seems to be effective in the post-crises period and this may also be 
limited to the economic reforms during the same period and the globalization trend. 
This result may signify that external discipline could play a role in strengthening 
domestic market discipline in the post-crises period. The limited effect of 
macroeconomic factors on market discipline is supported by the study of Caprio and 
Klingebiel (1997) who conclude that microeconomic factors have played the major part 
in recent banking crises in emerging markets. 
In order to answer our second question we employ Barajas and Steiner's (2000) 
methodology by examining the response of banks to the signals provided by depositors. 
We assume that banks respond to the decrease in deposit growth by taking corrective 
action regarding bank fundamentals. Furthermore, we allow for asymmetric responses 
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by in banks. In all cases, we find that banks respond only by improving their 
profitability, rather than adjusting other fundamental variables. This result may indicate 
(implicitly) that bank managers "gamble for resurrection" generating more income for 
owners which makes them more able to pay higher interest to depositors. However, this 
conclusion may indicate that policy makers and regulators should improve bank 
incentives to improve other fundamentals and therefore decreasing banks risk and 
improving safety. 
Various policy implications appear from these results. Financial regulators could rely 
more on elements of private market discipline as a complement to deposit insurance 
schemes and allow market participants (e. g. depositors) to assess banks' ability to 
absorb aggregate shocks and remain solvent. Furthermore, the results open the door for 
more discussion at the policymaker level in emerging markets as to the relevance of 
greater financial information disclosure (by both market participants and regulators) in 
order to build-up more effective discipline as components of evolving regulatory 
frameworks. Timely and accurate dissemination of information combined with greater 
transparency of reporting and accountability within banks could go a long way to reduce 
weaknesses detracting from effective market discipline and help enable depositors 
(private participants) to assess banks' ability to absorb aggregate shocks and remain 
solvent. Additionally, it is important to note here that market monitoring in emerging 
markets cannot effectively replace official supervision, but that it has a potentially 
powerful role within the overall regulatory regime. In particular, it has the advantage of 
exploiting the synergies between supervision and market discipline and thereby 
increasing the efficacy of the overall supervisory process. Until recently, depositor 
discipline has not grown strong enough to affect banks risk-taking behaviour. The 
implementations of Basel 2's new three pillars may provide a broader role and help 
emerging markets protect the banking system from excessive risk-taking and therefore 
reduce bank failure. 60 Finally, debate regarding the ability of depositors to efficiently 
60 Another suggested strategy which may be applicable here is that it is worth making 
banks seeking a 
credit rating and making that credit rating public to ensure outside agencies that are not supervisors 
but 
have high skills in risk analysis to give an objective opinion regarding the risk of the 
bank. The credit 
ratings agencies should be authorised international agencies that would suffer too much 
loss of reputation 
and devalued rating if they rated inaccurately and such agencies could 
be used in order to control rating 
quality. 
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and effectively monitor bank risk in emerging markets due to their low level of 
sophistication is questioned in our findings. We argue that those depositors are able to 
participate directly or indirectly to reduce weaknesses of the official regulation and 
supervision of banks operating in such markets. 
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Do Large Banks Dominate the Banking Sector in Emerging Financial 
Markets? 
Abstract 
Recent trends including competition, technological change, and deregulation have led to 
the emergence of dominant banks in many economies. The costs and benefits of these 
developments depend critically on whether or not the returns and riskiness of large 
banks can significantly influence relatively small banks within the same sector, bringing 
about a higher potential for systemic risk. The effect of bank size on systemic risk and 
the strength of spillover effects are also of interest because a `financial meltdown' is 
generally expected to start with serious problems at large banks and because the 
character of spillover may differ between banks of different sizes (Elyasiani et al., 
2007). The increase trend toward larger banks observed in the financial services 
industry give this issue added importance and encourage regulators to place greater 
concern over the emergence of dominant banks (Solvin et al., 1999). The main objective 
of this paper is to examine intra-industry information transfer in the banking sector by 
empirically assessing the large bank dominance issue within the framework of returns 
and volatility spillovers in an emerging capital market. In order to examine the large 
bank spillover issue, we apply the Vector Error Correction (VEC) and Generalized 
Autoregressive Heteroscedastic (GARCH) methodologies over the period spanning 
1998 to 2005 to examine spillover effects in the Jordanian banking system. Our results 
suggest significant intra-industry information channelled through not only the level of 
intra-industry returns but also through the common volatility returns without any clear 
dominance effect from large to small banks. This suggests that investors appear to be 
indifferent to the signal quality of information between large and small banks. These 
findings concerning return and volatility relations between large and small banks have 
importance for regulators in emerging markets. Regulators should look for stabilizing 
potentially adverse effects of negative event(s) at all banks in the system irrespective of 
their size (see, Raj an, 1992). 
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1- Introduction 
A particularly important feature concerning the stability of financial systems is the 
banking sector. Banks play a central role in the money creation process and in the 
payment system. Moreover, bank credit is an important factor in the financing of 
investment and growth. Therefore, regulators have a special interest in assessing 
banking system stability (Hartmann et al., 2005). 
Although banking activities are regulated and monitored by government authorities, the 
reasons for this regulation and its impact on bank industry structure remain 
controversial. A central issue of this controversy is the extent to which an event 
occurring at a specific bank can be transferred to affect the rest of the banks in the 
system. This issue can be at the origin of the bank contagion phenomenon which is 
directly related to systemic risk. The term contagion refers to the transmission of an 
idiosyncratic shock that affects one bank or possibly a group of banks and how this 
shock is transmitted to other banks or the banking sector overall (Edwards, 2000; 
Eichengreen and Rose, 1999; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; and Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
1999). Defined in this way contagion is a subset of the broader concept of systemic risk 
which may result from contagion or from a common shock affecting all banks 
simultaneously. Hence, information transmission and possible systemic risk is the main 
rational for financial regulation and prudential supervision that aims to preserve the 
stability of the financial system. 
Banks' role as collectors of private information for credit assessment creates various 
interdependencies. In the presence of information asymmetry, the position of banks as 
information intermediaries leads to higher industry-wide correlation due to 
homogeneous risk profiles (Bessler and Nohel, 2000). Developments in the banking 
industry (including financial innovation, increased competition, advances in information 
technology, deregulation, globalization, conglomeration and consolidation) are likely to 
have strengthened interdependencies among individual banks, affecting the structure of 
the industry, heightening bank sensitivity to shocks, and exposing the banking system to 
greater risks (Elyasiani et al., 2007). 
Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) note that the increasingly competitive environment has 
forced banks to become much larger, and an additional outcome is that it also increases 
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a bank's linkages with other banks. The increased exposure that other banks have to one 
another results in an increasing risk of catastrophe associated with large bank failure. 
These trends have attracted serious scrutiny from regulators and researches because the 
sheer size of large banks has led to greater concerns over heightened market power, 
increased systemic risk, stronger moral hazard incentives, and the rising costs of the 
`too-big-to-fail' doctrine (Elyasiani et al., 2007). 
Proponents of the `too-big-to-fail' doctrine argue that there is a need for regulators to 
stabilize potentially adverse effects of negative events at a large bank which are not 
present in similar small banks. In effect, regulators attempt to enhance welfare by 
foreclosing the possibility of failure of a large bank. Alternatively, Sharpe (1990) and 
Raj an (1992), argue that there is no need to provide special protection to large banks, 
because effective competition among financing sources minimizes the effect of the 
failure of a single large bank. Given the aforementioned conflicting views concerning 
the influence of large banks in the banking system, it is interesting to examine whether 
large banks are able to dominate the banking sector and therefore regulators need to 
consider large banks as being special. 
In general, a firm may become dominant if it has sufficient market power to enable it to 
affect prices or act independently of its rival, smaller price-taking firms (Pilloff and 
Roades, 2000). Baca et al., (2000) and Cavaglia et al., (2000) argue that industry factors 
have become an increasingly important component of security returns in most of the 
capital markets around the world. A broad empirical literature in banking relies on 
market data to assess bank risk and its future prospective. A key assumption in this 
literature is that information conveyed by market prices about bank's prospects and risk 
is reliable (Crouzille et al., 2004). 
Therefore, the main objective of this paper is to examine intra-industry information 
transfer in the banking sector by empirically assessing the large bank dominance issue 
within the framework of the returns and volatility spillover in the capital market. The 
main argument behind this objective comes from the costs and benefits of the banking 
industry developments noted before which depend critically on whether or not the 
returns and riskiness of large banks (or one large bank) can significantly 
influence 
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relatively smaller banks within the same sector, bringing about a higher potential for 
systemic risk. 
Previous empirical research concentrates on intra-industry information transfer in the 
banking sector and examines the effect of the information release from one bank to its 
rivals. The pioneer work by Aharony and Swary (1983), and Swary (1986) has 
examined the effect of specific bank failures or bad news on other banks share prices 
(see also e. g., Docking et al., 1997; and Sloven et al., 1999). Other studies, for example, 
Dickinson et al., (1991), Akhigbe and Madura (2001), and Karafiath et al., (1991) 
examine the information transmission in the banking sector and find that contagion 
effects are influenced by bank size. Finally, the effect of different types of bank 
information release has been examined. For instance, announcement of loan loss 
reserves (Docking, 2000), down-grading of debt (Schweitzer et al., 2001), and 
dividends reduction (Christie, 1994) have all been shown to provide some information 
content in relation to bank stock returns. 
Studies related to banking information transfer mainly adopt event study or simple 
regression methodology. However, recent developments in time series analysis, mainly 
applied to financial markets, have permitted researchers to undertake more rigorous 
analysis with regard to information transfers. The literature in this area emphasises on 
short and long-run comovments and volatility spillover among a number of developed 
and emerging financial markets. See for example, Ederington and Lee (1993), Harvey 
and Huang (1991), Darrat and Benkato (1999), and Bekaert et al., (2005), and Abraham 
and Seyyed (2006), Choudhry (1997), Eun and Shim (1989), Francis and Leachman 
(1998), Piesse and Hearn (2002), Westermann, (2004), and Moor (2007). 
However, there are only a handful of studies which apply this type of analysis 
specifically to the financial sector. For example, there has been research on integration 
of volatility spillover across the banking industry and other financial institutions in 
Europe (Kleimeier and Sander, 2000), in the US (Elyasiani et al., 2007) and among 
different countries (Elyasiani and Mansur, 2003). The results of theses studies provide 
evidence supporting the existence of returns and risk interdependencies across financial 
firms in different markets. 
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However, none of previous studies, to the best of our knowledge, have focused directly 
in examining the effect of the returns of large bank stocks on the returns of small bank 
stocks within the context of interdependence and volatility spillover. Therefore, the aim 
of this study is to investigate intra-industry information flows and to examine if there is 
a dominant (leader) role of large banks over smaller banks based on the information 
transmission mechanism'. 
In this paper we use financial data from 1998 until 2005 for nine banks listed on the 
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), Jordan. We employ a Vector Error Correction (VEC) 
model to study the return interdependencies as well as a Generalised Auto-Regressive 
Conditional Heteroscedastic (GARCH) model to investigate volatility spillovers. We 
also examine information transmission between large and small banks pre-and-post 1l th 
of September, 2001 to see whether this event led to a significant change and shift in 
information transmission within the banking sector 2. The results from the above 
empirical tests will help us to answer the following important questions: (1) Are risk 
and returns of Jordanian banks tightly linked? (2) Does the large bank dominate the 
returns and volatility linkages in the banking sector? (3) Has the 11th of September US 
event influenced banks' returns and volatility patterns? 
Information flows in ASE and between listed Jordanian banks, in particular, provide an 
interesting case, because Jordan has a relatively open economy with a small banking 
system comprising one major international bank, Arab Bank, with the remainder being 
relatively smaller national and foreign banks. Recent liberalization of interest rates in 
the Jordanian system has led to a more competitive environment and stimulated foreign 
investment. The stock market has developed rapidly and Arab Bank is the major 
component of the market. This had led some researchers to suggest that the Arab Bank 
dominates the banking sector in Jordan, and has led others to comment on the 
importance of examining this large bank effect within the banking sector in this 
emerging market (Saadi-Sedik and Petri, 2006). Nevertheless, the critical role played 
by the Jordanian financial system in the region emerged after the 11th of September US 
attack event. Portfolio inflows have been stronger than usual. Net inflows became 
1 This study will use interchangeably the terms leadership and dominance to indicate the strong return 
and volatility spillover between large bank and relatively smaller banks within the system. 
2 Previous studies have looked at the impact of 11th of September 2001 ( e. g Ito and Lee, 2005; and 
Nikkinen et al., 2007). 
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significantly positive reflecting the favorable economic conditions in Jordan. The 
relative reluctance of Arab nationals to invest in overseas markets, the abolishment of 
most restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic assets and the progress made by 
policy makers in Jordan to improve transparency and efficiency of the financial system 
have contributed further to foreign investors' interest (Saadi-Sedik and Petri, 2006). 
Our results show that the dominant role of the large bank in explaining other smaller 
bank risks and returns is not clearly evident. One explanation for this result is that 
market-wide information is incorporated into the prices of the large bank stock at the 
same time as being impounded into the prices of small bank stocks without considering 
the signal quality between these stocks (Chan, 1993). Regarding the effect of 11th of 
September event, it increased the volatility of Jordanian bank share prices, and appears 
to have resulted in a more integrated Jordanian banking system with higher levels of 
return causality and volatility spillover within the banking sector. 
Our results have implications for regulators, investors and portfolio managers. 
Regulators are particularly concerned with the potential for a widespread loss of public 
confidence in the soundness and safety of banks that could be triggered by the negative 
information release from large banks. However, our evidence suggests that any actions 
by regulators should be directed to industry-wide difficulties or interdependence among 
individual banks rather than large bank-specific idiosyncratic problems. Additionally, 
investors and portfolio managers should not highly concentrate on the large bank stock 
returns movement when they forecast the returns and risk of other bank stocks in the 
sector. 
The paper is arranged as follows; section 2 provides a brief overview of the Jordanian 
financial system. This is followed by a discussion of the theoretical and empirical 
literature of intra-industry information transmission in section 3. We then explain the 
data and methodology employed in Section 4. Section 5 contains the results and Section 
6 is the conclusion. 
2. Preliminary Background 
Emerging markets are complex and interesting. Jordan is no exception. Among 
emerging markets, Jordan is one of the most open to foreign investors and the most 
sophisticated among Arab countries. In 1997, Jordan introduced a modern securities 
law 
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by which separated regulatory functions from the technical side of the market. It created 
a regulatory body, the Jordan Securities and Exchange Commission (JSEC), to 
organize, develop and monitor the securities market according to internationally 
accepted and proven standards. This led to an increase in investors' confidence as well 
as in stock market activity. The maintenance of a transparent flow of information among 
market institutions, participants and investors and the creation of sophisticated, 
professional and efficient organizational and administrative functions of market 
institutions helped to develop Jordan's financial sector (Gentzoglanis, 2007). 
An ongoing reform programme has taken place over the last couple of decades3. For 
instance, interest rates were fully liberalized in the early 1990s. In 1996, a new 
investment law was passed, allowing equal treatment for domestic and foreign investors 
to transfer funds in and out the country, permitting for free capital movements aimed at 
opening the financial system to foreign participation. These reforms have resulted in a 
well-developed financial sector, placing Jordan among the Middle East and North 
Africa countries (MENA) with the highest financial development indicators in most 
areas (see Appendix 2.1 Tables 1 and 2). 
The main components of the Jordanian financial system comprise banking institutions 
and the capital market (Saadi-Sedik and Petri, 2006). While Jordan has a relatively open 
economy, it has a highly concentrated banking system characterised by one large 
international bank, Arab Bank, and a number of small national and foreign banks. The 
three bank concentration ratio for total assets, total deposits, and total equity amounted 
to around 75% over the period 2002-2005 (see Appendix 2.1 Table 3). More 
importantly, the concentration ratio of the largest bank (Arab Bank) relative to all listed 
banks exceeds 50% (see Appendix 2.1 Table 3). 
There are considerable variations in the character of Jordanian banks. The Arab Bank, 
comprising half the banking sector, is the largest bank in Jordan, with an asset-base of 
nearly JD 17 billion at the end of 2005. Arab Bank was the first national bank in Jordan 
established in 1930. The difference between the asset size of Arab Bank and other 
banks 
operating in Jordan is due to the substantial difference in their scope of operations; the 
3 See for example Jordan Securities Commission at: http: /www. jsc. gov. jo/main. asp. 
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Arab Bank has a worldwide presence, while the other Jordanian banks prime focus is in 
the local market. Arab Bank accounted for almost 61% of the total assets, 62% of total 
deposits, and 59% of total equity of the nine banks in our sample in 2005 (See 
Appendix 2.1 Table 4). 
The banking sector constitutes the largest part of the ASE. With 17 listed banks, the 
value traded for the banking sector constitutes 44% of the total value traded of listed 
companies compared with only 28% for industrial stocks, 1% for insurance, and 27% 
for services companies stocks as of 2004. However, despite the fact the banking sector 
comprises 64% of total market capitalization, the total value traded for the industrial 
sector in 2005 outperformed that of the banking sector due to the implementation of 
various privatizations (see Appendix 2.1 Table 5 and Figure 1), which increased 
investors' confidence in industrial firm stock investments (ASE, Data Base, 2005). 
Based on the trading information of the ASE in Appendix 2.1 Table 6, stock 
transactions in the banking sector are dominated by Arab Bank. On the other hand, the 
number of traded shares and contracts for Arab Bank were, during the same period, less 
than other banks which is mainly due to the high market value of this stock compared 
with the market value of other bank stocks; this high market value limits small 
investors' appetite for the stock. The number of contracts for Arab Bank (see Appendix 
2.1 Table 6) accounted for 53% of the total contracts in 2005, compared with only 21% 
in 2002. 
The importance of the banking sector can be recognized through the substantial 
percentage of foreign investments in ASE that are absorbed by the banking sector. 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the movements of foreign investments at ASE, as well as the 
banking sector share of foreign investments in ASE in 2005. Foreign investment 
increased sharply in 2004 for two reasons: first, the instability in the other Arab 
countries, and second, the efforts made by policy makers in the market to attract foreign 
investment into Jordan. 
Hence, it is interesting to examine whether the significant market position of Arab Bank 
in the Jordanian banking sector is sufficient to make it the leader or dominant in the 
stock market, and whether this bank influences other banks listed in the market 
in the 
context of returns causality and volatility spillover. 
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3. Theoretical Background and Information Transmission: 
A Literature Review 
3.1. Theoretical Background 
Information spillover effects have been described in the banking literature within the 
context of market contagion. The term contagion is interpreted differently within the 
banking literature (see for example Aharony and Swary 1983,1996). It can refer 
specifically to fear of a bank run (see Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Conversely, it can 
refer more generally to "any transmission of information across banks; as a given 
amount of information pertaining to one bank may be contagious to other banks" 
(Akhigbe and Madura, 2001, p 1). 
When a banking system does not work well, there is a potential for financial instability. 
Northcott (2004) argues that banks have traditionally been considered to be more 
vulnerable to instability than other industries, for various reasons: first, a bank's balance 
sheet consists of short-term deposits on the liability side and long-term assets that can 
be difficult to liquidate quickly. Secondly, highly leveraged firms have an incentive to 
engage in risky behaviour. If the firm achieves excess profit, shareholders benefit; if it 
does not, they will bear the cost. This agency problem is particularly strong for banks 
because banks tend to be very highly leveraged; a large share of the debt holders are 
depositors who have small claims, are widely dispersed, and may not be well informed 
of a bank's activities and potential risks; and the existence of deposit insurance further 
lessens depositor's incentives to monitor the risk-taking behaviour of the bank (See 
Paper 1 in this thesis). Moreover, De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) emphasise that banks 
share a complex network of exposures and face interrelated risks that can result in 
debilitating effects if bank failure occurs. 
Furthermore, the problems in the banking sector may have systemic effects on the 
economy. The nature of the contracts banks hold (short-term deposits and longer-term 
loans) exposes them to the possibility of runs; and linkages between banks combined 
with information asymmetries between counterparties and banks make them vulnerable 
to contagion (Jackson and Perraudin, 2002). 
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In the theoretical literature, contagion in the banking sector arises from the propagation 
of asymmetric information because investors do not have the information to distinguish 
between bank-specific developments and systematic phenomena (Slovin et al., 1999). 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) demonstrate that bank runs developed from random 
shocks that induce some investors to withdraw funds even when no fundamental change 
in a bank's prospects or asset values has occurred. Expectations about the condition of 
the banking sector may be affected by investors' perceptions about the ability of a 
specific bank to meet its obligations. As investors observe withdrawals, they respond 
similarly, generating a bank run that may force liquidation of longer-term investments at 
a loss. Gorton (1988) and Chari and Jagannathan (1988) contend that the `first come 
first served' nature of bank liabilities, together with the severity of asymmetric 
information about loan quality, implies that major adverse bank information alters the 
market's assessment of the value of rival banks. 
In addition, researchers have examined the transfer of shocks through the interbank 
market. Allen and Gale (2000) show that the possibility of contagion depends strongly 
on the completeness of the structure of interregional claims. They find that complete 
claims structures are shown to be more robust than incomplete structures. Freixas et al., 
(2000) investigate the ability of the banking sector to withstand the insolvency of one 
bank and whether the closure of one bank generates a rippling effect throughout the 
system. They find that contagion arises from unforeseen liquidity shocks, i. e. banks 
withdrawing interbank deposits from another bank. 
In summary, we can say that information that might cause a shock, which initially 
affects institutions or a particular region of an economy, can spread by contagion to the 
rest of the financial sector and this can then infect the larger economy. Thus, contagion 
effects are at the centre of systemic risk and occur through direct linkages between 
participants. Also, contagion can arise from indirect linkages, where firms have similar 
exposures, so that a single shock can affect multiple firms. 
Systemic risk, therefore, is a key concern for regulators who are charged with 
safeguarding overall financial stability (Dow, 2000). Systemic risk arises when the 
weakness of multiple banks imposes costs on the financial system and ultimately on the 
economy as a whole. Despite the fact that the precise meaning of systemic risk is 
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ambiguous, the literature reveals three frequently used concepts one at a macro level 
where the other two concepts are focused more at the micro level (Kauffman and Scott. 
2003). Under the first concept, systemic risk occurs when a large macro shock affects 
most or all of the economy or system adversely and simultaneously. Bartholomew and 
Whalen (1995) point out that systemic risk refers to an event having effects on the entire 
banking, financial, or economic system rather than just one or few institutions. Mishkin 
(1997) defines systemic risk as "the likelihood of a sudden, usually unexpected event 
that disrupts information in financial markets, making them unable to effectively 
channel funds to those parties with the most productive investment opportunities". 
However, Kaufman (1994), and Crockett (1997) define systemic risk focusing on that 
only one bank needs to expose indirect causation to the initial shock where all other 
banks along the transmission chain may be unexposed to this shock. Finally, systemic 
risk's third definition focuses on spillovers from an initial exogenous external shock but 
it does not involve direct causation and depends on weaker and more indirect 
connections. 
Inter-bank relations, can therefore, serve as a channel through which problems in one 
bank can spread to another. In this context, Allen and Gale (2000) use simple examples 
to show that the extent of fragility of the system depends on the structure of these inter- 
bank linkages. If each bank is connected to all other banks, a shock to one bank can be 
absorbed within the system since each bank bears a small share of the shock (Nier et al., 
2007). 
On the other hand, the effect of large banks on systemic risk and the strength of 
spillover effects are interesting to study because a `financial meltdown' is likely to start 
with problems related to the largest banks and because the nature of a spillover differs 
between banks of different sizes. In this context, Aharony and Swary (1996) examine 
informational contagion in five large bank failures that occurred in the Southwest region 
of the US during the mid-1980s, and found that size affects information contagion 
positively. 
Moreover, the recent consolidation trend has resulted in large banking institutions 
giving the size effects added importance. It is worth noting that, from a theoretical 
perspective, firm size can either reduce or increase a firm's risk. Risk reduction can 
be 
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achieved because increased size allows banks to diversify more extensively and to 
benefit from economies of scale in management of risk. In contrast, forces increasing 
financial institutions risk include increased moral hazard incentives and/or agency 
problems associated with managing more complex institutions. Boyd and De Nicolo 
(2005) provide a theoretical explanation based on moral hazard and contracting theory 
for why bank risk-taking can actually increase as bank assets become more concentrated 
with fewer banks. Their analysis suggests that the consolidation of the US banking 
industry might lead to increased risk at the individual bank and system levels. Berger et 
al., (1999) report that the growing size of banks has increased market power in some 
areas, improved profit efficiency, created more diversified financial institutions, and 
increased systemic risks. Demsetz and Strahan (1995; 1997), show that there are 
significant differences between large and small banks in their diversification and 
financial leverage strategies. They assert that large banks are better diversified but 
highly leveraged and less liquid which increases systematic risk. 
As early as 1955, Edwards proposed that size enabled big firms, regardless of local 
market shares and structural conditions, to affect the markets in which they operated in 
a manner that smaller firms could not. He proposed that access to "deep pockets" may 
provide big firms with the resources to engage in predatory or disciplinary pricing 
behaviour in a particular market. The size of market players in the banking sector is 
proposed to affect competition and may create dominance in the market. In the banking 
literature, it has been assumed that any competitive advantages that large and diversified 
banks have over other smaller banks and depository institutions in a market enable them 
to be dominant (Pilloff and Rhoades, 2000). A bank may be dominant for a variety of 
reasons. It may be more efficient than rival firms, it may have grown larger as a result 
of economies of scale or its products may be regarded as superior to that of its 
competitors. 
While smaller firms can achieve increases in profitability by competing aggressively 
with dominant firms they may face the threat of an overwhelming reaction by the 
dominant firm, which can act as a significant deterrent. Thus, rather than challenging 
the dominant firm across the board, smaller firms are likely to confine their activities to 
specialist niches, thereby not posing a major threat to the dominant firm (Pilloff and 
Rhoades, 2000). While a large market share may, in some circumstances, indicate that a 
145 
fine has a dominant position, of itself, market share is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition to establish dominance. Furthermore, it is not only a firm's absolute 
size or market share that matters in terms of establishing dominance but its size relative 
to its competitors. 
Having said this, however, market share has been used by some researchers as an 
indicator of a firm's competitive success. Mueller (1985), for instance, uses market 
share changes as a sign of the success of mergers which are often claimed to yield cost 
efficiencies, synergies, and other beneficial results. Factors such as financial strength, 
multi-market links, diversified operations, too-big-to-fail implicit guarantees, and 
economies of scale and scope are cited as reasons why large banks may have an undue 
influence on the competitive environment. 
Where some studies empirically address the question of the presence of large banks and 
the effect of these on competition (e. g. Hanweck and Rhoades, 1984; Wolken and Rose, 
1991; Pilloff, 1999), none of the previous studies (as far as we are aware) examine the 
effect of large banks in financial markets and specifically that market information is 
important for predicting banking problems. Curry et al., (2005) document the 
importance of incorporating securities market data into models that forecast banking 
problems. They argue that such information can improve predictions relative to 
traditional models. However, their analysis is conditional upon the effectiveness of the 
market in monitoring banks and accurately interpreting their prospects from financial 
data. Moreover, the presence of intra-industry effects would indicate information 
asymmetries in the market that could have negative repercussions in the context of 
specifying such models. 
As a consequence, we suggest that intra-industry research can offer a timely perspective 
on the issue of asymmetric information in banking markets. Understanding the 
interrelations between banks in financial markets and the effect of large banks in these 
relations will help us better understand potential contagion channels and therefore 
should help us inform regulators whether they have to focus on large banks when 
setting policies. 
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3.2. Empirical Evidence on Contagion and Information Transmission 
Studies of information transfer initially focused on industrial firms. The research in this 
area investigated the issue of intra-industry transmission or spillovers of information 
focusing on the influence of firm announcements on non-announcing firms within the 
market (see for example Szewczyk, 1992; Lang and Stulz, 1992; and Akhigbe et al., 
2005). The central result of these studies is that intra-industry contagion effects can be 
significant. 
The banking intra-industry information transfer literature concentrates on examining 
contagion effects. It has been acknowledged that a bank which experiences operational 
difficulties will have various impacts on other banks in the sector. Swary (1986) 
focused on an individual bank failure and determined negative valuation effects of other 
bank rivals as a result. Several other studies offer evidence that information about a 
single bank can be transmitted throughout the banking industry. Gay et al., (1991) found 
that bank failures cause a decline in stock returns of rival banks in Hong Kong. Aharony 
and Swary (1996) assessed southwestern US banks in response to five large bank 
failures and found evidence of contagion effects. 
Other studies examine additional types of announcements. Docking et al. (1997), for 
instance, find that loan-loss reserve announcements have negative effects on rival 
banks. In addition, Slovin et al., (1999) find dividends reductions are negative events for 
both announcing money-centre and regional banks, but only reductions at money center 
banks have negative contagion type externalities. In another study, Bessler and Nohel 
(2000) bring evidence regarding the adverse effect of dividends reduction 
announcement of money-centre and regional banks on the stock returns of non- 
announcing banks. Akhigbe and Madura (1999) narrow down the research on 
information transfers to the banking industry, where they try to determine if acquisition 
announcements made by banks in the U. S. have any intra-industry effects. Through 
cross-sectional analysis of announcements, they find that the created valuation effects 
extended to non-announcing banks, and were positive on average. The authors go on to 
conclude that while intra-industry effects do exist where bank acquisitions are 
concerned, these effects are conditional upon characteristics specific to the event and 
the rival banks. 
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Brewer and Jackson (2002) extend the banking information transfer literature by 
investigating inter-industry contagion between US banks and life insurance companies 
and find strong evidence of both intra and inter industry contagion. In another study, 
Stringa and Monks (2007) assess the significance of inter linkages from the UK life 
insurance sector to the UK banking sector and conclude that contagion occurs during 
events that have hit the life insurance sector as a whole. 
The aforementioned studies of information transfer in the banking sector used event 
study methodologies based on the assumptions of linear returns independence and 
constant conditional variance of return. It is noteworthy that the use of the traditional 
linear model in the presence of heteroscedastic and leptokurtic residuals can lead to 
parameter standard errors which are too large, possibly leading to an erroneous 
conclusion that a parameter is not significantly different from zero (Elyasiani and 
Mansur, 2003). 
Nevertheless, the information transmission literature has been extended to employ time 
series econometrics models such as a Vector Error Correction (VEC) model and 
Generalised Auto-Regressive Heteroscedastic (GARCH) systems to analyse information 
flow dynamics across financial markets. These studies examine interrelations across 
markets or exchanges located in different countries through examining integration or 
market interdependence (e. g., Ederington and Lee, 1993 Bekaert and Harvey, 1995; 
Harvey and Huang, 1991; Claessens and Forbes, 2001; Koedijk et al., 2002; Darrat and 
Benkato, 2003; Ng, 2000; and Masih and Masih, 2001; Chen et al., 2003; Cotter, 2004). 
Most of these studies find significant interdependence of price changes and volatility 
across international stock markets. 
Moreover, a number of these studies suggest that major stock markets lead emerging 
markets. For example, Hamao et al., (1990), Copeland and Copeland (1998), Jeong 
(1999), Baca et al., (2000), and Syriopoulos (2006) examine the dominance (leader) role 
of one market over other markets by testing the asymmetric relations between these 
markets. The asymmetric relation arises when there is a unidirectional causality or 
volatility spillover from the leader market to other markets. The results of this strand of 
research indicate there is a dominant role of the US equity market on other markets. 
In 
addition, information transmission across European markets 
have been investigated 
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previously (e. g. Linne, 1998; Jochum, et al., 1999; and Voronkova, 2004) and examined 
the dominant role of the UK and Germany within European countries. Rockinger and 
Urga (2001), for instance, investigate the relative importance of the German and UK 
equity markets for Central European (CE) markets and conclude that the influence of 
UK was stronger than that of Germany4. 
Recent studies which examine inter-industry information transmission across banks and 
other financial institutions have started to apply the aforementioned methodologies of 
VEC and GARCH. These methodologies are more elaborate than the basic event study 
as the aforementioned considers the short and long term relationships among different 
economic units, and allows for dynamic return interdependence and time-varying 
volatility. Generally, the results of these studies support interdependence and volatility 
spillover across financial institutions (see e. g. Jokipii and Lucey, 2007; Elyasiani and 
Mansur, 2003; and Elyasiani et al., 2007). 
On the other hand, the issue of financial institution size and its influence on contagion 
effects within the banking sector was first empirically introduced by Dickinson et al., 
(1991) who found that contagion effects in the volatility of stock prices in the banking 
sector was limited to regions and size. Furthermore, according to Karafiath et al., (1991) 
banks with larger size are more likely to carry contagion effects across the US banking 
system; however, Temzelides (1997) finds that the opposite-probability of observing a 
panic increases as the size of banks decreases5. 
4 Furthermore, studies provide evidence regarding information transmission across sectors within or 
across countries (e. g. Wang et al., 2003, Yang, 2003; Taing and Worthington, 2005; and Cummins and 
Wei, 2006). The risk return spillover between firms has been studied with more focus on industrial firms. 
Yu and Hsu (2002) explore the return dynamics between the world's major computer firms and their 
corresponding companies in Taiwan by adopting a VAR test methodology. They find existence of 
dynamic relations between the stock returns of own brand firms and corresponding firms. Hamrnouddeh 
et al., (2003), on the other hand, used a Vector Error Correction model (VEC) to examine the time series 
properties of daily spot and futures prices for the three petroleum types (heating oil, gasoline, and crude- 
oil) traded at five commodity centres within and outside the United States. They found some evidence 
supporting the existence of return and volatility spillover between the three petroleum products prices. 
5 In addition, the information transmission literature documents the existence of cross correlation between 
large and small stocks within a market. This strand of the literature shows that these cross correlations are 
asymmetric: the returns of small stock portfolios tend to be correlated with the lagged returns of large 
stock portfolios while the returns of large stock portfolios tend to be uncorrelated with the lagged returns 
of small stocks (Kanas, 2002; Lo and Mackinlay, 1990; and Hams and Pirsedtasalasai, 2006; Eun and 
Huang, 2003; Hameed and Kusnadi, 2003; and Gebka, 2006). In general they find that small firm stocks 
adjustments to the information from the market are different from large firms stocks. 
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Finally, Elyasiani et al., (2007) study the risk and return linkages across US financial 
institutions using the GARCH approach. They find evidence of strong spillovers among 
large firm securities compared with smaller stocks. They explain their results as a 
consequence of the lower ability of smaller financial institutions in diversifying their 
product set and their stronger connection with local economic conditions. This finding 
is supported by DeYoung and Ronald (2001), and Stiroh (2004), who argue that larger 
banks have greater exposure to systemic risk and lower idiosyncratic risk related to 
local factors. 
In summary, a substantial number of empirical studies relating to information transfer 
suggest that interdependency exists between markets, industries or firms. However, 
studies on movements of share prices or return causality and volatility spillover within 
the banking industry are limited, especially in emerging markets. In addition, the effect 
of large banks on smaller banks has, as far as we are aware, been unexplored. 
This paper aims to advance the established literature by firstly providing evidence on 
returns and volatility transmission for banks stock in an emerging market (Jordan). It 
also takes another direction by testing whether any return causality and volatility 
transmission in the banking sector is influenced by a dominant bank. In particular, we 
will seek to investigate to what extent small bank stock prices movements can be 
explained by large bank stock prices in the emerging capital market. Additionally, we 
analyse returns causality and volatility transmission patterns between large and small 
banks in the Jordanian ASE. Finally, we investigate whether the 11th of September event 
influenced the returns causality and volatility transmission relations in the banking 
sector. 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1. Data Description 
The data used in this study comprises daily and weekly figures of aggregate closing 
stock prices for nine banks operating in the Jordanian banking sector (JBS), namely: 
Arab Bank (AB), Housing Bank (HB), Jordan National Bank (JNB), Cairo Amman 
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Bank (CAB), Bank of Jordan (BJ), Jordan Kuwait Bank (JKB), Union Bank (UB), Arab 
Jordan Invest Bank (AJIB), and Arab Banking Corp (ABC)6. 
Weekly analysis was performed based on the data for Wednesday closing prices in 
order to avoid problems of the weekend effect . All prices are expressed 
in local 
currency (Jordanian Dinar). The data covers eight years, spanning from 6th of May 1998 
to 31 of March 2005 collected from the ASE data base, for a total of 358 weekly 
observations. Additionally, we compare the information transmission in the periods 
before and after 11th of September. This political effect may influence the financial 
markets by either changing the patterns of relationships or the degree of interaction 
between the banks' returns and volatility. Although the 11th of September attack 
occurred in the US, its impact is not limited to only US markets. Ito and Lee (2004) 
argued that this attack had significant economic repercussions internationally. Previous 
literature has found that after a shock market volatility tends to increase (Engle and 
Mustafa, 1992; and Schwert, 1990), and returns may fall (Nikkinen, et al., 2007). 
The 11th of September US attack led to some changes in the Arab region. In Jordan, a 
large amount of Jordanian investments abroad returned back to the country. Many 
Arabian and foreign investors have been attracted to the Jordanian banking system as a 
safe haven for their savings and ASE as a profitable choice for their investments (ASE, 
2005). 
Hence, this study will use two panels of periods to test whether this flow of money into 
both the financial market and banking sector will give different explanation for the role 
of a large dominant bank in terms of return and volatility transmission. Considering 
that new restructuring rules were adopted in ASE in late 1997, we define two non- 
overlapping sample periods; the first period is from 6th of May 1998 to 6th of September 
2001, and the second from 13th of September 2001 until 3 1St of March 2005. 
6 The choice of banks came from the continuity of trading information available 
during the study period. 
The main reason for choosing the period starting in 1998 is that the Amman 
Stock exchange adopted new 
restructuring rules in September 1997. 
7 Weekends in Jordan start from Friday morning until Saturday evening. 
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4.2. Methodology 
Following the methodology of Elyasiani et al., (2007), Darrat and Benkato (2003), 
Syriopoulos, (2005), Hammoudeh et al., (2003), and Moor (2007) among others, we test 
for return causality and volatility spillover between Jordanian banks using both the 
Multivariate Vector Error Correction (VEC) model for testing causality, and the 
Generalized Autoregressive Hetroscedastic (GARCH) approach for explaining time 
varying volatility. Whereas the VEC model is applied here because of its ability to 
examine short and long run relationships between the Jordanian bank stock prices, the 
GARCH methodology is employed due to its ability to capture volatility clustering or 
excess Kurtosis in the returns series8. 
We calculate stock returns in this study using the following formula (see Darrat and 
Benkato, 2003): 
R it = In 
I 
P it 
pit 
-I 
I 
(1) 
Where Rit is the weekly (daily) returns series for the closing prices of each bank i at 
time t, and Pit is the price of the bank i at time t, and Pit_1 refers to the price of bank i in 
at time t-1, and In is the natural logarithm. 
4.2.1. Testing for Stationarity 
An important ingredient in any analysis of parametric models is to check the stationarity 
of the time series in the models. As Diebold and Killian (1999) argue, the presence of a 
unit root is a necessary prelude to investigating the degree of integration. Therefore, we 
9 begin our empirical analysis by testing for unit roots in the bank stock prices. 
A stationary time series is one whose mean (expected value) and variance are constant 
over time; a non-stationary series is whose mean and/or variance change over time. A 
trended series is obviously non-stationary because its mean changes over time due to the 
8In this study, we apply a univariate GARCH model because for a given number of units in the sample 
(nine banks), it is extremely challenging to correctly specify a multivariate GARCH model while 
avoiding over-parameterisation. Specifically, we need to estimate a large number of parameters which 
require a long iteration process (see Gebka and Serwa, 2007; Fujii, 2005; and Ng, 2000). 
9 As is customary, all bank stock prices are expressed in natural logarithms prior to estimation. This is a 
convenient transformation since logarithmic first differences (percentage changes) approximate stock 
returns (Darrat and Benkato, 2003). 
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time trend. Frequently employed tests for determining whether a time series (Xe), is non- 
stationary (unit root) are the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Philips Perron 
(PP) tests. In this study, the unit root test is performed for each of the nine banks stock 
prices included in the sample to investigate whether these stock prices are integrated 
using the ADF test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979; 1981)10. The results are double checked 
by performing the Philips-Perron PP (Philips and Perron, 1988). The null hypothesis for 
both tests is that the series has a stochastic trend (unit root). The model for the ADF test 
consists of running a regression of the first difference of the series against the series 
lagged once, lagged difference terms, and optionally, a constant and a time trend. This 
can be expressed as: 
K 
SS AY, = ao + at + a2Yt-1 +I 5Pp-1AYT-P+1 + ut 
P=1 
(2) 
Where Yt_1= In (Pt- 1) is the natural logarithm of the price of each bank stock at time t-1, 
A is the first difference operator. P is the number of additional lags to use. The optimal 
number of lags K is chosen using the Akaike Information Criterion (Akaike, 1973). The 
test for a unit root is conducted on the coefficient of yt-i in the regression. If the 
coefficient (a2) is significantly different from zero then the hypothesis that y contains a 
unit root is rejected. Rejection of the null hypothesis implies stationarity. If the 
calculated ADF statistic is lower than the critical value then the null hypothesis is not 
rejected and it is concluded that the considered variable is non-stationary, i. e. has at 
least one unit root. 
One of the basic assumptions of the ADF test is that the disturbances are independently 
and identically distributed (IID), where PP (1988) relaxes the assumptions of IID, in 
other words PP and ADF tests use the same model and distribution, except that the PP 
test generalizes the ADF procedure by allowing for fairly mild assumptions concerning 
the distribution of errors from the autoregressive regression estimation to cope with 
potential serial correlation. The PP test equation can be expressed as follows: 
m 
a +a, yt_, +a2(t-T /2)+ 
i=1 
Y t-1 +p t 
(3) 
10 The ADF is considered to be more accurate than the simple Dicky Fuller test because it contains 
lagged terms to account for the fact that the underlying data generating process may be more complicated 
than a simple first order autoregressive process AR(1). 
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Where T is the number of observations and u, is the disturbance term which is not 
required to be serially uncorrelated or homogeneous. y, is the natural log of the bank 
share prices in period t, ao is a constant term, t-T/2 is a time trend. m is the optimal 
lag length to ensure serially uncorrelated residuals, decided according to Newey-West's 
(Newey and West, 1987) suggestions. 
The two tests will be carried out in the natural logarithms of the levels of the variables 
and first differences of the logarithms. The null hypothesis of stationary time series is 
rejected if a2 and a, in ADF and PP models, respectively, are statistically significant for 
each series. 
4.2.2. Cointegration and Error Correction 
The assessment of bank stock return interdependencies is based on the joint testing for 
the presence and number of cointegrating vectors as well as scrutinizing the relevant 
VEC model for causal relationships between these bank returns. Cointgration allows for 
the description of stable long run stationary relationships between integrated variables 
(bank returns or prices), as is defined as independent linear combinations of these non- 
stationary variables achieving stationarity. It implies that the series do not drift apart but 
are moving together by some long-run equilibrium relationship' 1 (Syriopoulos, 2005). 
There are many possible tests for cointegration; the most general of them is the 
multivariate test based on the autoregressive representation discussed in Johansen 
(1988) and Johansen (1991), this procedure provides more robust results when there are 
more than two variables (Gonzalo, 1994) and when the number of observations is 
greater than 100 ( Hargreaves, 1994). The Johansen (1991) test is estimated as follows: 
k-1 
DY= ao + 117, AY, -, 
+ II YY-, + Et (4) 
P=1 
Where, Yt is a column vector of the nine banks log share prices, A denotes the first 
difference operator, et is a 9x1 vector of residuals. The VEC specification contains 
" The cointegration technique pioneered by Engle and Granger (1987), Hendry (1986), made a 
significant contribution towards testing Granger causality. The term equilibrium in this case suggests a 
relationship which, on average, has been maintained by a set of variables for a long period 
(Hall and 
Hendry, 1988). 
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information on both the short and long adjustment to changes in Yt, via the estimated 
parameters F and H, respectively. 
Consistent with Johansen (1991), the coefficient matrix II contains the essential 
information about the relationship between the nine banks in the sample. Specifically, if 
rank fl = 0, then IZ is 9x9 zero matrix implying that there is no cointgration 
relationship between the banks. In this case the VEC model reduces to a VAR model in 
first difference. If II has a full rank, that is rank (II) =9 then all variables in Yt are I 
(0) and the appropriate modelling strategy is to estimate a VAR model in levels. On the 
other hand if IZ has a reduced rank, that is the rank of fl= n-1, then there is a 
cointegration relationship between the nine banks, which is given by any raw matrix I-I 
and the expression Ilht_, is the error correction term (Kavussanos and Visviks, 2004)12. 
The Johansen method provides two different likelihood ratio tests, the trace and the 
maximal eigenvalue test, to determine the number of cointegrating vectors (Hendry and 
Juselius, 2001). 
11 
Trace test statistic = -T ln(1- 2, ) 
i=1+i 
(5) 
Where T is the number of usable observations or time periods and A; is the eigenvalues 
obtained from the estimate of the 11 matrix. And the maximal eigenvalue test can be 
calculated as follows: 
The Maximal Eigenvalue statistic =- TIn(1- ý,. +, 
) (6) 
In the trace tests the null that there are at most r cointegrated vectors, against the 
alternative that the number of cointgrating vectors is greater than r, and the maximal 
tests the null that the number of cointgrating vectors is r, against the alternative of r+1. 
If bank prices are cointegrated then causality must exist in at least one direction 
(Granger 1986,1988) either unidirectional (single direction) or bidirectional (both 
directions). Although cointegration indicates the presence or absence of causality, it 
does not indicate the direction of causality between variables. This direction of the 
12 If only one long run relation exist among the variables, then those variables will share a single route 
of 
convergence towards the equilibrium path, but 
if there is more than one long run relation, there exist 
multiple forces pushing towards convergence paths among the variables. 
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temporal causality can be detected through the VEC model derived from the long-run 
cointegrating vectors (Masih and Masih, 1998). In this case causality can identify 
whether two variables move one after the other contemporaneously. When they move 
contemporaneously, one provides no information for characterising the other. Hence, it 
is appropriate to examine whether bank X causes Y by observing how much of the 
current return of bank Y can be explained by its own past return and whether the block 
of lagged values of bank X returns can improve the explanation of bank Y return. In 
other words, we can say that X causes Y if the changes in X should proceed changes in 
Y. Therefore, the VEC model specification can be written as follows: 
P-1 p-1 
AY =a+ ý, ßz,, t 1+ u; dY-; + e, dXt-, + E, t i=o ý=1 , _ý 
(7) 
Where Yt is an mx1 vector of variables cointegrated of order r, A Yt_; is the bank 
lagged return at time W. A Xt_; is a vector of the lagged returns of the other eight banks 
in the sample, these two variables interpret the changes of each bank as a result of the 
short run effects from past A Yt (bank returns) and A Xt (the rest of the eight banks 
returns), Zt_1 is the error correction term which is calculated as [ Yt_1-(a+bXt_i)]. The 
error correction term is included in the model to capture the deviation from the long run 
cointegration equilibrium in the last period. The order of lags is determined by the 
likelihood ratio (LR) test supplemented by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and 
the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC)13. Unidirectional causality from 
bank X to Y (X Granger causes Y) requires that some of the coefficient 9; , 
i=1,2.... p-1 
are non zero. If both variables Granger cause each other, then it is said that there is a 
two-way feed back relationships between Bank X and Y. These hypotheses can be tested 
by applying Wald test's on the joint significance of the lagged estimated coefficients of 
AX and A Y. 14 Based on the VEC model, we can infer the dominance role played by the 
large bank (Arab Bank) if there are casualty relations running from this bank stock 
returns to the majority of relatively smaller bank's stock returns, but not vice versa. 
13 The LR is the ratio of the restricted to unrestricted model and is distributed as Z2 (k), where k is the 
number of parameters. However, to distinguish between the improvements in the model due to an 
increase in the number of parameters, the AIC and SBIC criteria can be calculated. These criteria are 
functions of the log likelihood values as well as the number of free parameters in the estimation. 
14 The above technique or formulation has been used in mainstream macroeconomic analysis in order to 
test for causal chains implied by the major paradigms in macroeconomic theory (Masih and Masih, 1995). 
or the causal relations between some emerging financial markets and more developed market to test for 
the leading role of those markets (Elyasiani et al., 1998, and Kavussanos and Visviks 2004, among 
others). 
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However, the VEC model provides tests to discern within sample causality. These tests 
can only indicate Granger causality of the dependent variable within the sample period. 
They do not provide an indication of the dynamic properties of the system, nor do they 
allow gauging the relative strength of the Granger causal chain or degree of exogeneity 
amongst the variables beyond the sample period (Yang, 2003). However, Variance 
Decomposition (VDC) may account for the out-of-sample causality tests. Thus, for the 
robustness of the results, Variance Decomposition will be applied to have more 
understanding of the effect caused by a shock of one bank on the rest of the banks 
operating in the Jordanian Banking Sector (JBS) by partitioning the variance of the 
forecast error into proportions attributable to innovations (or shocks) in each bank in the 
system including its own. This procedure can provide an indication of these relativities. 
The results of VDC estimation may be used to indicate the importance of the large bank 
(Arab Bank) to explain the returns of other Jordanian banks. The VDC moving average 
system describes the dynamic interdependence of the banks included in the model. The 
response patterns are simulated by introducing one standard deviation shocks to each of 
the banks in the sample over different time horizons. The VDC test may provide an 
indication regarding the dominance role (information asymmetry pattern) of the large 
bank in the short run dynamic sense. If a large bank informationally leads other smaller 
banks, this bank's returns should most significantly be explained by its own innovations 
and not as much by other smaller banks' innovations. Instead, innovations from the 
large bank should be able to significantly explain other relatively small banks returns. 
4.2.3. Testing for Volatility Spillover 
Econometrics literature has evidenced that most financial time series contain a 
heterogeneous error term that has time varying variation (e. g., Engle, 1982). 
Furthermore, economists have discovered that volatility is an important factor linking 
firms within the same industry (Yu and Hsu, 2002), and volatility of asset prices relates 
to the rate of flow of information in the market (e. g. Ross, 1989, and Clark, 1973). In 
this section, we will try to examine the methodology of volatility spillover between 
large and relatively small banks within the JBS. 
Many studies show that financial time series are conditionally heteroskedastic 
(Bollerslev et al., 1992; and Park, 2001). This indicates that large price changes tend to 
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be followed by large changes and small changes tend to be followed by small changes 
(volatility clustering). When different stocks are traded on the market at different 
frequencies, this is known to generate autocorrelation in the market index (Lo and 
Mackinlay, 1990). Thus, the impact of any particular information shock in the market 
has a lagged effect through its impact on stocks that trade at different times. This means 
that for a bank's stock price the effect of any shock will die out more slowly than the 
ideal one-time change in the level. 
The suitability of any proposed statistical model depends largely on its ability to 
describe and account for notable empirical observations in sets of data (Nicholls and 
Tonuri, 1995). Thus, in order to assess the distribution properties of daily returns and 
daily squared returns in our sample. 
Given the common heteroscidasticity, non-normality and interdependency behaviour in 
financial time series, we follow several recent studies by modeling the stock returns 
using Generalized Auto-Regressive Conditional Heteroscidastic (GARCH) processes 
that parameterize time varying conditional variances (Bollerslev et al., 1988; Darrat and 
Benkato 2003; Elysiani and Mansur 1998; and Brewer et al., 2006, Elyasiani et al., 
2007; and Darrat and Zhong, 2000). This model was originally introduced by Engle 
(1982) as Auto-Regressive Conditional Heteroscidastic (ARCH) and generalized as 
GARCH by Bollerslev (1986). For these models to best detect the volatility long time 
series are recommended. Therefore, daily time series are used for modeling the 
volatility models. 
Engle (1982) developed the ARCH model to conveniently account for the volatility 
clustering commonly observed in financial time series, and capture the temporal 
dependence in the second moment of time series data. The structure of the ARCH 
models consists of two linked equations: the mean equation and the variance equation, 
which expresses how the variance changes over time. 
158 
The ARCH model is as follows: 
R it 
With 
aºo + ait 
k=1 
Rt-k 
P 
212 
ai0 + Ni, l£i, r-k 
k=1 
And 
ei, t/cot_, ->(O. h) 
+ Ei 
a>- 0, ß; >_0,1 ß;, -< 1(k=1,2.... p) k=] 
(8) 
(9) 
In this ARCH (p) model, the conditional variance h2 at time t is a positive function of 
squared errors in the last p period. Rt is the rate of return of a particular bank from day t- 
k to day t. and, wt_k is the past information set containing the realised values of relevant 
variables up to time t-k. Since investors know the information in Wt_k when they make 
their investment decisions at t-k, the relevant expected return and volatility to the 
investors are the conditional expected value of Rt , given (I)t_k , and the conditional 
variance of Rt given ot_k. 
However, the ARCH model does not allow the conditional variance at time t to have a 
stochastic component. Bollerslev (1986) extended the ARCH model and developed the 
Generalized ARCH (GARCH) model, in which the current conditional variance is a 
function of not only the squared errors in the last p periods, but also the conditional 
variances in the corresponding periods. The GARCH (p, q) model can be represented in 
the following form: 
P 
Rtt = (xlo + ait I Rt-k + £t k=1 
With 
P9 
h2_ /ý 
i, t - ai, p+ 
)- 
/'i, l 
£2 
i, t-k 
+ ýi, 
2 
hit-k 
k=1 k=1 
And 
ei, t/wt_l --3 (O. h) 
(10) 
(11) 
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aý0, ß;, l >_ 0(k =1,2... P), A2 ? 0(k =1,2.... q) 
Where, ß 1,1 , ... , 
ß, 1, p, and 02,1, ... , 
ß2, q are ARCH and GARCH parameters, respectively. 
The GARCH model is an infinite order ARCH model. The advantage of GARCH model 
is that it captures the tendency in financial data for clustering. In the GARCH model, 
the effect of a return shock on current volatility declines geometrically over time. 
Empirically, the family of GARCH models has been very successful. Of these models, 
the GARCH (1,1) is preferred in most cases (see the survey by Bollerslev et al., 1992). 
In the ARCH family of statistical models, the values of the parameters are usually 
estimated by maximizing the likelihood function using numerical techniques based on 
the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman (BHHH) (1974) algorithm 15 . For stability of the 
volatility process, the coefficients of the lagged errors squared and lagged conditional 
variances must sum to less than one. The specification test for the model involves the 
Ljung-Box statistics for the lack of serial correlation in the model residuals and their 
squares. 16 Because our paper main interest is discovering the volatility spillover 
between banks rather than modelling only volatility, this study follows Hammoudeh et 
al., (2003), Hamo et al., (1990), Park (2001), Harris and Pirsedtasalasai (2006), and 
employs a GARCH (1,1) model which expresses the conditional variance of a given 
time series (h2) as a linear function of one lagged squared of errors and one lagged 
variances. In the GARCH model, exogenous variables can be included in the 
conditional variance equation as follows: 
Rtr = aio + air Ll Rr-k + ei 
k=1 
With 
P9 
h2 
i't = ai, o 
+ý 
Yi, l 
£? 
t-k 
+ 
k=l k=1 
And 
ei, t/wr-, ---> (0, h) 
(12) 
m-1 
%ý 
2 
hi, 
t-k 
+) 
`' j£j, t-1 
j=1 
(13) 
15 Marquardt maximum likelihood and BFGS (Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno) has also 
been 
applied, however, BHHH algorithm is found to have better performance (Gannon and 
Au-Yeung, 2004). 
16Before estimation any ARCH models, The LM test is used to ascertain whether the ARCH effect 
is 
present and that the use of ARCH and GARCH model was warranted. 
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The above model describes the return series as an AR process while capturing both the 
GARCH (1,1) effect and the effect in the equation of conditional volatility. In this 
model we assume that banks stock return (Rit) are explained by a constant, plus it's 
lagged returns. 
In the GARCH (1,1) model, the conditional stocks return volatility of each of the nine 
banks are explained by their historical movements (GARCH effect, hi, t_1); it's lagged 
shocks (ARCH effect, E2and lagged innovations of other eight banks returns 
(ýý where i denotes the return of the bank under study, j refers to the other banks in 
the sample. The conditional variance is denoted by hi , and e, is the error or innovation. 
The set of information contained in the errors of the conditioned mean is represented 
by 0. In addition, the parameter ß, measures the partial impact of bank j past volatility 
shocks (volatility spillover) to the eight remaining banks. Furthermore, this study will 
examine whether the 11th of September event led to a greater degree of volatility within 
the JBS by applying this model for the two sub-periods, before and after the 11th of 
September. Based on the GARCH model, we can infer the dominance role played by 
the large bank if in most cases there is a volatility spillover running from this bank's 
stock returns to the majority of the other relatively smaller banks stock returns in the 
banking sector, but not vice versa. 
5- Empirical Results 
The empirical analysis of the relationship between the Jordanian bank stocks is 
presented as follows. First, we describe the descriptive statistics and correlation 
analysis, and secondly we present the results of the stationary test. The third part 
illustrates cointegration and error correction results. Finally, the volatility spillover 
results are presented. 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
In Table 2.1, we present summary statistics for the stock returns of the Arab Bank (AB) 
and other eight Jordanian banks in the sample for the entire period and the two sub- 
periods before and after 11th of September. Regarding the descriptive statistics, 
investors are interested in the mean and standard deviation of these returns, as indicators 
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of the expected returns and the volatility of their investment portfolios. The standard 
deviations of the returns represent volatilities of investment portfolios which along with 
the mean provide the risk return trade off, respectively. 
For the entire period the average weekly returns for the eight Jordanian banks was 
approximately 0.4 % compared to the Arab Bank average weekly returns of 0.3%. Over 
the first sub-period (Panel B) the average weekly stock return for the eight Jordanian 
banks was -0.1 percent lower than Arab Bank stock returns. For the second sub-period 
(Panel C) the average weekly stock returns for the eight Jordanian banks was 1.8 % 
compared to the Arab Bank average weekly returns of 0.7 percent. 
Based on the above results it is clear that Arab Bank's returns are not the highest across 
all banks. This is presumably because of the relatively stable share prices and may due 
to the lower number of shares traded in the market (compared with other banks in the 
sample). The market value of AB is relatively high and not attractive for individual 
small investors who search the market for short term profits. Therefore, it is not 
surprising to find AB returns also exhibit the lowest variability among the nine banks 
measured by the standard deviation of returns (around 3% in all periods). The range of 
fluctuations of the Arab Bank weekly returns, in all periods, is also quite low as evident 
by a relatively small disparity between minimum and maximum returns. 
The distributions of Arab Bank and other banks stock returns in all periods have non 
symmetric distributions as represented by the skewness and kurtosis. It appears that 
returns of most banks are far from normality, some have positive skewness, to the right, 
(AB, JNB, CAB, HB) whereas others are negatively skewed (BJ, JKB, ABC, UB, 
AJIB). For normal distributions the kurtosis value is equal to 3. Therefore, the excess 
kurtosis of each bank returns series confirms that the distributions of all bank returns are 
leptokurtic. Hence, all of the series have fat-tailed distributions relative to the normal 
distribution. Furthermore, the Jarque -Bera statistics confirms the non-normality 
for all 
returns series. Clearly, the null hypothesis of normal distribution in bank stock returns 
can be rejected for all series at the 1% significance level. 
The data further suggests that Jordanian bank stock prices appear to behave differently 
in the periods before and after September 11th 2001. As Table 2.1 (Panels A and B) 
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show, in general, all banks average returns are higher in the second period (influenced 
by greater foreign money flow in the region), which also may be the reason for slightly 
higher volatility of bank returns". Other interpretation for increasing banks average 
returns in the second period may result from the introduction of new financial services 
and products delivered by the Jordanian banks In addition, the effect of changes in 
regulations that allowed the foreign investors to increase their participation in the ASE 
may also explain increased returns in the second period. 
Descriptive Statistics for Bank Returns in the Sample 
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum 
Panel A Full Period (1998-2005) 
AB 0.003 0.143 -0.094 
JNB 0.003 0.220 -0.165 
CAB 0.004 
BJ 0,005 
HB 0.004 
JKB 0.006 
ABC 0.003 
UB 0.006 
AJ IB0.002 
Average 0.004 
0,226 
0.207 
0.154 
0.231 
0.239 
0.232 
0.179 
-0.293 
-0.270 
-0.140 
-0.272 
-0.242 
-0.523 
-0.404 
0.209 -0.289 
Panel B First Sub period (1998-2001) 
AB 0.001 0.117 
JNB -0.002 
CAB -0.003 
BJ 0.002 
HB -0.002 
JKB 0.003 
ABC -0.004 
UB -0.001 
AJ IB -0.003 
Average -0.001 
0.154 
0.163 
0.207 
0.138 
0.231 
0.236 
0.232 
0.148 
-0.094 
-0.165 
-0.163 
-0.174 
-0.140 
-0,211 
-0.241 
-0.523 
-0.188 
0.233 
S. D 
0.030 
0.048 
0.055 
0.051 
0.038 
0.044 
0.052 
0.053 
0.044 
0.044 
0.02 7 
0.042 
0.047 
0.027 
0.038 
0.044 
0.053 
0.056 
0.034 
-0.174 0.041 
Panel C Second Sub period (2001-2005) 
AB 
JNB 
CAB 
BJ 
HB 
JKB 
ABC 
UB 
AJIB 
0.007 0.143 
0,006 0.221 
0.011 0.226 
0.008 
0.088 
0.008 
0.009 
0.011 
0.006 
0.192 
0.154 
0.205 
0.239 
0.186 
0.179 
Average 0.018 0.200 
Notes: 
-0.071 
-0.150 
-0.293 
-0.270 
-0.094 
-0.272 
-0.182 
-0.116 
-0.404 
-0.223 
0.033 
0.054 
0.061 
0.049 
0.037 
0.045 
0.049 
0.047 
0.051 
0.049 
Skewness Kurtoisis Jarque-Gera Observation 
0.812 5.859 (160.773)* 357 
0.509 5.974 (147.060)* 357 
0.487 8.173 (412.105)* 357 
-0.038 8.563 (460.419)* 357 
0.556 5.277 (95.500)* 357 
-0.092 11.955 (1193.231)* 357 
-0.016 9.975 (723.764)* 357 
-1.878 32.906 (3514.070)* 357 
-1.662 25.947 (8015.289)* 357 
-0.109 15.174 
0.43 5 
0.272 
0.099 
0.622 
0.281 
0.090 
-0.462 
-3.940 
-0.712 
6.289 
5.773 
6.437 
7.916 
4.991 
11.989 
11.076 
47.868 
12.768 
(83.441)* 
(57.563)* 
(85.428)* 
(185.344)* 
(30.866)* 
(582.727)* 
(476.231)* 
(4971.05)* 
(702.103)* 
173 
173 
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173 
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173 
173 
173 
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-1.070 1 1.944 
0.946 
0.504 
0.536 
-0.416 
0.917 
-0.254 
0.615 
1.076 
-1.965 
0,127 
5.230 (65.221)* 
5.487 (54.93)* 
8.276 (219.953)* 
9.908 (340.287)* 
5.473 (72.295)* 
12.276 (657.100)* 
8.231 (220.143)* 
5.709 (91.252)* 
25.212 (3879.955)* 
1 0.072 
186 
186 
186 
186 
186 
186 
186 
186 
186 
Weakly returns for the nine banks are calculated based on the conventional first difference of logarithm prices. 
AB= Arab Bank, JNB=Jordan National Bank, CAB= Cairo Amman Bank, BJ= Bank of Jordan, HB= Housing Bank, 
JKB= Jordan Kuwaiti Bank, ABC=Arab Bank Corporation, UB= Union Bank, AJIB= Arab Jordan Investment Bank. 
S. D = Standard Deviation. 
Average is the average value for the mean, maximum, minimum, and standard deviation excluding the Arab Bank values. 
* is the I% significance level. 
17 Except for the Housing Bank, Arab Bank Corporation and Union Bank. 
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A time plot of the nine banks share prices and returns is presented in Figure 2.1 A and 
B, respectively. Where Figure 2.1(A) presents the large bank (AB) stock prices, the rest 
of the banks stock prices are illustrated in Figure 2.1 (B). One can clearly see also that 
the Jordanian banks witnessed a higher level of volatility post 11th of September. 
Figure 2.1 
Share Prices during 1998 to 2005 
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Figure 2.2 
Weekly Return of the Nine Jordanian Banks during 1998 -2005 
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While the descriptive statistics reported in Table 2.1 provide a general comparison for 
both the Arab Bank and the other banks in the sample, these measures do not however 
provide us with an indicator to estimate bank stocks integration. A simple test for 
integration between bank stock returns is to consider the correlation coefficients across 
bank weekly returns (Vinh and Daly, 2005). 
Therefore, the correlation matrix between bank returns is estimated, and presented in 
Table 2.2. It can be seen that the correlation of returns between the Arab Bank and most 
of the other relatively smaller banks are positive and significantly different from zero at 
the 1% significance level during the full period (Panel A). Comparing the two sub- 
periods (Panels B and C), one can determine whether the Jordanian bank stocks have 
become increasingly integrated. Comparison of the mean correlation coefficient across 
the two sub-periods between the Arab Bank and the other eight Jordanian banks 
collectively indicate an increase in the correlation from 0.05 (sub-period one in Panel B) 
to 0.19. The majority of Jordanian bank stocks recorded an increase in return 
correlations with the AB stock, over the first and second sub-periods. Also of interest 
are the return correlations between all banks in the sample. Overall, the results indicate 
that the majority of Jordanian bank stocks in the study have become more correlated 
with each other over the second sub-period compared with the first sub-period. This 
result may indicate that Jordanian banks tend to move together simultaneously to the 
market forces and the arrival of new and relevant information. 
However, these correlation findings are univariate and provide only a partial picture 
since they are only short-run indicators. In the next section indicators of long-run co- 
movement between bank stock returns can provide more appropriate indicators of long- 
term co-movements between the banks in our sample. 
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Table 2.2 
Correlation among Jordanian Banks Stock Returns 
Variable AB JNB CAB Bi HB 
A. Correlations between Bank returns for the Full period (1998-2005) 
JNB 
CAB 
BJ 
HB 
JKB 
ABC 
UB 
AJIB 
0.222* 
0.059 
0.195* 
0.290* 
0.179* 
0.156* 
0.007 
0.112+ 
0.035 
0.223* 0.019 
0.324* 0.127 
0.205* 0.005 
0.099-1'* 0.031 
0.152* 0.139* 
0.153* 0.185* 
0.189* 
0.206* 
0.075 
0.076 
0.169* 
0.259* 
0.155* 
0.146* 
0.183* 
JKB 
0.037 
0.162 * 
0.092 1 
B. Correlations between bank returns during the First sub- period (1998 - 2001) 
JNB 
CAB 
BJ 
HB 
JKB 
ABC 
UB 
AJIB 
0.164+ 
-0.019 
0.067 
0.274* 
0.151+ 
0.027 
-0.053 
-0.009 
-0.032 
0.164* 
0.324* 
0.348* 
-0.033 
0.032 
0.059 
0.122 
0271 * 
-0.155` 
0.017 
0.075 
0.256* 
-0.008 
-0.015 
0.118 
-0.262* 
0.022 
0.044 
ABC 
0.113+ 
0.125 
-0.022 
-0.133` 
C. Correlations between bank returns during the Second sub-period (2001 - 2005) 
JNB 
CAB 
BJ 
HB 
JKB 
ABC 
UB 
AJIB 
0.243 
0.080 
0.276* 
0.287 * 
0.191* 
0.248* 
0.037 
0.161+ 
0.047 
0.253* 
0.286* 
0.111 
0.179+ 
0.233* 
0.182+ 
-0.048 
-0.054 
-0.116 
-0.1371 
0.092 
0.221 * 
0.046 
0.221 * 
0.065 
0.118 
0.155' 
0.154' 
0.238* 
0.152+ 
0.270* 
0.123* 
0.215* 
, +, significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
5.2 Stationarity Test Results 
0.251* 
0.294* 0.315* 
0.295* 
0.212* 
0.296* 
0.114 
0.239* 
0.286* 
UB 
0.119+ 
0.066` 
0.145' 
The issue of stationary is relevant for both investigating the cointegration and studying 
the relations between variables, it is essential to examine the stationary of bank (log) 
level prices and first differences series before conducting cointegration tests'8. Table 2.3 
presents the results of the common two approaches used in this study. ADF and PP tests 
results indicate the presence of non stationary in log prices in all banks series in all 
panels of data samples used, the null hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected. 
However, the null hypothesis of a unit root in first differences is rejected at a 1% 
18 It is important to note here that going through testing for cointgration before conducting any 
stationarity tests can lead to serious problems of spurious regression. 
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significance level for all returns series indicating that all data, with no exception, are 
stationary. 
Table 2.3 
Unit Root Test Statistics 
Variables Levels to rites 
AB 
JNB 
CAB 
BJ 
HB 
JKB 
ABC 
UB 
AJIB 
ADF 
0.793 
0.179 
0.921 
-2.032 
0.399 
-2.407 
0.090 
-0.123 
-1.270 
(k) PP 
(1) 0.852 
(1) 0.086 
(2) 0.892 
(1) -1.947 
(1) 0.522 
(3) -2.198 
(1) -0.067 
(0) -0.123 
(0) -1.194 
(k) 
(4) 
(3) 
(7) 
(2) 
(4) 
(5) 
(4) 
(5) 
(7) 
ADF 
-4.218 * 
-21.756* 
-9.753* 
-16.536* 
-5.076* 
-8.957 * 
-8.021 * 
-17.571 * 
-18.562 * 
First differences returns 
(k) PP (k) 
(8) -19.583* (6) 
(0) -21.543 * (7) 
(0) -17.003* (2) 
(0) -16.536* (0) 
(6) -21.151 * (2) 
(2) -20.668* (8) 
(3) -21.015* (8) 
(0) -17.634* (5) 
(2) -18.564* (5) 
Notes: 
All variables are expressed in logarithms. ADF is the augmented Dickey- Fuller test; PP is the Phillips- Perron test. (k) is the 
optimal lag length, for ADF test this lag length is decided by AIC. The critical value at the I% significant level for log levels is - 
3.984, and for first differences is -2.566. The truncation lags PP are decided by Newey-West default, the critical value for PP test at 
the 1% significance level for the log levels is -3.435, and for first difference is -2.566. The two tests for the log level variables all 
have intercepts and trend, and the two tests for all the first difference variables have neither intercepts nor trends. 
*Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationary at 1% significance levels. 
5-3 Results of Cointegration and Causality 
Since each of the nine banks log prices contains a unit root, the nine variables as a 
group would become cointegrated if they share a common root. A non stationary 
variable tends to wander extensively over time. However, a set of non stationary 
variables may have the interesting property that a particular linear combination of them 
can keep these variables linked together, and then can prevent them from drifting too far 
apart. Table 2.4, shows the results from the Johansen (J) cointegraion Trace and 
Maximal Eigenvalue test statistics with their critical values at the 5 percent significance 
level. As multivariate cointegration tests, they cover all nine banks simultaneously. 
Panel A reports the results for the full estimation period. It is obvious from row one in 
this panel that based on both of the two test statistics (Trace = 198.240 and Maximal 
eigenvalue = 61.778) we are able to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration among 
the nine Jordanian banks (the null hypothesis of r=0 is rejected). 
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This empirical result indicates that there is a single cointegration relationship binding 
the AB with other banks in the sector, during the full period. 
To examine whether the cointgration test results differ between the first and second sub- 
periods under study, we perform another round of the J test of cointegration for each 
period separately. Table 2.4, Panel B, reports the results of the J test for the first period 
(pre 11th of September), while Panel C in Table 2.4 does the same for the second period 
(post 11th of September). The results in Panel B (row one) indicate that based on the two 
test statistics (Trace = 177.544 and Maximal eigenvalue = 49.979) we are not able to 
reject the null hypothesis of r=0, which suggests that the AB exhibited no 
cointegration relations with the other banks in the sample during the first period. The 
judgment, however, is quite different for the second period. The results presented in 
Panel C (row five) of Table 4 indicate that the Trace test statistic, which equals 70.30, 
clearly supports the presence of five cointegrating relations linking the AB with the 
other eight banks in the sample (the null hypothesis of r<4 is rejected in favor of r= 
5)19 
These results indicate that bank stock returns under study share a long run equilibrium 
(during the full period) which suggests that future fluctuations of prices in one bank 
stock can be determined or predicted to some extent using a part of the information set 
provided by the other bank stock prices. Moreover, the obvious presence of 
cointegration vectors in the second period could be partly attributed to the growing 
inflow of foreign portfolio investments in the ASE and the common path of Jordanian 
banks with regards to applying similar capital requirements, investments, and risk 
management techniques20. 
19Johansen and Juselius (1990) emphasize when a conflict between Trace and 
Maximal eigenvalue test 
statistics occurs, it is preferable to use the Trace statistic. 
20 Also these results might be explained by the remarkable changes in the financial system. 
During the 
last few years become one of the biggest net capital importers in the region. In particular, after the 
11th of 
September event a large amount of funds inflowed to the market. Many Jordanian 
(as well as other Arab) 
investors returned to the country. They believed that Jordanian banks are the safest place 
for their deposits 
and the capital market is a profitable place for their investments (Saadi-Sedik and 
Petri, 2006) 
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Table 2.4 
Johansen Cointegration Test Results 
Null Alternative 
The Trace The Maximal Eiienvalue 
Critical Value Alternative Test Statistics Critical Value 
(5%) Hypotheses (5%) Hypotheses Hypotheses 
Test Statistics 
Panel A: Full Period (1995- 2005) 
r =o r>1 (198.240)+ 
r<I r>2 (136.460) 
r<2 r>3 (92.010) 
r<3 r4 (64.090) 
r<4r>5 (40.480) 
r<5 r>6 (24.950) 
<6 r>7 (15.090) 
r<7 1"? 8 (6.430) 
r<8 r=9 (1.200) 
Panel B: First Period (1995- 2001) 
r =0 r>I (177.544) 
r<I r>2 (127.566) 
r<2 r>3 (87.307) 
r<3 r>4 (54.031) 
r<4 r>5 (32.907) 
r<5 r>6 (17.731) 
r<6r>7 (8.991) 
r<7 r>8 (3.839) 
r<8 r=9 (0.488) 
Panel C: Second Period(2001- 2005) 
197.370 r =1 (61.778)+ 58.434 
159.530 r- =2 (44.446) 52.363 
125.615 r =3 (27.918) 46.231 
95.754 r =4 (23.608) 40.078 
69.819 r =5 (15.532) 33.877 
47.856 r =6 (9.861) 27.584 
29.797 r =7 (8.660) 21.132 
15.495 r =8 (5.229) 14.264 
3.841 r =9 (1.203) 3.841 
197.370 r =1 (49.979) 58.434 
159.530 r =2 (40.259) 52.363 
125.615 r =3 (33.276) 46.231 
95.754 r =4 (21.124) 40.078 
69.819 r =5 ( 15.176) 33.877 
47.856 r =6 ( 8.7406) 27.584 
29.797 r =7 ( 5.152) 21.132 
15.495 r =8 ( 3.351) 14.264 
3.841 r =9 (0.488) 3.841 
r =o r> 1 (327.090)+ 197.370 r =1 (103.040)+ 58.434 
r<Ir >2 (224.080)+ 159.530 r =2 (67.400)+ 52.363 
r<2>3 (156.660)+ 125.615 r =3 (50.760)+ 46.231 
r<3r>4 (105.900)+ 95.754 r =4 (35.590) 40.078 
r<4r >5 (70.300)+ 69.819 r =5 (28.390) 33.877 
r<5r>6 (41.910) 47.856 r =6 (19.300) 27.584 
r<6r>7 (22.610) 29.797 r =7 (15.050) 21.132 
R<7 r> 8 (7.560) 15.495 r =8 (6.900) 14.264 
R< 89 (3.840) 3.841 r =9 (0.650) 3.841 
Notes: 
Johansen Cointegration test allows one to examine the number cointegrating vectors that might exist. The hypothesised number of 
cointgrating equation denoted as "r =o" exhibits the result of testing the hypothesis of no cointegration condition, r denotes the 
number of cointegrating ranks. 
According to the general guidelines of the LR procedure and the requirement of white noise residuals, the cointgration test uses two 
lags in panel A, two lag in panel B and seven lags in panel C. 
the (non-standard) critical values are taken from Osterwald- Lenum (1992). 
+ indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis of cointegration at the 5% level of significance. 
The presence of cointegration does not give an indication about the short run (causal) 
relationship. If a set of nonstationary variables is cointgrated, then an unrestricted VAR 
model comprised of the first difference of these variables will be misspecified. The 
reason is that the information of the long run equilibrium relationships among variables 
will be lost (Hammoudel et al., 2003). Therefore, the VEC model is used to analyse 
short run `causalities' running from any bank stock to the other bank stocks in the 
sector, the speed of adjustment to the equilibrium path, lag relationships and the impact 
of a propagation mechanism in the JBS. 
In order to estimate VEC models, the number of lags in each equation of different log 
series should be determined. The two VAR lag length with one error correction terms 
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for the full period, in addition to two and seven VAR lags length are chosen for the first 
and second periods, respectively. These models are tested on the basis of the likelihood 
ratio (LR) test supplemented by the AIC and SBIC information criteria. 
The VEC test is performed on the basis of Equation 7. The block exogeneity Wald 9s 
Chi Square ()e) test statistics are calculated to test the null hypothesis that the first bank 
return series does not Granger-cause the second, against the alternative hypothesis that 
the first bank return series Granger-causes the second. The results of VEC Granger 
causality are presented in Table 2.5. Each entry in the table denotes the x2 value of the 
bank on the left hand side caused by the bank at the top. The x2 values in the last column 
(all other eight banks column) indicate if we can reject the null hypothesis that each 
bank is not Granger caused by the remaining banks jointly. 
In Table 2.5, the causality results of AB to the rest of the banks in the sample are 
presented in the first column. Moreover, the causality results running from other banks 
in the sample to the AB are presented in the first row. In Panel A, the Granger causality 
results for the full period are reported. The returns of AB can cause the returns of two 
banks only, BJ and HB. The x takes the values of 4.868 and 7.196, respectively, and 
are both statistically significant. On the other hand, there are no significant short-run 
channels of causality running from the relatively smaller bank stocks to the AB stock 
during the full period. 
Additionally, it is interesting to note that the degree of interdependence among banks in 
the system is evident. Specifically, the role played by some banks was similar to that 
played by the AB in the VEC system by showing a significant causality effect on the 
banking system. Looking at the Chi square significance values from the second to the 
ninth column in Table 2.5, we can infer that BJ leads HB (x = 6.704, significant at the 
5%), JKB (x = 6.669, significant at the 5%), and UB ()? = 16.002, significant at the 1%) 
and follows KJB ()e = 10.606, significant at the 1%). In addition, JNB leads HB (x2 = 
27.396, significant at the 1%), AJIB (j2= 14.995, significant at the 1%), and none of the 
banks influenced its returns. The main indication of these results is that some banks 
have a similar influential power as the Arab Bank (JNB, CAB, UB, and AJIB) and 
others (BJ) are even more influential. 
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Table 2.5 
VEC Causality Test Results among the Nine Jordanian Banks 
Bank 
AB JNB CAB 
A- Full period (1998-2005) 
AB 1.468 
JNB 3.004 
CAB 1.643 3.292 
2.425 
0.455 
BJ 4.868 3.423 1.372 
HB 7.196+ 27.396* 27.029* 
JKB 1.9625 1.233 0.256 
ABC 1.240 3.988 2.781 
UB 1.054 0.676 9.061+ 
AJIB 1.736 14.995* 4.526 
B- First sub- period(1998-2001) 
BJ HB JKB ABC UB AJIB All other 
eight 
banks 
0.610 1.448 2.650 1.842 1.661 1.461 15.301 
3.466 4.405 0.812 0.145 0.141 0.056 12.533 
0.130 3.719 1.691 0.412 7.952+ 3.772 18.518 
2.630 10.606* 2.838 2.449 2.509 26.171 
6.704+ 8.286+ 1.748 8.625+ 54.793* 84.948* 
6.669+ 2.220 2.422 2.496 3.572 19.849 
1.533 3.152 1.962 2.802 4.040 20.036 
16.002* 1.252 1.598 2.870 5.324t 37.494* 
0.399 33.925* 2.791 9.057+ 2.676 47.80; * 
AB 1.454 0.756 0.249 0.128 0.856 2.784 3.075 0.192 10.9-, 2 
JNB 1.848 1.996 3.121 2.648 0.027 0.185 0.480 1.978 12.007 
CAB 0.345 0.389 1.599 1.862 0.106 0.521 2.178 3.523 10.235 
BJ 2.032 0.130 2.173 0.313 6.467+ 4.595 0.774 7.137+ 20.821 
HB 1.927 0.016 0,792 0.160 0.291 0.203 1.154 1.615 5.948 
JKB 0.124 0.095 1.758 0.859 0.100 0.193 1.205 3.059 7.869 
ABC 6.976+ 0.849 3.932 2.144 1.720 0.616 0.009 0.041 19.083 
UB 0.851 0.315 1.477 3.218 1.694 0.804 0.934 0.763 11.955 
JIBA 1.918 0.329 5.087-1- 3.249 0.285 0.711 4.215 1.192 24.2461 
C- Second sub period (2001-2005) 
AB 22.887* 10.260 24.385* 12.688 i 8.869 8.920 7.188 9.840 113.246* 
JNB 5.991 10.038 8.351 14.321+ 5.101 4.596 4.831 6.980 55.767 
CAB 3.836 4.936 12.2131t 3.385 7.122 4.222 12.603t 3.345 57.119 
BJ 8.230 11.275 9.311 9.084 8.365 5.764 4.234 4.335 62.023 
HB 8.102 10.574 9.048 8.374 9.313 5.785 4.735 4.075 61.552 
JKB 12.2291 1.567 5.032 5.987 14.873 14.486+ 26.495+ 14.033* 108.712+ 
ABC 29.742* 4.648 8.947 5.169 13.1821i 32.598* 4.642 17.696+ 151.104* 
UB 15.879+ 6.678 11.762 14.517+ 17.967+ 3.562 5.839 8.468 82.626 
12.6 AJIB 13.184t 2.430 13.741 t 0.783 7,066 8.264 10 ý 12.870t 69.737 
Notes 
- The VEC causality test results for the full sample period are presented in this Table. Each entry in the Table denotes the Chi square 
value and the significant level of the bank on the left hand side caused by the bank at the top. The values at the last column (all other 
eight banks column) indicate the whether each bank is Granger caused by the remaining banks. 
*, +, t indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
From the first to the tenth column in Table 2.5 it appears that the dominance role of the 
AB in causing stock returns of other banks is not evident since the pattern of relations 
between this bank and the rest of the banks during the full sample does not support the 
significant role played by its past returns in predicting the returns of the majority of the 
banks in the JBS. 
Additionally, the empirical causality results during the first and second period are 
reported in Table 2.5 Panels B and C. These results do not support the dominance role 
of the large bank (AB). In particular, there are limited short run channels of causality 
running from changes in the Arab Bank stock to other smaller bank stocks. In the first 
period, the AB runs only one significant causal relation to the ABC bank. However, in 
the second period AB significantly influences four banks in the banking system (JKB, 
ABC, UB, and AJIB). On the other hand, there are a number of significant short-run 
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channels of causality running from smaller bank stock returns (JNB, BJ, and HB) to AB 
stock returns. Despite the lack of dominance effect of the large bank (AB) on smaller 
banks in the sample, where the returns of the large bank have no relatively strong 
explanatory power over the rest of the banks, short-run Granger causality relations and 
predictability between small banks exist in all sample study periods. However, these 
causalities appear to be stronger in the second period. Specifically, in the first (second) 
period, among the nine banks in the sample 4 (21) significant causal links are found or 
5.5% (29.2%) of 72 possible causal linkages are significant. 
The causal findings in Table 2.5 give only qualitative relations. However, the Variance 
Decomposition (VDC) gives a quantitative measure to these causal relations indicating 
how much the movement in one bank stock can be explained by other bank stocks in 
terms of the percentage of the forecast error variance of that bank stock. Tables 2.6 
summarises the VDC findings of 1-week, 5-week, and 10-week ahead of forecast in 
each bank stock for the entire period 2i. Each entry in the table denotes the percentage of 
22 forecast error variance of a bank on the left-hand side explained by a bank at the top. 
The results in the table reveal that the AB own innovations fully account for its variance 
at the first horizon (1-week ahead) but the opportunity for the other banks innovations 
to explain the standard error for this bank increased from 0% in horizon 1 to 3.2 % (10- 
weeks ahead). In contrast, shocks from the AB stock are effectively transmitted to the 
other banks in the sector; they can collectively explain 31.3% of their variance over a 
10-week horizon. However, other relatively smaller banks add new information beyond 
the information originated from the AB to the rest of banks in the sample over the same 
horizon (e. g. JNB explains 34.6%, and CAB explains 25.8%). In other words, the 
information observed from these two banks is also useful for explaining the price 
variation in the remaining bank stocks (e. g. BJ, JKB, UB, AJIB). Finally, the response 
of the rest of banks in the sample to the shocks from any other individual bank is minor. 
The forecast error variance caused by each of these individual banks ranges from 0.01 
% 
to 6.9%. 
21 It is often the case that a variable will explain almost all of its own forecast error variance at a very 
short horizon and a smaller proportion at a longer horizon (Ewing, 2002). Therefore, our 
discussion 
focuses on 10-week ahead forecast results, in order to give other banks innovations the opportunity 
to 
contribute in explaining the percentage of forecast error variance for each 
bank in the system. 
22See Appendix 2.3 Table 1 and 2 for the variance decomposition results for the two sub-periods. 
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Table 2.6 
Decomposition of the Forecast Error Variance for the Full Period -(1998- 2005) 
Bank H. Z S. E 
AB I 
5 
10 
JNB 1 
5 
10 
CAB 1 
5 
to 
BJ 1 
5 
10 
HB 1 
5 
10 
JKB 1 
5 
]0 
ABC 1 
5 
l0 
UB 1 
5 
10 
AJIB 1 
5 
10 
0.034 
0.060 
0.047 
0.053 
0.088 
0.070 
0.059 
0.0818 
0.105 
0.054 
0.100 
0.078 
0.039 
0.049 
0.060 
0.0487 
0.065 
0.082 
0.058 
0.077 
0.098 
0.059 
0.086 
0.111 
0.049 
0.065 
0.082 
Notes: 
AB 
100.000 
97.208 
96,804 
4.009 
3.220 
3.686 
0.152 
0.472 
0.363 
2.164 
2.307 
2.631 
10.639 
13.534 
15.654 
2.243 
2.892 
3.182 
0.364 
0.687 
0.732 
0.064 
0.247 
0.177 
2.273 
4.550 
4.887 
JNB CAB BJ 
0.000 
0.049 
0.074 
95.99 
94.519 
93.999 
0.004 
0.194 
0.137 
3.258 
3.018 
3.011 
7.538 
12.259 
15.350 
3.550 
3.395 
3.334 
2.166 
3.656 
4.021 
2.490 
2.176 
2.106 
2.425 
5.239 
6.534 
0.000 
0.171 
0.187 
0.000 
0.149 
0.140 
99.844 
95.818 
95.441 
0.028 
0.102 
0.097 
1.6271 
5.883 
8.057 
0.276 
1.109 
1.357 
0.044 
0.261 
0.185 
1.172 
2.844 
2.811 
3.545 
10.680 
12.990 
HB 
0,000 0.000 
0.050 0.322 
0.057 0.370 
0.000 0.000 
1.003 0.187 
JKB ABC UB AJIB Others 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.648 0.409 0.348 0.795 2.792 
0.818 0.516 0.486 0.688 3.196 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.196 
0.210 0.020 0.007 0.690 5.481 
1.062 0.251 0.234 0.014 0.004 0.611 6.001 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.156 
0.354 1.577 0.134 0.224 0.730 0.497 4.182 
0.455 1.979 0.084 0.222 0.756 0.563 4.559 
94.550 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.45 
91.103 1.406 0.931 0.492 0.115 0.527 8.897 
90.706 1.154 1.328 0.454 0.165 0.452 9.294 
0.290 79.905 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 20.095 
1.182 57.267 0.310 0.349 0.713 8.502 42.733 
1.017 46.921 0.251 0.353 0.669 11.728 53.079 
1.940 1.768 90.221 0.000 0.000 0.000 9.779 
2.794 2.093 86.124 0.396 0.662 0.535 13.876 
2.445 2.154 86.223 0.310 0.601 0.395 13.777 
0.022 0.648 0.062 96.694 0.000 0.000 3.306 
0.574 0.842 0.661 92.147 0.549 0.622 7.853 
0.420 0.540 0.683 92.594 0.416 0.410 7.406 
0.921 1.600 1.482 0.478 91.79 0.000 8.1670 
6.160 3.428 0.919 0.662 83.295 0.269 16.705 
6.850 3.840 0.615 0.408 83.029 0.163 16.971 
0.811 0.096 0.571 0.635 0.423 89,223 10.777 
0.630 5.018 0.818 1.080 2.975 69.011 30.989 
0.489 6.794 0.924 0.709 3.652 63.020 36.98 
Each number in this Table denotes the percentage of error variance, measured by the standard error, of banks in the left hand side 
explained by the banks at the top. 
Others is the effect on a particular bank of all other banks in the system (the percentage of the forecast error variance of a particular 
bank [standard error] explained by all banks other than its own past. 
The previous results do not strongly support the leading role of the AB. Although this 
bank is relatively exogenous during the entire period (the majority of its own variance is 
explained by its own shocks) and has a significant explanatory power for the price 
movements of the other banks in the sector, some relatively smaller banks have also a 
substantial information role in explaining the remaining banks variations. This lack of 
large bank dominance is consistent with Elyasiani's et al., (2007) argument who stated 
that the ability of large banks, compared to smaller banks, to avoid restrictive regulation 
and earn differential returns due to their product innovation and managerial skills make 
large banks have less information transmission to their relatively smaller rivals. 
Additionally, testing for VDC during the two sub-periods (See appendix 2.3 Table 1 and 
2) gives the same conclusion regarding the lack of a dominance role of the AB. In the 
first period, while AB innovations were the most important explanatory variable 
for the 
variation of some banks (for example, they explained 4.6% of JNB, and 4.7% of 
ABC), 
they failed to exert a dominant influence for the rest of the banks. The same conclusion 
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exists for the second period. However, in the second period the Jordanian banks 
witnessed a higher degree of interdependence, this can be evident by examining the 
change of exogeneity of each individual bank between the first and the second sub- 
periods. Table 2.7 shows the proportion of bank stock movements that can be explained 
by its own shocks (or the degree of exogeneity) for the two sub-periods. We can infer 
that the exogeneity for all banks has been significantly reduced implying the high 
degree of interdependence between the Jordanian banks in the short run. It also clear 
that the AB becomes more influenced by other relatively smaller banks in the sector (its 
degree of exogeneity was reduced substantially from 93% to 56%). This result suggests 
that the AB stocks actively responded to other bank innovations during the second 
period compared with the first period. The higher level of interdependencies between 
the Jordanian banks after 11th of September may due to similar exposures to economic 
and regional conditions that may lead to greater correlations between banks returns and 
therefore more interdependency. 
Table 2.7 
The Comparison of Degree of Exogeneity during the Two Sub-Periods 
Bank 
AB 
JNB 
CAB 
BJ 
HB 
JKB 
ABC 
UB 
AJIB 
Degree of Exogeneity 
The First Sub-Period (1) The Second Sub-Period (2) 
92.734 
88.829 
92.851 
86.074 
79.130 
77.873 
76.739 
90.118 
80.835 
56.379 
70.130 
67.271 
59.769 
42.218 
65.043 
35.068 
51.435 
50.620. 
Difference (1)-(2) 
36.355 
18.699 
25.580 
26.305 
36.912 
12.830 
41.671 
38.683 
30.215 
Note: 
The degree of exogeneity is calculated as 100 percent minus the bank's own explanation of 
its standard error. 
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5.4. Results of Volatility Spillover 
5.4.1. Preliminary Analysis 
The presence of a serial correlation and non-linearity in the return series are essential in 
order to implement the GARCH specification (Hsieh, 1989). Therefore, we perform a 
number of tests to examine the characteristics of the return series. We first perform the 
Ljung-Box test statistics Q (p) and Q2 (p) for p=6 and 12 lags, to test for the presence 
of serial correlation and interdependency of each bank returns and squared returns 
series. The null hypothesis of no serial correlation is soundly rejected at the 1% and 5% 
significance levels for all bank returns and squared returns series. These results indicate 
the existence of significant linear and non-linear serial correlations (see Table 2.8). 
Non-linear serial correlations exhibit a characteristic known as volatility clustering, in 
which large changes tend to follow large changes, and small changes tend to follow 
small changes. 
Table 2.8 
Return Series Diagnostic Test Results 
Variable AB 
ARCH (LM) 263.867* 
Q(6) 96.497* 
Q(12) 123.16* 
Q2(6) 120.14* 
Q2 (12) 170.83 * 
BDS 0.202* 
JNB CAB BJ HB JKB 
228.792* 20.824* 26.931+ 122.737* 28.770+ 
167.71 * 76.920* 69.934* 12.994+ 51.139* 
208.33* 82.397* 71.819* 22.226+ 72.625* 
317.54* 78.750* 136.41* 42.863* 78.367* 
425.50* 96.790* 137.71* 66.668* 96.942* 
0.1996* 0.203* 0.2046* 0.2010* 0.2033* 
ABC 
26.217+ 
42.862* 
56.970* 
64.479* 
114.38* 
0.2032* 
UB 
24.829+ 
98.861 * 
145.11 * 
136.92* 
172.05* 
0.2037* 
AJIB 
22.582+ 
16.455+ 
27.586+ 
16.840+ 
30.260+ 
0.2014* 
Notes: 
ARCH (LM) is a Lagrange Multiplier test to see if ARCH effects are present in the set of residuals obtained from linear regression. 
Each return series were regressed on constant values, and then the squared residuals are regressed on their own history (12 
lags). 
The test statistics is t= T*R2, where T is the number of observations. It follows the Chi- square distribution with 12 
degree of 
freedom. Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates the presence of ARCH effect. 
BDS test is developed for detecting the nonlinear structure. It allows for testing the null hypothesis that a time series consists of 
Independent and Identically Distributed (IID) observations, against the alternative hypothesis that the time series 
is non-linear 
dependent (see Brock, et al., 1987). 
Q(p) and Q2 (p) are the Ljung-Box test statistics for independence of the original and squared returns series, respectively. 
It follows 
the Chi square distribution with p degree of freedom. The number of observations equals 1688. 
*, +, tindicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The volatility clustering characteristic can satisfactorily be captured by conditional 
heteroskedasticity models. This result is supported by the significant BDS test statistic 
results which examine the presence of non-linearity in the stock return series. 
Additionally, the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test was used to ascertain whether ARCH 
effects were present and that the use of GARCH model is warranted. Looking at 
Table 
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2.8 the LM test results for all of the bank returns series indicate that the ARCH effects 
are significant (at the 1% and 5% significance levels), suggesting that the use of the 
GARCH methodology is warranted. 
5.4.2. Volatility Spillover Effects 
Because of the presence of autocorrelation in the returns series, it is important to 
account for serial correlation structures in these series. This is usually achieved through 
the determination of an appropriate lag structure in the formulation of the mean 
equation. For this purpose, we use the SBIC, See Appendix 2.4 Table 1 for the reported 
summary statistics for the univariate autoregressive (conditional) models, AR (p) using 
SBIC. The selected criterion is based on minimization of the value of the test ratio. 
From the reported results it can be obvious that the AR(1) model was the selected 
model in most cases except for the AB and JNB return series, where the AR (2) is 
23 selected. 
The estimation results during the full sample period are presented in Table 2.9. This 
table comprises the GARCH (1,1) model results which are specified in equations (12) 
and (13). The second through the tenth column represent each bank mean and 
conditional volatility equations results. The fifth and sixth rows represent the ARCH 
and GARCH parameters in the conditional variance equations ß; , and 
/3; 
,, respectively. 
The degree of volatility persistence (sum of the ARCH and GARCH parameters) has 
lower values than one for all nine banks series, which implies that the GARCH model is 
stationary (Apergis and Rezitis, 2003). The results show that the own volatility for most 
of the banks are large and significant indicating the presence of ARCH effects. Looking 
at the fifth row in Table 2.9, the own volatility effects range from 0.003 (UB) to 0.560 
(AJIB). In the GARCH set of parameters, all the estimated coefficients are significant. 
24 The lagged conditional volatility ranges from 0.198 to 0.991 
23 We usually need higher number of lags in the AR model in order to capture the higher level of 
autocorrelation in the return series. 
24The Q and Q2 statistics for the GARCH residuals and their squares are not significant at conventional levels in most 
cases indicating that there is no serious problem in the models specification. Testing for the autocorrelation and 
ARCH effect of the results show that there is no significant autocorrelation among the residuals, and this suggests 
that the model is well specified. Results of LB (Q) and LB (Q2 ) test are reported in Table 9 and Appendix 2.4 Table 2 
and 3. 
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Table 2.9 
Volatility Spillover Results during the Full Period (1998-2005) 
Maximum AB JNB CAB BJ HB JKB ABC UB AJIB r ; t, At; tl--14 1_A M III lvvu 
Estimates 
Return Equation 
a,, () 
(X i 
0.000 
0.000 
0.155* 
0.032 
-0.042 
0.031 
Volatility Equation 
ß 0.000* 
/ 1, ý 11 (. nn 
ARCH (A,, ) 
V. VVU 
0.297* 
0.042 
GARCH 0.632* 
( , 8;, 2 ) 
0.044 
Volatility Spillover ß. 
AB 
JNB 
CAB 
BJ 
HB 
JKB 
ABC 
UB 
AJIB 
Log-L 
Q(6) 
P-value 
Q(12 
P-value 
Q2 (6) 
P-value 
Q2(12) 
P-value 
0.005 
0.007 
0.002 0.003 
0.004 0.005 
0.005 -0.003* 0.006 
0.005 0.001 0.007 
-0.001+ 0.000 0.000* -0.001 
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
0.001 * -0.003* -0.002 0.008 
0.001 0.000 0.003 0.010 
0.002 -0.003+ 0.005 -0.013 * 
0.003 0.001 0.009 0.003 
0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.002t 
0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
0.000 0.001 0.004 0.004 
5241443 4519.161 4436.947 4075.171 
8.349 5.444 18.968 7.908 
0.214 
1 1.305 
0.503 
6.000 
0.423 
9.250 
0.681 
0.001+ 
0.000 
0.166* 
0.029 
-0.037 
0.027 
-0.001 * 0.000 0.001+ 0.000 -0.001 ý 0.001+ -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
0.123 0.185* 0.110* 0.137* 0.137* 0.085 0.031 
0.079 0.023 0.030 0.034 0.034 0.049 0.046 
0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
0,000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.181 * 0.259* 0.173+ 0.156* 0.083* 0,051 * 0.003+ 0.560-t- 
0.022 0.064 0.520 0.028 0.026 0.013 0.001 0.325 
0.732* 0.606* 0.677* 0.595* 0.725* 0.883* 0.991 * 0.198 
0.020 0.026 0.025 0.039 0.031 0.010 0.004 0.144 
-0.009 0.015 -0.046 -0.015 0.084 0.001 0.066* 0.401-ý 
0.010 0.036 0.037 0.014 0.066 0.024 0.013 0.234 
0.007 -0.082* 0.006 -0.075* -0.036* -0.027* -0.033* 0.016 0.025 0.015 0.019 0.008 0.006 0.002 
0.488 
9.532 
0.65 7 
7.937 
0.243 
14.080 
0.296 
0.004 
25.826 
0.01 1 
11.753 
0.109 
14.006 
0.300 
1.268+ -0.002 -0.007* 0.028 -0.002 -0.013+ 0.525 0.009 0.002 0.023 0.001 0.006 
-0.002 -0.007* -0.007* 0.003 -0.004* 
0.005 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 
0.245 
15.400 
0.220 
0.896 
0.989 
1.146 
1.000 
-0.002 
0.002 
-0.002i -0.009* 
0.001 0.003 
0,010 -0.001 0.007 
0.007 0.001 0.018 
-0.007* 0.005 
0.001 0.009 
-0.001 
0.000 
-0.001 -0.004+ -0.009* -0.004+ 
0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002 
4604.534 4226.931 4208.962 4177.349 4573.963 
14.579 5.109 8.254 11.428 6.977 
0.024 0.530 0.220 0.076 0.323 
28.938 14.465 11.016 21.833 16.575 
0.004 0.272 0.528 0.390 0.166 
3.813 0.461 3.722 7.123 0.511 
0.702 0.998 0.714 0.310 0.998 
9.351 0.943 5.452 7.999 2.508 
0.673 1.000 0.941 0.785 0.998 
Notes: 
This Table reports the estimation results and the diagnostic test results of the GARCH (1,1) model as reported illustrated in 
equations (12) and (13), predicting the volatility for the daily returns of the eight relatively small banks in the sample (see Table I 
for banks notations). The parameters a ; j) a0a,, 2 are the estimated Autoregressive equation parameters, and ß;, () ß,,, , 
ß,, z , and 
f3 0 
are the conditional variance equation represent the constant, ARCH effect, GARCH effect, and Volatility spillover, respectively. In 
the diagnostic part, Log-L is the maximum log likelihood ratio. Q (p) and Q2 (p) are the Ljung-Box statistics for sixth and twelfth 
order serial correlation in standardized and squared standardized residuals. Numbers below the coefficient values in the Table are 
robust standard error statistics to allow for possible violations of the assumption of normality for the condition errors (Bollerslev and 
Wooldridge, 1992). t, +, * indicates significances at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
-0.001 * 0.000 0.000* -0.001-1 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
-0.008* -0.008* -0.002 
0.002 0.003 0.004 
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The numbers shown in rows seven to fifteen are parameter of volatility spillover ß, ,. 
The results indicate that the AB has a role in transmitting volatility to two banks only, 
UB and AJIB, at the 1% and 10% significance levels, respectively. It should be noted 
that the AB is subject to a significant volatility spillover effects from other three banks, 
HB, JKB, and AJIB at the 5%, 1 %, and 1% significance levels, respectively. On the 
other hand, some of the other banks appear to play a more important role than AB in 
transmitting volatilities to the sector. For example, JNB, HB, and ABC individually 
have significant effects on the volatility of other five banks (see row eight, eleven and 
thirteen in Table 2.9). In short, these results support the VEC model test results, 
discussed before. Hence, there is no clear evidence that the AB has a leading role in the 
transmission of returns and volatility in the JBS. 
Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix 2.5 show the estimation results for the first and second sub- 
periods under study. Based on these results, the leading (dominance) role of the AB was 
not strongly supported by the two sub-period results. The AB affects significantly the 
volatility of three and two banks in the first and second sub-periods, respectively. 
However, it receives a significant volatility transmission from two and three banks in 
the same periods, respectively. 
Finally, the significance patterns of volatility spillover in the two sub-periods within the 
banking sector have been increased. This increase of information spillover might be 
attributable to the fact that most of the flow of foreign capital for portfolio management 
increased after the 11th of September 2001. 
In summary, our results show that the volatility spillover effects, namely the 
transmission of information flows, from large to small banks is not stronger than that 
between relatively small banks or from small to larger bank. This finding contrasts 
previous studies which document that return and volatility spillovers between small and 
large stocks are asymmetric due to signalling quality (e. g. Lo and MacKinlay, 
1990)25. 
Our results are consistent with Conrad et al., (1991) who pointed out that conditional 
volatility of both large and small stocks are driven by the same factors 
in an economy, 
25 The returns and volatility of small stock tend to be correlated with the 
lagged returns of large stocks. 
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without any differences in the timing of the effects of these factors. It may simply be the 
case that these factors are not more closely associated with large bank stocks. 
From applying the VEC and the GARCH models, we can conclude that there is no clear 
evidence that the large bank dominance effect exists in the Jordanian banking system. 
For the large bank to be dominant, two main conditions need to be satisfied. Firstly, the 
large bank should be independent which means that the returns and volatility of this 
bank should not be influenced by the majority of other relatively smaller banks in the 
system. Secondly, the returns and volatility of this bank should significantly affect the 
majority of the returns and volatilities of other relatively smaller banks in the system. 
However, the two conditions for the dominance effect to exist have been violated. 
During the full and the two sub-sample periods the large bank was not able to interpret 
the returns and volatility changes of the other smaller banks clearly, and it was affected 
by many other smaller banks. 
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6. Conclusions 
The dominant position of large banks may enable them to play an important role in 
explaining the dynamics of returns and volatility of relatively small banks in the stock 
market. A bank may be considered dominant if it has an influence on the returns and 
volatility of other banks with its own stock price moving independently. Information 
transmission within the banking sector is important, relative to the other industries, 
because bank contagion occurs faster, spreads more broadly within the industry, and 
permeates far beyond the banking sector to cause substantial damage to the financial 
system and the economy (Kaufman, 1994; Elyasiani and Mansur 2003). This situation 
added importance and encourage regulators to place greater emphasis over the 
supervision of the largest banks. 
This paper examines empirically the dynamic relations between bank share prices in an 
emerging market by investigating the return intedependence and volatility spillovers 
among bank stock prices and returns using cointegration, error correction representation 
and GARCH methodologies. In addition, we attempt to discover whether the advantages 
of being large in the banking industry are reflected in the capital market. In other words 
is large bank stock able to dominate relatively small bank stocks? We investigate 
whether large bank stock's movements influence the stock returns and volatility of other 
relatively small banks. We also investigate return causality or volatility effects from 
relatively small bank stock to large bank stock returns. 
The evidence of cointegration between Jordanian bank stocks suggests that future 
fluctuations (returns) of prices of one bank stock can be predicted to some extent using 
a part of the information set provided by another bank stock price. Additionally, 
implementing the VEC model and VDC helped us to conclude that return 
interdependence exists between Jordanian banks. However, the large bank (AB) proved 
not to be the most influential bank for other smaller bank return, in other words, the 
large bank failed to be the dominant bank in explaining stock returns within the banking 
sector. 
The GARCH model estimates reveal that volatility spillover exists between Jordanian 
banks, although a large bank dominance effect on volatility was not evident 
from the 
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results. Furthermore; from the volatility results, it might be said that the large bank is 
almost independent, has not been affected by information of most of the banks in the 
sample. This result is not surprising because the market value of this stock is relatively 
high compared to other listed banks in the ASE. In addition, the AB stocks attracts 
institutional more than retail investors. This may be a reason why this stock moves in a 
manner isolated from the other banks in the Jordanian banking sector. 
Overall, the evidence indicates that although returns and volatility transmission may 
exist between Jordanian banks, the information flow does not have an influence on the 
pattern of the transmission mechanisms between large and small stocks. Therefore, the 
dominance effect does not appear to exist in the Jordanian banking sector. This result 
may be consistent with Gebka's (2006) suggestion that factors other than size might be 
important proxies for informed trading which may further explain patterns in stock 
returns. 
This conclusion might have important implications. First, our results suggest that any 
actions by regulators should be directed to industry-wide difficulties or interdependence 
among individual banks rather than large bank-specific idiosyncratic problems. In 
particular, regulators should look for stabilizing potentially adverse effects of a negative 
event at all banks in the system without providing special attention to the largest bank. 
Second, this study adds to our understanding that investors and portfolio managers 
should consider that return causality and volatility spillover between banks may be due 
to factors other than size when they construct their portfolios. Third, interdependence 
between bank stock prices may provide investors and portfolio managers important 
information for their investment strategies. Interdependence between bank share prices 
may indicate that prices in the market are not equal in their capacity to discover new 
information and one stock price may serve as a primary asset for price discovery. 
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Appendix 2.1 
Table 1 
Middle East and North Africa: Financial Development Ranking 
High 
Bahrain 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Oman 
Qatar 
Level of financial Development* 
, o.. v.,. ý., oeM,. ý. ý.. omý.., ý., ý, ým, ý. ý. ý,,., ýz.,. m. o.,. ý,. o.,,. ý.,,, ý...., _. ýe., ý., ýýý. ý,... d. Medium 
Algeria 
Djibouti 
Egypt 
Mauritania 
Morocco 
Pakistan 
Saudi Arabia 
United Arab of Emirates (U. A. E. ) 
Low 
Iran 
Libya 
Sudan 
Syria 
Yemen 
Source: Financial Development in the Middle East and North Africa Susan Creane, Rishi Goyal, A. Mushfiq 
Mobarak, and Randa Sab, 2003 International Monetary Fund. 
Notes: Based on an index of qualitative and quantitative data; 2000-01 data; scoring 0-10, with 10 being the 
highest level of development. Within each category, the countries are arranged in alphabetical order 
Table 2 
General Statistics for the Jordanian Banking Sector (JD million) 
Year 1998 
Number of banks 
Number of branches 
Population per bank branch 
Total Assets* 
Growth in total Assets 
21 
457 
10 
10,460 
Total deposits* 6811 
Growth in Total Deposits - 
Direct credit facilities* 4285 
Growth in Direct credit - 
facilities* 
1999 2000 
21 
463 
10.1 
11,551 
10.43% 
7502 
10.15% 
4466 
4.22% 
2 I 
469 
10.7 
12,914 
11.80% 
8225 
9.64% 
4547 
1.81% 
2001 
21 
471 
11.04 
15,119 
17.07% 
8721 
6.03% 
4949 
8.84% 
2002 
21 
471 
11.3 
15,702 
3.86% 
9368 
7.42% 
5130 
3.66% 
2003 
21 
449 
12.2 
16,236 
3.40% 
9969 
6.42% 
5262 
2.57% 
2004 
24 
447 
12 
17,821 
9.76% 
11564 
16.00'0 
6189 
17.62% 
2005 
24 
459 
12.2 
21,087 
18.33% 
12060 
4.29% 
7880 
27.32% 
Direct credit facilities to - 59.53% 55.28% 56.75% 54.76% 52.78% 53.52% 
65.34% 
total Deposits* 
Total deposits* 6811 7502 8225 8721 9368 9969 
Direct credit facilities* 4285 4466 4547 4949 5130 5262 
Notes: 
11564 
6189 
12060 
7880 
The number of banks licensed to operate in Jordan stood at 24 banks at the end of 2005, including 8 licensed foreign 
banks (five of which are Arabic banks). The licensed banks operate 459 branches in Jordan and 135 branches outside 
the country. Jordan also has two Islamic banks. With more than 20 banks operating in a small market, Jordan is 
widely thought to be over-banked. The number of population per bank branch in 2005 was 12.2 thousand for every 
branch, compared with 10 thousand for every branch in 1998. Financial savings in Jordan are primarily intermediated 
through the banking sector. In recent years deposits were attracted from other Arab nations, and the savings and 
remittances of the many Jordanians who traditionally had never used banks were captured (Central Bank of Jordan 
2004). The banking system in Jordan is privately owned, and well-developed. Banks can extend loans and credit 
facilities in foreign currencies for trade-related purposes. Increasingly, banks have started introducing new products 
and corporate bond issues. Moreover, the inter bank money market has become prominent over the last few years. 
* All numbers include the Jordanian branches only. 
Source: Yearly Statistical Bulletin, Special Issue, Central Bank of Jordan, 2005. 
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Table 3 
Concentration Ratio 3 and 1 
Concentration Ratio for Three Lar 
Total Total 
2002 
2003 76 76 
Assets Deposits 
75 75 
2004 75 75 
2005 71 72 
est bank % Concentration Ratio for the largest bank% 
Total Equity Total Assets Total Total Equity 
Deposits 
76 52 55 61 
76 51 
73 50 
68 
ý. ,ý ýý. ýý , ýý, ýý ý ýýý,,. ý,. ý Source: Banks Scope Data Base and banks Annual Reports. 
55 
54 
52 
62 
58 
57 52 
*The numbers are calculated as the percent of individual bank statistics relative to the total e number of all listed banks 
Table 4 
Number of Branches, Total Assets, Total Credit Facilities, Total Deposits, and 
Total Equities for a Sample of nine Jordanian banks 
Bank name 
Arab Bank 
Housing Bank 
Jordan National Bank 
Cairo Amman Bank 
Bank of Jordan 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 
Union Bank 
Arab Jordan Invest. Bank 
84 
96 
41 
33 
44 
31 
11 
8 
Arab Banking Corp. 
. ýý 
12 
roý 
2002 2003 2004 2005 
68.48% 68.21% 66.30% 60,88% 
8.24% 8.90% 9.85% 11.57% 
6.45% 5.74% 6.19% 6.05% 
4.17% 3.86% 3.86% 4.44% 
3.75% 3.97% 3.78% 4.28% 
4.10% 4.46% 4.93% 7.20% 
1.73% 1.73% 2.01% 2.36% 
1.69% 1.66% 1.59% 1.73% 
1.39% 1.47% 1.47% 1.49% 
Total Deposits and Money market 
Fundin 
Arab Bank 
Housing Bank 
Jordan National Bank 
Cairo Amman Bank 
Bank of Jordan 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 
Union Bank 
Arab Jordan Invest. Bank 
Arab Banking Co 
2002 2003 
68.40% 67.57% 
7.96% 8.78% 
5.89% 5.72% 
4.45% 4.12% 
4.05% 4.33% 
4.25% 4.61% 
1.88% 1.91% 
1.81% 1.78% 
1.32% 1.18% 
2004 2005 
65.37% 62.42% 
10.05% 11.57% 
6.35% 5.61% 
4.15% 4.18% 
4.16% 4.50% 
5.06% 6.50% 
2.16% 2.22% 
1.61% 1.80% 
1.09% 1.19% 
2002 2003 
65.44% 66.06% 
7.57% 7.53% 
10.20% 9.00% 
3.57% 3.38% 
4,26% 4.27% 
4.70% 5.38% 
1.84% 2.11% 
0.88% 0.88% 
2004 2005 
61.40% 58.25% 
9.15% 11.03% 
10.60% 8.52% 
3.53% 3.85% 
4.05% 4,64% 
6.54% 8.50% 
2.15% 2.81% 
1.25% 1.10% 
1.53% 1.39% 1.33% 1.29% 
Total Equities 
2002 2003 2004 
68.95% 69.08% 65.51% 
13.25% 12.77% 13.05% 
3.47% 3.55% 4.17% 
2.18% 2.35% 3.33% 
3.08% 3.11% 3.25% 
4.25% 4.47% 5.05% 
1.69% 1.48% 2.06% 
1.73% 1.72% 1.82% 
1.39% 1.47% 1.76% 
Source: Banks Annual Reports 2006. 
Notes: 
N. B is Number of Branches 
All numbers are calculated as bank total assets over the sum of the total assets for the nine banks in the sample. 
The same procedure is applied for bank total loans, total deposits and money market funding, and total equities. 
2005 
59.19% 
12.80% 
6.14% 
5,60% 
3.79% 
5.25% 
3.63% 
1.77% 
1.82% 
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Table 5 
Trading Volume and Market Capitalization for the four Main Sectors in Jordan 
Sector 
Banking 
Insurance 
Services 
Industry 
2004 
71692995 
43427 
1006396 
1050432 
2005 
6043405 
179878 
8003977 
16871052 
ýý ý ýý 
Trading Volume (Thousand JD) 
2002 
349776 
11418 
114075 
471434 
2003 
524838 
22538 
449866 
845796 
Source: Amman Stock Exchange yearly bulletin 2006. 
Figure 1 
Market Capitalization of ASE Distributed by Sectors 
(2005) 
Source: Amman Stock Exchange Data Base 2006 
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Table 6 
Trading for a Sample of Nine Jordanian Banks 
Bank 
Arab Bank 
Housing Bank 
Jordan National Bank 
Cairo Amman Bank 
Bank of Jordan 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 
Union Bank 
Arab Jordan Invest. 
Bank 
Arab Banking Corp. 
Value Traded million JD 
2002 2003 2004 2005 
222.108 177.502 822.921 3,350.289 
9.783 20.777 43.921 339.629 
13.001 17.206 146.889 120.167 
1.426 6.157 15.019 272.260 
37.415 64,392 99.603 235.536 
4.391 26.302 46.228 87.273 
4.298 7.218 28.324 211.705 
7.672 13.490 17.272 27.813 
3.390 4.407 10.045 19.739 
Number of Shares Traded Thousand) 
2002 2003 
1,135 749 
3,986 5,628 
2004 2005 
3,404 54,207 
8,236 21,437 
11,104 13,675 59,561 19,648 
762 2,178 2,543 24,997 
14,504 22,801 21,997 235,536 
1,231 3,565 4,314 87,273 
3,240 3,567 7,173 211,705 
402 3,203 5,598 27,813 
277 1,961 2,747 19,739 
Market Capitalization (million JDýýý 
Arab Bank 
Housing Bank 
Jordan National Bank 
Cairo Amman Bank 
Bank of Jordan 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 
Union Bank 
3.761 5,996 8.389 19.219 
8.698 11.561 39.492 14.206 
0.198 2.274 3.391 26.278 
15.899 22.581 23.807 32.343 
2.524 3.713 10.1 10 7.531 
1.745 2.278 8.062 20.269 
0.960 1.768 5.255 6.412 
0.985 3.085 4.352 3.696 
Source: Amman Stock Exchange data Base, 2005. 
, 
619.200 2,684 4,185.280 11,141,000 
242.000 433.00 800.000 2522.100 
41.588 69.176 217.200 311.100 
32.000 76.000 210,000 266.625 
7.765 154.030 250.000 198.000 
96.750 213.750 368.750 495.000 
26.40 43.200 143.750 214.500 
30.400 67.000 93.800 139.920 
20.200 80.040 115.368 109.882 
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Figure 2: Foreign Investments Movements in ASE 
1000 
500 
0 
52 
al 
/ 
/ / 
j 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Source: Amman Stock Exchange data Base, 2005. 
Figure 3 
--ý- Non Jordanian Buying (JD 
Mill) 
"------ Non Jordanian Selling (JD 
Mill) 
ASE Foreign Investment Distributed Between Sectors in 2005: 
Banking 
41% 
Insurance 
14% 
Source: Amman Stock Exchange data Base, 2005. 
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Table 2 
VEC Results for the First Sub-Period (1998 - 2001) 
Dependent AB(-1); 
Variables AB(-2) 
JNB(-1), 
JNB(-2) 
AB 0.222*; -0.002; 
-0.008 0.152* 
JNB 0.037; -0.280*; 
0.073 0.032 
CAB 0.028; 0.003; 
-0.036 -0.109* 
BJ 0.019; -0.070; 
-0.017 0.109i 
HB 0.006; -0.095; 
-0.019 -0.132 ''i 
JKB -0.001; 0.005; 
0.049 0.012 
ABC -0.066' ; 
0,011 
UB -0.058' ; 
AJIB 
0.029 
0.00 1; 
-0.027 
0.025; 
0.001 
0.017; 
-0.032 
0.129 t; 
0.015 
JKB(-1), ABC(-1); UB(-1); AJIB (-1), 
JKB(-2) ABC(-2) UB(-2) AJIB(-2) 
-0.048; 0.222 t; 0.074; 0.083; 
-0.027 -0.320+ 0.161 -0.097 
-0.023; -0.075; 0.038; 0.044; 
0.016 0.064 -0.052 0.023 
-0.099; -0.199+; 0.116; 0.1290+; 
-0.066 0.047 -0.072 0.079 
-0.079; 0.142*; 0.171 *; -0.098*; 
0.009 -0.049 0.102 0.0630 
-0.027; 0.130; 0.176*; 0.042: 
-0.027 0.139 0.049 0.012 
-0.146 t; 0.086; -0.092; -0.043; 
0.044 0.013 -0.060 0.034 
0.024; -0.144 t; -0.072; -0.090*; 
-0.016 -0.041 -0.061 -0.074" 
-0.068; 0.006; 0.031; 0.051; 
-0.006 0.002 -0.132* -0.002 
0.141 t; -0.024; 0.047; -0.080; 
-0.115 -0.014 
0.114 -0.177+ 
Notes: 
All variables except the error correction terms (ECT) are the first differences of their logarithms. The VEC of 2 lag length is 
selected on the basis of the LR test supplemented by AIC and SIC information criteria. Figures in parentheses are coefficient values. 
*, +, Vindicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Table 3 
Dependent 
Variables 
AB 
ECTI - 
ECT5 
VEC Results for the Second Sub-Period (2001- 2005) 
AB(-1) JNB(-1) 
CAB(-1); BJ(-l); HB(-1); 
CAB(-2) BJ(-2) HB(-2) 
0.059; 
0.038 
-0.057; 
0.010 
0.028; 
-0.1191 
0.018; 
0.105 
0.136 
0.056 
-0.010; 
-0.027 
-0.048; 
0.001 
0.073; 
0.046 
-0.0 13; 
-0.190+ 
0.010; 0.169 i; 
-0.190 t 0.021 
-0.038; -0.011; 
-0.019 -0.007 
-0.020; -0.045; 
-0.137 0.047 
0.012; 0.005; 
-0.052 0.029 
-0.017; 
-0.060 
-0.141 j; 
0.170+ 
0.080; 
0.139+ 
-0.055; 
-0.003 
0.241+; 
0.184+ 
CAB(-1) BJ(-1) 
-0.3461'; 
-0.1041 
-0.025; 
0.031 
-0.021; 
-0.020 
-0.012; 
0.056 
0.028; 
-0.108 
HB(-1) JKB(-1) ABC(-1) UB(-1) AJIB (-1) 
AB(-7) JNB(-7) CAB(-7) BJ(-7) HB(-7) JKB(-_7 
-0.798 * -0.159 
0.316+ -0.231 
-0.008 -0.366+ 
-0.310+ -0.211 
0.178 -0.303+ 
-0.2271 
-0.10 
-0.358* -0.007 0.202 i 0.038 -0.082 
-0.386* 0.059 0.374* 0.077 0.044 
-0.346* 0.068 0.424* 0.066 0.101 
-0.281 * 0.079 0.262+ -0.015 0.077 
-0.219* 0.163+ 0.181+ 0.164 0.081 
-0.134 0.104'r 0.088 0.319+ -0.034 
-0.145* 0.0452 -0.037 
0.155+ -0.049 
JNB 0.843+ -0.865+ -0.547+ 
-0.589+ -0.717+ -0.566+ 
0.542+ -0.655+ -0.434+ 
-0.145 -0.379 -0.322t 
-0.196 -0.381 -0.328+ 
-0.219 -0.185 
-0.087 -0.104 
CAB 0.063 -0.255 
-0.012 -0.275 
-0.775* 0.027 
0.950* 0.185 
-0.288 0.264 
0.232 
0.153 
0.053 
-0.066 
-0.094 
-0.180 
-0.183 
-0.077 
0.053 
-0.530+ 
-0.578+ 
-0.492+ 
-0.525+ 
-0.2501 
-0.200' 
-0.077 
ABC(-7) UB(-7) AJIB(-7 
-0.356t 
-0.457 
-0.397+ 
-0.265 i 
-0.227t 
-0.195+ 
-0.069 
-0.029 
-0.038 
-0.036 
-0.096 
-0.025 
-0.066 
0.062 
-0.350+ 
-0.334+ 
-0.305+ 
-0.339* 
-0.249* 
-0.151+ 
-0.106+ 
0.301 0.270 0.224 -0.080 -0.413+ 0.583+ 
0.238 0.157 0.191 -0.169 -0.279 0.551+ 
0.211 0.096 0.322 -0.223 -0.203 0.489 i 
0.045 0.101 0.208 -0.249 -0.036 0.460+ 
-0.127 0.481+ 0.337 -0.350 
0.020 0.378+ 
-0.055 0.562* 0.200 -0.151 -0.076 0.266'' 
-0.176 0.218 0.194 
0.004 -0.152 0.224t 
J. 
-0.085 -0.795* 0.108 
0.003 0.422 -0.185 
-0.231 -0.811 * 0.270 
0.019 0.409 0.045 
0.028 -0.704* 0.297 0.088 
0.419 -0.380* 
0.035 -0.507+ 0.051 0.038 
0.324 -0.317* 
0.035 -0.2891 -0.060 
0.006 0.293 -0.218 
-0.056 -0.390 -0.029 -0.286 
0.191 -0.100 
0.032 -0.200 
0.136 -0.172 -0.064 -0.095 
-0.026 
0.100 
0.096 
0.078 
-0.000 
0.065 
-0.055 
195 
0.442 
0.189 
0.420+ 
-0.839* 
-0.476 
HB 0.210 
0.215t 
0.239t 
-0.053 
-1.290* 
-0.338 -0262 
-0.490t -0.198 
-0.266 -0.116 
0.018 -0.046 
0.006 0.080 
0.122 -0.090 
0.152 -0.117j' 
-0.239 
-0.075 
-0.062 
-0.217 
-0.297 t 
-0.038 
0.088 
-0.318 1'0.075 0.641+ 0.461+ 
-0.232 0.069 0.418 0.494+ 
-0.100 0.025 0.251 0.554 
0.022 0.097 0.056 0.361 
0.053 0.035 0.292 0.355 
0.121 -0.034 0.245 0.247 
-0.003 0.030 0.059 0.228 
-0.227' -0.175 0.136 
-0.176 -0.155 0.194 
-0.101 -0.150 0.020 
-0.108 -0.146 0.060 
-0.089 -0.066 -0.006 
-0.039 -0.001 -0.047 
-0.014 0.060 -0.003 
JKB 0.082 -0.092 -0.061 0.184 
0.049 -0.226 -0.083 0.1297 
-0.227 -0.410'1 -0.149 0.019 
-0.317t -0.177 -0.062 0.014 
0.196 -0.299 -0.001 0.166 
0.067 0.007 0.223+ 
0.073 0.001 0.170+ 
0.251 
0.394 i 
0.419 
0.129 
0.218 
0.331+ 
0.112 
0.151 0.301 
0.298t 0.338 
0.026 0.345 
0.271 0.089 
0.306+ 0.114 
0.209 -i 0.141 
0.121 1 -0.115 
0.466 
0.118' 
0.426'= 
0.532+ 
0.567* 
0.333+ 
-0.046 
0.183 
0.128 
0.047 
0.076 
-0.067 
-0.053 
0.027 
0.437+ 
0.217 
0.209 11 
0.168 
0.171'i 
0.155 
0.133 
0.331 
0.186 
0.287'1- 
0.216 
0.071 t 
0.099 
0.0808 
ABC 0.777* -0.793* 0.137 -0.309 0.152 -0.080 -0.500* -0.097 0.129 -0.564 
-0.3181- -0.809* 0.098 -0.241 t 0.146 0.004 -0.347+ -0.189 0.108 -0.575* 0.348+ -1.032* -0.002 -0.145 0.027 0.236 -0.152 -0.101 0.138 -0.542* 
-0.073 -0.868* -0.030 -0.038 0.153 0.239 -0.266 -0.009 0.138 -0.325+ 0.368 -0.722* -0.032 0.019 0.135 0.155 -0.300+ -0.169 0.043 -0.295+ 
-0.164 -0.073 0.087 0.013 0.356 -0.427 -0.070 -0.078 -0.094 0.092 -0.071 0.0122 0.035 0.060 -0.052 -0.034 0.034 0.015 
UB 0.652+ -0.624+ 
0.134 -0.630+ 
0.171 -0.654+ 
-0.174 -0.808* 
0.084 -0.526 j 
-0.131 
0.1070 
AJIB 0,442 -0.451 
0.180 -0.293 
0.369t -0.684+ 
0.204 -0.344 
-0.439 -0.186 
0.028 
0.191 
Notes: 
-0.207 -0.003 
-0.224 -0.165 
-0.304 -0.181 
-0.257I -0.268t 
0.191 j -0.122 
-0.132 0.008 
0.020 0.021 
0.1452 
0.215 
0.142 
0.080 
0.025 
0.010 
-0.002 
-0.262 
-0.267 
-0.097 
-0.278 1- 
-0.145 
-0.259 
-0.159 
0.3 84+ 
0.201 
-0.082 
-0.045 
-0.010 
0.031 
-0.018 
-0.075 
-0.101 
-0.029 
-0.081 
-0.069 
-0.074 
-0.066 
*, +, tindicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
0.089 
0.0639 
0.203t 
0.164 
0.026 
-0.159t 
-0.063 
-0.563 
-0.504 
-0.485t 
-0.400t 
-0.428 
-0.212 
-0.029 
-0.341 
-0.378 i 
-0.337 i 
-0.030 
-0.021 
-0.105 
-0.083 
-0.047 
0.053 
-0.083 
-0.033 
-0.164 
-0.075 
-0.022 
-0.548* 
-0.386* 
-0.327* 
-0.272+ 
-0.280* 
-0.331 * 
-0.194* 
-0.187 -0.740 -0.214 
-0.025 -0.676+ 0.096 
0.102 -0.479* 0.180 
-0.054 -0.313 -0.029 
0.102 -0.284 -0.082 
0.134 -0.249* -0.123 
0.172 -0.154* -0.1028 
-0.070 0.4272 -0.312 i 0.150 
-0.010 0.285 -0.011 0.228 0.001 0.218 0.126 0.227 
0.051 0.249 0.135 0.2821- 
0.021 0.140 0.152 0.196 
-0.110 0.076 0.043 0.288+ 
-0.034 -0.116 -0.050 0.12721- 
0.613t 0.440'r, 
0.536t 0.402 t 
0.429 0.305 t 
0.4153i 0.0610 
0.2559 0.054 
0.409+ -0.110 
0.200 0.031 
-0.957+ 
-1.025* 
-0.688+ 
-0.458-'r 
0.121+ 
-0.426 j 
-0.214+ 
-0.004 
-0.009 
0.028 
0.003 
0.127 
0.287 
-0.086 
0.151 
0,124 
0.101 
0.072 
-0.065 
0.053 
0.052 
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Appendix 2.3 
Table 1 
Decomposition of the Forecast Error Variance for the First Sub-Period 
(1998 - 2001) 
Variable H. Z 
AB 1 
5 
10 
JNB 1 
5 
10 
CAB 1 
5 
10 
BJ 1 
5 
l0 
HB 1 
5 
10 
JKB 1 
5 
10 
ABC 1 
5 
10 
UB 1 
5 
10 
AJIB 1 
5 
10 
S. E 
0.028 
0.027 
0.027 
0.037 
0.040 
0.040 
0.042 
0.044 
0.0439 
0.044 
0.047 
0.047 
0.037 
0.040 
0.040 
0.044 
0.046 
0.0460 
0.053 
0.056 
0,057 
0,057 
0.060 
0.060 
0.033 
0.035 
0.036 
AB 
100.00 
92.778 
92.734 
3.970 
4.620 
4.626 
0.072 
0.325 
0.331 
0.530 
0.987 
0.991 
7.903 
7.123 
7.136 
1.297 
1.527 
1.528 
0.346 
4.749 
4.749 
0.186 
1.115 
1.1 14 
0.002 
1.010 
1.015 
JNB 
0.000 
0.958 
0.966 
96.030 
88.908 
88.829 
0.325 
0.477 
0.490 
1.379 
1.954 
1.959 
10.005 
10.118 
10.117 
9.933 
9.815 
9.814 
0.036 
0.543 
0.551 
0.662 
1.172 
1.172 
0.275 
0.530 
0.544 
CAB 
0.000 
0.790 
0,794 
0.000 
1.325 
1.338 
99.603 
92.940 
92.851 
0.060 
1.558 
1.560 
0.024 
0.645 
0.665 
1.212 
2.093 
2.098 
2.867 
4.624 
4.625 
0.708 
1.712 
1.714 
4.029 
7.767 
7.770 
BJ 
0,000 
0,783 
0.802 
0.000 
2.377 
2.381 
0.000 
1.124 
1.1416 
98.031 
86.101 
86.074 
0.679 
0.714 
0.718 
4.211 
4.818 
4.817 
2.581 
4.956 
4.957 
0.098 
2.585 
2.587 
2.071 
3.969 
3.983 
HB JKB 
0.000 0.000 
AB 
0,000 
0.171 0,341 1.964 
0.172 
0.000 
0.877 
0.887 
0.000 
1.164 
1.170 
0.000 
0.055 
0.061 
81.389 
79.193 
79.130 
0.709 
0.771 
0.773 
0.044 
0.910 
0.914 
0.141 
1.134 
1.138 
0.945 
0.919 
0.922 
0.343 
0.000 
0.221 
0.225 
0.000 
0.164 
0.181 
0.000 
3.830 
3.833 
0.000 
0.321 
0.325 
82.639 
77.895 
77.873 
6.884 
6.988 
6.988 
0.209 
0.686 
0.687 
0.020 
0.930 
0.939 
1.969 
0.000 
0.165 
0.171 
0.000 
0.422 
0.435 
0.000 
1.616 
1.621 
0.000 
0.165 
0.172 
0.000 
0.073 
0.079 
87.243 
76.760 
76.739 
0.002 
0.767 
0.772 
1.006 
3.242 
3.242 
UB 
0.000 
2.160 
2.161 
0.000 
0.230 
0.241 
0.000 
1.172 
1.173 
0.000 
0.417 
0.420 
0.000 
0.471 
0.471 
0.000 
0.642 
0.642 
0.000 
0.346 
0.350 
97.990 
90.136 
90.118 
0.178 
0.747 
0.750 
AJIB 
0.000 
0,055 
0.059 
0.000 
1.276 
1.302 
0.000 
2.211 
2.227 
0.000 
3.481 
3.482 
0.000 
1.251 
1.266 
0.000 
2.367 
2.376 
0.000 
0.124 
0.127 
0.000 
0.695 
0.698 
91.475 
80.885 
80.835 
INT 
0.00 
7.222 
7.266 
3.970 
11.092 
11.171 
0.969 
7.06 
7.149 
1.969 
13.899 
13.926 
18.611 
20.807 
20.87 
17.361 
22.105 
22.127 
12.757 
23.24 
23.261 
2.01 
9.864 
9.882 
8.525 
19.115 
19.165 
Notes; 
Number in this Table denotes the percentage of error variance, measured my the standard error, of banks in the left hand side 
explained by the banks at the top 
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Table 2 
Decomposition of the Forecast Error Variance for the Second Sub-Period from 
(2001- 2005) 
Variable 
AB 
H. Z 
5 
10 
JNB 1 
5 
10 
CAB 1 
S 
10 
BJ 1 
5 
10 
HB 1 
5 
10 
JKB I 
5 
10 
ABC 1 
5 
10 
UB 1 
5 
10 
AJIB 1 
5 
10 
S. E AB 
0.029 100.000 
0.034 73.448 
0.041 
0,057 
0.062 
0.070 
0.062 
0.071 
0.078 
0.049 
0.057 
0.063 
0.034 
0.041 
0.047 
0.046 
0.055 
0.062 
0.040 
0.052 
0.063 
0.045 
0.056 
0.062 
0.053 
0.059 
0.068 
56.379 
3.495 
3.923 
4.568 
4.435 
6.740 
6.008 
8.576 
12.938 
13.324 
11.915 
9.990 
9.049 
3.332 
3.281 
4,176 
10.065 
10.277 
14.785 
0.534 
1.792 
3.612 
10.409 
12.470 
12.815 
JNB 
0.000 
2.218 
4.0480 
96,505 
86.202 
70.130 
0.105 
1.324 
2.833 
1.005 
1.916 
4.838 
4.865 
5.391 
6.198 
0.785 
1.751 
1.704 
0.244 
1.939 
2.221 
4.825 
6.966 
7.722 
0.673 
2.051 
2,960 
CAB 
0.006- 
1.688 
4.465 
0.000 
1.111 
7.067 
95.461 
78.493 
67.271 
0.841 
7.110 
9.154 
3.622 
3.623 
6.685 
0.036 
1.602 
3.744 
0.049 
4.928 
3.968 
0.752 
5.922 
6.168 
0.837 
5.948 
9.782 
BJ 
0.000 
8.947 
8.475 
0.000 
2.922 
3.077 
0.000 
1.879 
7.143 
89.578 
69.245 
59.769 
4.753 
6.787 
8.155 
0.277 
5.686 
8.451 
1.174 
4.620 
7.163 
3.697 
8.167 
8.767 
5.254 
6.280 
7.514 
HB JKB 
0,000 0.000 
2.703 3.385 
4.616 5.759 
0.000 0.000 
0.392 1.267 
3.548 1.816 
0.000 0.000 
2.089 2.694 
3.946 3.474 
0.000 0.000 
3,784 1.474 
4,349 2.174 
74.846 0.000 
53.576 3.712 
42.218 5.798 
1.712 93.858 
3.936 73.010 
4.647 65.043 
1.010 12.871 
6.604 14.804 
6.237 19.926 
4.995 2.366 
8.259 4.113 
8.152 5.923 
0.420 0.414 
1.610 0.819 
3.501 2.105 
ABC 
0.000 
4.573 
4.366 
0.000 
0.359 
1.241 
0.000 
1.456 
2.092 
0.000 
0.421 
1.652 
0.000 
5.261 
5.948 
0.000 
3.249 
3.903 
74.587 
50.232 
35.068 
0.336 
3.906 
5.494 
1.343 
5.647 
5.670 
UB 
0.000 
1.940 
6.130 
0.000 
1.851 
4.344 
0.000 
4.970 
5.435 
0.000 
1.176 
1.962 
0.000 
5.793 
10.573 
0.000 
5.986 
5.225 
0.000 
1.770 
3.802 
82.495 
59.732 
51.435 
0.644 
1.044 
5.033 
A, JJB 
0.000 
1.099 
5.762 
0.000 
1.973 
4.210 
0.000 
0.356 
1.798 
0.000 
1.937 
2.778 
0.000 
5.868 
5.377 
0.000 
1.499 
3.108 
0.000 
4.826 
6.831 
0.000 
1.142 
2.728 
80.006 
64.132 
50.620 
Others 
0.000 
26.552 
43.621 
3.495 
13.798 
29.87 
4.539 
21.507 
32.729 
10.422 
30.755 
40.231 
25.154 
46.424 
46.424 
6.142 
26.99 
34.957 
25.413 
49.768 
64.932 
17.505 
40.268 
48.565 
19.994 
35.868 
49.38 
Notes: 
Number in this Table denotes the percentage of error variance, measured by the standard en-or of banks in the left hand side 
explained by the banks at the top 
Others is the effect on a particular bank of all other banks in the system (the percentage of the forecast error variance of a 
particular bank (standard en-or) explained by all banks other than its own past). 
Appendix 2.4 
Table 1 
Autoregressive Model Specification. 
AR(p) 
AR(5) 
AR(]) 
AR(2) 
AR(3) 
AR(4) 
AB 
-5.9476 
-5.951 * 
-5.9480 
-5.9444 
-5.9417 
JNB 
-5.1944 
-5.196* 
-5.1947 
-5.1788 
-5.1943 
Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) 
CAB 
-5.1048* 
-5.1031 
-5.0986 
-5.0948 
-5.0900 
BJ 
-5.0625 * 
-5.0578 
-5.0531 
-5.0485 
-5.0436 
HB 
-4.6834* 
-4.6784 
-4.6753 
-4.6735 
-4.6687 
JKB 
-5.2701 * 
-5.2657 
-5.2611 
-5.2581 
-5.2544 
ABC 
-4.9903 * 
-4.9876 
-4.9839 
-4.9793 
-4.9747 
UB 
-4.8256* 
-4.8222 
-4.8174 
-4.8131 
-4.8083 
AJIB 
-5.1977* 
-5.1927 
-5.1945 
-5.1903 
-5.1861 
Notes 
The univariate autoregressive model is given by AR (p) using Schwarz Bayesian Information 
C»terion, SBEC 
= 2L( 0)+( log T )k . 
The criterion selection is based on minimization of the value of test ratio. 
* is the minimum value. 
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Table 2 
Volatility spillover during the First Sub- Period (1998- 2001) 
HB 
0.009 0.015 0.028 0.025 0.019 0.019 0.104 0.023 
-0.007 0.020 0.262+ 0.002 -0.016 0.090 0.131+ 0.005 0.005 0.015 0.105 0.016 0.011 0.098 0.054 0.019 
0.021 -0.003+ 0.025 0.031 0.01 /t -0.009 -0.041+ -0.0088 0.013 0.001 0.022 0.025 0.007 0.010 0.017 0.001 
0.000{' 0.001 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 -0.001 -0.002+ 0.0008 
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 
JKB 0.004 -0.002 -0.006* 0.000 0.004 -0.002 -0.008 -0.0078 
0.005 0.016 0.001 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.053 0.001 
ABC -0.002* -0.002t 0.015 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.003* -0.005* 
0.000 0.001 0.011 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.002 
UB0.001 0.000 0.003 -0.001 * 0.045 0.002+ -0.002 -0.001 * 
0.001 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.026 0.001 0.000 0.000 
AJIB -0.003* 0.007 -0.007* -0.002 0.001 -0.005* -0.007 -0.003 
0.001 0.009 0.001 0.016 0.005 0.002 0.020 0.009 
Log-L 2636.42 2325.10 2248.85 2215.73 2195.36 2233.21 2142.38 2094.96 2329.15 
Q(6) 2.272 13.618 4.698 4.214 17.929 8.826 5.211 6.171 15.502 
P-value 0.893 0.034 0.583 0.648 0.006 0.184 0.517 0.404 0.017 
Q(12 8.704 20.958 12.847 12.334 33.415 11.762 14.930 9.563 25.534 
Q`(6) 
Q2(12 
0.417 0.773 0.008 0.980 0.951 0.998 1.000 1.000 0.033 
0.728 0.051 0.380 0.419 0.001 0.465 0.245 0.654 0.012 
9.254 3.437 22.215 3.085 2.469 1.539 0.707 0.464 18.413 
0.160 0.752 0.001 0.798 0.872 0.957 0.994 0.998 0.005 
12.357 8.150 26.715 4.181 5.204 2.591 1.593 0.714 22.450 
Notes: 
This Table reports the estimation results and the diagnostic test results of the GARCH (1,1) model as reported 
illustrated in equations (12) and (13), predicting the volatility for the daily returns of the eight relatively small banks 
in the sample. The parameters a ;, o a ;, i a i, 2 are the estimated Autoregressive equation parameters, and 
ß i. o ß i. i ,ßi., , 
and ß0, are the conditional variance equation parameters represent the constant, ARCH effect, GARCH effect, and 
Volatility spillover, respectively. In the diagnostic part, Log-L is the maximum log likelihood ratio. Q(p) and Q' (p) 
are the Ljung Box statistics for sixth and twelfth order serial correlation in standardized and square standardized 
residuals. Numbers below the coefficient values in the Table are robust standard error statistics to allow for possible 
violations of the assumption of normality for the condition errors (Bollerslev and Wooldridge, 1992). indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Maximum Likelihood AB 
Estimates 
Return equation 
a; 0 
a;, 
JNB CAB BJ HB JKB ABC UB AJIB 
0.000 -0.00121- -0.003* 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002* 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
0.175 * 0.085-i 0.097 1 0.075+ 0.109 0.047 0.137 0.110 -0.051 0.043 0.044 0.053 0.035 0.041 0.053 0.051 0.088 0.073 
a, -0.059 -0.086+ 
0.052 0.039 
Volatility Equation 
ýr. 
o (X 10') 
ARCH fli, j 
GARCH A2 
Volatility spillover 
0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000+ 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.217* 0.266* 0.186* 0.110* 0.145* 0.019 0.058 0.084 0. /8 3 0.049 0.063 0.035 0.037 0.044 0.018 0.028 0.056 0.094 
0.504* 0.565* 0.614* 0.445* 0.568* 0.914* 0.731 0.430+ 0.595* 
0.083 0.080 0.028 0.043 0.111 0.042 0.060 0.020 0.091 
ßi 
AB -0.003 -0.154* -0.147* 0.016 -0.1458 0.335 3.806 -0.1148 0.038 0.015 0.026 0.091 0.031 0.362 2.523 0.020 
JNB 0.005 0.014 -0.011 0.021 -0.004 -0.041 0.196 0.001 
CAB 
BJ 
Table 3 
Volatility Spillover during the Second Sub-Period (2001-2005). 
Maximum AB JNB CAB 
Likelihood 
Estimates 
Return equation 
a; 0 
0.000 
0.000 
0.198* 
0.044 
a;, -0.058 
0.038 
Volatility 
Equation 
ß;. 
o 
ARCH A, 
GARCH ßU 
Volatility spillover 
ßj 
AB 
0.002+ 0.000 0.001 0.002* 
0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
0.211 * 0.067 0.113* 0.085 
0.032 0.116 0.042 0.059 
-0.009 --- 
0.045 
0.000* 0.0008* 0.000* 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.301 * 0.132* 0.3718* 
0.057 0.024 0.110 
0.568* 0.799* 0.5108* 
0.064 0.025 0.056 
JNB 0.015 
CAB 
BJ 
HB 
-0.012 0.075 0.011 -0.052* 0.106+ -0.024 0.036 0.046* 0.009 0.058 0.033 0.009 0.043 0.015 0.026 0.015 
-0.017 -0.094* 0.010 -0.063* -0.023+ -0.017 -0.014* 
0.022 0.026 0.017 0.016 0.010 0.015 0.002 
-0.002 
0.004 
-0.005* 0.005 
0.000 0.007 
BJ HB JKB ABC UB AJIB 
0.002+ 0.001 0.001+ 0.001 ý 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
0.134+ 0.117* 0.106* 0.118* 
0.061 0.036 0.038 0.044 
0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.228 0.254* 0.088* 0.069* 0.129* 0.160* 
0.341 0.051 0.024 0.014 0.033 0.039 
0.839* 0.465* 0.791 * 0.909* 0.725* 0.623* 
0.026 0.094 0.030 0.015 0.050 0.059 
-0.006* -0.001 -0.003 -0.006* 0.002 0.000 
0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.009 
0.004 -0.006 -0.006* 0.004 -0.004 
0.004 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.003 
0.091+ -0.025* 0.014 0.014 
0.039 0.010 0.018 0.018 
-0.003 0.012 -0.226 
0.014 0.035 0.344 
-0.004* 
0.001 
-0.008 
0.006 
0.009 
0.006 
-0.00 1 
0.000 
2219.424 
3.730 
0.713 
11.717 
0.469 
3.635 
0.726 
7.526 
0.821 
-0.003 
0.004 
0.007 
0.024 
0.008 
0.028 
-0.0028* 
0.000 
2288.774 
21.130 
0.002 
24.546 
0.017 
10.210 
0.116 
11.444 
0.491 
0.016 
0.023 
-0.005 
0.009 
-0.054+ 
0.024 
-0.005 
0.003 
2030.059 
2.203 
0.900 
4.705 
0.967 
0.897 
0.989 
0.990 
1.000 
-0.005* 
0.001 
-0.001 
0.005 
0.003 
0.016 
-0.001 * 
0.000 
2407.390 
4.495 
0.610 
11.240 
0.508 
9.807 
0.133 
14.613 
0.263 
0.004 
0.007 
-0.081 * 
0.017 
-0.003 
0.003 
2180.94 
2.493 
0.869 
10.372 
0.583 
0.551 
0.997 
1.375 
1.000 
-0.009 
0.013 
0.041 * 
0.015 
-0.013* 
0.002 
2174.880 
5.601 
0.469 
7.726 
0.806 
2.721 
0.843 
9.741 
0.639 
0.012 
0.012 
0.004 
0.008 
0.001 
0.002 
2266.166 
4.979 
0.546 
18.461 
0.102 
6.428 
0.377 
11,805 
0.461 
0.030+ 
0.015 
0.012 
0.012 
0.058* 
0.020 
2291.259 
4.989 
0.545 
7.708 
0.808 
0.721 
0.994 
2.467 
0.998 
This Table reports the estimation results and the diagnostic test results of the GARCH (1,1) model as reported 
illustrated in equations (12) and (13), predicting the volatility for the daily returns of the eight relatively small banks 
in the sample. The parameters a ;. o a ;, ia are the estimated Autoregressive equation parameters, and 
ß ;. o ß ;, i, ß;. 2 , 
and ß;,; , are the conditional variance equation parameters represent the constant, 
ARCH effect, GARCH effect, and 
Volatility spillover, respectively. In the diagnostic part, Log-L is the maximum log likelihood ratio. Q(p) and Q, (p) 
are the Ljung Box statistics for sixth and twelfth order serial correlation in standardized and square standardized 
residuals. Numbers below the coefficient values in the Table are robust standard error statistics to allow for possible 
violations of the assumption of normality for the condition errors (Bollerslev and Wooldridge, 1992). t, +* indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and I%, respectively. 
0.015 
0.006 
0.009 
-0.001 * 
0.000 
0.026 
0.017 
JKB -0.001 
0.002 
ABC 0.008 
0.007 
UB -0.012* 
0.005 
AJIB 0.000 
0.003 
Log-L 2569.393 
Q(6) 5.429 
P-value 0.490 
Q(12 9.010 
0.702 
Q2(6) 4.004 
0.676 
Q2(12 9.751 
0.638 
Notes: 
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Paper 3 
Market Value, Book Value and Earnings: Is Bank Efficiency a Missing 
Link? 
Abstract 
Banking institutions play a vital role in the economy. They provide a major source of financial intermediation and participate in the economic development of a country. Trends towards internationalization, globalization, liberalization, and deregulation in 
emerging markets, reinforce competition among different financial institutions and induce improvements in banking productivity and efficiency. In addition, creating value 
has also become an important issue in the development of the financial services 
industry. The main purpose of this study is to explore the market value of banks. It aims 
to determine the main reasons for the difference between the book and market values in 
the banking industry. More specifically, this study seeks to examine whether earnings 
and its components are relevant and sufficient to bridge the gap between banks' market 
and book values, and whether bank efficiency can be value relevant for banks 
valuation. This study applies a non-parametric frontier analysis (DEA) to estimate the 
relative cost efficiency of Jordanian commercial banks from 1993 to 2004, and employs 
the Truman's et al (2000) valuation methodology. We find that the components items of 
net income are more important in explaining bank value compared with only looking at 
the aggregate value at the bottom line of the income statement (net income). 
Furthermore, banks operational efficiency adds incremental information in explaining 
the market and book values gap. The results are robust to the inclusion of other 
explanatory variables such as credit risk and solvency risk. This study provides further 
insight for bank investors, shareholders, policy makers and regulators who need to 
accurately assess bank market value and performance. 
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1. Introduction 
Banking institutions play a vital role in the economy. They provide a major source of 
financial intermediation and participate in economic development and growth. 
Evaluating banks' value and monitoring their financial condition is important to 
depositors, owners, managers, potential investors, supervisors, and society in general. 
All these parties are interested in the safety and profitability of the banking sector as this 
is inextricably linked to safe growth of the economy. Valuation approaches differ 
according to the field of application, goals and methodologies used. For example, 
accountants take value to mean book value, where economists are concerned about fair 
value (intrinsic value). On the other hand, stakeholders evaluate the services which they 
receive based on the utility provided by these services and concentrate on the market 
value that proceeds from actual financial transformation or sale of instruments. 
Due to the rapid development and appetite for innovations in the banking industry, it is 
important to accurately evaluate bank performance, and consequently a number of 
theoretical methods of valuation exist. Based on the purposes of bank valuation, two 
main types of valuation approaches exist related to internal and external valuation. The 
latter refers to valuations performed by independent evaluators such as central banks 
and credit rating agencies; whereas the former usually focuses on valuation methods 
used by shareholders with the purpose of analysing (and growing) increasing cash flows 
and profitabilit 
A bank's internal value can be estimated using stock market prices which can be 
defined as the present value of expected net cash flows discounted at the appropriate 
risk-adjusted rates of return (Rose and Hudgins, 2004). A bank stock price reflects the 
market's evaluation of the bank's performance. According to rational expectations 
theory traders learn about bank quality from the stock price and informed traders 
produce information about future profitability which consequently influences 
bank's 
future stock prices. Therefore, banks' managers pay closer attention to the value of 
their 
stocks and direct strategies arrived at boosting shareholder and stakeholder value. 
In 
1 Many researches suggest that well- functioning 
banks promote growth. For example, Levine and 
Zervos 
(1998), Beck, et al. (2000), Lozaro-Vivas and Pastor (2006), among others provide 
evidence that bank 
operations affect economic growth. 
See Levine (2006) for a review of this literature. 
2 In this study our focus is on bank internal valuation rather than external valuation. 
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general, a bank creates value for shareholders over a given time period if the level of 
generated returns on invested capital exceeds the opportunity cost (cost of capital) 3. 
Recently, banks have faced greater levels of competition and this has created excess 
capacity in traditional lines of business and forced them to become more market- 
oriented. The degree of bank complexity has increased further as they have moved away 
from being traditional intermediaries to more market-oriented and sophisticated 
institutions, providing a wider range of non-banking products and services. 4 As a result 
of such changes, banks nowadays rely more heavily on intangible or hidden assets in 
their operations. Therefore, as argued by Ang and Clark (1997), the conventional 
wisdom that banks book values should closely approximate their market values is 
becoming increasingly invalid. Accordingly, book and market values will differ and the 
former cannot adequately reflect the enterprise's internal value. The difference between 
market value, current stock price, and intrinsic value is an indication of the expected 
rewards for investing in a security (Kothari, 2001). If the stock fails to rise in value 
commensurate with stockholders' expectations, current investors may seek to unload 
their shares and the bank will have difficulty in raising new capital to support its future 
growth. 
Since earnings are considered the primary profitability indicator, capital market-based 
researchers in accounting have developed and tested a variety models in order to explain 
the observed relation between earnings and other accounting information, firm 
fundamentals, and market value. They test the accounting information value relevance 
and the ability of financial information to explain the divergence that can occur between 
market and book values. Most of the empirical studies explain market value by using key 
accounting number approaches predominantly built on a growing theoretical framework, 
starting from the permanent earnings approach adopted by Miller and Modigliani 
(1966), 
and followed by methodologies based on abnormal earnings adopted by 
OhIson (1995), 
Feltham and Ohlson (1995), and Penman (1998). These approaches use a 
linear function 
of equity book value and the present value of expected future residual 
income to 
determine the market value. 
3 Opportunity cost is the rate that investors could earn from investing in a second 
investment choice with 
the same risk. 
4 Banks focused recently on non interest earning activities such as insurance and assets management. 
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In some cases, stock market valuation studies have discovered that variation in stock 
prices does not reflect the variation in earnings (Kothari, 2001)5, or the explanatory 
power of earnings levels and changes for market returns has significantly decreased over 
time (Francis and Schipper, 1999). An increasing gap between market and book values of 
equity in most countries is a significant signal of the loss of relevance of accounting 
information and may signify that other kinds of information are needed in order to 
explain actual value. As a result, the accounting literature has started to consider other 
types of information that might not be captured in current accounting measures. For 
example, Amir and Lev (1996), Ittner and Larcker (1998), Trueman, et al., (2000), 
Liedtka (2002), and Liang and Yao (2005) indicate that the value relevance of financial 
accounting information to investors is largely insufficient for security valuation and a 
combination of financial and non-financial information better explains stock prices. 
However, the accounting literature does not provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
valuation of banking firms. Furthermore, a large number of banking studies examine 
bank valuation issues indirectly6 and only a small number of studies directly address the 
sources of inter-bank variation in market valuation. Under this view, Kane and Unal 
(1990) demonstrate that whenever the economic market values of bank assets and 
liabilities differ from their accounting and book value, the firm has substantial hidden 
assets. They argue that banking valuations must combine backward looking accounting 
information and forward looking market success indicators that better measure relative 
performance and market value (and also capture hidden asset values). Subsequently, 
studies have started to examine the relevance of (new) economic variables extracted from 
financial and non-financial sources that recognize a possible mismatch between book and 
market values ( e. g., Ang and Clark, 1997). 
In order to succeed and survive, banking institutions have to efficiently produce their 
outputs from inputs. Producing more outputs than competitors from the same amount of 
inputs, or consuming fewer inputs from the same amount of outputs is a sign of relative 
efficiency (Adenso-Diaz and Gascon, 1997). Therefore, bank efficiency can be used to 
5 Kothari (2001) relates the low magnitude of earnings response coefficients to five main reasons: prices 
leads earnings, inefficient capital markets, noise in earnings, and deficient GAAP and transitory earnings. 
6For example, studies which use the event study methodology report significant capital market reactions 
to the cited events including Unal (1989), Musumeci and Sinkey (1990), 
Megginson et al. (1995), and 
Black et al. (1990). In addition, in a recent study, Caprio et al., (2006), studies the relationship 
between 
bank value (estimated by market to book value, and Tobin's Q) and shareholders protection. 
They find 
that stronger shareholder protection laws increase valuations. 
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proxy for firms' competitive advantage which affects the firm's current profitability and its future potential. These factors can be treated as important ingredients in bank 
valuation. Banks relative success in utilizing inputs efficiently (we argue) has important 
information value since relative performance also provides information on the banks 
competitive advantage. Firms which can operate efficiently can exploit their 
competitive advantage and produce sustainable profits for a longer period of time 
leading to greater market share at the expense of other firms (McWilliams and Smart, 
1993). While a substantial body of literature has emerged on bank efficiency7, this 
strand of literature has not often been analysed from shareholders point of view, and 
only a few studies (e. g. Eisenbeis et al., 1999; Chu and Lim, 1998; and Beccalli et al., 
2006) have attempted to bring together the issue of bank efficiency and (stock) market 
performance. 
This study seeks to advance the literature that examines the issue of bank valuation in 
two ways: First, it examines the information content of earnings and its components as 
applied to commercial banks in an emerging market. Secondly, instead of only focusing 
on earnings or its components as a proxy for bank market value, this study also aims to 
explore whether efficiency is a primary determinant of bank market value. As a 
consequence, we examine the question as to whether the choices made by management 
in the cost minimization process explain bank market valuation. 
In order to address the above issue, this study uses share prices from banks listed on the 
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) as well as accounting variables obtained from their 
annual reports over the period from 1993 to 2004. Bank cost efficiency estimates are 
derived using the Data Envelopment (DEA) approach (additionally, bank efficiency is 
also measured using the cost-to-income ratio and the results are compared with the DEA 
estimates to check for consistency). Overall, our results support the view that bank 
efficiency is an important variable that helps to explain the gap between market and 
book values. Additionally, earnings components are also statistically significant in 
providing information to investors in term of explaining bank market valuation. 
This study is important not only because it is one of the handful of studies that explicitly 
evaluate the relationship between bank efficiency and stock prices, but also (as 
far as we 
are aware) it is the first to examine such relationships for emerging market 
banks. This 
See Berger (2007) for recent review of efficiency studies around the world. 
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paper provides insights for policy-makers as to the importance of operational efficiency 
in influencing shareholder wealth maximization in banking. This is significant because 
regulators need to be able to accurately value banks in order to efficiently monitor the 
banking system and ensure its safety. Valuations derived from market prices can also be 
more accurate and timely than those derived from standard accounting sources and as 
such further investigation into the determinants of banks' market prices can be helpful 
in assessing the risk of bank failure (Laeven, 2002). 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 will discuss the theoretical justification as 
to why non-financial (economic) information variables can be useful in explaining bank 
valuation, followed by a summary of the relevant literature in Section 3. Section 4 
illustrates the empirical methodology used in this study. Section 5 analyses the results 
of the study. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2. Background on Valuation and Efficiency 
In order to bring together bank valuation and bank efficiency, it is possible to identify 
within the economics literature two schools of thought that provide different sets of 
economic objectives for firms to pursue: the new classical theories of the firm 
(Marginalists) and the behaviouralists (Fiordelisi, 2005). Economist under the 
framework of the new classical theories of the firm (Marginalists), argue that a firm 
exists to allocate resources and organize production in such a way as to satisfy 
consumer wants, driven by the desire to maximize profits (see March and Simon, 1958; 
Cyert and March, 1963; and Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Hence, if the firm wants to 
survive it has to concentrate on profit maximization (Alchian, 1965) through efficient 
use of resources8. 
However, developments of theories of the firm focus on contractual relationships 
between the parties who comprise the organization (originally introduced 
by Alchian 
8 The new classical view has four main assumptions. First, firms 
have a limited size, Secondly, firms 
operate in a perfectly competitive market, thirdly, firms have perfect 
knowledge of market supply and 
demand, and finally, firms work in a regime characterized 
by perfect mobility and divisibility of 
productive inputs, where frictions are absent and conditions are static. 
Based on these assumptions, for a 
firm to maximize its instantaneous profits, they argue, it has to take two 
decisions, first it has to select an 
optimal production function, and secondly, it has to 
define the optimal quantity of output. In this case the 
optimal production function is the function which allows the 
firm to produce with the lowest average cost 
per unit (given output quantity) and the optimal output quantity 
is that corresponding to the minimum 
point of average cost per unit curve 
(for more discussion on the new classical theory of the 
firm see for 
example March Simon, 1958; and 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
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and Demsetz, 1972). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the firm is the entire set of 
contractual relationships which bind together the firm's stakeholders (owners, 
employees, material suppliers, creditors, customers and other parties with contractual 
involvement in the firm activities). Jensen and Meckling declare that most firms are 
simply legal fictions, which possess an artificial identity created by law, and serve as 
link or nexus for the contractual relationships between the individual parties. 
Accordingly, banks' management are hired by stakeholders principally to efficiently 
manage the bank resources and maximize banks' profits to create more wealth for the 
banks' owners. 
On the other hand, behaviouralist economists (Monsen and Downs, 1965; Williamson, 1963; 
and Baumol, 1959 among others) assume that a firm is managed by two groups: managers 
and owners, while the latter intend to maximise firm's profits, managers aim to maximise 
their own utility functions. In addition, they believe that owners do not have the possibility to 
directly manage their fine (especially large firms) and they have to delegate to managers the 
decision-making on the daily activities9. 
Consequently, bank stakeholders need to monitor bank behaviour, by doing so they can 
improve the functioning of the bank, and are also able to alter the valuation and cost of 
capital of the bank (Claessens, 2006). One way of monitoring and evaluating bank 
performance is through assessing the bank's ability to create value for the existing 
shareholders. A firm (bank) is said to create value for shareholders over a given time 
period when the return on invested capital is greater than its opportunity cost, or than 
the rate that investors could earn by investing in other securities with the same risk 
(Fiordelisi, 2007) 10 
Originally, the shareholder value theory (also referred to as the Theory of Business 
Value) can be traced back to the seminal work of Markowitz (1952), Miller and 
Modigliani (1961), Sharpe (1964) and Fama (1976). Shareholder value theory begins 
from the works undertaken by economists who developed the Capital Assets 
Pricing 
Model (CAPM), which relates the expected return of an investment to the risk 
incurred 
by owning the particular investment. Consequently, accounting profits, 
disclosed in the 
Also called the Managerial Capital View. These economists showed substantial 
differences between the 
new classic view and reality. They argued that since large 
firms are managed by subjects distinct from 
owners, the ability of management to pursue owners' objectives 
is a questionable issue, and the deviation 
from pursuing a profit maximization strategy by management may exist. 
10 The concept of shareholder value is an old term in business. 
See for example, Marshall (1890). 
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bank income statement, is not the same as shareholder value. The measure of bank 
profitability ignores such items as cash flows, timing and risk, whereas in estimating 
value creation these factors have to be considered. " 
In the market place, prices (value) are formed by the forces of demand and supply. the 
more the expected reward the higher the demand and the superior the market price. A 
commonly accepted view is that accounting income is the reward that is due to 
stakeholders from their investment (Morley, 1979). A significant factor that underlies 
the acceptance of this view is the dominance of "contractual theories of the company" 
within the accounting discipline (Williams, 2001). In contrast, Oberholzer and 
Westhuizen (2004) assert that any conclusion drawn from conventional accounting 
information analysis is not final; they argue that this type of analysis is not adequate in 
the basis for judgment about the future. Accounting information represents short-term 
measures of operating performance rather than more relevant long-term performance. 
The former information may be not sufficient because it tends to aggregate many 
aspects of performance such as financing, marketing and operations. "A bank may 
appear to be performing well even if it is poorly managed in some of these dimensions, 
as long as it compensates by performing particularly well in other dimensions" 
(Sherman and Gold 1985, p 298). 
As dissatisfaction with the traditional model of company evaluation (Accounting 
model) has grown, alternative theories of the company have emerged. This has also led 
to changing views on income -a key variable that accountants attempt to measure. 
The 
enterprise theory of the company is one alternative perspective that provides a different 
notion of income (or earnings) (Van Staden, 1998). This alternative interpretation of 
income is termed "value added" and is specifically defined as the wealth created or 
distributed by the company through the utilization of the essential productive resources 
(Firer and Stainbank, 2003). In this setting, Kothari (2001) demonstrates that accounting 
performance measures serve either as managerial performance measures or valuation 
information indicators. A managerial performance measure has a contracting motivation 
that indicates the value added by the managers' efforts or actions over a period, whereas 
an information valuation measure is designed to provide 
information useful for 
company valuation, including such things as the firm's economic 
income or the changes 
in shareholders' wealth. 
11 For the difference between profit maximization and value creation see 
Gitman, (2006) 
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Economists (such as Penrose, 1959) recognized that firms are not homogeneous and 
have highly distinct individual characteristics and resources. From this early work what 
emerged was the so-called "Resource Based Theory" of the firm (RBT)1`. The main 
premise of this theory is that firm performance is a function of the effective and 
efficient use of its resources. The value creation capability of the organization comes 
not from the dynamics of the industry, but from organizational processes, leading to 
idiosyncratic endowments of proprietary resources (Barney, 1991; Collis and 
Montgomery, 1995). A key idea behind the RBT is how organizations develop strategic 
resources. That is, RBT examines the nature and quality of resources deployed in the 
value creation process, and does not provide a framework for understanding the 
deployment process and how the resulting value is created; the relationship between 
resource (input) and corporate value (output) is assumed, but not explained (Peppard 
and Rylander, 2001). 
The ability to create more value for stakeholders is nowadays considered by many to be 
the appropriate means for conceptualising a company's performance in addition to 
being a good indicator highlighting financial returns to company owners (Firer and 
Stainbank, 2003). Accordingly, economists (e. g., Edvinsson and Malone 1997; Stewart 
1997; and Pulic 1999) believe that traditional measures of a company's performance, 
which are based on conventional accounting principles of determining income, are 
unsuitable in the new economic world. Firer and Stainbank (2003) argue that the use of 
traditional measures may lead investors and other relevant stakeholders to make 
inappropriate decisions when allocating scarce resources. In addition, economists are 
also interested in how such changes in the economy may affect the efficiency with 
which banks transform resources into various financial services. Given that 
financial 
measures are important inputs into top management decision-making, and 
traditional 
accounting measures have limitations, it is important that we understand 
the 
determinants of bank value. In addition, it seems reasonable to assume 
that efficiency 
influences firm valuation but this has rarely been examined 
in the academic literature. 
It is important, we believe, to determine the extent to which 
bank market value can 
capture management efficiency. 
12 In fact, researchers distinguish between tangible and 
intangible resources, physical, human and 
organizational capital. 
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The performance and valuation of banks may be described in terms of their efficiency. 
The efficient bank effectively transforms resources into various financial services. 
whereas an inefficient bank wastes resources, namely, bank produces less than the 
feasible level of output from the resources employed (or uses relatively costly 
combinations of resources to produce a particular mix of products or services). Thus. as 
Wheelock and Wilson (1995) pointed out, the main goal of stakeholders, as well as 
managers, is to devise policies that improve the efficiency of banks. If efficiency is 
maximized, one would expect this to be reflected in improved bank valuation. 
The goal of shareholder wealth maximization (SWM) is typically interpreted to mean 
maximizing the market value of a firm's common stock. In semi-strong efficient 
markets where most information is incorporated into prices, as is widely accepted 
(Brealey and Myers, 2002) stock value performance is the best measure of estimating 
whether firms are creating value for shareholders or not. While management needs to 
increase profitability to create more value for shareholders, the management of risks and 
profitability is closely related, because risk-taking is a necessary condition of future 
profitability (Bessis, 2002). To obtain more value, a bank must either take on increased 
risk or lower its operating costs. Greater risk translates as greater volatility of both net 
income and the market value of a bank's shareholders' equity. 
In this sense, Bronn and Bronn (2005) argue that for any managerial measure to be 
useful it should be operation oriented and not simply an indicator of past performance. 
The aforementioned authors noted that using internal operational aspects 
in monitoring 
can assist practicing managers to better utilize this strategic resource. 
Competitive 
advantage accrues to the bank through efficiency, although efficiency 
levels are not 
directly reported in the balance sheet or income statement. 
Improved efficiency would 
be expected to create value for shareholders; therefore, as such 
it should be managed 
and quantified. 
Consistent with wealth maximization (creation), managers' performance 
and their 
efficiency needs to be assessed by shareholders 
from a valuation perspective (market 
performance). However, the market value of equity 
is a function of variety of 
`information variables', including a firm's earnings, the 
book value appearing in the 
balance sheet and, perhaps, other contextual and economic 
variables as well (Tippett, 
2000). Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) note that this relationship 
arises out of the fact 
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that a firm can be viewed as a set or collection of resources to which it applies a 
particular `business technology' to produce a stream of expected future earnings. There 
are, as a consequence, two complementary aspects to the valuation of a firm's equity. 
The first of these is determined by discounting the stream of expected future earnings 
under the assumption that the firm applies its existing business technology indefinitely 
into the future. This is defined as the `recursion value' of equity. The second element of 
this value arises out of the fact that the firm invariably has options to convert or use its 
resources in alternative and potentially more profitable ways. That is, the firm has the 
option to change its existing business technology. The potential to make change like this 
gives rise to what is known as the `adaptation value' of equity (Burgstahler and Dichev, 
1997, p. 188). 
Consequently, based on the above, the market value of the firm is the sum of its 
recursion and adaptation value. In this study we examine whether recursion value 
indicators, represented by earnings and book value are sufficient to bridge the gap 
between market and book values or should these be complemented by other adaptation 
values, (represented by bank efficiency measures). 
3. Empirical Studies on Valuation and Efficiency: A Literature Review 
Valuation is currently one of the most studied areas in finance (for example, see Biddle et 
al., 1997 and 1999; Charreaux and Desbrieres, 2001; Fernandez, 2002 and Weaver and 
Weston, 2003). Over the last decade or so, it has been recognised that shareholder-value 
maximization is an important priority for firms, and creating value for shareholders 
has 
become a major strategic objective of banks. 
The notion of value maximization is inextricably linked to stock prices performance. 
In 
theory, the behavior of stock prices is the preferred indicator of firm performance as 
it 
reflects the expectations of all market participants to that particular stock. 
It summarizes 
the aggregate information that market participants have about 
the firm, and the 
aggregate expectation for the firm's future profitability growth, and risk. 
The literature 
dealing with stock valuation is substantial, for example; Stewart 
(1991), Schuster (2000), 
Copeland at al., (2000), Black et al., (1998), Rappaport 
(1998), Weissenrieder (1997). 
Schroeck (2002) and Belmont (2004). This literature can be 
divided into two groups. 
Studies in the first group focus on assessing the value- relevance of 
different company 
items, such as accounting performance measures 
(e. g. Barth and Beaver 2001. and 
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Holthausen and Watts 2001). On the other hand, studies in the second group model the 
link between market value and either traditional accounting performance measures (e. g. 
Ohlson, 1995; Felthman and Ohlson, 1995; Dechow et al., 1999; Ahmed et al., 1999: 
and Ota, 2002), or more innovative performance measures ( e. g. O'Byrne, 1996; and 
Garvey and Milbourn, 2000). Nevertheless, few of the above two groups recognise the 
importance of including other types of information in stock valuation (Truemanet et al., 
2000; Liang and Yao, 2005), or consider bank valuation through linking measures of 
bank productive efficiency to stock performance (Beccalli et al 2006, Eisenbeis et al 
1999, and Chu and Lim 1998). 
This paper seeks to investigate the `black-box' between non-financial performance 
measures (efficiency) and bank valuation. In particular, we examine whether banks' 
efficiency explain the difference between market and book values of equity by 
providing signaling information to market participants that bank efficiency can improve 
future bank profits. Two strands of literature relates to this area of study. First, the 
market-based accounting literature (value relevance literature), and secondly, banking 
efficiency studies. A summary of this literature will be provided in the following 
sections. 
3.1. The Value Relevance Literature 
Since stakeholders have an obvious interest in the value of the firm, academics and 
consultants have examined features of firm value extensively. In this section we will 
focus on the main studies that examine the relationships between firm valuation and earnings, 
book values and earnings components. Then, we will summarize the major studies 
that 
include other types of information and more innovative performance measures 
in firm 
valuation. 
Generally it has been assumed that firm value can be defined as the present value of 
expected net cash flows discounted at the appropriate risk-adjusted rate 
of return. 
Accounting financial statements produce the necessary information 
for market 
participants to form their valuations. The information presented 
in the balance sheet 
and the income statements are considered to 
be the most useful information. For 
example, book value of equity represents past performance and 
current earnings are 
indicative of future performance (Barker, 1999; Foerster and 
Sapp, 2005). 
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Academic researchers in the area of market-based accounting develop and test models 
to explain the observed relation between accounting figures and a wide variety of 
capital market variables such as stock prices and stock returns (Stickney et al. 2004). 
The impact of financial statement information on capital markets indicators referred to 
as value relevance studies, is a well documented area of research (Kothari 2001). and 
the number of these studies is large (see appendix 3.1 Table 1 for Holthausen and Watts 
2001's summary of the main value relevance studies). 
The main focus of the value relevance studies is to identify accounting items, and other 
variables that influence market returns. Information is considered "value relevant" if 
stock price movements are associated with the release of such information. The value 
relevance is usually interpreted by the size of the coefficient of determination (adjusted 
R) from regressions of stock price or returns on accounting and other information (e. g., 
Collins et al., 1997; and Dontoh, et al., 2004). 
In general, empirical studies explaining stock market values using key accounting 
numbers are predominantly built on various theoretical frameworks, including: the 
permanent earnings approach adopted by Miller and Modigliani (1966); the dividend 
discounting model and its transformation; approaches using abnormal earnings adopted 
by Ohlson (1995), Feltham and Ohlson (1995); and approaches that use a linear 
function of equity book value and the present value of expected future residual income 
as outlined by Penman (1998). [In addition, more recent approaches to abnormal 
earnings growth models have also emerged, for instance see Ohison and Juettner- 
Nauroth, 2005; and Penman, 2006)]. 
Many of the previous studies have argued that earnings, as a key accounting number, 
provide information content in stock returns. Earning is important in valuations 
because 
it summarizes firm performance. The information content of earnings 
has been a major 
focus of accounting research since the1960s (see Ball and Brown, 1968; and 
Beaver, 
1968). These studies set the foundation for future research by being the 
first to show 
that changes in earnings, as a summary performance measure, correlate with unexpected 
changes in stock prices 13. Some of the researches following Ball and 
Brown and Beaver 
13 In addition, a literature has emerged that investigates value relevance 
in emerging markets. Such 
studies examine the value relevance of earnings and book value 
(El Shamy and Keyed, 2005), the effect 
2001), or 
of different accounting systems on firm valuation (Gomik-Tomaszewski and 
Jermakowicz, 
compare the value relevance of accounting numbers across countries 
(Harris, 1994; Joos and Lang 1994; 
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have reproduced their results in different settings: in different countries, using interim 
earnings compared to annual earnings, or using shorter earnings announcement periods 
(e. g., Beaver and Dukes 1972; Patell and Kaplan, 1977; Bowen et al., 1987; Kormendi 
and Lipe, 1987; and Pfeiffer, 1998 among others). 14 
Typically, value relevance studies examine the link between a range of earnings 
measures and market indicators. For instance, items such as historical earnings, current 
earnings, residual earnings and operating cash flows among others have been used in 
order to examine how they predict future market returns (see for example Stewart, 
1991). Additionally, previous studies have also investigated the value relevance of 
earnings and cash flows. However, the results are not conclusive. Some studies found 
that each measure provides incremental information in explaining market returns 
(Rayburn, 1986; Wilson, 1986; Pfeiffer, 1998; and Ali and Pope, 1995), whereas others 
conclude that earnings variations is superior to cash flows in explaining value creation 
(Dechow, 1994). 
Kormendi and Lipe (1987), Collins and Kothari (1989); and Sloan (1996); and Baber et 
al., (1999), distinguish between two types of earnings, transitory versus persistent, and 
investigate the value relevance of these types of earnings 15. These studies found that 
both earnings and earnings changes are value relevant with greater weight to persistent 
earnings than those that are perceived as transitory. Permanent or persistent earnings 
influences the value relevance of earnings with the market assigning greater weight to 
persistent earnings than to those that are perceived as transitory (Collins and Kothari 
1989). 
Cheng et al., (1996) examine the effect of earnings permanence on the 
information 
content of cash flows and conclude that falls in the persistence of earnings results 
in a 
decline in value relevance of earnings and an increase in the value relevance of cash 
flows. These findings indicate that the market looks to cash flows as an alternative 
source of information if earnings values look inadequate. 
In this context, Collins et al., 
(1997) show that when book values are added as an additional 
independent variable 
along with earnings, the value relevance holds steady or 
improves over time, and that 
and King and Langli 1998). Many studies empirically support 
the value relevance of accounting 
information. 
14 See Kothari (2001) and Lee (2001) for further details of the value relevance studies. 
15 Persistence of earnings is indicated by levels and earnings changes. 
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the incremental value relevance of earnings (book value) declines (increases). Similarly. 
Collins et al., (1999) examine whether book value is a correlated omitted variable to 
demonstrate that the basic earnings valuation model is mis-specified (if book value is 
excluded). In general, the literature suggests that some factors have been found that 
increase the value relevance of book value but these reduce the value relevance of 
earnings (Berger et al., 1996). For instance, factors such as the increasing magnitude 
frequency of abnormal and extraordinary items (Elliott and Hanna, 1996); and increases 
in intangibles (Amir and Lev, 1996) have been examined before. Bernard (1993 ) 
empirically tested various valuation functions which used earnings and book value as 
determinants and found that book value explained 55% of the cross sectional variance in 
stock prices. 
The link between book and market values and company valuation has received increase 
academic attention since the work of Ohlson (1995) who considered both earnings and 
book value as major determinants in equity valuation. The model provides a theoretical 
framework for identifying those tasks which are necessary to value firms via 
fundamental approach. The essence of the model is that book value and earnings are 
relevant valuation attributes, not merely signals about other attributes. Book value 
represents a stock measure of value, while earnings (a flow variable) measures 
increments to book value. Dividends inter the model due to their impact on the time 
series of subsequent realizations of accounting data. The model also allows for any 
value relevant information other than book value, earnings, and dividends16 . 
When book value is a poor indicator of market value (for example, due to the presence 
of unrecognized assets) and when earnings are transitory, other variables may provide 
some explanation for security prices. Given that security price changes primarily reflect 
revisions in expectations of current and future profitability, studies attempt to explain 
the differences in the relation between market value and earnings by providing evidence 
of a list of firm-specific (profitability ratios, liquidity ratios, and sales), or/and 
industry- 
specific (market structure) determinants relations. Mostly, the selection of 
the variables 
' It should be imphasis that the Ohlson model does not provide a 
fully developed framework for 
fundamental analysis. Most notably, Ohison does not identify specific 
financial statement variables 
(beyond book value and earnings) or non financial information useful 
in assessing firm value. However. 
this should not be considering a weakness of the model. 
By appealing to economic intuition and 
institutional knowledge, accounting researchers have begun to identify such variables. 
The Ohlson model 
provides the genesis of arguments benefiting the 
financial analysis (Bauman, 1996) 
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has been governed by either statistical procedures (Ou and Penman, 1989) or through 
surveys of financial statement users (Lev and Thiagarajan, 1993). 
The amount of earnings can play a critical role in the valuation process as it provides an 
important source of information to investors. If markets perceive a decline in the 
reliability of earnings figures they may look to other descriptive information as a base 
for valuation. Investors and researchers consider earnings components more informative 
than aggregate earnings for explaining market values as they are more relevant for 
evaluating the firm's ability to generate future earnings and for assessing earnings 
persistence (Giner and Reverte 1999, Chen and Wang 2004). 
In the accounting literature there is a consensus that using components of earnings 
instead of just earnings provides incremental value relevance. Lipe (1986) analyses 
whether six commonly reported earnings components (gross profits, general and 
administrative expenses, depreciation expense, interest expense, income taxes and other 
items) provides additional information not included in earnings to explain market 
returns. He provides evidence consistent with the fact that the decomposition of 
earnings providing a statistically significant amount of information that would be lost if 
only earnings were reported and the stock market recognizes differences in the time- 
series properties of the components of annual earnings. Ohlson and Penman (1992) 
discover that stock returns react differently over short time horizons to earnings 
components (gross margin, operating expense, depreciation and amortization, taxes, 
extraordinary items and all other items) however reactions are similar over longer 
horizons. 
Barth et al., (1992) examine whether market participants implicitly assign different 
coefficients to pension cost components when determining security prices. The results 
support the view that pension cost components' coefficients generally differ from one 
another. Additionally, consistent with the market viewing pension related 
income 
streams as less risky, pension-related components generally have larger coefficients 
than non-pension components of income. Chen and Wang (2004) investigate the value 
relevance of operating income versus below-the-line items in to the 
Chinese stock 
market and find that earnings components are impounded in to stock prices as 
they are 
persistent whereas non persistent below-the-line items are value 
irrelevant. 
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Overall, Kothari (2001) notes that the interest in research on the value relevance of the 
earnings components has three main motives, First, it is used to evaluate standards that 
require earnings components to be disclosed and fundamentals analysed, by examining 
whether earnings components are incrementally informative in their association with 
security prices, see, for example, Ohison and Penman (1992), Dechow (1994), and Basu 
(1997). Secondly, earnings management or window dressing that might distort earnings 
as a measure of firm performance can be examined by looking at various accruals or 
cash flows that have an impact on market value (see e. g. Matsumoto, 2002). Finally, 
the link between earnings components and market value can be used by management for 
forecasting. Interest in the time-series properties of earnings components also arises 
because summing the forecasts of the components might yield a more accurate forecast 
of earnings, see e. g., Lennox and Park (2006), Frankel et al., (1995); Kasznik and Lev 
(1995); and Coller and Yohn (1997). 
In fact, despite the aforementioned evidence which support the view that accounting 
information, such as book value earnings and earnings components are value relevant, a 
body of literature has emerged that created the widespread impression that accounting 
information has lost its value-relevance. Francis and Schipper (1999) and Brown et al., 
(1999) document a decline in the value-relevance of earnings over time. In particular, 
these studies claim that financial statements are less relevant in assessing the 
fundamental value of high technology service-oriented firms (Dontoh et al., 2007). 
It has also been stated that the value relevance of accounting information is becoming 
increasingly questionable in the new economic era (knowledge economy) with higher 
levels of innovation and rapid technological developments in which investments 
in 
human resources, information technology, and research and development 
have become 
essential in order to strengthen firm's competitive success (Quinn et al., 
1996). 
Goldfinger (1997) notes that, the source of economic value and wealth 
is no longer the 
production of material goods but the creation and manipulation of 
intangible assets, 7. 
Intangibles are often difficult to identify because, in accounting, 
for an item to be 
included in the balance sheet: it must be quantifiable an either on asset or 
liability; it 
17 Intangible assets are often identified as the excess of the cost of an acquired company 
over the value of 
its tangible net assets, in most cases intangibles are simply 
defined as (capital) assets that lack physical 
substance but which are likely to yield future benefits. 
Then, whenever those probable future economic 
benefits lack physical form, they should be considered as intangible assets 
(See Riahi-Belkaoui, 2005). 
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must have a reliable measurable relevant attribute; the information provided by the item 
must make a differences in users decisions; and the information must be 
representational faithful, verifiable and neutral. Accordingly, Hendriksen and Van 
Breda (1992) argue that standard valuation procedures developed for tangible assets 
may not be applicable for intangible assets. For instance, Trueman, et al., (2000) find 
that the addition of non-financial indicators on the basis of net income provides 
significant incremental explanatory power in terms of the valuation of Internet firms. 
Truemant et al provide evidence supporting the view that financial information has very 
limited use for valuation of internet companies. Using Ohlson's (1995) model they add 
internet usage as a non-financial performance measure for such firms. They conclude 
that non-financial information is important in valuing the internet companies. 
Kane and Unal (1990) develop a model to investigate the structural and temporal 
variation in the market valuation of banking firms. In their model they try to capture the 
hidden reserves of US banking firms. According to Kane and Unal hidden capital (un- 
booked capital) exists whenever the accounting measure of a firm's net worth diverges 
from its economic value. Such un-booked capital has on-balance-sheet and off-balance- 
sheet sources. They argued that the accounting or book value of a bank's capital 
represents a biased estimate of the market value of stockholders equity. 
As innovation is a fundamental source of wealth, and the degree of freedom given by 
GAAP may be exploited by management accounting information becomes insufficient 
and less informative of the firms' current financial position and future prospects and 
less useful in firm valuation (Lev and Zarowi, 1999). Increasingly the gap 
between 
market and book value of equity in most countries is a significant signal of the 
loss of 
relevance of accounting information. For example data from Morgan 
Stanley's World 
Index revealed that the listed value of these companies, in the 
USA ranged between 
double and nine times their book value (Edvinsson and Malone, 
1997). 
Furthermore, the previous literature has found that the market perceives 
intangibles as 
an asset (Duangploy et al., 2005), and that it has to be accurately valued. 
Thus, firm 
value (market value) is considered a combination of tangible value 
(book value) and 
intangible value (intellectual capital, goodwill, patents, 
brand, research and 
development, customer or relational capital and advertising etc). 
In this context, there is 
a stream of value relevance studies of intangible assets or non 
financial measures, which 
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are not directly and accurately disclosed in financial statements (Kallapur and Kwan. 
2004). Chauvin and Hirschey (1993), and Ballester et al., (2003), for instance. 
document a positive valuation effect of advertising and research and development 
expenditure for a broad sample of firms. Tseng and Goo (2005) argue that despite that 
intellectual capital is intangible and cannot be accurately measured; firms need to 
develop methods of increasing firm's value by proactively focusing on intellectual 
capital management. Kim and Chung (1997) argue that brand popularity is significantly 
related to market share. 
An increasing body of literature (see for example Bao and Bao, 1998; Liedatka, 2002; 
Chen and Dodd, 1997; Clinton and Chen, 1998; and Hassel et al., 2005) also focuses on 
examining the value relevance of non-accounting (emerging) performance measures, 
such as economic value added or balanced scorecards, and whether these measures can 
substitute for traditional financial measures, such as net income and cash flows, in 
explaining equity market prices. These studies conclude that emerging financial 
measures can add incremental information not included in the comprehensive 
(traditional) financial measures. 
In summary, the gap that occurs between market and book values due to internal or 
external factors suggests that accounting information is not the only information needed 
in the valuation process. Thus, the market will search for other information that might 
reflect market value. Subsequently, recent studies have started to employ a number of 
additional economic variables extracted from financial and non financial information 
variables such as the firm's economic shareholders value added (e. g., Bao and Bao, 
1998; Riahi-Belkaoui, 1993; Liang and li Yao, 2005; and Wang et al, 2005). 
Pfeiffer et al., (1998) found that off-balance sheet mortgage servicing rights was value 
relevant in explaining the market value of equity. Amir and Lev 
(1996) indicate that 
there are complementarities between financial and non-financial 
information. They 
argue that if we were to only use financial indicators in the traditional way, 
this might 
result in biased inferences. For a company that focuses 
its core value on intangible 
assets, non-financial indicators that are related to the company's value are 
even more 
important than traditional financial indicators (Liang and Li Yao, 2005). 
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The relationship between the market and book values of equity in banks has attracted 
various researchers. Beaver et al., (1989) focus on the banking industry. They examine 
whether cross sectional differences in market to book ratios for bank equities are 
captured by supplemental disclosures with respect to default risk (non performing loans) 
and interest rate risk ( loan maturity) using a sample of 149 US banks in 1983. They 
found that non-performing loans and loan maturity variables contribute in a statistically 
significant manner to an explanation of cross sectional variation in market to book 
values. Nelson (1996) examined the relationship between bank market and book values 
and the reported fair value of assets and liabilities. He proposed that after controlling for 
future profitability, the fair value of securities is the only value that has explanatory 
power incremental to book value. Additionally, a small number of studies have 
attempted to provide an explanation for the gap between book and market values in 
banking. Ittner and Larcker (1998) and Lambert (1998) note that customer satisfaction 
and stock prices are significantly positively correlated. However, customer satisfaction 
cannot completely reflect the accounting book value of the bank. Dermine and Hillion 
(1992), examine the relationship between the market value of equity and book value of 
assets and liabilities for French banks over the years 1971 to 1981. They found that 
assets and liabilities subject to taxation are priced at a lower value and that demand 
deposits appear to provide rent. Baele et al., (2007), find some evidence of the 
relationship between diversification and market returns. They show that higher levels of 
diversification seem to be associated with slightly higher market returns. However, 
diversification also seems to increase systemic risk. 
In attempt to analyze bank's market value, the literature has also examined the 
relationship between regulation and the value of equity of the banking 
firm. Keeley 
(1990), for instance, has studied the association between bank charter values and 
regulation. He provides empirical support that increased competition causes 
the market 
value of banks to decline relative to their book value. 
In this context, Ang and Clark (1997) argued that the level of 
bank efficiency (scale and 
scope efficiency) and the new trend in banking activities 
(the growth of non-interest 
income) must be reflected in the market value of bank shares. 
Many of these activities 
do not appear on the balance sheet but affect cash 
flows. Ang and Clark examine the 
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value additivity'8 of cash flow producing activities of US banking organizations for the 
period from 1974 through 1991. They provide evidence that the response of banks to 
changing technological (including increased efficiency), competitive and regulatory 
environment increases their market value. 
Although firm valuation is one of the core features of corporate finance and has 
attracted extensive coverage in the literature, we argue that a bank's business exhibits 
peculiarities that deserve special treatment. From our perspective we suggest that 
efficiency is important and can be treated as an unrecognized asset (hidden asset) as 
defined in the accounting literatures. Hidden assets (what Kane and Unal (1990) call as 
a hidden capital) appear whenever the economic or market values of bank assets and 
liabilities differ from their accounting or book value. While efficiency is equivalent to 
an intangible asset in banking, it is a firm-specific performance measure that can be 
simply calculated using publicly available information or alternatively, can be estimated 
using more sophisticated non-parametric or parametric techniques. The following 
section will provide an overview of the bank efficiency literature and explain how this is 
to be linked to valuation. 
3.2. Bank Efficiency and Valuation 
Basically, efficiency is viewed from both the industrial organization and strategic 
management literatures as the product of firm-specific factors such as management skill, 
innovation, cost control, and market share as the determinants of current firm 
performance and its stability (McWilliam and Smart, 1993). Although, the concept of 
efficiency has typically been ignored in accounting valuation studies, it 
has been 
explored extensively in the banking literature 
19. This section focuses on the following 
issues. First, we will start by defining efficiency in banking. Secondly, we will give some 
explanation regarding the relationship between bank's value and efficiency. 
Finally, the main 
18 The value additivity principle has been applied both to the valuation of 
cash flows produced by 
portfolios of securities and the cash flows produced by 
firms. As applied to portfolios of securities, value 
additivity is said to hold if the sum of market prices of a 
bundle of securities bought separately is equal to 
the market price of the same combination of securities purchased as a single 
unit. In this form, value 
additivity is simply the no arbitrage condition in the capital market 
(see Huang and Litzenberger 1988, 
and Jarrow 1988). However, Ang and Clark (1997) concentrate on 
the valuation of the cash flows of a 
firm which is said to be hold if the sum of the market values of n separated 
cash flows produced within a 
bank is equal to the sum of the market values of these same cash 
flows produced in n individual banks. 
19 There are a few studies in the accounting literature that use techniques 
to investigate inefficieiic in a 
non-for-profit setting (Hayes and 
Millar, 1990), measure the inefficiency for possible 
budgeting and 
control purposes (Mensah and 
Li, 1993), or measure performance (Dopuch and 
Gupta, 1997). 
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evidence found in the empirical literature regarding the estimation of efficiency and the 
connection between efficiency and valuation will be summarized. 
Regarding the definition of efficiency, Afriat (1988) defines efficiency as the relation 
between ends and means; he suggests that efficiency can be measured as the `extent to 
which they are matched' (Cebenoyan, 2003). Banks have focussed on improving their 
productivity and efficiency in order to create value for their shareholders20. Usually, 
banks focus on identifying the potential for achieving cost savings even by selecting the 
optimal firm size (scale economies) and product mix (scope economies), or by 
maximizing operational or productive efficiency (Goddard et al., 2007). In operational 
or productive efficiency two components can be identified: pure technical (or physical) 
efficiency and allocative (or price) efficiency. Koopmans (1951, p. 60) defines technical 
efficiency as follows: "a firm is technically efficient if an increase in any output requires 
a reduction in at least one other output or an increase in at least one other input and if a 
reduction in any input requires an increase in at least one input or a reduction in at least 
one output". Therefore, Technical Efficiency (TE) demonstrates the ability of a bank to 
obtain maximal outputs from a given set of inputs or of minimising inputs for a given 
target of outputs, this component focuses only on physical quantities and technical 
relationships. If information on prices is available and a behavioural assumption (such 
as profit maximisation or cost minimisation) can be appropriately made, Allocative 
Efficiencies (AE) can be introduced. AE in input selection refers to the selection of that 
mix of inputs which produces a given quantity of outputs at the minimum cost. In 
formal terms, Price Efficiency21 refers to the ability of using the input in optimal 
proportions, given their respective prices and production technology. 
Farrell (1957) introduced a measure which combines technical and allocative efficiency, 
known as Overall Efficiency (OE) which expresses the ability of a firm to choose its 
input and/or output levels and mix them to optimise its economic goal. The overall 
efficiency is also called "X-efficiency" (or Economic Efficiency). Berger et al., (1993, 
p. 228) define the term X-efficiency as "all technical and allocative efficiency of 
20 Although productivity and efficiency are used in the literature interchangeably, a 
difference between 
the two concepts exists. As defined by Lovell (1993), the productivity of a production unit 
is expressed as 
the ratio of its outputs to its inputs and it is determined by the production technology. 
On the other hand, 
the efficiency of production is only a determinant of productivity, which can 
be defined as the comparison 
between observed and optimal values of a firm's inputs and outputs. 
21 Allocative Efficiency is the terminology currently adopted by the most recent literature, whilst 
Farrell 
(1957) originally labelled this measure as "Price Efficiency". 
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individual firms, as distinguished from scale and scope efficiencies". A more precise 
definition is proposed in Bauer et al., (1997, p. 1), "X-efficiency measures the deviations 
in performance from that of best practice firms on the efficient frontier, holding 
constant a number of exogenous market factors such as the forces faced in the local 
market. That is, the frontier efficiency of an institution measures how well it performs 
relative to the predicted performance of the best firm in the industry if these best firms 
were facing the same market conditions" 22. Berger et al., (1993) argued that X- 
efficiencies across banks are relatively large and dominate scale and scope efficiencies. 
Put simply, deviation from the best practise frontier is termed X-inefficiency. If cost 
minimization is the banks' objective, then cost inefficiency shows how far the estimated 
cost function of a bank is to the estimated best practice cost function. On the other hand 
if the main objective of the bank is profit maximization profit X-inefficiency estimates 
how far a bank's profit function is to the best performing bank's profit function in the 
industry. 
Regarding the issue of how bank efficiency can be the related to bank valuation, we can 
illustrate this relation based on both components of X efficiency, TE and AE. By 
improving TE, a bank is able to obtain a higher level of outputs from a given set of 
inputs or of reducing inputs for a given target of outputs. Additionally, by improving 
allocative efficiency, a bank is able to use inputs in optimal proportions, given their respective 
prices and production technology. In both cases, a bank, operating efficiently, all other 
things being equal, will obtain a higher net income which is expected to 
increase 
investors' expectation of future benefits and therefore produce higher market valuation 
for the bank. 
There is a large body of literature dedicated to describing approaches 
to measuring the 
efficiency of financial institutions. Publications targeted 
for practitioners audience 
frequently focus a well-known accounting ratio such as the cost 
income ratio (CIR) 
(Davidson, 1997). This measure has intuitive appeal and 
is thus simply called 
"efficiency ratio". According to the Cocheo (2000), this ratio 
is generally considered an 
important benchmark particularly among US Publicly traded 
banks. This conclusion 
comes as no surprise as CIR is the focus of many 
bank equity analysts when gauging 
22 See for example US studies: Kaparakis et al., (1994), Mester 
(1993), Berger and Humphrey (1992). and 
Elyasiani and Mehdian (1994), European studies Altunbas et al 
(2001), and Maudos et al., (2001), and 
emerging market studies Kwan (2006). 
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relative efficiency in the sector (Asher, 1994). The limitations of CIR have been 
discussed in numerous Articles such as that by Osborne (1995), who found no clear 
correlation between the CIRs and return on equity for a sample of US banks. In 
summary, recent academic studies clearly have major reservations when this simple 
accounting ratio is used as an efficiency measure. 
Efficiency research tends to be family routed in economic theory. There has been a 
growing interest in estimating operating efficiency in various banking markets. Previous 
bank efficiency studies have focused on how well banks utilize cost advantages 
resulting from scale and scope production (e. g. Humphrey, 1987; Molyneux et al., 1996; 
Lang and Wetzel, 1996; Berger et al., 1993 and Altunbas et al., 2001)'3. However, the 
attention has more recently switched to X- efficiency using different methodologies. 
Two main methodologies are usually applied to estimate bank efficiency: parametric and non- 
parametric approaches. The former identifies a specific form for the production function, 
whereas the latter does not specify any such form. Berger and Humphrey (1997) summarise 
over 120 studies (See Appendix 3.1 Table 2, for the list of reviewed papers) dealing with cost 
and profit efficiency in banking. These studies are divided between those using parametric 
and non-parametric techniques: 69 studies applied non-parametric techniques and 60 adopted 
parametric approaches. Berger and Humphrey (1997, p. 15) affirm that "overall, it seems 
clear that the estimates of mean or median efficiency for an industry may be a more 
consistently reliable guide for policy and research purposes than are rankings of firms by their 
efficiency values, especially between non-parametric and parametric approaches". 
Berger and Mester (1997) contribute to the efficiency literature by employing three 
concepts of economic efficiency in order to examine the variation in the estimated 
efficiency of banking firms. Cost efficiency, standard profit, and alternative profit 
efficiency measures are the three concepts of efficiency which are employed 
in their 
study. They analyzed 6000 US banks over the period 1990 to 
1995 using the 
distribution free approach (DFA). The efficiency scores are found to 
be 86% for cost 
efficiency, 54% for standard profits, and 46% for alternative profit efficiency. 
Although 
the three efficiency measures were positively correlated to some 
traditional accounting 
performance measures, they found that profit efficiencies were not positively 
correlated 
with cost efficiency. 
23 Where scale efficiency measures whether a bank is providing the most cost 
efficient level of output, 
scope efficiency measures whether a bank is producing the most cost efficient 
combination of outputs 
(Isik and Hassan, 2003a). 
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Similarly, Maudos and Pastor (2003) analysed cost and profit efficiency of the Spanish 
banking sector over the period 1985-1996 using a non-parametric estimation approach, 
Data Envelopment Approach (DEA). They found that average cost efficiency, standard 
profit, and alternative profit efficiency in commercial banks (91%, 67%, and 539"0 
respectively) are higher than for saving banks (80%, 47% and 35% respectively) and 
profit efficiency for both types of banks was well below those for cost efficiency. 
According to Maudos and Pastor, these results imply the existence of market power in 
the setting of prices and the existence of differences in the quality of bank output. 
Furthermore, the banking literature has also developed by relating efficiency estimates 
to various aspects of bank business. Some studies tackle the aspect of variation in 
efficiency across banks in term of their ownership and organizational structure yielding 
often mixed or inconclusive results. Whereas some authors provide evidence that higher 
foreign ownership of banks is associated with greater efficiency, others show that 
privatization by itself is not sufficient to increase bank efficiency (see Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997; and Isik and Hassan, 2003b; Chakravarty and Williams, 2006; and 
Berger et al., 2006). Moreover, previous literature relates aspects of bank management 
and efficiency. Spong et al., (1995) find that cost efficient banks are characterised by 
having incentives and monitoring procedures that align management behaviour with 
shareholders' interests'. Berger and Hannan (1998) provide evidence on US banks, that 
the structure of banking markets and the level of concentration and its implications for 
firm behaviour (quit life hypothesis) is positively related to bank cost efficiency. Mester 
(1996) found that managerial prudence in terms of higher levels of bank capitalization 
has been found to be positively related to efficiency (moral hazard hypothesis). Berger 
and De Young (1997), Williams (2004), and Rossi et al., (2005) among others, examine 
the intemporal relationship (sign and direction) between cost efficiency, asset quality, 
capitalization, and risk, in attempt to analyze specific types of managerial behaviour 
namely bad management, bad luck, and skimping behaviour. Usually a 
Granger 
causality method is used to study the aforementioned behavioural types, (and these are 
not mutually exclusive). "Bad luck" behaviour exists if an increased 
level of problem 
loans leads to a reduction in cost efficiency. In contrast, a fall in 
bank cost efficiency 
followed by increases in problem loans at the industry level reflects bad management. 
Efficient banks may engage in "skimping" behaviour, when reductions 
in capital at 
thinly capitalized banks causes an increase in problem loans (Williams, 
2004). 
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Recently the banking literature has related efficiency measures to bank profitability. De 
Young and Hasan (1998) and Berger et al (2000) use the X-efficiency measures to 
explain profitability following bank mergers and acquisitions. Elyasiani et al (1994) 
investigates the relationship between a bank's financial performance measured by 
accounting ratios and production performance proxied by efficiency indices using data 
on 203 large US banks from 1983 to 1987. They find a significant association between 
the financial and production performance measures for large banks, however. this 
association is time sensitive. They suggest that efficiency indexes should be considered 
as a supplement to financial ratios in examining the performance of banking firms. In 
addition, other studies have examined the efficient structure paradigm by linking bank 
profitability and efficiency (Demsetz, 1973). The efficient structure hypothesis suggests 
that relatively efficient firms compete more aggressively for and gain dominant market 
shares and also have higher profits because of their ability to reduce the cost of 
production (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Most research seems to supported evidence 
of the efficient structure hypothesis which indicates that bank efficiency has a 
significant effect on bank profitability (Park and Weber, 2006)24. 
In addition, the relationship between efficiency, solvency, and bank failure have also 
been discussed in the literature. Akhigbe and Madura (2001) for instance argue that 
bank failure is related to the profit efficiency. Miller (1996) also noted that management 
driven weaknesses, for example, inefficiency in profitability, play a significant part in 
determining 90% of US bank failures (Lou, 2003). Siems (1992) investigated a sample 
of 930 small US commercial banks and found that profit efficiency or management 
quality is indeed a determinant of bank failure. Additionally, Reboredo (2004) finds that 
greater efficiency with respect to a risk return frontier improved solvency (although 
solvency is not related to efficiency). 
While a number of bank efficiency studies have examined profit efficiency measures 
very few have examined the link to market value. Lou (2003) examined marketability 
efficiency (activities generating more market value) in addition to profit efficiency 
for a 
sample of 245 large banks using the non parametric DEA approach. 
He found that 14% 
24 This area of studies compares between two types of profitability 
drivers, bank market power ersus 
efficiency effect. The evidence of these studies support that more cost efficiency 
is more important than 
market power in explaining profitability. 
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of banks in the sample obtained higher level of profit performance but lower levels of 
marketability performance. In a recent study, Fiordelisi (2007), creates a new measure 
of efficiency namely "Shareholder Value efficiency". He used the parametric Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis (SFA) to estimate his new efficiency measure. According to Fiordelisi. 
more efficient banks are these which produce the maximum possible economic value 
added (EVA). Based on his sample of selected European banks (from France, Germany. 
Italy, and the UK), he found that this measure of efficiency can explain value creation in 
banking better than cost and profit efficiency. 
Additionally, Chu and Lim (1998) evaluate the cost and profit efficiencies of banks 
listed in Singapore over the period 1992 to 1996. They studied the effect of this 
efficiency on the percentage change in bank share prices. Using the DEA method to 
estimate efficiency they conclude that the average profit efficiency is significantly lower 
than cost efficiency (83% and 95%, respectively). Furthermore, they find a significant 
relation between profit efficiency rather than cost efficiency and the percentage change 
in bank share prices (correlation coefficients of 0.82 and 0.32, respectively). According 
to them, since shareholders desire dividends which are paid out of profits and not 
income, profit efficiency can explain fluctuations in share prices. Alternatively, 
Kirkwood and Nahm (2006) adopted Chu and Lim's (1998) approach to examine the 
relationship between profit and cost efficiency to changes in Australian banks' stock 
prices over the period 1995 and 2002. They note that Chu and Lim's model ignores 
factors that may affect stock returns. Thus they specify a Sharp and Lintner's model of 
excess stock returns which includes profit efficiency as an explanatory variable (in 
addition to market excess return). Kirkwood and Nahm conclude that the efficiency of 
bank operations significantly explain bank's stock prices. 
Adenso- Diaz and Gascon (1997) linked various measures of bank efficiency with the 
stock performance for all Spanish banks quoted on the Madrid stock exchange in 1994. 
Four partial measures of bank efficiency were estimated each of which included various 
inputs and outputs. The four efficiency measures included: production costs, systemic 
risk, specific risk and the size of branch network distributions. They found that the most 
influential variable in determining stock performance was the specific risk of 
banks. 
However, the other efficiency measures seem to have only a limited effect on 
bank 
stock performance. 
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Eisenbeis et al., (1999) studied the information content of cost X-efficiency estimates 
using both stochastic and linear programming frontier techniques for a sample of US 
bank holding companies (BHC) from 1986 to 1991. First, they found that the non- 
parametric inefficiency scores were two to three times larger than those estimated using 
the parametric stochastic frontier approach. However, the patterns of the efficiency 
measures across banks and time were similar and highly rank correlated. Overall they 
found that the stochastic frontier measures of bank inefficiency were more closely 
related to bank stock returns. Beccalli et al., (2006), in contrast, arrived at different 
conclusions concerning the most appropriate efficiency estimation technique when 
examining the relationship between bank efficiency and stock performance. Beccalli et 
al., (2006) found that cost efficient banks do better than less cost efficient banks in term 
of market returns when using both parametric and non-parametric techniques to 
examine the relationship between efficiency scores and stock returns for a cross-country 
sample of European banks. They also suggest that the DEA efficiency measures better 
explain bank stock market performance compared to the parametric (Stochastic 
Frontier) estimates. 
While the previous literature addresses the important relationship between market 
performance and bank efficiency, none of these studies directly analyze the issue of 
banks' market valuation by examining the gap between market and book values, or 
explore this relation in emerging markets. Subsequently, this study contributes to the 
above mentioned literature by attempting to connect two branches of the literature 
(namely accounting and banking studies). While efficiency -as a performance measure- 
has typically been ignored in the market-based accounting literature, it has been widely 
studied in the banking literature, but (generally) not in the context of the market 
valuation process. This study, therefore also aims to contribute to the established value 
relevance literature by using the relative performance measure, 
bank efficiency, and to 
examine how this measure may relate to the gap that occurs 
between market and book 
values across banks. 
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4. Empirical Methodology 
This section presents the methodology used to examine the relevance of net income 
(and its components) and also efficiency in order to explain bank stock performance. 
This section is organised in three sub-sections. Firstly, we illustrate the link between bank 
market value with various financial and economic performance indicators and, secondly, 
various hypotheses and testable models are presented. Finally, we discuss the data used in the 
study. 
4.1. Linking Bank Value to Financial and Economic Performance Measures 
Previous studies assume that share prices in efficient markets incorporate most of the 
available information. Additionally, the behaviors of stock prices are believed to be the 
best indicator of a firm's performance (Brealey and Myers, 2002). From an economic 
point of view, the fair (intrinsic) value of any resource equals the present value of the 
expected future returns (cash flows) from the resource discounted at the rate that reflects 
the risk inherent in those expected returns. Yet, prices do not necessarily equal value for 
every security at all times, even in relatively efficient securities markets. Price is 
observable, value is not. Thus, this study tries to examine this issue in emerging 
markets. More specifically, it aims to explain the difference between market and book 
values in emerging market banking sector, the focus will be on Jordanian banks listed 
on the Amman Stock exchange (ASE). 
As discussed in section 3, valuation is a question of debate. Although firm valuation is 
one of the core problems of corporate finance and has attracted extensive coverage 
in 
the literature, we argue that a bank's business exhibits peculiarities that 
do deserve 
special treatment. However, the special nature of banking does not require a separate 
and novel pricing theory; instead, certain deviations from standard methods appear 
to be 
appropriate. As stated by Damodaran (2005), p. 603): "The 
basic principles of valuation 
apply just as much for financial service firms as they 
do for other firms. There are, 
however, a few aspects relating to financial service firms that can affect 
how they are 
valued". Based on Damodaran's argument, we modify the standard valuation 
models 
which include the traditional accounting information and 
include an important 
economic performance measure, namely bank efficiency. 
In other words, this study 
examines whether bank efficiency provides incremental 
information in explaining bank 
230 
market valuation. The main structure of the methodology of this study is summarized in 
Figure 1. 
Figure (1) shows that internal value drivers may enhance bank market value. Internal 
value drivers are indicated by using two types of information. First, financial 
information can be used by analysts by extracting performance measurement variables 
presented in financial statements, particularly net income, and its components. 
Secondly, because of the existence of differences in the value creation activities that are 
directly connected with management efficiency, we also plan to include cost efficiency 
as a bank-specific performance measure estimated using the non-parametric DEA 
methodology. Thus, we aim to examine whether the efficiency of banks helps in 
explaining the difference between market and book values. Finally, we also include risk 
measures which are also expected to affect bank value. 
Regarding the first group of variables, accounting information (net income and its 
components) is expected to influence bank market value, and move book values closer 
to market values. Profit measures are used in the market valuation models in most of the 
value relevance literature (Ohlson, 1995; Collins et al., 1999; Ballester and Livnat, 
1997; Graham et al., 2000, among others). In this study we use the aggregate net income 
value that appears in the bottom line of the income statement. Net income is calculated 
as the difference between all bank's income and costs (including tax and financial 
expenses) obtained over a year. It can be summarized as follows: 
NI= (IR+FR)-(IC+FC) = IM + (FR-FC) 
Where, NI is the bank net income, IR is the interest cost, FR is the fee revenue, IC is the 
interest cost, FC is the fee Costs, and IM is the interest margin25. We expect that the 
greater the net income the higher the market value, since market value reflects the 
investors' expectations of the future benefits associated with their 
investments. The 
higher the net income, the greater the ability of the bank to pay 
dividends to existing 
shareholders, and therefore the higher the demand for bank stocks, which 
increases 
share prices. 
'S Net income values were divided by the number of shares in order to 
keep the values included in the 
model consistent. 
231 
Figure (3.1): Financial and Economic Information in Bank Valuation. 
1 -Net Income 
2- Net Income 
Components. 
P, 
I 
TMMW/l 
Financial Statement Items: 
Financial Performance 
Measure(s) 
(1) 
ý 
Internal Value Drivers ý--------------, 
of the bank ý 
Insolvency 
Risk: 
Z -score 
. -ý-ý,. -ýý, -., -. -. 
Non Financial 
Performance 
Measure 
(2) 
n 
Bank Efficiency: 
Source: Author's own 
\ 
Bank Transformation of 
Inputs into Outputs 
-Loans 
-Securities 
-Off Balance 
sheet 
ý 
As noted in the previous literature (e. g Ohlson and Peman, 1992; 
Dechow, 1994; Basu 
1997, and Chen and Wang 2004) the more the available 
information the better the 
valuation of stocks. Therefore, we disaggregate net 
income into components. Three 
Credit Risk: 
Loan Loss 
Provision / 
Gross Loans. 
Output 
232 
main components have been included in a separate model. The first component of net 
income is operating income (01) which can be calculated as the summation of IR and 
FR. The second component is operating expense (OEXP) which is the expenses related 
directly to the banks product delivery including total interest expenses IC. We assume 
that the higher the operating expenses the lower the market value due to the negative 
effect of expenses on expected cash flow. Finally, we include other expenses variable 
(OTHER). This component includes depreciation, administrative expenses, and research 
and development expenses. Two possible explanations relate to the effect of this 
variable on market value. The market may treat the increase of other expenses as bad 
news, because market participants may consider the high value of expenses as a waste 
and an indication of management inefficiency. On the other hand, market participants 
may treat this type of information as good news, since this type of expense (e. g. 
research and development) may generate more future benefits for the bank and increase 
its ability to generate future income. 
One might claim that, while the share market value is an economic value that reflects 
the equilibrium price of the demand and supply of a particular stock, NI and its 
components are mainly accounting figures. Therefore, these values are not enough to 
bridge the gap between the market and book value. To provide more explanation, we 
need to analyse first why the market and book values may differ. 
Book and market values mainly differ for at least two reasons. First, changes in an 
asset's book value differ from changes in its market value since accounts do not reflect 
changes of an asset's market value because of various accounting principles (GAAP). 
For example, accountants' value an asset using historical cost instead of market values; 
therefore, items in the balance sheet do not reflect economic real value. In addition, 
book values are conservative; gains are not recognized until they are realized, while 
accountants recognise gains that should properly belong to the previous period. 
Secondly, balance sheets may miss some important information. they may 
fail to 
recognize some assets (e. g. items that refer to the capacity of the company to generate 
abnormal returns in the future, such as managerial skills). 
As a consequence, we include bank cost efficiency as an 
indicator that reflects the 
ability and skills of bank management to choose inputs and/or output 
levels and to mix 
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these inputs to minimize cost. Regarding the relationship between bank efficiency and 
market value, we assume that the higher the efficiency levels the more the current and 
expected cash flows. This is because more efficient banks are able to reduce costs and 
produce greater profits26. Bank cost efficiency has been included in this study rather 
than profit efficiency because we believe that banks have more control over their costs 
than profits. In addition, the ability of banks to generate profits is clearly indicated to a 
major degree in earnings and its components that are already included in our models. 
We also note that banks may increase their profits by undertaking more risky activities. 
As such, the opportunity cost of capital increases since shareholders require higher 
returns from more risky acting. Instead, by improving cost efficiency, a bank may 
increase its profits without increasing risks and, consequently, creating value for 
shareholders. As such, it is possible that cost efficiency has a closer statistical 
relationship with shareholder value than profit efficiency. 
Bank market and book values, as well as financial and economic performance, may also 
be influenced by two specific risk indicators, credit and insolvency risks. These types of 
risks may influence market value. Credit risk is the probability that bank borrowers will 
fail to meet their obligations in accordance with the agreed terms. This type of risk is 
considered the major risk faced by commercial banks, because revenues associated with 
lending activities is the main source of bank income, hence, previous studies have 
typically focus on credit risk measurement in banking (e. g. Duffie, 2005; Lucas and 
Klaassen, 2006; and Galluccio and Roncoroni, 2006), and the relationship between this 
risk and other risks (e. g. Zheng, 2006; and Jobst et al., 2006). The effect of credit risk 
on bank market value is obvious, a downside credit risk positively affect bank's market 
value. The main reason for this expected relationship is that the higher the credit risks 
the more the required rate of return by investors (discount rate used to calculate the 
present value of expected future cash flows). Since banks are assumed to accurately 
forecast their credit losses, and reflect their forecasting by seeking protection against 
loan-losses through their choice of appropriate provision for such losses. Therefore, 
in 
this study we proxy bank credit risk using annual loan-loss provisions ratio 
(LLP) 
(measured as loan loss provision to total loans); this ratio is assumed to provide an 
26 A negative relation may be possible as well; more cost efficiency may 
have negative effects on cash 
flows. For example, cost minimization may adversely affect customer satisfactions 
that may lead to lower 
level of future cash flows. 
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indication of credit risk. This ratio has two possible effects on market value. The market 
may interpret loan-loss provisions as signals of bank managers' private information 
about expected future earnings, and by increasing loan-loss provisions will be able to 
withstand a `hit to earnings' through absorbing future potential losses (Beaver et al. 
1989). Therefore, investors interpret components of unexpected provisions as `good 
news' (Elliot et al., 1991; and Beaver and Engel 1996). On the other hand, an increase 
in the banks' loan-loss provision can also be viewed as bad news, especially if it is not 
accompanied by other, more timely indicators of loan default, because LLP will then 
serve as the primary source of information on loan default (Ahmed et al. 1999; and 
Hatfield and Lancaster, 2000). 
Finally, we also consider insolvency risk measured by the Z score, a metric for bank 
insolvency risk developed by Boyd et al., (1993). The Z score is a statistic indicating the 
solvency for each bank j in every year t that can be calculated as follows: 
Ej I1j2Iiri /A 
--ý 
y12 
j=z A: 
Z= i 
S,. 
Where Aj is the estimated market value that can be calculated as follows: 
ir1 `Cjpj -Cj-1pj-1 
Where cj is the number of outstanding shares adjusted for stock splits, and pj is the share 
price of the last business day of month j. Ej is the market value of total equity (e. g. share 
prices multiplied by number of shares outstanding); Aj is the market value of total 
assets: 
Aj =Ej +L, 
L is the book value of total debt at the end of each fiscal year. And Sr is the estimated 
standard deviation of. r1 Aj. The Z score is negatively associated with insolvency risk, 
where Z is the number of standard deviations below the mean by which profits must 
fall 
in order to eliminate equity. Boyd et al., (1993) defines the downside risk as 
being 
negative values of the Z score (see Yasuda et al., 2004). Therefore, we assume that 
Z 
has a positive effect on market value. In other words, the higher the value of the 
Z-score 
the lower the insolvency risk and the higher the expected market value. 
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4.2. Empirical Models, Testable Hypotheses and Data 
The empirical foundation of this study is based on relating bank's stock prices to the 
underlying financial information disclosed in the financial statements and to other non 
financial (economic) information. Particularly, we adopt Ohlson's (1995) model which 
links firm market value with both of financial and non-financial information. This 
model has been used in various value relevance studies (e. g. Callen and Morel. 2001. 
Biddle et al., 2001; Myers, 1999; Trueman et al., 2000, and Dechow et al., 1999). In 
particular, we use Trueman's et al., (2000) methodology which tests for the difference 
between book and market values using both net income, net income componets as well as 
other information (bank efficiency measures and risk indicators). 
Traditional financial theory notes that the value of a firm is estimated as the present 
value of the future dividend stream to equity holders over an infinite horizon. 
Consequently, to estimate fair value, analysts are required to forecast a complete future 
stream of firms' net dividends. Obvious difficulties in a practical application of the 
dividends discount model have been overcome by Ohlson (1995) who redefines the 
valuation model using accounting variables as follows: 
00 
MVt=BVt+E(RE) 
i-1 +(1 + r)' 
(1) 
Where MVt refers to the market value at the end of the current period t, BVt is the 
book value of common equity at time t, REt+; represents residual earnings27 for 
period t=i, r is the company's required rate of return on its equity capital and E( ) is 
the expected value. 
When a bank's expected earnings are decomposed into its components for period t+i 
equation (2) can be written as: 
E= OI - OEXP NONEXP(2) 
Where Er+; refers to the earnings for period t+i, OIt+z is the bank operating 
income 
for period t+i, OEXPt+i represents the banks operating expenses 
for period t+i and 
27 With a linear information dynamic assumption (as in Feltham and 
Ohlson 1995, Ohlson, 1995), the 
residual income model is equivalent to a weighted average of 
book value and earnings. Although, in 
Ohlson's model, prices are related to book values of equity plus the present 
value of excess earnings 
"abnormal earnings". Nevertheless, it has become common 
in previous studies (Collins et al.. 1997; 
Gornik-Tomaszewski and Jermakowicz, 2001; and Graham et al., 2000) to examine 
the value-relevance 
of accounting data by regressing stock prices on 
book values and earnings. 
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NONEXPt+; refers to other non operating expenses for period t+i. (other expensed 
not accounted in the OEXP ) 
Following Trueman et al., (2000), our paper ties investors' expectation for each of 
the components of earnings to the current available accounting information and 
other information by using two main hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that there is 
a positive linear correlation between the operating income in the future and the 
current operating income, operating expenses, and the other financial and non- 
financial information. Subsequently, the future expected operating expenses will be 
positively linearly correlated with the current operating expenses. Second, future 
non-operating expenses are expected to be zero. Thus, alternative rearrangement of 
equation 1 using the information in equation 2 gives the market value as a linear 
combination of book value, operating income, operating expenses and other 
financial and non-financial information. 
MVt = ao +a, BVt +a2OIt +a3OEXPt +a4OFIt (3) 
Where OFIt is the bank's other financial and non-financial information for period t. 
According to the above mentioned theoretical model, and to analyze the explanatory 
power of bottom line net income into the value of the bank, this study establishes 
the first empirical regression model that is shown in the following equation: 
MVj1 = ao + a, B V>t + a2 NI, t + e; t 
(4) 
Where, MV jt is market value (proxied by stock prices) calculated for each bank j 
three months after fiscal year end period t to account for any delay in the release of 
accounting information. BVjt is bank j's book value of common equity at the end of 
the year t, and NIjt is the net income available to bank j's common stockholders at 
the end of year t28. 
Two additional arguments can be used to support our specification. First, although 
Ohlson's (1995) valuation model relies on forecasts of future earnings, not the 
current reported earnings, the current earnings can be thought of as the realization of 
previously forecasted earnings (Gornik-Tomaszewki and Jermakowiz, 
2001). 
28 Some researchers argue that earnings forecasts contain value relevant 
information and add this 
information to Ohlson's valuation model (e. g., Dechow, et al., (1999) and recently 
Loh and Main (2006) 
among others) but unfortunately this type of information is not available 
in the Jordanian market, and if 
they are available they are biased measures as argued by Das, et al., 
(1998). For the above reasons. these 
forecasts are not included in the model. 
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Second, the use of current end-of-period book value instead of the lagged book 
value allows us to analyze the gap between market and book value. 
Consequently, the above model (Equation 4) will be used to test the first hypothesis 
that can be stated in its alternative form as follows: 
HI = net income has value relevance in explaining the difference between bank 
market and book values. 
In order to directly address the of noted assertion that net income plays only a small 
role, at best, in the valuation of bank stocks ( Bao and Bao 1998, Riahi-Belkaoui 
1993, Liang and li Yao 2005, and Wang et al 2005), we test whether net income 
components are able to provide different explanations in the market to book value 
relationship: 
MV j, = ao + a, B Vet + a2 OI1t + a3 OEXPjt + a4 OTHER; t + Est (5) 
Where Oljt is the operating Income (interest and non-interest income) of bank j in 
quarter t, OEXPjt is the expenses related directly to the banks product delivery 
including total interest expenses and non interest expenses including commissions 
and fees of bank j in year t, and OTHERjt are expenses other than interest expenses 
of bank j in year t (including depreciation and amortization, administrative 
expenses, and research and development expenses). 
The second tested hypothesis in its alternative form is as follows: 
H2 = net income components add information beyond aggregate net income, in 
which they can improve the explanation of the difference between banks market and 
book value. 
Furthermore, to assess the relevance of bank efficiency as non financial information, 
the following equation is expressed as: 
MVjr = a0 + alBVjr + ai N[, r + asýfr E 
{1 +e, t 
(6) 
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Where, EffJ, is the cost efficiency for bank j at year t estimated using the DEA 
methodology (see section 4.3 for detailed discussion of this methodology), or the 
accounting cost income ratio. 
Thus, the third alternative hypothesis can be expressed as follows: 
H3= Banks' cost efficiency has value relevance; it can provide a significant 
incremental information content to the net income model. 
Additionally, this study will include other information indicators, important in bank 
valuation, as additional independent variables along with the financial data obtained 
from financial statements. Two risk measures will also be added to the aggregate model 
to control for the effects of efficiency on the relationship between market and book 
value as follows: 
MV --ao+aBVj, +czNL, + LLPl +Ejr (7) 
MY. t = ao +a, BVt +a2NIýt +a3Z; t +Ejt 
MVt =ao +a, BVt +a2NIjt +a3Efft +Eýt 
t MVt =aý, +a, BVt+a2Nlit+a3, LLP1ý+a42Efft+Ej 
MV t= ao + a, BV t+ a2 
NI; t+ a3 
Zjt+ a4 Eff t+ Ejt 
MV ao +a, BVt +a2Nl. t +, 
ß, LLPý +ßiZ, t +ß4Efft +Ejt 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
From equations 7 to 12 we can test the following hypothesis in its alternative form as: 
H4= banks' efficiency has value relevance after considering for credit and insolvency 
risk in the net income model. 
Furthermore, the efficiency measure, as well as the other control variables, will 
be 
added to the net income components model as follows: 
MV =% +a, BV, +a2Ol, +a3OEXý'+a4OTHEX)'+, 
ýLLPIý +-,, 
MVt =ao +a1BV, +a2OI, t +a3OEXP +a4OTHEXýt 
+ ßIZj, +£jt 
MVit = ao + a1BVt + a, Ol j, + a30EXPj, + a4OTHEXP jt 
+ a5Eff jt + V, 
MVt =ao +a, BV, +a2Ol, +a3OEXP +a4OTHEXýt +ßILLP. 
Rt +ß2Eff t +E1t 
MVt = ao +a1BVt +a201j, +a3OEXPt +a40THEXP +a51Eff t 
+a6Z; t +E; t 
MVt = ao +a1BVt +a201jt +a3OEXP +a40THEXý'+a51LLPRý, 
+a6Z, t +a6Eff, t it 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
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Where LLPRjt is our measure of bank credit risk namely, the ratio of loan-loss 
provisions to gross loans for bank j in year t; Z is a score that refers to a metric for 
insolvency risk developed by Boyd et al., (1993), (see section 4.2 for the calculations 
and expected effect of the variables). 
From equations 13 to 18 the following alternative hypothesis can be derived as follows: 
H5= banks' efficiency has a value relevance after considering for credit and insolvency 
risk in the income components model. 
To control for heteroscedasticity in the above mentioned models, all variables are 
deflated by the end of year book values29. Furthermore, to examine the incremental or 
marginal contribution of the efficiency variable to explaining bank value, we employ 
the following F test (Gujarati, 2005)30: 
R2 
New -R2oid I(Df, ) 
uIn\ 
(1-R2New)/(Df2) 
Where, 
R2Newl Is the R2 for the bank valuation model with the efficiency measure. 
117) 
R2 Old Is the R2 for the bank valuation model without the efficiency measure. 
Df, Is the number of new regressors. 
Df2 Is the number of observations - number of parameters in the new model. 
The F test will be used to examine the following alternative hypothesis: 
H6: the complete model (with efficiency) provides improved explanatory power 
compared to the model with earnings or earnings components alone. 
Considering that pooled time series cross-sectional data requires various stochastic 
specifications, we control in all regressions for fixed firm and time effects 
31. The 
following section will briefly discuss the chosen panel technique used 
(fixed and 
29 A number of deflators have been used before, as proxies for scale, 
in valuation models such as: sales, 
number of shares, opening market value, for further discussion on 
deflation and scaling see Akbar and 
Stark (2003). 
30 F test for nested models are chosen here rather than the non-nested models tests such as 
Voung (1989) 
and the J test by Davidson and MacKinnon ( 1981) because in this study, the competing 
models are 
nested where in each time the first model becomes part of the second model. 
31 Most of the prior studies made the simplest assumption of common effects. 
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random effects) and then we will discuss the approach used to calculate our bank 
efficiency measures. 
4.2.1. Panel Data Techniques 
The term panel data refers to the pooling of observations on a cross section of firms 
(banks) over several time periods (Baltagi, 2005). Pooled data for banks over several 
years are used to deal with the limitation of the small number of banks in the study. 
Various other benefits of using panel data have been discussed in the literature (see for 
example Hsiao, 2003). Using pooled data may help to control for individual 
heterogeneity which is an essential part of the analysis. However, in the basic regression 
model, a simple assumption is that the parameters do not vary across sample 
observations. 
Three main pooling techniques are typically used with panel data, the common, fixed 
(dummy variable) and random effects (error components) techniques. While the 
common effects model assumes that the financial relations are homogeneous across 
firms, the other techniques account for heterogeneity. 
The fixed effects model allows for differences in intercepts to be modeled using dummy 
variables, that is, fixed coefficients. Assuming we have i= 1,2....... N cross sectional 
observations, and t=1,2,3......, T time series observations, the ( i, t) the observation on 
the dummy variable model with which we are concerned can be written as: 
nk 
/ý 
. 
yit - al 
+I 
fi 
Dit +I/K xkit + eit 
(20) 
i=2 K=1 
Where, 
P,, is the intercepts coefficient for the ith cross- sectional banks 
Dit , are 
dummy variables that take a value of unity for observations on 
bank i but will 
be 0 for observations on other banks. 
, 
ßý- are the slope coefficients that are common to all 
banks, 
ylt is the dependent variable 
x, are the explanatory variables, e, t , are 
independent and identically distributed 
kit 
random variables with E[e; 1 ] =0 and 
E [ei, 2]`6 e2. 
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As argued by Judge et al., (1988), fixed effects are usually employed when specifying a 
different intercept coefficient for each cross- sectional unit and can adequately capture 
differences in cross-sectional units. That is, cross-sectional identifiers explain changes 
from bank to bank. 
An alternative to the fixed-effects model is a random-effects model that assumes that 
the coefficients are random variables drawn from some larger population (Worthington 
and West, 2004). The random effects model can be written as follows: 
k 
Y; t =8+ 
jßK xk, r +ur+e; t K=I (21) 
Where E[u, ] = 0, E[u2] = ßu2, E[uiuj] =0 for iýj, E[uieit] =0 and all other variables are 
as previously defined. The structure of the model is such that, for a given bank, the 
correlation between any two disturbances in different time periods is the same, and 
unlike a first-order autoregressive model, does not decline as the disturbances vary over 
time. Further, not only is the correlation constant over time, it is identical for all banks 
(Judge et al., 1988). The inference is that the results from this model may be generalised 
to the whole population from which the sample is taken. 
4.2.2. Common, Fixed and Random Effect Choice 
This study will depend heavily on the following tests to choose between common, fixed, 
and random effects estimates. These are listed as below: 
4.2.2.1 Lagrange Multiplier Test (LM) 
This test was originally developed by Breusch and Pagan (1980) and is based on OLS 
residuals. The test is used in our study to compare between the pooled regression and 
the random effects model based on Maximum Likelihood estimation under the null 
hypothesis that the OLS is the preferred model, as follows: 
Ho: 8=0 (or Corr [nit, nis] =0), 
H#0 
LM test value will be calculated using the following equation: 
LM= nT 
2(T-1 X" 11 
rI 
T 
ý=1 r=1 ei, 
T2 11 1; 
=t 
j:, eir 
t" ý(1) if HO is true. 
P ,z nT (Tel) ý 
2(T _ 1) Te 
ýýý r-i ,t 
2 
(?? ) 
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4.2.2.2. Hausman Test: 
This test is used to choose between a fixed or random-effects specification. Under this 
hypothesis, there are two sets of estimates; one of which is consistent under both the 
null and alternative hypothesis, and another that is consistent only under the null. The 
null hypothesis is that both the fixed and random specifications are consistent, whereas 
under the alternative the fixed effect model is, but the random-effects model is not. The 
test is based on a Wald criterion which is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with 
K degrees of freedom (Greene 1993, p. 479-480). 
t_x2 
8 re l2 
Var ý fe _Var[ý 1e] 
(23) 
t- i (l) if HO is true. 
4.2.3. Data 
The sample used in this study comprises 15 listed commercial banks that operate in 
Jordan. The banks in the sample consist of all publicly traded banks which had market 
data during the time period under study. All of the fifteen banks have December 31 as 
their financial year end. The data sample selected in the research was collected for each 
year during the 1993-2004 periods. The data used in the empirical models have been 
acquired from the annual financial statement of the banks in the sample and the Amman 
Stock Exchange Data Base 32 . 
This study uses annual data because accounting 
information that is required is only available on a yearly base (not quarterly as in the 
USA and some other developed markets). The data set consists of 173 bank year 
combinations. Moreover, the non-parametric DEA model will be applied to calculate 
the efficiency scores of sampling banks. Because homogeneity of operations is essential 
in efficiency analysis, our study excludes foreign owned banks, which constitutes a 
small portion of the sector. In addition, foreign banks stocks are not listed on the 
Amman Stock Exchange. 
32 The reason for the lack of empirical analysis on banks in emerging markets and 
Arab countries in 
particular relates to the availability of data. Most of the time, such data are considered confidential 
and 
typically proprietary. However, as the Jordanian economy opens up, the 
Amman stock exchange became 
a rich database and covers all of the national listed banks. 
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4.2.3.1. Efficiency Estimation 
As mentioned before (in section 3-2), operational efficiency is a broad concept. It refers to the 
banks success in transforming resources (inputs) to outputs with minimum cost (or maximum 
profit). The banking efficiency literature has focused on different aspects of efficiency: 
technical efficiency, allocative efficiency, and overall efficiency. Overall Efficiency (OE), 
also called "X-efficiency" (or Economic Efficiency), expresses the ability of a firm to choose 
its input and/or output levels and mix them to optimise its economic goal. X-efficiency is 
estimated in banking studies as the sum of both allocative and technical efficiency. On 
the other hand, Technical Efficiency (TE) expresses the ability of a firm to obtain maximal 
outputs from a given set of inputs or of minimising inputs for a given target of outputs: this 
component focuses only on physical quantities and technical relationships. Allocative 
Efficiencies (AE) refer to the ability of using inputs in optimal proportions, given their 
respective prices and production technology33. 
In this paper, X-efficiency (introduced by Leibenstein, 1966), will be used to proxy for 
bank economic performance. The empirical banking literature focuses on frontier 
efficiency, or how close financial institutions are to a best practice frontier, as an 
important performance matrix (see Berger and Humphrey, 1997). We choose to use X- 
efficiency, rather than scale or scope efficiency, because as noted by Berger and 
Humphrey (1992), X-efficiency differences across banks are relatively large and 
dominate scale and scope economies. More formally, X-inefficiency can be defined (in 
banking) as the deviation of the bank cost (profit) function, observed input(s) - output(s) 
combinations, for a specific bank from the best practice cost (profit) function (frontier), 
the closer the bank to the best practice frontier, the more the X-efficient the bank 
(Molyneux and Iqbal, 2005). 
There are five main approaches to estimating the efficient frontier, three of which are 
parametric: Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA), Distribution Free Approach 
(DFA), 
and Thick Frontier Approach (TFA); and two of which are non-parametric 
(linear 
programming) approaches including: Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) and the Free 
Disposal Hull (FDH)34. Both of these approaches attempt to benchmark the relative 
33 On the other hand, allocative inefficiency is the failure of the Decision 
Making Unit (DMU) to choose 
an optimal input mix to reach relative input prices mix, and technical 
inefficiency occurs when the DMU 
is employing an excessive level of inputs for output production 
(Molyneux and Iqbal, 2005). 
34 There is consensus in the previous literature that the advantages of efficiency estimation 
derived from 
parametric and non-parametric approaches exceed the efficiency estimation 
using accounting ratios. For 
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performance of production units but differ from each other mainly due to their 
underlying assumptions. A major challenge for both sets of approaches is in 
distinguishing random error, arising from accounting practices or some other sources, 
from inefficiency. Each of the parametric approaches has different ways of dealing with 
random error, whereas the non-parametric approaches have generally ignored this 
feature, parametric approaches require particular feature of the error distribution in 
estimating the efficiency. In comparing the two methodologies Resti (1997, P-211) 
stated that: `(i) econometric and linear programming results do not differ dramatically, 
when based on the same data and conceptual framework; (ii) when differences arise, 
they can be explained by going back to the intrinsic features of the models'. 
This paper attempts to estimate efficiency using DEA, a nonparametric technique that 
does not require a prior functional specification of the unknown technology (Fukuyama, 
1993). This technique was developed in its initial form by Charnes, et al., (1978), and 
has been frequently used in efficiency studies and production analysis (e. g Elyasiani, et 
al., 1994; Barr, et al., 1994; and Wheelock and Wilson, 1995) DEA has advantages 
over other frontier estimator methods. First, it deals easily with multiple input-multiple 
output production, and variable return to scale (VRT)35. Second, this non-parametric 
frontier is estimated using a mathematical linear programming, and is less data 
demanding, hence it is preferred when working with small samples. 
36 [Parametric 
frontiers are estimated using econometric techniques that require relatively larger 
sample sizes in order to estimate unbiased coefficients of underlying cost/ profit 
function models. These have a large number of inputs, outputs, inputs or output prices, 
environmental factors and so on (Isik and Hassan, 2003a)]. Finally the DEA approach 
uses the actual sample data to derive the efficiency frontier against which each 
firm in 
the sample can be evaluated , thus 
it does not require any specifications of functional 
example, financial ratios do not consider input prices and output mixs 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1992) and 
the frontier approaches provides an overall, objectively determined numerical score and 
a ranking (Berger 
and Humphrey, 1997), where the selection of the weights of 
financial ratios is subjective. Additionally, 
such approach can accommodate multiple inputs and multiple outputs and 
the results are all inclusive 
(Thanassoulis et al., 1996). Furthermore Rees (1995) addresses the effect of 
the use of accounting data 
that may exaggerate the limitation of accounting statements, the effect of 
accounting policies and 
practices, and technical issue related to negative numbers and small 
divisors. 
35 For disadvantages of DEA see Yilderim (2002). 
36 Particularly, it is a useful method in our study because the population size of 
the Jordanian banking 
system is relatively small. Although, this study covers all 
types of banks operating in the Jordanian 
banking sector and no discrimination is made between 
different forms of banks in the sector. This 
procedure is consistent with Altunbas's et al.., 
(1994) analysis, who study all types of 
banks operating 
in the same market. 
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form, which is ideal (we would suggest) for most emerging markets banking institutions 
because although some banks operate a fairly typical intermediation service, others offer 
a wider range of services and these characteristics make the specification of a 
production function difficult and fraught with the probability of using an incorrect 
functional form (Kirkwood and Nahm, 2006). 
It is important to mention here that the potential of data error, often noted as a 
shortcoming of DEA (Mester, 1996), is minimized here as this study employs only 
audited data extracted from the respective banks' annual reports. Moreover, given that 
the main purpose of this study is to estimate the overall effect of efficiency scores on 
bank valuation rather than detecting the sources of inefficiency, the overall cost 
efficiency estimates will be used in this study rather than its components (aliocative and 
technical efficiency using the DEA technique37). In addition, cost efficiency has been 
chosen here because cost control is a prerequisite and necessary condition to maximize 
shareholders' value (see Sinkey 1998), and the bank managers have more control over 
costs rather than outputs (Goddard et al., 2001). 
DEA measures efficiency by estimating a non-stochastic envelopment frontier over the 
data points that lie on or below the frontier. Thus, the frontier represents the set of best 
practice observations for which no other unit or linear combination of units employs as 
little or less of every input without changing the output quantities (input oriented 
efficiency frontier) or produces as much or more of every output without altering the 
input quantities used (output oriented efficiency frontier). The DEA 
input orientated 
models are chosen in the present study because cost minimization or reduction 
is 
assumed (Golany and Roll, 1989). Therefore, this study will use an 
input oriented DEA 
technique to measure the efficiency scores of the Jordanian 
banks in the sample. In 
addition, the DEA approach has been used because, as argued 
by Seiford and Thrall 
(1990), the kind of mathematical programming procedure used 
by DEA for efficient 
frontier estimation is comparatively robust. 
One has to make an assumption about the bank production process 
before efficiency can 
be estimated. Humphrey (1985) distinguishes 
two alternative approaches to the 
37 Berger et al., (1993) find that banks inefficiency is technical 
in nature rather than allocative. Hence 
authors, in the banking studies like: Altunbas et al., 
(2000) and Mester (1993), do not 
decompose the x 
efficiency measures. 
246 
definition of banks input and outputs: the production approach and the transaction 
(intermediation) approach. According to the production approach, banks are considered 
to produce deposits and loans using capital, labour and materials. The number of 
deposits and loans accounts is the appropriate measure of output, and only operating 
costs are taken into account. On the other hand, the transaction approach assumes that 
banks collect funds, deposits and purchased funds, and intermediate these funds into 
loans and other assets38. This study will adopt the intermediation approach, originally 
developed by Sealey and Lindley (1977). Consequently, this study views banks as 
intermediating between agents with surplus funds (depositors) and agents with deficit 
funds (borrowers) because, as noted by Ferrier and Lovell (1990), the intermediation 
approach is more closely connected with the overall costs of banking. 39 
For our estimation of cost efficiency we choose three outputs: total loans, securities and 
all other earning assets, and off balance sheet items proxied as non interest income (fee 
based income and cotangent liabilities). We include the latter measure of non-traditional 
banking output because, as noted by Clark and Siems (2002), omission of off-balance 
sheet activity from output is likely to result in understated measures of firm efficiency, 
as total bank output would tend to be underestimated (Jagtiani and Khanthavit, 1996). 
In accordance with Aly et al., (1990) the inputs should we use in an estimation of bank 
efficiency include bank deposits, labour and capital. Hence, we choose three inputs: 
deposits (including: customer deposits, other banks deposits, notes and debenture, and 
other borrowed funds), capital (fixed assets) and labour (employee personal expenses). 
The prices for the inputs were calculated as follows: the price of interest 
bearing 
liabilities W1, equals total interest expenses of time and saving deposits and all other 
loanable funds divided by loanable funds (borrowed funds), the price of capital, W2, is 
equal to operating expenses (excluding employees expense) 
divided by total assets, and 
finally the labour price input, W3, is equal to labor expenses 
divided by total assets 
(including capitalized leases). 
38 It should be noted that the definition and measurement of 
bank inputs and outputs has long been 
debated by researchers, for more discussion see Molyneux and 
Iqbal (2005). 
39 As discussed by Berger and Mester (1997), the transaction approach 
(intermediation) is most often used 
because it is easier in terms of data availability, and because 
it relates specifically measuring the cost of 
intermediating deposits to the receivers of loans. This mentioned reason 5 encouraged 
the majority of 
banking studies to use the intermediation approach ( 
Molyneux and Igbal, 200) 
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following Kirkwood and Nahm (2004) we estimate our DEA efficiency measure as follows, considering a group of i banks (i=l,.... N) that produce M outputs using K 
inputs, the input-oriented DEA model to measure the cost efficiency for bank J can be 
estimated as follows: 
Minimize wI' z; (over zi and X) 
Subject to 
Y1-YA< 
-z1+XA<_Ok, 
N I'll = 1, 
z1 >- 0k and 
A>0 
, ti, 
Where, Y is an (M* N) matrix of actual quantities of M outputs by N banks, y; is an 
(M* 1) vector of the output quantities actually produced by bank i, which is the ith 
column of Y, X is a (K* N) and is a matrix of used quantities of K inputs by used 
quantities of K inputs by N bank, xi is a (K* 1) vector of the input quantities actually 
used by bank i, which is the i th column of X, z; is a (K* 1) vector of optimal quantities 
of input prices, and ? is an (N* 1) vector of constants whose optimal values are to be 
found together with zi, Ni is an (N* 1) vector of ones and OM, OK, ON are null vectors of 
order M, K, and N, respectively. The objective function w. 'z1 represents the minimum 
cost that bank i could achieve in producing the output quantities yi if it were as efficient 
as its peers (best practice in the sample). The actual cost incurred in producing y; is 
wi, xl. 
So cost efficiency can be measured as follows: 
', z' CE=w, 
w; xi 
The cost efficiency score will be a value ranging between 0 and one and will never 
be a 
negative value. To compare the cost efficiency estimates derived 
from DEA estimates 
with standard accounting measures we will also use the cost-to-income ratio 
to test for 
robustness so as to see which measure has greater value relevance. 
The cost income 
ratio is simply, the ratio of all operating income (including 
interest income, non-interest 
income, and other income) to all operating costs (including 
interest expenses, non- 
interest expenses and other expenses). 
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Instead of estimating a common frontier across time, we construct twelve separate annual 
efficiency frontiers, one for each year under study, to account for the changes in the 
macroeconomy and marketplace over time. Constructing an annual frontier specific to each 
year t is more flexible and thus more appropriate than estimating a single multi-year frontier 
for the banks in sample (DeYoung and Hasan, 1998) 
5. Results 
5.1 Cost efficiency 
The first set of the results pertains to the estimation of the bank cost efficiency scores. 
Table 3.1 shows the average cost efficiency scores calculated based on the DEA 
approach. The table also presents the accounting efficiency measure (cost-income ratio 
calculated as total cost to total income). Over the sample period 1993 to 2004 the 
average banks' cost efficiency scores range between 61.9% and 83.3% with an average 
value of 73.5%. Our results appear to be consistent with previous studies. For example, 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) summarise over 120 studies in banking and found an average 
cost efficiency of 79%. Distinguishing between parametric and non-parametric studies, the 
authors found on average that cost efficiency amounted to 72%40, based on non-parametric 
efficiency analysis. 
Moreover, Berger and Humphrey (1997) defined a sort of confidence interval formed by the 
mean plus and minus one standard deviation (between 66% and 92%) that captured 82% of 
the observations summarised in their study. Looking at our findings, most of our annual mean 
levels estimated using DEA (Table 3.1) are inside the interval estimated by Berger and 
Humphrey (1997). However, comparing our results to more recent studies, our cost efficiency 
estimates are lower than those estimated by Luo (2003) for US banks (88%), Maudos and 
Pastor (2003) average cost efficiency of Spanish banks (90%), and Kirkwood and 
Nahm 
(2006) for Australian banks (between 86 % and 98%). 
On average, Jordanian banks can save nearly 26.5% (1-73.5%) of their 
total costs 
compared to the best practice frontier without decreasing their outputs. 
This result 
suggests that the same level of outputs could be produced with approximately 
74% of 
current inputs if the banks under study were operating at their most efficient 
level. 
40 This mean value mostly account for technical efficiency levels. 
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Table 3.1 
Average Cost Efficiency Scores for All Banks in the Sample 
tf.. _-- 1 e'cir A.. o...,,.,. ,. -.. ý nrC1 agC cWJL 
efficiency Scores 
1993 0.746 
1994 
1995 
(0.237)¢ 
0.733 
(0.229) 
0.773 
(0.203) 
1996 0.619- 
(0.211) 
1997 0.688 
(0.191) 
1998 0.685 
(0.210) 
1999 0.714 
(0.227) 
2000 0.789 
(0.161) 
2001 0.754 
(0,165) 
2002 0.763 
2003 
2004 
Average 1993- 
20042 
(0.161) 
0.721 
(0.185) 
0.833 
(0.261) 
0.735 
(0.204) 
i 
Cost Income Ratio 
0.589 
(0.219) 
0.759 
(0.591) 
0.715 
(0.356) 
0.652 
(0.251) 
0.640 
(0.272) 
0.675 
(0.279) 
0.662 
(0.350) 
0.671 
(0.280) 
0.548 
(0.168) 
0.588 
(0.209) 
0.611 
(0.391) 
0.510 
(0.206) 
0.636 
(0.313) 
Notes: 
I Cost efficiency scores are calculated by the DEA input oriented methodology, using the DEAF 2.1 computer programme from 
Coelli (1996). 
2 16 banks were included to estimate the best practice frontier on a yearly bases. 
3 Cost Income ratios are calculated as all operating costs including interest and non interest income as will as other expenses divided 
by all operating income including interest and non interest income and other income. 
4 Standard deviations are in parentheses 
In spite of the assumed negative effect of economic instability on bank efficiency (see 
for example Yildirim, 2002), Jordanian banks obtained relatively high efficiency 
betweenl993 to 2004 recording its highest level in 2004 at 83%41. This result is 
consistent with Al-Jarrah and Molyneux (2003) who found that the average cost 
efficiency in Jordanian banks between 1992 and 2000 averaged 89%, and Isik et al, 
(2005) found that it amounted to just fewer than 90% during 1991 and 2001. This 
level 
of cost efficiency in Jordanian banks during our period may due to the 
implementation 
41 During this time period the region faced the first and second Iraqi war. 
These two wars affected the 
economy mainly because Jordan is not an oil producer and 
depended heavily on the subsidized oil supply 
from Iraq (See Al Jarrah and Molyneux, 2003). 
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of economic and financial reforms which helped banks improve their efficiency and 
reduce their deviation from the best practice frontier. 
The standard deviation of the DEA cost efficiency scores varies from year to year 
during the study period. The yearly standard deviation of efficiency scores within 
ranged between 62% and 83%; reaching its highest variation in 2004. This result 
suggests that Jordanian banks witnessed an efficiency gap within their operations. On 
the other hand, the average cost income ratio calculated during our sample period had a 
higher standard deviation, 31.3%. Average cost income ratios fell in the range between 
51% and 76%. The lowest deviation was achieved in 2004 consistent with the DEA 
score. This level of cost income ratio seems not to be very far from the benchmark 
suggested by Salomon Brothers (1993) of 50-55%. The high variations between banks 
appear to relate to the different size of bank. 
5.2. Descriptive Statistics 
In this section, we present the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
empirical models developed in section 4. Table 3.2 presents the values for the variable 
included in the models. The market value per share variable tends to exceed the book 
value per share widely during the sample period. The average market value stands at 
10.395 JD compares with 2.36 JD for the book value per share. By comparison, we can 
say that the standard deviation of the market value (29.56) is noticeably more than the 
standard deviation of the book value (3). This gap between the two values suggests that 
the classical accounting bank valuation model should include other relevant variables 
which may help explain the gap and provide a better explanation of bank market value. 
In this study the efficiency scores are included in the valuation model as "other" 
information. The average efficiency scores during the sample period are around 73.5% 
ranging between the minimum and maximum values of 8.54% and 100%, respectively, 
with a variation equal to 19.54%. Consistent with our results (Table 3.2), the accounting 
cost income ratio witnesses a higher standard deviation equal to 31 %. 
Comparing the two types of expenses, it is obvious that operating income exhibited 
variation over our sample period equal to 2.57, whereas the standard 
deviation of net 
income is only equal to 0.43. The different levels of standard deviation values 
between 
the NI and the 01 may indicate the income smoothing of net 
income streams practice by 
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Jordanian banks, who may have been motivated to reduce the banks' risk and cost of 
capital (Liu et al., 1997). 
Table 3.2 
Descriptive Statistics for the Main Variables Used in the Study 
Variable Mean St. Dev Minimum Maximum 
MV 10.3950 29.5578 0.320 177.72 
BV 2.3649 
CJI % 62.96 
Eff % 73.50 
OI 2.0084 
OEX 1.2161 
OTHER 0.7923 
NI 0.2377 
LLPR 0.0153 
Z 
Notes: 
146.825 
3.0029 
31.00 
19.45 
2.5661 
1.8382 
0.7952 
0.4256 
0.1740 
. 7848 
-1.7990 
17.81 
8.54 
0.1116 
0.0211 
0.0905 
-0.4534 
0.0005 
8.6670 
1- Variables are defined as follows: 
MV is the market value per share. 
BV is the book value per share. 
C/I %is the cost income ratio. 
Eff %is the relative cost efficiency score. 
01 is the operating income per share generated by the bank during the year. 
OEX is the operating expenses per share generated by the bank during the year. 
OTHR is the other expenses per share generated by the bank during the year. 
NI is the net income per share generated by the bank during the year. 
LLPR is the loan loss provision ratio. 
Z score index value calculated as Z_ 
12 
_Iýi 
Iý4i +ý 
12 Ei Ei 
i=1 Ai 
16.3640 
257.14 
1.000 
16.0881 
11.9423 
4.3286 
2.4467 
0.1463 
354.02 
s, 
Where 7[ j is the estimated market value of total profits that can be calculated as follows:, Th = Cj p, - Cj_I pj_, 
Where c; is the number of outstanding shares adjusted for stock splits, and pi is the share price of the last business day of month j. Ej 
is the market value of total equity (e. g. share prices multiplied by number of shares outstanding); Ai is the market value of total 
assets: Aj _ Ej +L, and L 
is the book value of total debt at the end of each fiscal year. And Sr is the estimated standard deviation 
of)rf /A. 
2- The net income and net income components are calculated as a per share numbers to avoid small coefficient values. As argued 
by 
Ramanathan (2002) the regression coefficients and the corresponding standard errors will be affected but the significance of the 
variable as well as all other statistics will be unchanged because of variables scaling 
The two measures of risks (credit risk and insolvency risk) have a noticeable difference 
in their variations. The credit risk measure (LLP ratio) which records an average value 
of 1% during the sample period and varies between (. 05% and 14.65%) with standard 
deviation around 17.4 %42, and the Z-score has an average value of 
146.82 with 
standard deviation of 78.49%. This different level of standard 
deviation between the 
two risk measures may indicate that whereas the 
Jordanian banks might use quite 
similar methods in managing their credit risk and estimating 
their loan-loss provisions 
42 We may say that this level of loan loss provision ratio is not very 
high in comparison with other studies. 
For example Eng and Nabar (2007) find the loan loss provision to 
be 7.7% for Malaysia and Singapore 
for their overall study period from 1998 to 2000, and 6% in the non crisis period. 
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they vary a lot with regard to their insolvency. Comparing our sample mean value for 
the Z-score with other studies that have used the same method, we can say the Z-score 
for Jordanian banks value is quite high. For example, Yasuda at al., (2004) estimate an 
average Z-score value for Japanese banks during 1990s between 8.91 % and 17.63 %. In 
addition, Konishi and Yasuda (2004) found that the Z-score ranged between 14.64% 
and 18.79%, the same time period. 
5.3. Correlation Analysis 
To investigate the preliminary relationship between market value and the other 
variables, we present a correlation matrix in Table 3.3. This table shows the correlation 
patterns of the relationships among market value and the financial and non-financial 
measures. Clearly, the market value is significantly correlated with the efficiency scores 
and the cost-income ratio, net income, operating income, and other operating expenses. 
The accounting and economic measures of efficiency are negatively and significantly 
correlated. This result is not surprising given that banks with higher costs attain lower 
cost X-efficiency. More importantly for our study, and consistent with our assumptions, 
from Table 3.3 we can infer that a significant correlation occurs between market value 
and banks' cost efficiency. Positive and significant relationship (5% significance level) 
exists for relative efficiency measure. However, cost income ratio seems to negatively 
affect banks market value. This result perhaps is not surprising given the focus of 
management on minimizing cost in order to improve bank market value. Additionally, 
the risk variables show a significant association with the efficiency estimates. 
Loan-loss provision announcements are treated as good news in the market. Although 
banks share prices and loan-loss provision ratios are positively correlated, this 
correlation was not supported with statistical significance. On the other 
hand, the 
insolvency risk measure (Z-score), is negatively correlated 
banks stock prices which 
may indicate that investors in the market cannot sufficiently assess 
the insolvency of 
banks, and the most important consideration in their stock selection 
is short-term 
profitability because higher insolvency risk is not reflected 
in the market as a higher 
cost of capital, instead, investors continue to demand 
bank stock even if its insolvency 
risk increases. 
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Table 3.3 
Correlation Matrix: Market and Book Values and the Financial and Non 
Financial Variables Included in the Models 
MV 
BV -0.088 
(0.250) 
C/I -0.152 
EFF 
OTHER 
OE 
(0.047) 
0.175 
(0.02) 
0.205 
(0.007) 
0.116 
(0.129) 
01 0.228 
NI 
Z -score 
LLP 
(0.003) 
0.186 
(0.014) 
-0.1839 
(0.023) 
0.0124 
(0.831) 
BV 
0.754 
(0.000) 
0.054 
(0.477) 
0.289 
(0.000) 
0.390 
(0.000) 
0.192 
(0.012) 
-0.595 
(0.000) 
0.199 
C/I 
-0.635 
(0.000) 
0.088 
(0.248) 
0.358 
(0.070) 
-0.158 
(0.037) 
-0.590 
(0.000) 
0.479 
(0.009) (0.009) 
0.420 0.287 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: 
- See Table 3.2 for variables definition. 
EFF 
-0.074 
(0.336) 
-0.024 
(0.754) 
0.025 
(0.740) 
0.045 
(0.561) 
0.5347 
(0.0 07) 
0.236 
OE NOEX 01 NI 
0.747 
(0.000) 
0.862 0.896 
(0.000) (0.000) 
-0.321 -0.122 0650 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
-0.003 0.119 0.088 0.123 
(0.968) (0.120) (0.252) (0.106) 
0.447 0.428 0.095 -0.608 
(0.002) (0.041) (0.000) (0.212) (0.00) (0.893) 
The values between brackets are the p values. 
- In each cell in the table the upper value is the Pearson product moment correlation coefficient which measures the 
degree of linear relationship between two variables. The correlation coefficient assumes a value between -1 and +l . If 
one variable tends to increase as the other decreases, the correlation coefficient is negative. Conversely, if the two 
variables tend to increase together the correlation coefficient is positive. For a two-tailed test of the correlation p 
value (the value between brackets to test the following hypotheses: Ho: r=0 versus HI: rý0 where r is the 
correlation between a pair of variables. 
Furthermore, banks' operating income and net income are positively and significantly 
related to banks' market value, indicating that more profitable banks have higher market 
values. Additionally, where operating expenses are not significantly correlated with 
market values, other operating expenses, including research and developments and 
depreciation expenses, are positively correlated with market value. Additionally, the 
banks operating income is positively and significantly correlated with each of the 
expense components indicating that higher realized operating expenses are associated 
with the ability of the banks to generating more operating income. One would expect 
that higher operating expenses (mainly interest expenses) are associated with 
improvement in deposits level and hence a greater ability of bank loans to grow 
investments and therefore operating income (interest income). 
On the other hand, the 
more the non-operating expenses, such as research and 
development and other 
administrative expenses, the higher the future income. 
Z 
score 
-0.010 (0.893) 
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5.4. Empirical Results 
In this section, we estimate the models outlined in section 4. For each model, the 
selection of the most appropriate pooling procedure is documented based on the 
techniques discussed in the methodology section 43 . Tables 3.4 to 3.6 present the 
estimated coefficients and standard errors of the valuation models. The dependent 
variable is specified as the market to book value in each of these models. 
5.4.1. Net Income and Net Income Components Models 
The regression results of models 1 and 2 are presented in Table 3.4. Where net income 
and book values are included in model 1 as independent variables, in model 2 net 
income is replaced by the three components of income (operating income, operating 
expenses, and other expenses). The results indicate that the net income coefficient 
(1.49) is statistically significant at the 5% level; suggesting that market value is 
significantly associated with net income. This means that net income in its aggregate 
level contributes to explaining the difference between market and book values. The 
explanatory power of this model equals 13% as indicated by the adjusted R value44,4ti ' 
However, when net income is decomposed into its components (model 2), the overall 
explanatory power of the model increases substantially. The explanatory power of this 
model is higher compared with the aggregate net income model, as indicated by the 
adjusted R2 values of 21.14% versus 13.82%. This explanatory power enhancement 
exists because net income comprises various accounting items and mixes too much 
information together (Liang and Li Yao, 2005). 
43 In general, there is a consistency in the signs and significances of the estimated coefficients 
for all the 
pooling techniques (common, fixed, or random effect). 
44 R-squared coefficient allows one to evaluate the proportion of the variability of the 
dependent variable that is 
explained by the selected explanatory variables. This coefficient ranges between 0 and 1 and the closer the model 
is to 1, the greater the explanatory power. The adjusted coefficient of determination 
(or adjusted R2) is expressed 
as: 
R2 
(n-1)R22 -p adj. = 
n-p-I 
Where n is the number of observations and p the number of explanatory variables. 
as The explanatory power of other studies which examine the value relevance of earnings, vary 
greatly 
where some studies found that R2 is low ( e. g. Liang and Yao, (2005) 
found this ratio to be nearly 6%o for 
electronic industry firms, and Trueman et al., (2000) recorded R2 for earnings model equal 
3% in internet 
firms), some banking studies found quit high explanatory power of earnings 
( e. g. Kohlbeck. -1004 
found 
that value relevance of earnings is around 50%). 
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Table 3.4 
Regression Results for the Difference between Market and Book Values Based on Net Income and Net Income Components 
Modell: MV 
it =ao+a, BV1, +a2NIif +Fif 
Model 2: MV1, = ao + a, BV11 + a2 OP, + a3OEXPj, + a4OTHER i, +ej, 
Model 
BV 
NI/BV 
OI 
OEXP 
OTHER 
HT 
(P- value) 
. 
7500+ 
. 
4793 
. 3654 . 4148 1.4915+ 
. 6623 
F 4.26 
(P- value) (0.00) 
R2 
. 218 
Adj. R2 0.1382 
LM 7.33 
(P- value) (0.00) 
Estimation 
4.46 
(. 09) 
2.233 
. 
6992 
. 
0233 
. 
0780 
-3.9212* 
. 
8784 
4.57 
(0.00) 
. 294 
0.2114 
10.50 
(0.00) 
9.33 
(. 05) 
FE FE 
Notes: 
- In each model the dependent variable is the market book value. 
-See Table 3.3 for variable definition. 
- In each model the first value is the estimated coefficient, and the second is the standard errors. 
-*, +, i indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. 
-LM is the Lagranger Multiplier, this test originally created by Breusch and Pagan (1980) based on COLS residuals. This test is used in this study to compare between pooled regression and random effect model based on Maximum Likelihood estimation under the 
null hypothesis the efficient estimators is pooled least Square. 
- FE is the Fixed Effects model; RE is the Random Effects model. The F statistic and Adjusted R2 for the valuation models assume 
the fixed effects in the pooled data. The F-statistic tests the hypothesis that all of the slope coefficients (excluding the intercept) in a 
regression are zero. 
HT is Hausman Test to choose between a fixed or random effects specification. The null hypothesis is that both the fixed and 
random specifications are consistent and the alternative hypothesis is that fixed effect is better estimator than Random effect. 
- Values between brackets are p- values. 
Regarding the coefficients of the net income components, although operating income 
and operating expenses have positive coefficients (2.2 and 0.02, respectively), only 
operating income coefficient seems to be significant in the valuation of Jordanian banks 
at the 1% significance level. On the other hand, operating expenses do not provide any 
important signaling for market valuation. This might be because investors believe that 
this type of information is already incorporated in the net income value. The other 
operating expenses coefficient looks relatively high (3.9) and suggests that this variable 
is relatively important in providing information to the market about the future earnings 
of banks. Although, other operating expenses (including administrative expenses, 
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research and development expenses, and marketing expenses) would be expected to 
influence market values of banks, it appears that investors in Jordanian banks assume 
that theses expenses reduce value. This could be because investors believe less attention 
is being paid by managers to core business areas46,47 
From the first and second models we can accept the first two alternative hypotheses and 
agree that net income can provide investors in the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 
approximate prediction ability of the trend of bank's stock prices as it does explain 
differences between bank market and book values. However, if investors only place 
emphasis on the bottom line net income they will then ignore the important implications 
hiding behind a large number of other accounting components which can improve the 
predictive ability about future earnings. This result is consistent with Easton (1989) and 
Giner and Reverte (1999) who note that accounting earnings are not the only potentially 
relevant data that accounting systems produce. In addition, this result is in line with 
many studies relating to the earnings disaggregation literature e. g., Lipe, (1986), and 
Ballas (1996). Hence, earnings components convey information and are complementary 
to that provided by aggregate earnings because such information enables investors in 
emerging markets to evaluate contributions made by individual earnings components to 
the firm's overall market value. 
5.4.2 Net Income, Efficiency, and Other Variables 
As argued by Kohlbeck (2004), the value relevance of net income does not mean that 
accounting information is the only information that can be used to value securities, 
investors and analysts may use other information sources. In the case of Jordan, the 
result of using the other information is tested through models 3 to 8 and presented 
in 
Table 3.5. 
The first two columns of Table 3.5 show the results of model 3 and 
4 when the two 
types of risk (credit and insolvency risk) have been added to the net 
income model 
(model 1). Credit risk is calculated by the loan-loss provisions ratio. 
The coefficient of 
46 Administrative and sales expenses are expenses which are associated with 
developments of financial 
products to meet customer demand. In order to implement the 
banks' future plans and vision, banks need 
to spend more on research and development and employ researchers with specialized 
financial knowledge 
in order to develop products that meet the particular demands of 
individuals.. 
47 This variable is included as other operating expenses 
in aggregate terms instead of more 
detailed 
expenses because of the lack of comprehensive 
data for all banks in the sample, especially 
in the early 
years. 
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credit risk ratio (9.4) tends to have a positive and significant relationship with market 
value at the 5% level. This result is consistent with Beaver et al., (1989, p158) who 
suggest that an increase in LLP can indicate that "management perceives the earnings 
power of the bank to be sufficiently strong that it can withstand a `hit to earnings' in the 
form of additional loan-loss provisions". Similarly, Liu and Ryan (1995) as well as 
Wahlen (1994) provide evidence that LLP contain only "good news" components. 
On the other hand, the coefficient of insolvency risk that is estimated using the Z-score 
index is negative (-. 006) and significantly affects market value at the 1% level. This 
result is quite surprising, because one would expect that the more the insolvency risk 
(indicated by lower values of our estimated Z-score) the less the market price. As 
argued by Clark (1996), a more risky collection of projects will require a higher 
expected return on the comparable financial securities and therefore a higher cost of 
capital. Recall the main definition of the fair value of a bank in the market, as the 
present value of expected future cash flows. Investors, or more generally the 
stakeholders, need to estimate the future benefits of acquiring a stock, also they have to 
use appropriate discount factors (the cost of capital rate or the opportunity cost rate) in 
order to reach the best estimation of fair value. Usually, the cost of capital (or the 
required rate of return) is the discount rate that is used to estimate the market value of 
the firm and investors suppose that the higher the risk the more the required the rate of 
return should be. In view of the fact that the Z-score measures the number of standard 
deviations below the mean by which market profits must fall in order to eliminate 
equity (Boyd et al, 1993), then the higher the Z- score value the lower 
is the bank 
insolvency risk and the lower the expected return in this case the more the expected 
market value of the bank. 
However, it still remains a question to be answered: why insolvency risk 
is negatively 
and significantly associated with the market value. Two reasons may 
be given to 
explain this negative relationship between the Z-score and market prices. 
The first 
reason is that the ability of investors in emerging markets to assess 
the insolvency risk 
of banks is questionable. The second explanation 
is that although banks' shareholders 
have much to lose if a bank becomes insolvent, speculators still can 
earn short-term 
capital gains from investing in insolvent bank stocks which may 
raise the market value 
of such stocks irrespective of their performance. 
Based on this result reported in Table 
3.5, we can conclude that under the net income model, 
the Z-score provides an 
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additional 2.2% (based on adjusted R2 values reported in Tables 3.4 and 3.5) of 
explanatory power while the percentage for the incremental explanatory power of loan- loss provisions provides additional explanation close to only 1 %. 
Table 3.5 
Regression Results for the Difference between Market and Book Values Based on Net Income, Efficiency, and other Variables 
Model 3: MVt = ao +GBVt +a2NI, +a3LLP1 +eJ1 
Model 4: MVt = ao +a, BVt +a2NI1 +a3Z1t +e11 
Model 5: MV = ao +a, BV +a2NIt +asEff +0 
Model 6: MV = ao +qB V +cx2NI1 +%LLP +a42Eff jc 
Model 7: MV =ao+o; BVt+a2NIt+a3Efft+a4Zýt+'f, 
Model 8: MV = ao + cBVt +a2NI t +ß, LLP1 +/322; 1 +ß4Eff, +e t 
Model 
BV 
(3) 
. 
4223+ 
. 2110 
(4) 
. 
9109* 
. 
2784 
(s) 
. 1123* 
. 
0288 
(6) 
-1.4328* 
. 5493 
NI 3.1787* 2.1317* 1.9814 * 2.495* 1.8698* 3,2950* 
. 
7150 
. 
6229 
. 
5576 
. 
7392 
. 6291 . 
7323 
LLPR 9.3678+ 
3.928 
z 
Eff 
-. 00589* 
. 
00168 
11.4126* 
4.0956 
(7) 
-. 5113 
($) 
-. 6733 
. 5724 . 
5560 
13.8737* 
3.958 
-. 00598 -. 00686* 
. 
0016 . 
0017 
. 89026* 
1.8361 * 1.4546* 1.6512* 
. 
2164 
. 
5397 . 5315 . 
5175 
F 2.76 3.24 2.86 2.76 3.09 3.33 
P-Value (. 0000) (. 0000) (. 0003) (. 0003) (. 0001) (. 0000) 
R2 . 
232 
. 
2619 
. 
2487 
. 
2436 . 2654 . 
292 
Adj. R2 . 
1479 . 
1800 . 1600 . 
155 . 
179 . 204 
LM 1.57 3.86 . 
08 . 
43 . 
27 . 09 
(P-Value) (. 2104) (. 0495) (. 7728) (. 5116) (. 6005) (. 7689) 
HT 6.14 5.97 6.89 5.28 10.32 7.65 
(P-Value) (. 1051) (1129) (. 0755) (. 2602) (. 0353) (17.69) 
Estimation OLS RE OLS OLS 
method 
OLS OLS 
Notes: 
- In all models the dependent variable is the market book value. 
- In each model the first value is the estimated coefficient, and the second 
is the standard errors 
-*, +, ; indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. 
-LM is the Lagrange Multiplier, this test originally created by Breusch and 
Pagan (1980) based on OLS residuals. This test is used 
in this study to compare between pooled regression and random effect model based on Maximum 
Likelihood estimation under the 
null hypothesis the efficient estimators is pooled least Square. 
- FE is the Fixed Effect model; RE is the random effect model and 
OLS is the Ordinary Least Square Model. For comparison reason, 
the F statistic and Adjusted RZ for the valuation models assume the fixed effects in the pooled 
data. 
- HT is Hausman Test to choose between a fixed or random effects specification. 
The null hypothesis is that both the fixed and 
random specifications are consistent and the alternative hypothesis is that fixed effect 
is better estimator than Random effect. Values 
between brackets are p- values. 
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Column 5 in Table 3.5 presents the results of the relationship between the cost 
efficiency measures and market value. The evidence here is consistent with our claim 
that bank cost efficiency significantly affects bank market value and helps partly explain 
the gap between market and book values. When the DEA efficiency scores are used as 
explanatory variables, the coefficient of the efficiency scores (0.89) is positively and 
significantly affect banks market value at the 5% significance level. In addition, it 
provides around 2.3% incremental information to the net income model (model 1). This 
result is inline with previous studies that indicate that stocks of efficient banks tend to 
perform better than their inefficient counterparties in the stock market (Beccali et al., 
2006; Kirkwood and Nahm, 2006). The implications of these results are that more 
efficient banks with superior management shelter banks from unexpected profit shocks 
(see Baele et al, 2007). Accordingly, investors would demand less compensation for 
such behaviour. Improvements in bank cost efficiency appear to be reflected in banks 
market value. Senior managers and investors (as well as regulators) should note that 
improvements in bank efficiency feed through the improvements in the valuation 
process. 
Based on the results of models 6 to 8 in Table 3.5, the importance of efficiency exists 
even when each type of risk (LLP ratio and Z-score) are included in our models. The 
explanatory power reaches its highest level when all variables are included together, as 
expected, and the adjusted R2 equals to 20.4%. This is followed by the model which 
includes jointly the Z-scores and efficiency scores (both deflated by book value in 
model 7), that have an adjusted R2 equals to 17.9 %. These results 
indicate that the two 
variables contribute to explaining the differences between 
book and market values. 
Overall, efficient banks are more capable in attaining a minimum operating cost 
and 
these banks are likely to benefit from improvements in market value. 
From the former 
results we can accept the two alternative hypotheses three and 
four that efficiency 
measures are important in explaining the gap 
between market and book values and it 
stay significant even after controlling for risk. 
We can conclude that if only the 
aggregate financial performance measurement 
(net income) is considered, the 
explanatory power of the valuation model 
decreases. 
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5.4.3 Net Income Components, Efficiency, and Other Variables 
The regression results of the net income components models are presented in Table 3 .6 It can be observed from models 9 and 10 that the relationship between LLP ratio and 
market value is not statistically significant when net income has been disaggregated into 
its components. However, Z-score significantly affect market value at the 1% 
significance level 
More importantly, the test results for the incremental information of the efficiency 
scores over the net income components are illustrated in Table 3.6 (model 11). The 
coefficient of efficiency scores (0.90) has a significant relationship with the market 
value at the 1% significance level. Net income components are significantly related to 
market value. Looking at model 11 in Table 3.6 we can observe that adding the bank 
cost efficiency measure to the valuation model improves the explanatory power of the 
models slightly by around 2%. Additionally, inferences regarding the efficiency scores 
seem to hold significant after considering the additional risk variables. In models 12,13 
and 14) 
In essence, our efficiency measure is value relevant with respect to bank market value in 
both the aggregate net income and the income components models. This conclusion 
supports the fifth alternative hypothesis. While this paper does not specifically address 
whether efficiency scores should be recognized or disclosed in financial statements, the 
result supports the call for greater emphasis on bank efficiency measures as a driver of 
bank value. 
Furthermore, we examine whether the unconstrained valuation models which 
include 
the efficiency scores are superior to each of the two constrained valuation models 
(net 
income or net income components). The incremental information of the cost efficiency 
measures in the net income model (model 5, Table 3.5) 
is tested using the F test in 
equation (19). The results of this test rejects the null hypothesis 
that the unconstrained 
efficiency model is not superior (F= 6.64 " Foos 1,170). 
Likewise, the F test rejects the 
same null hypothesis for model 11 in Table 3.6 where 
the efficiency has been included 
in the net income components model (F= 5.21- 
F0. °5 1,170). Therefore, this conclusion 
supports the sixth alternative hypothesis. 
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Table 3.6 
Regression Results for the Difference between Market and Book Values Based on Net Income, Efficiency, and other Variables: Model 9: MV = +qBJ +czOlt+a3OEXft+a4OTHEX'+ALLPI +e, 
Model 10: MV 
t= %+qBv t+ a201 t+ a3 OEX P+ a4 OT HE X? + ßZ t+ et Model 11: MVt =% +a, BVt +aZOIt +c OEXýt +a4OTHEX7+, g Efft +£j t Model 12: MVt = cý +c BVt +c4Olt +o OEXP+a4OTHEX'+ALLPJý +ßEff +Ejt 
Model 13: MV. 
t =a0 +a, BVt +a201ý1 +a3OEXPt +a4OTHEXP +a51Eff. 1 +a6Z. Jt +e 1 1. T Y .dA_ __ _ 1vloaeL 14: MVji =% +a, BV, +a201jt +a3OEXP+a4OTHEXTP +aS, LLPý +a6Z, t +aGEfft +FjI Model 
BV 
OI 
OEXP 
OTHER 
LLP 
Z score 
EFF 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
. 
4993 
. 
8306+ 
. 1298* -1.7478* . 1055* 
. 
4221 
. 4181 . 
0284 
. 
5537 
. 0287 
-. 997-It 
. 5694 
2.3568* 2.7458* 2.5551* 2.4193* 2.6596* 3.1510* 
. 
8283 
. 
6985 
. 5583 . 7247 5443 . 7245 
. 
4676 -. 1262 -. 8751 -. 9963 -1.0552f -1.9685+ 1.0248 
. 
7665 
. 
6126 
. 
8703 
. 
5989 0.8771 
-4.0294* -4.3725* -3.5395* -3.286* -3.5624* -3.8470* 
. 
9614 
. 
8655 
. 6975 . 8029 . 6788 . 
7874 
1.2610 7.7047* 10.4010+ 
4.4811 4.2739 4.1767 
-. 0052* -. 0049* -. 0062* 
. 
0017 
. 
0016 
. 
0016 
. 
9006* 2.0912* 1.1992* 1.8730* 
. 
2083 
. 5392 . 2231 . 
5224 
F 3.36 4.10 3.71 3.48 4.14 3.98 
(P-Value) (. 0000) (. 0000) (. 0000) (. 0000) (. 0000) (. 0000) 
R2 
. 
294 
. 
337 
. 
315 
. 
313 . 352 . 
356 
Adj. R2 . 
206 
. 
255 . 
230 . 
223 . 268 . 
267 
LM 7.78 6.88 0.13 2.30 
(P-Value) (. 0052) (. 0087) (71844) (0.1292) 
HT 11.10 13.38 12.17 8.83 
(P-Value) (. 0495) (. 0201) (. 0325) (0.1823) 
Estimation FE FE OLS OLS 
method 
. 
03 . 
(0.8659) 
12.53 
(. 0511) 
OLS 
. 
59 
(0.4420) 
13.57 
(. 0594) 
OLS 
Notes: 
- In each model the dependent variable is the market book value. 
-See Table 3.3 for variables definition. 
- In each model the first value is the estimated coefficient, and the second 
is the standard errors for each variable included. 
-', +, 'i indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. 
-LM is the Lagrange Multiplier. This test originally created 
by Breusch and Pagan (1980) based on OLS residuals. This test is used 
in this study to compare between pooled regression and random effect model based on 
Maximum Likelihood estimation under the 
null hypothesis the efficient estimators is pooled least Squares. 
-FE is the Fixed Effect model; RE is the random effect model and 
OLS is the Ordinary Least Square Model. For comparison reason, 
the F statistic and Adjusted Rz for the valuation models assume the fixed effects in the pooled 
data. 
- HT is Hausman Test to choose between a fixed or random effects specification. 
The null hypothesis is that both the fixed and 
random specifications are consistent and the alternative hypothesis is that fixed effect 
is better estimator than Random effect. 
- Values between brackets are p- values. 
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5.4.4. Cost Income Ratio Analysis 
In order to compare between DEA bank efficiency economic measures and accounting 
indicator of cost efficiency in the Jordanian banking sector, we re-estimate the previous 
valuation models by using the cost income ratio to examine if the economic measure of 
efficiency dominates the accounting measure in explaining the difference between 
market and book values. 
The results including the cost income ratio, as an alternative cost efficiency measure in 
the bank valuation models, are illustrated in Table 3.7. This table is divided into two 
parts. Part A (from columns 1 to 4) shows the results from adding this ratio to the net 
income model, and Part B (from columns 5 to 8) discloses the results from adding the 
same ratio to the net income components model. One can see that the coefficient of 
accounting cost income ratio (-0.78) is significant at the 5% level in the net income 
model (column 1 in Table 3.7), although this significancey disappeared when the cost- 
income ratio is included in the income components model (Column 5 in Table 3.7). The 
explanatory power in both cases has not improved substantially, with only slight 
increases in the net income model (14.17% compared with 13.82% for the net income 
model without adding the cost income ratio). Additionally, this modest improvement 
has not been supported with a significant F-test (F= 0.693< F0.051,17o). These results are 
not surprising. The cost-income ratio has incremental explanatory power in the net 
income model because the aggregate value of income may mask information regarding 
bank valuation which gives an opportunity to the cost income ratio to provide additional 
signalling regarding the future prospects of the bank. However, this ratio 
lacks 
explanatory power when it is included in the income components model 
because these 
components may give the investors more information regarding the 
banks operating 
situation. Based on the above results, our empirical findings suggest results 
that show 
that the economic measure of bank cost efficiency (DEA scores) 
is more important than 
the accounting measures (cost-income ratio) in explaining the market value of 
Jordanian 
banks. These results reveal that while accounting numbers 
in banks' financial 
statements have information content regarding 
bank value, non-parametric estimates of 
bank efficiency provide greater information content than simple accounting 
ratios of 
bank cost performance. 
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Table 3.7 
Valuation Models with Cost Income Ratio 
BV 
NI 
01 
OEXP 
OTHER 
L LP 
A- Net Income Valuation Model 
(1) 
. 
9165* 
. 3159 
1.5444* 
. 6238 
(2) (3) (4) 
. 6551+ 1.3643* . 
5220 
. 2772 . 2992 . 0366 2.0743 2.0106 2,3780* 
. 7904 . 
61807 
. 80149 
9.5693+ 10.7948+ 
4.2616 4.367 
B -Income Components Valuation Model 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
. 
08457* 
. 
09774* 
. 
0101 
. 
0997 
. 0400 . 02943 . 0964 . 
0963 
1.7417 * 2.7744 * 2.5863 * 2.8210* 
. 
6229 
. 7713 . 7156 . 
8481 
. 
3930 -1.3764 . 55147 .23 513 
. 
6705 
. 
9041 
. 7303 . 
9499 
-3.0512* -3.628* -4.233* -4.4283 
. 7710 . 8572 . 8859 . 9679 7.3838* 2.6097 
4.3362 4.4988 
Z score -. 0060* -. 0035+ -. 00437 -. 00456* 
. 
0017 
. 00169 . 00165 . 00170 Cost -. 7850+ -. 15604 -. 76925* . 26328 -. 0366 . 5408 . 
2434 
. 1825 income 
. 31443 . 
21926 
. 
2816 
. 
2709 
. 
2529 
. 3668 . 5320 . 
3477 
ratio 
F 2.67 
(P-Value) (. 0008) 
R2 
. 
227 
Adj. R2 
LM 
(P-Value) 
HT 
(P-Value) 
Estimation 
Method 
. 14170 2.88 
(. 0896) 
2.28 
(. 5169) 
RE 
2.31 
(. 0037) 
. 
202 
. 
115 
2.26 
(. 1326) 
5.31 
(. 1506) 
OLS 
3.10 
(. 0000) 
. 266 
. 181 
. 
94 
(. 3316) 
6.95 
(. 1387) 
OLS 
2.48 
(. 0001) 
. 
236 
. 140 1.38 
(. 2393) 
9.20 
(. 1012) 
OLS 
3.37 
(. 0001) 
. 
2949 
. 207 6.91 
(. 0086) 
5.16 
(. 3972) 
RE 
3.18, 
(. 0000) 
. 
295 
. 202 1.96 
(. 1615) 
12.39 
(. 0538) 
OLS 
3.67 
(. 0000) 
. 
326 
. 
236 
5.98 
(. 0145) 
11.70 
(. 0689) 
FE 
>. 49 
(. 0000) 
. 326 
. 
2333 
5.44 
(. 0197) 
13.65 
(. 0578) 
FE 
Notes: - In all models the dependent variable is the market book value. 
- In each model the first value is the estimated coefficient and the second is the standard errors for each variable 
included. 
-*, +, i indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. 
-LM is the Lagrange Multiplier,. This test originally created by Breusch and Pagan (1980) based on the 
OLS 
residuals. This test is used in this study to compare between pooled regression and random effect models based on 
the Maximum Likelihood estimation under the null hypothesis the efficient estimators is pooled least Squares. 
- FE is the Fixed Effect model; RE is the random effect model and OLS is the Ordinary Least 
Square Model. For comparison 
reason, the F statistic and Adjusted RZ for the valuation models assume the fixed effects in the pooled data. 
- HT is Hausman Test to choose between a fixed or random effects specification. 
The null hypothesis is that both the 
fixed and random specifications are consistent and the alternative hypothesis is that fixed effect is better estimator 
than Random effect. 
- Values between brackets are p- values. 
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6. Conclusions 
In this paper several hypotheses have been proposed and tested concerning the value 
relevance of earnings, earnings components, efficiency, and risk. This study contributes 
to the extant valuation literature in two respects: First; instead of focusing on earnings 
as an aggregate number in interpreting the gap between market and book values we 
examine the value relevance of earnings components in bank valuation. Secondly, we 
analyses the gap between banks' market and book values using variables developed in 
the economics literature based on production theory (banks' relative cost efficiency). 
This study is important, because it is one of the few studies that explicitly evaluate 
banking efficiency from a shareholders' perspective. In addition, it contributes to the 
literature that analyses the relationship between bank cost efficiency and stock 
performance in the banking literature. This paper follows the approach adopted by 
Trueman et al., (2000) (based on Ohison, 1995) to evaluate the relation between 
earnings, earnings components and market value. 
The cost-to-income has been traditionally used in the literature to indicate bank cost 
efficiency48. However, researchers have demonstrated that cost efficiency measures 
derived from parametric and non-parametric approaches have advantages over 
traditional accounting indicators (see Berger and Humphrey, 1997). This study 
advances the literature by incorporating DEA bank efficiency measures in addition to 
accounting measures to test whether cost efficient banks are more able to create value 
for shareholders. 
The main findings of this paper are as follows: First, it is found that earnings and its 
components are value relevant and explain the gap between market and book values. 
Secondly, cost efficiency, as an economic performance measure, provides incremental 
information, not contained directly in banks financial statements, to the market. These 
48 Cost-income ratio is computed as the ratio of operating costs over operating income. This measure 
expresses the part of income that is residual after the company covers all operating incomes. This ratio 
is 
calculated focusing on the long-term and, consequently, extra-ordinary costs and incomes are omitted. 
As 
such, the cost-income ratio is calculated as the ratio between operating costs (defined as all 
interest costs, 
commission and fee expenses, administrative costs, personnel expenses and other operating costs) and 
operating incomes (defined as all interest revenues, commission and fee income, 
dividend earned and other 
operating income). A company with a higher cost-income ratio than another company achieves a 
low level of 
residual income and, as such, this company is judged less efficient. This measure 
has the advantage to be easy 
to be calculated and is intuitively simple. However, it presents some shortcomings 
it does not control for 
business mix and therefore may not be an accurate measure for comparison purposes. 
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results support the argument of Dutta and Reichelstein (2005) that stock prices 
aggregates signals received by the market and firm's accounting systems and each of 
these signals reflect management's unobservable efforts). Our findings regarding the 
positive relationship between bank efficiency and market value seem to be in 
concordance with the main findings reported in the literature, (e. g. Beccalli et al 2006, 
and Eisenbeis et al., 1999). 
However, while Beccalli et al (2006) found that accounting measure of efficiency (cost- 
income ratios) had no influence in market returns in European banking, our study finds 
that in Jordanian banking investors make use of accounting-based efficiency in the 
valuation procedure and the cost income ratio appears to be significant in some of our 
valuation models 49. 
Economic estimation of bank's cost efficiency is able to provide more explanatory 
power in the difference between market and book values of Jordanian banks, a weaker 
explanation can be achieved using accounting measures of bank efficiency. It is 
important to note here that the relation between market value and our accounting cost 
efficiency measure (cost income ratio) indicates that individual accounting ratios 
numbers do have information content regarding the bank market value for investors in 
emerging markets (Jordan). However, our accounting ratio of bank efficiency has less 
sufficient information content compared with the economic estimation of efficiency. 
Moreover, credit risk, the probability that a bank's borrower does not have the ability to 
meet its loans obligations, seems to be positive and significant in some of our valuation 
models. This positive sign means that banks with lower credit risks have higher market 
values. We choose loan-loss provisions to measure bank credit risk because we assume 
that banking firm's respond to exogenous sources of credit risk by increasing their 
loan- 
loss provisions. The positive influence of banks loan-loss provision suggests that 
the 
stock market considers the way in which banks manage their credit risks. 
In addition, 
increasing loan-loss provisions appear to be interpreted as "good news" this news may 
49 Beccalli et al., (2006) studied the effect of some accounting performance 
measures ROE and 
income cost ratio on market value without including 
book value in the model. In addition, they assess 
the value-relevance of efficiency estimates running the 
following model 
Rjt-ßo+ßtEjr+£jr 
Where, Rjt is the raw market return of bank j at the period ending at t and 
Eft is the annual change of efficiency 
estimates for bank j at the period ending at t for two consecutive periods. 
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indicate strength of banks future earnings (see Beaver et al., 1989, and Johnson 1989. 
Elliot et al., 1991; Liu and Ryan, 1995; and Wahlen, 1994). 
In addition, insolvency risk is also included in our models, and this measure is 
estimated following Boyd et al., (1993) Z-score. We find that our measure of insolvency- 
risk negatively affect market values. The main interpretation for this negative 
relationship between market value and insolvency risk suggest an inability of market 
investors (in the Jordanian banking sector) to accurately quantify the accurate level of 
bank insolvency. 
The value relevance of banks' efficiency has an important implication for regulators 
and policy makers because it is important for regulators, especially in emerging markets, 
to create an environment that enhances the efficiency and stability in the banking 
system. Using bank efficiency as a performance evaluation measure may improve 
banking systems overall efficiency and stability. In addition, valuations derived from 
market prices can also be more accurate and timely than those derived from standard 
accounting sources and as such further investigation into the determinants of banks' 
market prices can be helpful in assessing the risk of bank failure. 
267 
References 
Adenso-Diaz, B. and F. Gascon (1997), "Linking and Weighting Efficiency Estimates with Stock Performance in Banking Firms", Wharton School Working Paper, 97/21. 
Afriat, S., (1988), "Efficiency in Production and Consumption". In Applications of Modem Production Theory" (A. Dogramaci and R. Färe, eds. ). Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 251-268. Ahmed, A., Takeda, C., and Thomas, S., (1999), "Bank Loan Loss Provisions: An Examination of Capital Management, Earnings Management and Signalling Effects ", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 28: 1-25. 
Aiman A., Omran, M., (2006), "Accounting Information, Value Relevance, and Investors' Behavior in the Egyptian Equity Market", Review of Accounting and Finance, 5: 279 - 297. Akbar, S., and Stark A., (2003), "Discussion on Scale and Scale Effect in Market Based Accounting Research", Journal of Accounting Business and Finance, 30: 57-72. 
Akhigbi, A., and Madura, J., (2001), "Why Contagion Effects Vary Among Bank Failure", Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 25: 657-680. 
Alchian, A., (1965), "The Basic of Some Recent Advances in the Theory of Management of the Firm", Journal 
of Industrial Economics, 14: 30-41. 
Alchian, A., and Demsetz, H., (1972), "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organisation, American 
Economic Review, 62: 777-795. 
Ali, A., and Poe, P., (1995), "The Incremental Information Content of Earnings Funds Flow and Cash flows: The UK Evidence", Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 22: 19-34. 
Al-Jarrah, I and Molyneux (2003), "Efficiency in Arabian Banking", University of Wales Bangor, IEF 
Working Paper. 
Altunbas, Y., Molyneux, P., Murphy, N., (1994), `Privatization, Efficiency and Public Ownership in Turkey - An Analysis of the Banking Industry 1991- 1993, Institute of European Finance, Working Paper. 
Altunbas, Y., Liu, M., and Molyneux , P., and Seth, R., (2000), "Efficiency and Risk in Japanese Banking", Journal ofBanking and Finance, 24: 1605-1628. 
Altunbas, A., Gardener, T., and Molyneux P. (2001), "Efficiency in European Banking" European Economic 
Review, 45: 1931-1955. 
Aly, H., Grabowski, Y., Pasurka, C., and Rangan, N., (1990), "Technical, Scale and Allocative Efficiencies in 
U. S. Banking: An Empirical Investigation", Review of Economics and Statistics 72: 211-18. 
Amir, E. and B. Lev, (1996), "Value-Relevance of Non Financial Information: The Wireless Communications 
Industry", Journal ofAccounting and Economics 22: 3- 30. 
Ang, J., and Clark, J., (1997), "The Market Valuation of Bank Shares with implications for the Value 
Additively Principle", Financial Markets, Institutions and Investments, New York University Salmon 
Center, 6: 1-22. 
Asher, J., (1994) "Can Efficiency Go so Far", ABA Banking Journal. 43-48. 
Baber, W., Kang, S., and Kumar, K., (1999), "The Explanatory Power of Earnings Levels vs. Earnings Changes 
in the Context of Executive Compensation", The Accounting Review, 74: 459-472 
Baele, L., Jonghe, 0., and Vennet, R., (2007), "Does the Stock Market Value Bank Risk", Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 31: 1999-2032. 
Ball, R., and Brown, P. (1968), "An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers", Journal of 
Accounting Research, 6: 159-178. 
Ball, R., Kothari, S., (1991), "Security Returns Around Earnings Announcements", The Accounting Review, 
66: 718-738. 
Ballas, A. (1996) "The Information Content of the Components of Earnings: Cross Sectional Evidence From the 
Ohlson Model'. Paper Presented at the 19th Annual Congress of the EAA, Bergen. 
Ballester, M., Garcia-Ayuso, M., and Livnat, J., (2003), "The Economic Value of the R&D Intangible Asset", 
European Accounting Review, 12: 605 - 633. 
Baltagi, B., (2005), "Econometric analysis of panel data", Wiley & Sons. 
Bao, B., & Bao, D., (1998), `Usefulness of Value Added and Abnormal Economic Earnings: An empirical 
Examination', Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 25: 251-65. 
Barr, R., Seiford, L., Siems, T., (1994), "Forecasting bank failure: A non-parametric frontier Estimation 
Approach', Recherches Economiques de Louvain 60,1-13. 
Barth, M., Beaver, W., and Landsman, W., (1992), "The Market Valuation Implications of Net Periodic Pension 
Cost Components", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 15: 27-62. 
Barth, M., and Beaver, W., (2001), "The Relevance of Value Relevance Literature for Financial Accounting 
Standard Setting: Another View", Journal ofAccounting and Economics, 31: 3-75. 
Barker, R., (1999), "The Role of Dividends in Valuation Models Used by Analysts and Fund Managers", 
European Accounting Review, 8: 195 - 218. 
268 
Barney, J (1991), "Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage" Journal of Management, l7 i 99-120. Basu, S., (1997) "The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24: 3-37. 
Baumol, W., (1959), "Business Behaviour, Value and Growth", New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
Bauman, M., (1996), "A Review of Fundamental Analysis Research in Accounting", Journal of Accounting Literature, 
Bauer, P., Berger, A., Ferrier, G., and Humphrey, D., (1997), " Consistency Conditions for Regulatory 
Analysis of Financial Institutions: A Comparison of Frontier efficiency Methods, The Federal Reserve Board, Finance and Economic Discussion Series, No, 1997-50. 
Beaver, W., and Dukes, R., (1972) "Inter period Tax Allocation, Earnings Expectations, and the Behaviour of Security Prices", The Accounting Review, 47: 320-332. 
Beaver, W., Eger, C., Ryan, S., Wolfson, M., (1989), "Financial Reporting, Supplemental Disclosures, and Bank Share Prices", Journal of Accounting Research, 27: 157-178. 
Beaver, W, Lambert, R., and Morse, D., (1980), "The information content of security prices", Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 2,3-28. 
Beaver, W., and Engel, E., (1996), "Discretionary Behaviour with Respect to Allowances for Loan Losses and 
the Behaviour of Security Prices", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 22: 177-206. 
Beaver, W., (1968), "The Information Content of Annual Earnings Announcement", Journal of Accounting 
Research Supplement, 6: 67-92. 
Beccalli, E., Casu, B., and Giraadone G., (2006), "Efficiency and Stock Performance in European Banking". 
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 33: 245-262. 
Beccalli, E., (2004), "Cross-Country Comparison of Efficiency: Evidence from the UK and Italian Investment 
Firms", Journal of Banking and Finance, 28: 1363-1383. 
Beck, T., Levine, R., and Loayza, N., (2000), "Finance and the Sources of Growth", Journal of Financial 
Economics, 58: 261-300. 
Belmont (2004), "Value Added Risk Management in Financial Institutions: Leveraging Basel 2& Risk 
Adjusted Performance Measurement", John Wiley & Sons. 
Berger, A., (2007), "International Comparisons of Banking Efficiency", Financial Markets, Institutions & 
Instruments, 16: 119-144. 
Berger, A, and De Young, R., (1997), Problem Loans and Cost Efficiency in Commercial Banks", Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 21: 849-870. 
Berger, A., and Humphrey, D., (1992), "Measurement and Efficiency Issues in Commercial Banking" In Z. 
Griliches (ed), output Measurement in the Services Sector. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press. 
Berger, A. Ofeck E., and Swary, I., (1996), "Investor Valuation of the Abandonment Option", 
Journal of 
Financial Economics 42: 257-287. 
Berger, A., and Hannan, T., (1998), "The Efficiency Cost of Market Power in the 
Banking Industry: A test of 
the "quiet life" and Related Hypotheses. The Review of Economics and Statistics 80: 
454-465. 
Berger, A., Humphrey, D., (1997), "Efficiency of Institutions: International Survey and Directions 
for Future 
Research", European Journal of Operations Research, 98: 175-212. 
Berger, A., Hunter, W., Timme, S., (1993), "The Efficiency of Financial Institutions: A Review and 
Preview of 
Research Past, Present, and Future", Journal of Banking and Finance, 17: 221-249. 
Berger, A., and Master, L., (1997), "Inside the Black Box: What Explains 
Differences in the Efficiencies of 
Financial Institutions", Journal of Banking and Finance, 21: 895-947. 
Berger, A., Hasan, I., and Zhou, M., (2006), "Bank Ownership and Efficiency 
in China: What will Happen in 
the World's Largest Nation? ", Available at: htttý 'ýssrn corn`abstract-92426 
"The Globalization of Financial Institutions: Berger, A., De Young, R., Genay, H., and Udell, G., (2000), 
Evidence from Cross-Border Banking Performance", Brookings-Wharton papers on 
Financial Services, 3: 
23-125. 
Bernard, L. (1995), "Earnings Quality, Book Value, and the State of Financial 
Statement Earnings Quality, 
Book Value, and the State of Financial Statement Analysis". 
In S. Butler (ed. ). Earnings quality, (174- 
183) Oklahoma: The University of Oklahoma. 
Bessis, J. (2002), "Risk Management in Banking ", Wiley, New York. 
Biddle, G., Seow, G., and Siegel, A., (1997) "Relative versus Incremental 
Information Content", Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 12: 1-23. 
Biddle G. C., Chen P., Zhang G. (2001), "When Capital Follows Profitability: 
Non Linear Residual Income 
Dynamics", Review of Accounting Studies, 6: 229-65. 
Black , H., 
Fields, M., and Schwitzer, R., (1990), "Changes in 
Interstate Banking Laws: The impact on 
Shareholders Wealth", Journal of Finance, 45: 1663-1672. 
Black A., Wright P., Bachman, J., (1998), "In Search of Shareholder 
Value", FT Pitman Publishing, London. 
269 
Boyed, J., Gragam, S., and Hewitt, R., (1993), "Bank Holiday Company Mergers with Non Bank Financial Firms: Effect on the Risk of Failure", Journal of Banking and Finance, 17: 43-63. Bowen, R., Burgstahler, D., and Daley, L., (1987), "The Incremental Information Content of Accrual versus Cash Flows", The Accounting Review, 62: 723-747. 
Brown, S., Lo, K., and Lys, T., (1999), "Use of R2 in Accounting Research: Measuring Changes in Value Relevance over the Last Four Decades". Journal ofAccounting and Economics, 28: 83-115. Brealey R, and Myers S., (2002), "Principles of Corporate Finance", McGrw-Hill. 
Breusch, T., and Pagan, A., (1980), "the L. M Test and Its Applications to Model Specification in Econometric: Review Economic Studies, 47: 239-254. 
Bronn, C., and Bronn, C., (2005), "Reputation and Organizational Efficiency: A Data Envelopment Analysis Study", Corporate Reputation Review, 8: 45- 58. 
Brown, S., Lo, K., and Lys, T., (1999), "Use of R2 in Accounting Research: Measuring Changes in Value Relevance Over the Last Four Decades". Journal ofAccounting and Economics, 28: 83-115. Burgstahler, D., and Dichev, I., (1997), "Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Decreases and Losses". Journal ofAccounting and Economics, 24: 99-126. 
Callen J., and Morel M., (2001), "Linear Accounting Valuation when Abnormal Earning are AR (2)", Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 16: 191-203. 
Caprio, G., Leaven, L., and Levine, R., (2006), "Governance and Bank Valuation", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3202. 
Carbo, S, Gardener, E. P. M., Williams, J., (2003), "A Note on Technical Change in Banking: The Case of European Savings Banks", Applied Economics 35: 705-719. 
Charreaux, G., and Desbrieres, P., (2001), "Corporate Governance: Stakeholder Value Versus Shareholder 
Value", Journal of Management and Governance, 5: 107-28. 
Cebenoyan, F., (2003), "Operational Efficiency and the Value-Relevance of Earnings". Hunter College 
Department of Economics Working Papers 301, Hunter College Department of Economics. 
Charnes, A.,. Cooper, W., and Rhodes, E., (1978), "Measuring the Efficiency of Decision Making Units", 
European Journal of Operational Research 2: 429- 444. 
Chakravarty, S., Williams, J., (2006), "How Significant is the Unfair Advantage Enjoyed by State-Owned 
Banks in Germany? ", Cambridge Journal of Economics, 30: 219-226. 
Chauvin, K., and Hirschey, M., (1993), "Advertising, R&D Expenditures and the Market Value of the Firm", 
Financial Management, 22: 128-140. 
Chen, S. and Dodd, J., (1997), "Economic Value Added (EVA): An Empirical Examination of a New 
Corporate Performance measure", Journal of Managerial Issues, 9: 318-33. 
Chen, S., and Wang, Y., (2004), "Evidence from China on the Value Relevance of Operating Income vs. 
Below-the-Line Items", International Journal ofAccounting, 39: 339-364. 
Cheng, C., Liu, C., and Schaefer, T., (1996), "Earnings Performance and the Incremental Information Content 
of Cash Flows from Operations", Journal ofAccounting Research, 34,173-181 
Chu S., and G., Lim (1998), "Share Performance and Profit Efficiency of Banks in an Oligopolistic Market: 
Evidence from Singapore", Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 8: 155-168. 
Ciammarino, R., Schwartz, E., and Zechner, J., (1989), "Market Valuation of Banks Assets and Deposit 
Insurance in Canada", Canadian Journal of Economics, 22: 109-127 
Claessens, S., (2006), "Competitive Implications of Cross-Border Banking, " Policy Research Working Paper 
Series 3854, The World Bank. 
Clark, J., (1996), "Economic Cost, Scale Efficiency and Competitive Viability in Banking", Journal of Money, 
Credit & Banking, Vol. 28: 342-364 
Clark, J., and Siems, T., (2002), "X-Efficiency in Banking: Looking Beyond the Baince Sheet, ", Journal of 
Money Credit and Banking, 34: 987-1113. 
Clinton, B., and Chen, S. (1998), `Do new Performance Measures Measure Up? ", Management Accounting, 80: 
38-43. 
Cocheo, S., (2000), "Performance Picture: Avoiding Efficiency as a Religion", American Bankers Association, 
ABA Banking Journal, 92: 58-59. 
Coller, M., Yohn, T., (1997), "Management Forecasts and Information Asymmetry: An Examination of Bid- 
Ask Spreads", Journal ofAccounting Research, 35: 181-191. 
Collins D. and Montgomery, C., (1995), "Competing on Resources: Strategy in the 1990s", Harvard Business 
Review (July-August), 119-128. 
Collins, D., and Kothari, S, (1989), "An Analysis of Intertemporal and Cross-Sectional Determinants of 
Earnings Response Coefficients", Journal of Accounting and Economics 11: 143-181. 
Collins, D., Maydew, E., and Weiss, I., (1997), "Changes in the Value-Relevance of Earnings and 
Book Values 
Over the Past Forty Years", Journal ofAccounting and Economics, 24: 39-67. 
270 
Collins, D., Pincus, M., and Xie, H., (1999), "Equity Valuation and Negative Earnings: The Role of Book Value of Equity". The Accounting Review 74: 29-61. 
Collins, D., Kothart, S., (1989), "An Analysis of Inter-Temporal and Cross-Sectional Determinants of Earnings Response Coefficients", Journal ofAccounting and Economics 11: 143-181. Copland, T., Koller, T., Murrin, J., (2000), "Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies". John Wiley & Sons, Third Edition, New York. 
Crandall, R., (1969), "Information Economics and Its Implications for the Further Development of Accounting Theory" The Accounting Review, 44: 457-466. 
Cyert, R., and March, G., (1963), "A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (2nd ed. ). Blackwell Publishers, Inc., Malden, Massachusetts. 
Damoddaran, A., (2005), "Applied Corporate Finance", John Wiley & Sons, inc, New York, Second Edition. 
Das, S., Levine C., and Sivaramakrishnan, K., (1998), "Earnings Predictability and Bias in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts". The Accounting Review, 73: 277-294. 
Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J., (1981), "Several Tests for Model Specification in the Presence of Alternative Hypotheses, " Econometrica 49: 781-793. 
Davidson, S., (1997), "Measuring Profitability", American Community Banker, 6: 48-50. 
Dechow, P., (1994), "Accounting Earnings and Cash Flows as Measures of Firm Performance: the Role of Accounting Accruals", Journal ofAccounting and Economics, 18: 3-42. 
Dechow P., Hutton A., Sloan R., (1999), "An Empirical Assessment of the Residual Income Valuation Model 
Journal ofAccounting and Economics, 26: 1-34. 
Demsetz, H., (1973), "Industry Structure, Market Rivalry and Public Policy" Journal of Law and Economics. 
16: 1-9. 
Dermine, J., and Hillion, P., (1992), "Deposit Rate Ceiling and the Market Value of Banks: The Case of France, 
1971-1981 ", Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 24: 184-194. 
De Young, R., and Hassan 1., (1998), "The Performance of De novo Commercial Banks a Profit Efficiency 
Approach", Journal of Banking and Finance, 22: 565: 587. 
Docking, D., Hirschey, M., and Jones, E., (1997), "Information and Contagion Effects of Bank Loan Loss 
Reserve Announcements " Journal of Financial Economics, 43: 219-239. 
Dontoh, A., Radhakrishnan, S., and Ronen, J., (2004), "The Declining Value-Relevance of Accounting 
Information and Non-Information-based Trading: An Empirical Analysis", Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 21: 795-813. 
Dontoh, A., Ronen, J., and Radhakrishnan. J., (2007), "Is Stock Price a Good Measure for Assessing Value- 
Relevance of Earnings'? - An empirical test", Review of Managerial Science, Forthcoming. 
Dopuch, N., and Gupta, M., (1997), "Estimation of Benchmark Performance Standards: An Application to 
Puplic School Expenditures", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 23: 141-161. 
Duangploy, 0., Shelton, M., and Omer, K., (2005), "The Value Relevance of Good will impairment Loss", 
Bank Accounting and Finance, 8: 23-28. 
Duffle D., (2005), "Credit risk Modelling with Affine Processes", Journal of Banking & Finance, 29:. 2751- 
2802. 
Dutta, S., and S. Reichelstein (2005), "Accrual Accounting for Performance Evaluation", Review of 
Accounting 
Studies, l0: 527-552. 
Easton, P., Zmijewski, M., (1989), "Cross-Sectional Variation in the Stock Market Response to Accounting 
Earnings Announcements", Journal ofAccounting and Economics, 11: 117-141. 
Edvinsson, L. and Malone, M. (1997), "Intellectual Capital: Realising Your 
Company's True Value by Finding 
Its Hidden Brainpower", Harper Collins, New York, NY. 
Eng, L., and Nabar, S., (2007), "Loan Loss Provisions By Banks 
in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore", 
Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting, 
18: I8-38. 
Eisenbeis R. A., Ferrier G. D and S. H. Kwan (1999), "The Informativeness of 
Stochastic Frontier and 
Programming Frontier Efficiency Scores: Cost Efficiency and Other Measures of 
Bank Holding Company 
Performance", Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper, 99-23. 
Elliott, J., and Hanna, J., (1996), "Repeated Accounting Write-Offs and 
the Information Content of Earnings" 
Journal of Accounting Research, 34: 135-155. 
Elliot, J., and Hanna, D., and Show, W., (1991), "The Evaluation 
by the Financial Markets of Changes in Bank 
Loan Loss Reserve Levels", The Accounting Review, 66: 847-861. 
El Shamy, M, and Keyed, M., (2005), "The Value Relevance of 
Earnings and Book Values in Equity Valuation: 
ernational Journal An International perspective- The Case of Kuwait", 
Int of Commerce and 
Management, 14: 68-79. 
Elyasiani, E., and Mehdian, S., and Rezvanian, R., (1994), 
"An Empirical Test of Association between 
Production and Financial Performance: The Case of 
Commercial Banking Industry", Applied Financial 
Economics, 4: 55-59. 
271 
Elyasiani, E., and Mehdian, S (1985), The Comparative Efficiency Performance of Small and Large U. S. Commercial Banks in the Pre- and Post Deregulation Eras", Applied Economics 27: 1069-79. Fama, E., (1976), "Foundations of Finance", New York: Basic Books. 
Farrell, M., (1957), "The Measurement of Productive Efficiency", Journal of Royal Statistical Society, Series A. CXX, Part 3,253-90. 
Feltham, G., (1968), "The Value of Information", The Accounting Review, 43: 684-696 
Feltham, G., and Ohlson J., (1995). "Valuation and Clean Surplus Accounting for Operating and Financial Activities. " Contemporary Accounting Research, 11: 689- 73 1. 
Ferrier, G., and Lovell, C., (1990), "Measuring Cost Efficiency in Banking: Econometric and Linear Programming evidence ", Journal of Econometrics 46: 229- 245. 
Fernandez, P., (2002), "A definition of Shareholder Value Creation, University of Navarra, IESE, Research Paper, No, 448. 
Fiordelisi, F., (2007), "Shareholders Value and Efficiency In European Banking", Journal of Banking and Finance, 31: 2151-2171. 
Fiordelisi, F., (2005), "Shareholder Value in European Banking", PhD Thesis, University of Wales Bangor, No, 2005: 8. 
Firer, S., and Stainbank, L., (2003), "Testing the Relationship Between Intellectual Capital and a Company's Performance: Evidence from South Africa" Meditari Accountancy Research, II: 25-44. 
Frankel, R., McNichols, M., and Wilson, G., (1995), "Discretionary Disclosure and External Financing", 
Accounting Review 70: 135-150. 
Francis, J., and Schipper, K., (1999), "Have Financial Statement Lost Their Relevance? ", Journal of Accounting 
Research, 37: 319-352. 
Foerster, S., and Sapp, S., (2005), "The Dividend Discount Model in the Long-Run: A Clinical Study". Journal 
of Applied Finance, 15: No. 2, 
Fukuyama, H., (1993), "Technical and Scale Efficiency of Japanese Commercial Banks: a non Parametric 
Approach", Applied Economics, 25: 1101-1112. 
Gujarati, D., (2005), " Basic Econometrics" McGraw- Hill. 
Galluccio, S., Roncoroni, A., (2006), "A New Measure of Cross-Sectional Risk and its Empirical Implications 
for Portfolio Risk Management", Journal of Banking & Finance, 30: 2387-2408. 
Garvey, C., and Milbourn, T., (2000), "EVA versus Earnings: Does It Matter Which Is More Highly Correlated 
with Stock Returns? " Journal of Accounting Research, 38: 209-245. 
Giner, B., and Reverte, C., (1999) "Value Relevance of Earnings Disaggregating in Spain", European 
Accounting Review, 8: 609-629. 
Griffin, P., and Wallach, S., (1991), "Latin American Lending by Major U. S. Banks: The Effects of 
Disclosurees about Non accrual Loans and Loan Loss Provision", The Accounting Revieui-, 66: 830-846. 
Gitman, L., (2006), "Principles of Managerial Finance", Twelfth Edition, Addison Wesley. 
Goddard, J. A., P. Molyneux, and J. O. S. Wilson (2001), `European Banking. Efficiency, Technology and 
Growth' (John Wiley and Sons, England). 
Goddard, J., Molyneux, P., Wilson, J., and Tavakoli, M., (2007), "European Banking: An Overview", Journal 
of Banking & Finance, 31: 1911-1935. 
Goldfinger, C. (1997), Understanding and Measuring the Intangible Economy: Current Status and Suggestions 
for Future Research. CIRET Seminar. Helsinki. 
Golany, B., and Roll, Y., (1989), "An Application Procedure for DEA", Omega, 17: 237-250. 
Gornik-Tomaszewski, S. and E. Jermakowicz. (2001), "Accounting-Based Valuation of Polish 
Listed 
Companies", Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 12: 50- 
74. 
Graham, R., Morrill, C., and Morrill, J., (2005), "The Value Relevance of Accounting under 
Political 
Uncertainty: Evidence Related to Quebec's Independence Movement", Journal of International Financial 
Management and Accounting, 16: 49-68. 
Greene, W., (1993), Econometric Analysis, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs. 
Harris, T., Lang, M.,, and Mouer, H., (1994), "The Value Relevance of 
German Accounting Measures: An 
Empirical Analysis". Journal of Accounting Research, 32: 187-209. 
Hassel, L., Henrik N., and Nyquist, S., (2005), "The Value Relevance of 
Environmental Performance", 
European Accounting Review, 14: 41-61. 
Hatfield, G., and Lancaster, C., (2000), " The Signalling Effects of 
Bank Loan Loss Reserve Additions", 
Journal of Financial Strategic Decisions, 13: 57-73. « 
Hayes, R., and Miller, J., (1990), "Measuring Production Efficiency 
in Non-For-Profit Setting . 
The 
Accounting Review, 65,505-516. 
Hendriksen, E., and van Breda, M., (1992), "Accounting Theory ", 5th ed. 
Burr Ridge: Irwin. 
Hsiao, C., (2003), "Analysis of Panel Date" Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
272 
Holthausen, R., Watts, R., (2001), "The Relevance of Value Relevance", Journal ofAccounting and Economics, 31: 3-75. 
Haung, C., and Litzengerger, R., (1988), "Foundations for Financial Economics", North-Holland, New York. Humphrey, D., (1985), "Cost and Scale Economies in Financial Intermediation, in : R. C Aspinwell and R. A. Fisenbeis, eds., Handbook of Banking Strateg, Wiley. 
Humphrey, D., (1987), "Cost Deispersion and the Measurment of Economics in Banking". Federal Reserved Bank of Richmond Economic Review May- June: 24-38. 
Isik, I., and Hassan M., (2003a), "Technical, Scale and Allocative Efficiencies of Turkish Banking Industry" Journal of Banking and Finance, 26: 719 -766. Isik, I., and Hassan M., (2003b), "Efficiency, Ownership and Market Structure, Corporate Control and Governance in the Turkish Banking Industry", Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 30,1363- 1421. 
Isik, I., Gunduz, L., and Omran, M., (2005), "Managerial and Scale Efficiency in the MENA Banking: A Panel 
Study of the Jordanian Banking Sector", Working Paper, Arab Monetary Funds. 
Ittner, C., and Larcker, D., (1998), "Are Non Financial Measures Leading Indicators of Financial Performance" 
An Analysis of Customer Satisfaction", Journal of Accounting Research, 36: 1-35. 
Jagtiani, J., and Khanthavit, A., (1996), "Scale and Scope Economies at Large Banks: including Off Balance 
Sheet Products and Regulatory Effects (1984-1991), Journal ofBanking and Finance, 20: 1271-87. 
Jensen, M., and Meckling, W., (1976), "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs, and capital 
Structure", Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305- 60. 
Jarrow, R., (1988), "Financial Theory", Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. 
Jobst, N. J., Mitra G., Zenios S. A., (2006), " Integrating Market and Credit Risk: A Simulation and Optimisation 
Perspective. Journal of Banking & Finance ", 30:. 717-742. 
Joos, P., and Lang M., (1994), Supplement), "The Effects of Accounting Diversity: Evidence from the 
European Union", Journal ofAccounting Research, 32: 141-168. 
Judge, G., Hill, R., Griffiths, W., Lütkepohl, H., and Lee, T., (1988), "Introduction to the Theory and Practice 
of Econometrics". Wiley, New York, pp. 468-91. 
Kallapur, S., Kwan, S., (2004), " The Value Relevance and Reliability of Brand Assets Recognized by U. K. 
Firms", The Accounting Review, 79: 151-172. 
Kane, E. J., and Unal H., (1990), "Modeling Structure and Temporal Variation in the Market's Valuation of 
Banking Firms", Journal of Finance 45: 113-136. 
Kaparkis, E., Miller, S., and Noalas, A., (1994), "Short run Cost Inefficiency of Commercial Banks: A Flexible 
Stochastic Frontier Approach, Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 1875-1893. 
Kasznik, R., Lev, B., 1995. To Warn or not to Wam: Management Disclosures in the Face of an Earnings 
Surprise. Accounting Review, 70: 113-134. 
Keeley, M., (1990), "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking", American Economic Review, 80: 
1183-1200. 
Kim, C., and Chung, Y., (1997), "Brand Popularity, Country Image and Market 
Share: an Empirical Study", 
Journal of International Business Studies, 28: 1105-1121. 
King, R., and Langli, J., (1998), "Accounting Diversity and Firm Valuation", 
The International Journal of 
Accounting, 33: 529-567. 
Kirkwood, J., and Nahim, D., (2006), "Australian Banking Efficiency and 
Its Relation to Stock Return". The 
Economic Record, 82: 253-267. 
Kohlbeek, M., (2004), "Investor Valuations and Measuring Bank Intangible Assets", Journal of 
Accounting, 
Auditing, and Finance 19: 29 - 60. 
Kothari, S., (2001), "Capital Market Research in Accounting", Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 31: 105- 
23]. 
Kormendi, R., and Lipe, R., (1987), "Earnings Innovations, 
Earnings Persistence, and Stock Returns". The 
Journal of Business, 60: 323-345. 
Konishi M., Yasuda Y., (2004), "Factors Affecting Bank Risk Taking: Evidence 
from Japan", Journal 
Banking and Finance, 28: 215-232 
Koopmans, T., (1951), "An Analysis of Production as an Efficient Combination of 
Activities, in Koopmans 
TC. ed. Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation, 
Cowles Commission for Research in Economics 
Monograph No. 13, New York. 
Kwan, S., (2006), "The X-efficiency of Commercial Banks in Hong Kong, 
" Journal of Banking and Finance, 
30: 1127-1147. 
Lucas, A., Klaassen, P., (2006), "Discrete Versus Continuous State 
Switching Models for Portfolio Credit 
Risk", Journal of Banking & Finance, 30: 23-35. 
Laeven, L., (2002), "Bank Risk and Deposit Insurance", World Bank Economic 
Review, 16: 109-137. 
273 
Lambert, R., (1998), "Customer Satisfaction and Future Financial Performance Discussion of are Non financial Measures Leading Indicators of Financial Performance? An Analysis of Customer Satisfaction" Journal of Accounting Research, 36: 37-46. 
Lang, G., and Wetzel, P., (1996), "Efficiency and Technical Progress in Banking: Empirical Results for a Panel of German Cooperative Banks. " Journal of Banking and Finance 20: 1003-23. Lee, C., "Market Efficiency and Accounting Research: A Discussion of Capital Market Research in Accounting" Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31: 233-253. 
Leibenstein, H., (1966), "Allocative Efficiency vs X- efficiency" Journal The American Economic Review, 56. - 392-415. 
Lennox, C., and Park, C., (2006), "The Informativeness of earnings and Management's Issuance of Earnings Forecasts "Journal of Accounting and Economics " 42: 439-458. 
Lev, B. and Sougiannis, T. (1996), 'The Capitalization, Amortization, and Value- Relevance of R& D', Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, 21: 107- 138. 
Lev, B., Zarowin, P., (1999), "The Boundaries of Financial Reporting and How to Extend Them". Journal of Accounting Research, 37: 353-385. 
Lev, B., and Thiagarajan, R., (1993), "Fundamental Information Analysis" Journal of . Accounting Research, 31: 190-215. 
Lev, B., Zarowin, P., (1999), "The Boundaries of Financial Reporting and How to Extend Them". Journal of 
Accounting Research, 37: 353-385. 
Levine, R., (2006), "Finance and Growth: Theory, Evidence, and Mechanisms, In: Aghion, P., Durlauf. S. (Eds), 
Handbook of Economic Growth. Amsterdam: North-Holland Elsevier Publishers, PP, 865-934. 
Levine, R., and Zervos, S., (1998), "Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth", American Economic 
Review, 88: 537-558. 
Liang , 
C, and Yao, M (2005), " The Value Relevance of Financial and Non Financial Information- Evidence 
from Taiwan Information Electronic Industry", Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 24: 135- 
157. 
Liedtka (2002), "The Information Content of Non Financial Information Performance Measures in the Airline 
Industry", Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 29: 1105-1121. 
Lipe, R., (1986), "The Information Contained in the Components of Earnings", Journal of Accounting Rexcarch, 
24: 37-68. 
Liu, C., Ryan, S., and Wahlen, J., (1997), "Differential valuation Implications of Loan Losses Provisions across 
Banks and Financial Quarters", Accounting Review, 72: 133-146. 
Lipczynski, J., Wilson, J., and Goddard, J., (2005), "Industrial Organization: Competition, Strategy ", Policy 
(2°d Ed. ). Prentice Hall, Harlow, England. 
Levne, R., (1997), "Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda", Journal of Economic 
Literature, 35: 688-726. 
Loh, R., and Mian, G., (2006), "Do Accurate Earnings Forecasts Facilitate Superior Investment 
Recommendations? ", Journal of Financial Economics, 80: 455-483. 
Lopes, A., (2002), "The Value Relevance of Brazilian Accounting Numbers: An Empirical Investigation", 
University of Sao Paulo, Department of Accounting Working Paper No. 1 
Lou, X., (2003), "Evaluating the Profitability and Marketability Efficiency of Large Banks An Application of 
Data Envelopment Analysis", Journal of Business Research, 56: 62 7-635. 
Lovell, C., (1993), "Production Frontier and Productive Efficiency", In: Fried, Harold O., Lovell, 
C. A. Knox, 
and Schmidt, Shelton S., (Eds. ), "The Measurement of Productive 
Efficiency. Techniques and 
Applications", Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 3-67. 
Lozano-Vivas, A., and Pastor, J., (2006), "Banking Economic Activities 
Performance: An Empirical Study at 
the County Level", The Manchester School, 74: 469-482, Special Issue. 
Matsumoto, D., (2002), "Management's incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises", 
The Accounting 
Review, 77: 483-514. 
March, J., and Simon, H., (1958) "Organizations ". Wiley: New 
York. 
Marshall, A. (1890), Principles of Economics, (8th Edition), Macmillian, 
London, 1952. 
Markowitz, H., (1952), "Portfolio Selection", The Journal of Finance, 7: 77-91. 
Myers, J. (1999), "Implementing residual income valuation with linear information 
dynamics", The Accounting 
Review, 74: 1-28 
McWilliams, A., and Smart, D., (1993), "Efficiency v. Structure-Conduct-Performance: 
Implications for 
Strategy Research and Practice", Journal of Management, 19: 63-78. 
Maudos, J., and Pastor, J., (2003), Cost and Profit Efficiency 
in the Spanish Banking Sector (1985-1996): a 
non-parametric approach, " Applied Financial Economics, 
Taylor and Francis Journals, 13: 1-12. 
Maudos, J., and Pastor, J., (2001), " Cost and Profit 
Efficiency in Banking: An Internacional comparison of 
Europ, Japan and the USA, Applied Economic Letters, 8: 
383-387. 
274 
Megginson, W., Poulsen, A., and Sinkey, J., ( 1995), " Syndicated Loans Announcement and the Market Value of the Banking Firm", Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 27: 457-475. Mensah, Y., and Li, S., (1993), "Measuring Production Efficiency in a Not-for-Profit Setting: An Extension". The Accounting Review, 68: 66-88. 
Mester, L, (1993), "Efficiency in the Savings and Loan Industry". Journal of Banking and Finance, 17: 267 - 286. 
Mester, L., (1996), "Measuring Efficiency in US Banks Accounting for Heterogeneity is Important "European Journal of Operational Research, 98: 230-240. 
Miller, M., and Modigliani, F., (1966), "Some Estimates of the Cost of Capital to the Utility Industry 1954-"", American Economic Review, 56,333-39 1. 
Miller, M., and Modigliani, F., (1961), "Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares", The Journal ofBusiness, 34: 411-433. 
Miller W. (1996), "Bank Failures in Connecticut: a Study and Comparison of Performance". American Business Review, 14: 25- 37. 
Molynuex, P., and Iqbal, M., (2005), "Banking and Financial Systems in the Arab World, Paigrave Macmillan 
Publisher, New York. 
Molyneux, P., Altunbas, Y., Gardener, E. P. M., (1996), "Efficiency in European Banking". John WW'iley, 
Chichester, UK. 
Monsen, R., and Downs, A., (1965) "A Theory of Large Managerial Firms. " Journal of Political Economy 
73: 221-236. 
Morley, M., (1979), "The Value Added Statement in Britain", The Accounting Review, 54: 618-629. 
Musumeci, J., and Sinkey, J., (1990), "The international Debt Crisis, Investor Contagion, Bank Security Returns 
in 1987: The Brazilian Experience", Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 22: 209-220. 
Nearon B., (2004), "Intangible Assets: Framing the Debate", The CPA Journal. January: 34-35. 
Nelson, K., (1996), "Fair Value Accounting For Commercial Banks: An Empirical Review Analysis of SFAS 
No. 107" Accounting Review, 71: 161-182. 
Nikiel, E., and Opiela, T., (2002), "Customer Type and Bank Efficiency in Poland: Implications for emerging 
Banking Market, " Contemporary Economic Policy, 20: 255- 271. 
O'Byrne, S., (1996), "EVA and Market Value", Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 9 116-126. 
Oberholzer, M., Westhuizen V., (2004), "An Empirical Study on Measuring Efficiency and Profitability of 
Bank Regions " Meditari Accountancy Research,. 12: 165-178 
Ohlson, J. and Juettner-Nauroth, B., (2005), "Expected EPS and EPS Growth as Determinants of Value", 
Review of Accounting Studies, 10: 349-365. 
Ohison, J., (1995), "Earnings, Book Values, and Dividends in Equity Valuation. " ContemporaryAccounting 
Research, 11: 661- 687. 
Ohlson, J., and Penman, S., (1992), "Disaggregated Accounting Data as Explanatory Variables for Returns", 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 7: 553-573. 
Osborne, J., (1995), A Case of Mistaken Identity; The Use of Expense/ Revenue Ratio to measure Bank 
Efficiency", Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,, 8: 55-59. 
Ota, K., (2002), "A Test of the Ohlson (1995) Model: Empirical Evidence From Japan", International Journal 
of Accounting, 37,157-182. 
Ou, J., and S. Penman (1989), `Financial Statement Analysis and the Prediction of Stock Returns', Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 11: 295-329. 
Quinn, J., Anderson, P., and Finkelstein, S., (1996), "Leveraging Intellect", Academy of Management 
Executive, 
10: 7-27. 
Park, K., and Weber, W., (2006), "Profitability of Korean Banks: Test of Market 
Structure Versus Efficient 
Structure" Journal of Economics and Business, 58: 222-239. 
Patell, J., and Kaplan, R., (1977), "The Information Content of Cash Flow 
Data Relative to Annual Earnings". 
Working paper, Stanford University. 
Peppard J.; Rylander A, ( 2001) "Using an Intellectual Capital Perspective to Design and 
Implement a Growth 
Strategy: - the Case of APION" European 
Management Journal, 19: 510-525. 
Penrose, E., (1959), "The Theory of Growth of the Firm ", Oxford: Basic Blackwell. 
Penman, S., (2006), "Handling Valuation Models", Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 18: 
48-55. 
Penman, S., (1998), "Combining Earnings and Book Values in Equity Valuation". Contemporary 
Accounting 
Research, 15: 291-324. 
Pfeiffer, R., (1998), "Market Value and Accounting Implications of Off-Balance 
Sheet Items", Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, 17: 185-207. 
Pfeiffer, J., Elgers, P., and Lo, M., (1998), Additional Evidence of Incremental 
Information Content of Cash 
Flows and Accruals: the Impact of Errors in Measuring Market 
Expectations, Accounting Review: 73: 
373-385. 
275 
Pulic , A., (1999), " An Accounting Tool for IC Management" Available Online at http: // measuring -ip at. Quinn, J., Anderson, P., and Finkelstein, S., (1996), "Leveraging Intellect", Academy of Management Executive, 10: 7-27. 
Rappaport, A., (1998), "Creating Shareholders Value", the Free Press, New York. 
Ramakrishnan, R., Thomas, R., (1998), "Valuation of permanent, transitory, and price-irrelevant components of 
reported earnings", Journal ofAccounting, Auditing, and Finance, 13: 301-349. 
Reboredo, J., (2004), "A Note on Efficiency and Solvency in Banking", Applied Economics Letters, 11: 183-185. 
Rayburn, J., (1986), "The Association of Operating Cash Flow and Accruals with Security Returns". Journal ot Accounting Research, 24: 112-133. 
Rees, B., (1995), "Financial Analysis, " Second Edition, Prentice Hall International, London UK. 
Resti A., (1997), "Evaluating the Cost-Efficiency of the Italian Banking System: What Can be Learned From the 
Joint Application of Parametric and Non-Parametric Techniques" Journal of Banking and Finance, 2 1: 
221-250. 
Riahi- Belkaui, A. (1993), "The Information Content of Value Added Earnings and Cash Flows", The 
International Journal ofAccounting, 28: 140-146. 
Riahi- Belkaui, A., (2005) " Accounting TheoryAcademic Press", London. 
Rose, P., and Hudgins, S., (2004), "Bank Management and Financial Services ", Sixth Edition, Irwin, McGraw- 
Hill 
. 
Rossi, s., Schwaiger, in., AND Winkler, g., "Managerial Behaviour and Cost/Profit Efficiency in the Banking 
Sectors of Central and Eastern European countries" Oesterreichische National bank, Working Paper 96. 
Salomon Brothers, (1993), "Cost Management in Global Banking: the Lessons for Low Cost Producers", New 
York, Salomon Brothers, pp2-16. 
Sealey , 
C., and Lindley, T., (1977)" Inputs Outputs and A Theory of Production and Cost at Depository 
Financial Institutions" The Journal of Finance, 4: 1251-1266. 
Seiford, L., and Thrall, R., (1990), `Recent Developments in DEA. The Mathematical Programming Approach 
to Frontier Analysis, Journal of Econometrics, 46: 7-38. 
Schuster, L., (2000), "Shareholder Value Management in Banks, "McMillan press Ltd, London. 
Schroeck, G., (2002), " Risk Management and Value Creation in Financial Institution", John Wiley & Sons. 
Sharpe, W., (1964), "Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk", Journal 
of Finance, 19:. 425-442. 
Sherman, H. and Gold, F. (1985), "Bank Branch Operating Efficiency: Evaluation With Data Envelopment 
Analysis", Journal of Banking and Finance, 9: 297-315. 
Siems, T., (1992) "Quantifying Management's Role in Bank Survival", Economic Review, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas, (January) 29-41. 
Sinkey, J., (2002), "Commercial Bank Financial Management in the Financial-Services Industry", Prentice 
Hall. 
Stikney, C., Brown, P., and Wahlen, J., (2004), "Financial Reporting and Statement Analysis: 
A strategic 
Perspective", Fifth edition, Thomson. 
Sloan, R., (1996), "Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect Information in Accruals and Cash flows about future 
Earnings", The Accounting Review 71: 289-316. 
Sloan, R., (1998), "Discussion of "Evaluating Non- GAAP Performance Measures in the 
REIT Industry", 
Review ofAccounting Studies, 71: 289-316. 
Spong, K., Sullivan, R., and DeYoung R., (1995), "What Makes a Bank Efficient`? 
A look at Financial 
Characteristics and Bank Management and Ownership Structure", 
FRB of Kansas City Review, 
December, 1-19. 
Stiroh, K., (2005), "New Evidence on the Determinants of Bank Specific Risk", 
Mimeo. 
Stiroh, K., (2006), "A Portfolio View of Banking with Interest and Non Interest Activities" 
Journal of Money 
and Credit and Banking, 38: 1351-1361. 
Stewart, G., (1991), "The Quest for Value", Harper-Collins, New York, NY. 
Stewart, T. (1997), "Intellectual Capital: The New Wealth of Nations, Doubleday 
Dell Publishing Group", New 
York, NY. 
Thanassoulis, E., Boussofiane, A., and Dyson, R., (1996), "A Comparison of 
Data Envelopment Analysis and 
Ratio Analysis As Tools for Performance Assessment", Omega International 
Journal of Management 
Sciences. 24: 229-244. 
Trueman, B., Wong, M., and Zhang X., (2000), "The Eyeballs 
Have it: Searching for the Value in Internet 
Stocks, " Journal ofAccounting Research, 38: 137-162. 
Tippett, M. (2000), "Discussion of Estimating the Equity Risk Premium 
Using Accounting Fundamentals". 
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 27: 1085-106. 
Tseng, C., and Goo, Y., (2005), "Intellectual Capital and 
Corporate Value in an Emerging Economy: Empirical 
Study of Taiwanese manufacturers", R&D Management, 
35: 187-201. 
276 
Unal, H., (1989), "Impact of Deposit-Rating Ceiling Changes on Bank Stock Returns", Journal of Honey Credit and Banking, 21: 206-220. 
Van Staden, J. (1998), "The Usefulness of the Value Added Statement in South Africa, Managerial Finance. 24: 44-59. 
Voung, H. Quang, (1989), Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-Nested Hypothesis. Econometrica, 57,307-333. 
Wang, L., Alam, E., and Makar, S., (2005), " The Value-Relevance of Derivative Disclosures by Commercial Banks: A Comprehensive Study of Information Content Under SFAS Nos. 119 and 133", Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 25: 413-427 
Wahlen, J., (1994), "The Nature of Information in Commercial Bank Loan Loss Disclosure" Accounting 
Review, 69: 455-478. 
Weaver, S., and Weston, J., (2003), "A Unifying Theory of Value Based Management", Anderson Graduate 
School of Management and Finance, University of California, Los Angeles, Paper 403. 
Wheelock D., and Wilson P., (1995), "Evaluating the Efficiency of Commercial Banks: Does Our View of 
What Banks Do Matte? " Federal Reserve Bank of ST. Louis Review, July August pp 39-52. 
Wheelock, D., Wilson, P., (2000), "Why Do Banks Disappear? The Determinants of U. S. Bank Failures and 
Acquisitions", Review of Economics and Statistics, 82: 127-138. 
Weissenrieder, F., (1997), "Value Based Management: Economic Value Added or Cash Value Added"", 
Department of Economics, Gothenburg University, Study no. 3. 
Williamson, 0., (1963). "Managerial Discretion and Business Behaviour, " American Economic Review. 53: 
1032-57. 
Williams, M. (2001), "Are Intellectual Capital Performance and Disclosure Practices Related? ", Journal of 
Intellectual Capital, 2: 192-203. 
Williams, J., (2004), "Determining Management Behaviour in European Banking". Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 28: 2427-2460. 
Wilson, G. (1986), "The Relative Information Content of Accruals and Cash Flows: Combined Evidence at the 
Earnings Announcement and Annual Report Date" Journal of Accounting Research 24: 165-200. 
Worthington, A., West, T., (2004), " and Australian Evidence Concerning the Information Content of Economic 
Value- Added, Australian Journal of Management,. 29: 201-223. 
Yildirim, C., (2002), "Evolution of Banking Efficiency within an Unstable Macroeconomic Environment: the 
Case of Turkish Commercial Banks", Applied Economics, 34: 2289-2301. 
Yasuda, Y., Okuda, S., and Konishi, M., (2004), "The Relationship between Bank Risk and Earnings 
Management: Evidence from Japan", Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 22: 233-248. 
Zheng H., (2006), "Interaction of Credit and Liquidity Risks: Modelling and Valuation", Journal of Banking 
& 
Finance, 30: 391-407. 
Züiiiga-Vicente, J., and Vicente-Lorente J., (2006), "Strategic Moves and Organizational 
Survival in Turbulent 
Environments: the Case of Spanish Banks (1983-97)", Journal of Management Studies, 
3: 485-519. 
277 
ý ýv 
.ý 
ý ý 
r-I 
ý 
ý ý 
Cý 
H 
ý 
O 
'ý 
eý 
> 
.ý 
O 
ý 
I 
ý 
ý ä 
ý 
ý Ü 
.¢ 
W 
.ý 
ý 
_ý ý 
ý 
0 
ýö 
ý 
.ý 
rU 
ý 
a 
ýI 
aý' ý 
------------------ 
ý 
ýO oo (r) MMM I- 'Z r- 00 r- 00 d- d JNýD 
xZ 
/ýý ýý ý /ý< /ý/ý /ýti /ý /ýý / /ý 
O, Oý Cý /Oý /Oýý Oý ,. '", ýý 
VN 
ný /ý ný /n ýýV`V'V`ýýýýV'ýY T' ýV T` TýV` cý JJ^ 
rr ---- rti rr - r+ r--+ -------- '-+ 
--- 
ý 
Cý 
ý' dýýýC'Lfý"¢ýCQ 
ý-, . -, ý-, . -ý dd "-ý U -ý 
---------- 
QýQtidd¢QQrýÜQ 
3ý 
: --n "0 
Ü 
"z b Ti U :3 C-d 
'ý ýýý 
t) 
x 
>> 
ýý 
¢ ddýý¢ddddý¢ýdmmmmmmm 
ýý 
c 0 ý c 
C5 O"- NM ^ýý _ý^ 
NNN 
Z --- NM It ýýý 00 ON -ý 
ýÜ 
p 
ý ý 
aý 
bÜ 
teS 
p., 
Cý 
Ri 
ý 
ý 
I 
Y 
i 
ý 0 ý ý 
ýý 
ýö 
ýý 
ý"ýr. . --. 
5ý 
a ýo > "ý H 
ýýý 
_ . --+ -- 
ýý 
-------------- 
ý- '-- . --+ - rrý 
ý r. 
ý ct 1-- ON I-- 00 l-- `U ýr- r- OO Qý O 00 0` O Ný 00 ýt 
ß` ý 
ýý 00 tý CT ýý Cn ý a\ ýOOgý O\ O\ 01 0o CS a, Q< O` G^ Q o0 
O\ 01 clý 01 O, O\ Ot ON 01 O1 OO 
ý<T 
Oti ý O` CT Gr D, O> O` O` 
--r. - . -r - T-. --,, - . --. r-. r.. - . --. - r., r. . -. . __. . -. 
0 ý ýýQýýýýýýýýýýýý 
dd 
ýwM., w 
"ý p. ý, ý aý a (D 
Co 91 
cý 
cý '8 
, r_ b 90 Aý2ý 'Ci 'C3 i9 -0 n. 
g 
.5t; 
Ua 
h2 
9Ng. Q. cd ýa .ýý 6 Uý'ýý 'a ý 
.GZ tnA 9-d-o 
> ý ET 
¢ Aäaäcäýä mm°'ýUýU'ýUÜ2aGlrawwrs. wC7týý7ý7Lýzzz 
9 
gt v) 0 r- 00 vý O-NMe to `p 
r- 00 ýONMv> >^ 
[ý ao 
ZNNNNNNNMMMMMMMMM Mý dd Ct 
ý 
ýýýý 
'ý'+ ''' 
C. (2 
,. ß. 
ý, 
ý 
Cd ß. 
t 
h 
°oa ý oý 
ý ýý 
ýö 
-u 
ý 
.ý'ý ýý 
ý ý 
- 00 
ý1- 
ln 
ý 
r 
M1 
n 
U 
.ý 
Gý 
ý 
ý 
'L7 . dS ý 
.ý on 
.ý .i ý 
§8 
dd 
wý 00 
o0 ti 
.ý II 
Oýý 
Q 
ý 
ý ý 
b17 
M ý, 
ý ýýýýýýý°ý ILý 
LI., wý 01 Q ý 
ý 
V'I 
, ý 
lý oo ýpp vM ý CT D [ý ý o0 
ýýýc"rnall ý 
Z.. 
ý¢ý 
ý 4 ýn%ýý, ýý, ý, ý 
N 
rID ý 
ý 
Q 
C ý U 
xO cn ý 
V] 
-ý bp "ýýý ý 
ý 
"= 
ýýýý. 
1 
Öýýý 
.ýp gýza, 
0. xxV) »>ýý 
ý Cr O --- (--j M d' V') `U [- 00 O> pN Z d'4nv7v>ýnýnýnenvýknvýýýýD 
ý 
ý 
0 
J 
U 
ý 
ý 
I 
. 4-- ý 
ý ý x 
Q05 ý 
ö .5aQ III ' Li5 3 
_ý w=cO 
Gi ý ýC>ýý ýOO L 
bA L, 1J cö ý 
"= .N Li to 
ýp 
10 CO "r 
9 
.roý "- ýý 
L ¢ý ýý Qa `ý. ý 
] 
J 
Table 2 
Studies of the Efficiency of Banks up to 1997 
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Comparing different efficiency U. S. 
techniques or assumptions 
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U. S. 
U. S. 
Spain 
Germany 
U. S. 
Comparing different output measures Norway 
Finland 
Italy 
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Method: 
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SFA 
SFA 
DEA 
SFA 
DFA 
SFA 
DFA 
TFA 
DEA 
SFA, TFA 
DEA 
Authors: 
Berg, Forsund and Jansen (1992 ) 
Elyasiani and Mehdian (1995) 
Fukuyama (1995 ) 
Lozano(1995a) 
Zaire (1995) 
Humphrey and Pulley (1997) 
Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1997) 
Berger and Humphrey (1992a) 
Cebenoyan, Cooperman and Register (1993) 
Barr, Seiford and Siems (1994) 
Elyasiani, Mehdian and Rezvanian (1994) 
Hermalin and Wallace (1994) 
Berger and De Young (1996) 
Mester (1996) 
Mester (1997) 
De Young (1997c) 
Berg and Kim (1994) 
Berger (1995) 
Devaney and Weber(1995) 
Berg and Kim (1996) 
M audos(1996b) 
Berger and Hannan (1997) 
Berg (1992) 
Berger and Humphrey (1992b) 
Fixier and Zieschang (1993) 
Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey (1997) 
De Young (1997b) 
Peristiani (1997) 
Ferner and Hirschberg (1994) 
Wheelock and Wilson (1994) 
Ferrier and Lovell (1990) 
Giokas(1991) 
Bauer, Berger and Humphrey (1993) 
Eiseinbeis, Ferner and Kwan (1996) 
Maudos (1996a) 
Altunbas and Molineux (n. d. ) 
Zhu, Ellinger and Shumway (1995) 
Berg, Forsund and Jensen (1991) 
Kuussaari (1993) 
Favero and Papi (1995) 
Hunter and Tirm-ne (1995) 
Kuussaari and Vesala (1995) 
Rangan, Grabowski, Aly and Pasurka (1988) 
Aly, Grabowski, Pasurka and Rangan (1990) 
Elyasiani and Mehdian (1992) 
Cebenoyan, Cooperman, Register and 
Hudigins (1993) 
Chang, Hasan and Hunter (1993) 
Grabowski, Rangan and Rezvanian (1993) 
Mester (1993) 
Newman and Shrieves (1993) 
Pi and Tine (1993) 
De Young and Nolle (1996) 
Mahajan, Rangan and Zardkochi (1996) 
Battacharya, Lovell and Sahay (1997) 
Hasan and Hunter (1996) 
Elyasiani and Mehdian (1990a) 
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Intercountry comparisons 
Methodology issues 
U. K. 
U. K. 
Tunisia 
Japan 
Switzerland 
Denmark 
U. S. 
Spain 
Germany 
Italy 
Germany 
U. S. 
DEA 
DEA 
SFA 
DEA 
DEA 
DEA 
SFA 
DEA 
TFA 
DEA, SFA 
DFA 
DEA 
Norway, Sweden, DEA 
Finland 
11 OECD countries SFA 
8 developed countries DEA 
Norway, Sweden, DEA 
Finland, Denmark 
15 developed countries TFA 
U. S. 
U. S. 
U. S. 
Belgium 
U. S. 
Spain 
Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, Denmark 
DEA 
TFA 
DFA 
FDH 
DEA 
DEA 
MOS 
U. S. DFA 
U. S. DFA 
Source: Berger and Humphrey, (1997, Table 1) 
Field (1990) 
Drake and Weyman-Jones (1992) 
Chaffai (1993) 
Fukuyama (1993) 
Sheldon and Haegler (1993) 
Bukh (1994) 
Kaparakis, Miller and Noulas (1994) 
Perz and Quesada (1994) 
Lang and Weizel (1995) 
Resti (1995) 
Lang and Weizel (1996) 
Miller and Noulas (1996) 
Berg, Forsund, Hjalmarsson and Suominen 
(1993) 
Fecher and Pestieau (1993 ) 
Pastor, Perez and Quesada (1994) 
Bukh, Berg and Forsund (1995) 
Ruthenberg and Elias (1996) 
Charnes, Cooper, Huang and Sun (1990) 
Berger and Humphrey (1991) 
Berger (1993 ) 
Tulkens (1993) 
Ferrier, Kersterns and Vanden Eeckaut (1994) 
Grifell-Tajte and Lovell (1994) 
Bergendahl (1995) 
Adams, Berger and Sickles (1996) 
Akhavein, Swamy and Taubman (1997 
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Summary and Concluding Remarks 
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1. Summary 
This PhD thesis has analysed three empirical issues related to the banking sector in an 
emerging market. The issues are market discipline, large bank dominance and bank 
valuation. 
In paper 1, we examine the hypothesis of effective depositors' discipline. We attempt 
to answer two initial questions: first, do depositors react to bank risk-taking 
behaviour, and is this reaction affected by financial crises or the introduction of 
explicit deposit insurance? Second, is depositor discipline effective enough to force 
banks to respond to the signals sent by depositors to the market? 
We present evidence that depositors can practice disciplinary effects with regard to 
banks operating in an emerging market. In order to assess if depositors react to bank 
risks in such a way that deposit withdrawals could be considered an action of market 
discipline in the country, we test if riskier banks attract fewer deposits. The null 
hypothesis is that deposit withdrawals and deposit interest rates do not respond to 
observable weaknesses in individual banks, traceable to ex-ante bank characteristics. 
If bank characteristics (measured using CAMEL variables) explain significantly the 
growth rate of real deposits and/ or interest paid to depositors, this will be evidence 
for the existence of depositors' discipline. In other words, we assume that market 
discipline exists if an increase in bank risk leads to a decrease in the supply of 
deposits and therefore, holding other factors constant, market discipline will lead to 
higher interest paid and a lower level of deposits. 
Building on market discipline studies (e. g. Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2001; 
Murata and Hori, 2006; Ghosh and Das, 2003; Goldberg and Hudgins, 1996; Barajas 
and Steiner, 2000; and Park and Peristiani, 1998; among others) we include two sets 
of control variables, first, non-fundamental variables (variables not directly related to 
bank risks such as size and number of branches), and secondly macroeconomic and 
systemic variables (GDP growth, inflation, concentration, cash outside the 
banking 
sector, and US risk free rate). Control variables have been considered 
in testing for 
market discipline, as suggested by Barajas and Steiner (2000), to overcome 
the main 
short-comings of the specifications used in previous market 
discipline studies as 
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additional individual bank variables that should play a key role in depositor behaviour 
towards bank risks. 
A comprehensive panel data was collected from the Jordanian banking sector for the 
period from 1982 to 2005. In order to see if depositors respond to bank risk we 
estimate reduced form equations, in which the dependent variable (deposits, as 
proxied by yearly percentage growth rates in total deposits, and price proxied by 
implicit interest rates which are interest expenses divided by total deposits) are 
modelled as a function of bank fundamentals, systemic and macroeconomic variables, 
as well as other control variables. Furthermore, in order to analyse depositors' 
sensitivity to financial crises, two non-overlapping periods (namely pre- and post- 
crises) have been examined, as well as the effect of the introduction of deposit 
insurance. 
Overall, the estimation results enable us to conclude that depositors in Jordan punish 
banks for their risky behaviour through both withdrawals of deposits and higher 
deposit prices. Depositors seemed to witness a "wake-up call" effect after the 
financial crises (where market discipline effects strengthened). Regarding the results 
of the effect of introducing the explicit deposit insurance on depositors' discipline, no 
clear evidence was found to support that market discipline is harmed by new 
depositors' insurance coverage. This result may be interpreted as a perceived lack of 
deposits protection coverage by the new insurance scheme - that is, the system may be 
viewed as being non-credible. Depositors may have no or little confidence in the new 
deposit insurance arrangements. This view is supported by Marinez Peria and 
Schmukler's (2001) argument that deposit insurance has no effect on depositors' 
behaviour towards risk. Another interesting finding of our study, in contrast to Levy- 
Yeyati et al., (2004), is that we find that macroeconomic variables tend to 
have a 
limited effect on market responses. Furthermore, deposits sensitivity to the global 
market seems to be effective in the post-crises period and this may also 
be limited to 
the economic reforms during the same period and the globalization trend. 
This result 
may signify that external discipline could play a role 
in strengthening domestic 
market discipline in the post-crises period. The limited effect of macroeconomic 
factors on market discipline is supported by the study of Caprio and 
Klingbeil (1997) 
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who conclude that microeconomic factors have played the major part in recent 
banking crises in emerging markets. 
In order to answer our second question we employ Barajas and Steiner's (2000) 
methodology by examining the response of banks to the signals provided by 
depositors. We assume that banks respond to the decrease in deposit growth by taking 
corrective action regarding bank fundamentals. Furthermore, we allow for asymmetric 
responses by banks. In all cases, we find that banks respond only by improving their 
profitability, more than adjusting other fundamental variables. This result may 
indicate (implicitly) that bank managers "gamble for resurrection" generating more 
income for owners which makes them more able to pay higher interest to depositors. 
However, this conclusion may indicate that policy makers and regulators should 
improve bank incentives to improve their overall fundamentals in order to reduce risk. 
Various policy implications appear from these results. Financial regulators could rely 
more on elements of private market discipline as a complement to deposit insurance 
schemes and allow market participants (e. g. depositors) to assess banks' ability to 
absorb aggregate shocks and remain solvent. Furthermore, the results open the door 
for more discussion at the policymaker level in emerging markets as to the relevance 
of greater financial information disclosure (by both market participants and 
regulators) in order to build-up more effective discipline as components of evolving 
regulatory frameworks. Timely and accurate dissemination of information combined 
with greater transparency of reporting and accountability within banks could go a 
long 
way to reduce weaknesses detracting from effective market discipline and 
help enable 
depositors (private participants) to assess banks' ability to absorb aggregate shocks 
and remain solvent. Additionally, it is important to note here that market monitoring 
in emerging markets cannot effectively replace official supervision, 
but that it has a 
potentially powerful role within the overall regulatory regime. 
In particular, it has the 
advantage of exploiting the synergies between supervision and market 
discipline and 
thereby increasing the efficacy of the overall supervisory process. 
Until recently, 
depositor discipline has not grown strong enough to affect 
banks risk-taking 
behaviour. The implementations of Basel 2's new three pillars may provide a 
broader 
role and help emerging markets protect the 
banking system from excessive risk-taking 
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and therefore reduce bank failure'. Finally, debate regarding the ability of depositors 
to efficiently and effectively monitor bank risk in emerging markets due to their low 
level of sophistication is questioned in our findings. We argue that depositors are able 
to participate directly or indirectly to reduce weaknesses of the official regulation and 
supervision of banks operating in such markets. 
Although previous literature support market discipline and argue that holders of bank 
claims are effective monitors of bank activities, so free, unregulated banking is 
practical (e. g. Kareken and Wallace, 1978; Dothan and Williams, 1980; and Calomiris 
and Kahn, 1991), others do not support this view. Diamond and Dybvig, (1986); 
Bryant, (1980); and Chan et al., (1992) contend that some government regulation of 
banks is necessary to protect depositors and counter perverse incentives at distressed 
banks. In their view, bank regulations and supervision are necessary forms of 
monitoring, since depositors are held predominantly by small, uniformed investors, 
implying a collective action problem and the potential for negative externalities 
(Merton, 1977,1978; and Bhattacharya, 1982). Too-big-to-fail is one of the 
mechanisms that permit regulators to foster confidence in the banking system, and 
reduce external effects of a bank's difficulties. Regulators have used their discretion 
to assure the durability of large banks, a form of implicit insurance that is based on 
the assumption that a large bank failure generates widespread negative externalities. 
Proponents of the too-big-to-fail doctrine argue that there is a need for regulators to 
stabilize potentially adverse effects of a negative event at a large bank, which are not 
present when a similar event occurs at a small bank. Therefore regulators attempt to 
enhance welfare by foreclosing the possibility of the failure of a large 
bank and 
therefore reduce systemic risk in banking. Alternatively, Sharpe (1990) and 
Rajan 
(1992), argue that there is no need to provide special protection to 
large banks, since 
effective competition among financing sources minimizes the effects of the 
failure of 
a single large bank. Given the aforementioned conflicting views concerning 
the 
I. Another suggested strategy which may be applicable here is that 
it is worth making banks seek a credit 
rating and make that credit rating public to ensure outside agencies 
that are not supervisors but have 
high skills in risk analysis to give an objective opinion regarding the risk of 
the bank. The credit ratings 
agencies should be authorised international agencies that would suffer 
too much loss of reputation and 
devalued rating if they rated inaccurately and such agencies could 
be used in order to control rating 
quality. 
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influence of large banks in the banking system, it is interesting to examine whether large banks are able to dominate the banking sector and therefore regulators need to 
consider large banks as being special. 
While systemic risk has traditionally been associated with banking markets. the 
growth of securities markets has probably increased their role in the transmission of 
shocks (De Bandt and Hartmann, 2000). Hence, in Paper 2 we analyse the intra- 
industry information transmission associated with returns and volatility within the 
Jordanian banking sector (JBS). In particular, three main questions have been 
examined: (1) Are risk and returns of Jordanian banks tightly linked? (2) Does the 
large bank dominate the returns and volatility linkages in the banking sector? (3) Has 
the 11th of September US event influenced banks' returns and volatility patterns? 
The methodology used in this study includes testing for the return causality and 
volatility spillover between Jordanian banks. Both Multivariate Vector Error 
Correction (VEC) model for testing causality, and Generalized Autoregressive 
Hetroscedastic (GARCH) model for explaining time-varying volatility are employed 
in this study. We use weekly and daily data from the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 
during the period from 6th of May 1998 to 31St of March 2005. All tests are conducted 
before and after 11th of September 2001 to incorporate the effect of this event on bank 
stock prices. Therefore, the sample is divided into two periods. The first period is 
from 6th of May 1998 to 6th of September 2001, and the second periods from 13th of 
September 2001 until 3 1St of March 2005. 
Implementing the VEC model leads us to conclude that return interdependence exists 
within the Jordanian banking sector. However, the large bank proved not to be the 
most influential (causal) indicator for other smaller banks returns. At the same time its 
return is affected by the returns of some other banks in the sector. Regarding the 
ability of the large bank to explain the forecast error variance of the relatively smaller 
banks, its power of explanation does not outperform the power of other small 
banks. 
These results indicate that the large bank failed to be the dominant bank 
in explaining 
stock returns within the banking sector. On the other hand, based on the 
GARCH 
model results we can say that volatility spillover exists between 
Jordanian banks. 
However, a large bank dominance effect was also not evident from these results. 
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Finally, our results find that returns and volatility have been intensified after the 11 `h 
of September. 
Based on these results, we can argue that investors appear to be indifferent to the 
signal quality of information between large and small banks. If the durability r of large banks is implicitly guaranteed by the regulators, then the effect of large banks should 
be modest relative to small banks (Slovin et al., 1999). In addition, other factors such 
as deeper liquidity and greater levels of profitability may play an important role in 
investment decisions and affect return and volatility spillover between banks 
regardless of their size. While this result is not consistent with Lo and MacKinlav 
(1990) it may be in line with Gebka's (2006) suggestion that factors other than size 
might be important proxies for informed trading which may further explain the 
patterns in stock returns. 
This conclusion may have important implications. First, our results suggest that any 
actions by regulators should be directed to industry-wide difficulties or 
interdependence among individual banks rather than large bank-specific idiosyncratic 
problems. In particular, regulators should look for stabilizing potentially adverse 
effects of a negative event at all banks in the system without providing special 
attention to the largest bank. Second, this study adds to our understanding that 
investors and portfolio managers should consider that return causality and volatility 
spillover between banks may be due to factors other than size when they construct 
their portfolios. Third, interdependence between bank stock prices may provide 
investors and portfolio managers important information for their investment 
strategies. Interdependence between bank share prices may indicate that prices in the 
market are not equal in their capacity to discover new information and one stock price 
may serve as a primary asset for price discovery. 
Studies on the stock market have found that market values do incorporate all relevant 
publicly known information (Ball and Kothari, 1994). It may be expected that 
efficient firms perform better than inefficient firms and this 
fact will be reflected in 
market prices (directly through lower costs or higher output or 
indirectly, through 
higher customer satisfaction and higher prices which 
in turn may improve stock 
performance). In paper 3 we attempt to combine the accounting and 
banking literature 
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in order to explore the role of bank efficiency in explaining the difference between the 
bank book and market values. In particular, we empirically examine the following two 
questions: Is accounting information value relevant in evaluating banks in emerging 
markets? Can efficiency (as an economic performance measure) add more 
information in interpreting the gap between the bank book and market values in these 
markets? 
In order to answer the aforementioned two questions, we adopt a methodology similar 
to the value relevant studies in the capital market-based accounting research. Based 
on Ohlson (1995), we used the approach of Trueman et al., (2000) to study the impact 
of accounting (earnings and its components) and economic information (cost 
efficiency) on bank valuation. This paper utilizes the non-parametric Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique to measure bank cost efficiency. 
The main findings of this paper are as follows: First, it is noticed that earnings and its 
components are value relevant and explain the gap between market and book values. 
Secondly, cost efficiency as an economic performance measure of firm success, 
provides extra information, not contained directly in the banks financial statements, to 
the market. Theses results support the argument of Dutta and Reicheistein (2005) 
which indicates that market prices aggregate signals received by the firm's accounting 
system, each of these signals reflects management unobservable efforts. In addition, 
these results seem to be in concordance with the main findings reported in the 
literature, (e. g. Beccalli et al., 2006, and Eisenbeis et al., 1999). Finally we also find 
that investors in emerging markets still make use of accounting-based efficiency 
indicators in the valuation procedure and the cost income ratio appears to 
be 
significant in some of our valuation models. 
The conclusion of this study may provide insights for policy makers and regulators 
concerning the development of an operating environment that enhances 
the efficiency 
and value of commercial banks which in-turn could 
lead to a larger volume of 
intermediation, improved financial services and products, and ultimately a safer 
banking system. 
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2. General Discussion 
Policy makers in emerging markets are faced with increasing globalisation pressures 
and this can have implications for the regulation of the banking system. Increased 
volume and volatility of capital flows, for instance, may endanger the financial 
stability needed for economic growth. The question which arises, therefore. (here) is 
how to adapt the regulatory framework to the increasingly competitive globalised 
environment. Regulators in most emerging markets have been required to implement 
appropriate regulation and supervisory practices in the financial sectors. Therefore, 
policy makers have introduced various prudential and systemic regulations aimed at 
increasing safety and stability. 
Generally, the two main components of the financial system are financial institutions 
(mainly banks) and financial markets. Because emerging markets financial systems 
are typically bank-based (as posed to market-based) regulators appear to concentrate 
their attentions on banking institutions. However, over recent years the liberalization 
trend, financial innovation and integration with the global financial system have 
created new environments for financial markets where banks are more closely linked 
for markets. As a result regulators and policy makers increasingly recognise the 
connection between banks and financial markets and the links to financial stability 
and economic growth. 
However, the evidence of a growing number of financial crises around the world has 
illustrated that the safe and efficient operation of the financial system cannot 
be 
guaranteed by government regulation alone. Therefore, regulators have realised that 
the trend towards market oriented banking operations, and integrated 
financial 
markets require more creative regulation regardless of 
how conscientious the 
regulators, or well intended the regulations. Thus, it 
has been suggested that 
government regulations need to be supplemented by market 
discipline (Kaufman, 
2003). 
The core theme of this thesis has been to explore the participation of 
depositors and 
investors in maintaining overall financial stability and to reveal 
how the connection 
between banks and financial markets can contribute in this track. 
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First, we argue that depositors are the first party who can pursue market discipline 
(monitoring) which can complement rule-based regulators in emerging markets. 
Depositor discipline may be treated as a pressure exercised on bank managers in order 
to push those managers to work in a sound and safe manner. Furthermore, there is a 
general belief that depositors are more able to share the burden of bank regulation 
than shareholders, because shareholders' incentives to increase bank profitability may 
outweigh their desire to decrease bank risk (Tsuru, 2003; and Park and Perstiani, 
2007). 
Secondly, the natures of investors (shareholders) contracts (extra benefits are 
expected from banks' high risk-taking which create strong incentives for managers to 
attain high risk in order to increase returns) has led some researchers to believe that 
investors may be considered as enemies of regulators (Park and Peristiani, 2007). We 
argue that investors can support regulators efforts indirectly towards achieving 
financial stability by inducing bank managers to improve the level of bank efficiency. 
The ability of the stock market to reflect the information content of bank efficiency in 
bank market values will encourage managers to improve the efficiency level of their 
operations because investors may prefer more efficient banks. Hence, this can be a 
potential way to stabilise excessive volatility in emerging stock markets. 
Finally, we believe that the link between banking and financial markets can improve 
our understanding of the behaviour of the banking sector. Some might argue that the 
dominance of large banks over relatively smaller banks (dominance hypothesis) is self 
evident, but what is evident in our results is that large bank dominance 
does not exist 
and other small banks can play an important role in information transmission and 
volatility spillover. Since the stability of financial markets is 
important for the 
soundness of the financial system, it is worth noting that regulators need 
to consider 
the relations between banks in the financial markets and not 
disregard individual 
small bank share behaviour. The results support the view that 
financial difficulties in 
one bank trouble in one bank whether large or small, can easily spread 
to another. The 
transmission of shocks from one bank to another might create 
financial market 
instability during a crisis, which could further spread to the production side of 
the 
economy. 
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3. Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
The main limitation of the study predominantly relate to the small number of banks in 
Jordan and data availability. Although research conducted in this thesis contributes to 
the literature in some ways, the analysis could have been improved were specific data 
were more easily available. The unavailability of bank account details and the lack of 
comprehensive information regarding the classification of insured and uninsured 
deposits restricted our ability to distinguish between the behaviour of insured and 
uninsured depositors towards bank-risk taking. Furthermore, the lack of sufficient 
information regarding detailed bank accounts types prohibited us from examining 
whether depositors react through changes in account types rather than changing their 
banks as a consequence of altered bank conditions. 
In addition, the small number of listed banks made it difficult to undertake different 
estimations of bank efficiency in our third paper as we only use DEA as an efficiency 
estimation technique. Unfortunately, assessing bank efficiency is extremely 
challenging when the aim is to utilise a small data sample as undertaken in this thesis. 
However, one should add that data issues are a common limitation of emerging 
market studies. 
As an avenue for further research on depositor discipline one fruitful area for further 
research could be to analyse the difference between depositors behaviour across 
different types of banks. Islamic bank depositors, for example, may have different 
attitudes towards bank risk compared with commercial banks. Hence, 
it is worth 
widening the analysis of depositor discipline to examine depositors' 
behaviour and 
subsequent Islamic banks response particularly as this type of 
banking business is 
increasing rapidly in Jordan and elsewhere. Finally, the results of the second and 
third 
papers could be further enriched by extracting the analysis to other 
developed and 
emerging markets. This would provide us with the opportunity 
to compare between 
the behaviour of bank stocks in different capital markets. 
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